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THE

THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC,

A Repertory,

CHIEFLY OF FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

A SERIES OF PAPERS SELECTED FROM THE PERIODICAL AND OTHER LITERATURE OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, HOLLAND, ETC.

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I.—BAUR AND THE SPECULATIONS OF THE TÜBINGEN SCHOOL.*

Few men of the present century have exerted a stronger influence on theological science than Dr. Ferdinand Christian von Baur, late Professor of Theology at the University of Tübingen. For nearly thirty years his name has been on the lips of every one in Germany; his works and views have been the center of innumerable struggles; and what has long been true of Germany is becoming equally true of England. There is, therefore, a very natural curiosity to know who Baur was; where he was born and brought up; what was his training; from what school of thought he issued; through what course of development he passed in arriving at the results commonly called the "Tübingen views;" and what were his principal works, their merits, and defects. This curiosity we shall do our best to gratify.

Baur was born on the 2d of June, 1792, in the village of Schmeiden, Würtemberg, not far from Stuttgart, where his father was village pastor. When Ferdinand was eight years old, his father was promoted to the deanery of Blaubeuren—a place in which the son also subsequently held an official position. Even as a child, Baur was remarkably sober and quiet and evinced a strong inclination to intellectual pursuits. He cared little for either playmates or play. He was also very sensitive and shy. Indeed, a certain measure of shyness clung to him to the end of his days. These peculiarities were inherited in part from his mother, whose constitution was marked by a touch of melancholy; but they were fostered also by the simplicity, strictness, and seriousness which reigned in the family. Till he was fourteen years of age his father instructed him at home, but then he entered the school at Blaubeuren, where he remained two years. The discipline at Blaubeuren seems to have been rather like that which used to prevail at many of our English public schools—very severe; and the time the youth spent there proved so painful, that he was greatly delighted to remove to Maulbronn, where the teachers were both more merciful and more skillful. The

* From the *British Quarterly Review*, April, 1867.

public schools of Würtemberg were at that time more like those of England than is at present the case in Germany. Even now they bear the name "Cloisters," and are in reality old Roman Catholic monasteries, which at the Reformation instead of being appropriated by the princes and nobility, as was too frequently the case in other countries, were converted into schools, which were in the main supported by the confiscated revenues. Fifty years ago, too, their arrangements were very much of a monastic character. In 1809, Baur entered the Tübingen *Stift* or Foundation, a sort of theological seminary connected with the University. As this institution has harbored within its walls, at one time or another, some of the most distinguished men of Germany—as, for example, Schelling, Hegel, Baur, Strauss, Vischer, Dorner, and others—it may be well to give here a brief notice of it, especially as its character and constitution have great peculiarities. The seat of the seminary is an old monastery, which at once attracts the attention of the traveller who approaches the town from the river Neckar. The older part of the building was once occupied by Augustine friars; numerous alterations, however, have given to the whole a rather modern appearance. It occupies a fine situation. The upper stories command a glorious view upwards towards the Swabian Alps; and downwards to the rushing Neckar, with its boatmen and raftsmen, between whom and the students a war of words has been waged as far back as memory reaches. The entire building, with the exception of two halls and the dining-room or refectory, is divided into studies and bed-rooms, accommodating from six to ten students each. Between every two rooms lives a young a man called a *Repetent* (literally a 'Repeater,' a sort of tutor), whose duty it is to watch over the conduct, to direct the studies, and spur on the industry of the young men entrusted to his charge. The *Stiftlers*, as we may call them, attend the lectures at the University. They are divided into classes called *Promotions;* and to each *Promotion* are assigned certain rooms, with which, as might be expected, are associated all sorts of nick-names, memories, peculiar customs, and traditions. The *Promotions* are subjected to periodical examinations in philosophy and dogmatic theology by the *Repetents;* every half year an essay has to be prepared, and at the close of the Semester, a special examination decides the position to be assigned to their members. This is an arrange-

ment, as connected with a University, surely well worthy of imitation. The discipline and methods observed at the *Stift*, with their somewhat formal and scholastic character, seem to have suited the constitution of Baur's mind. The industry, thoroughness, and thoughtfulness which marked him as a boy and which his father had not failed to foster, he continued to display as a student, so that when he quitted the university in 1814, he was allowed to be the best informed, and in a scientific point of view, the ablest member of the *Promotion* to which he had belonged. Prior to commencing his university career, his attention had been almost exclusively devoted to classical philology, and even then he had acquired an unusually thorough knowledge of the Latin and Greek languages and literatures. During the first two years the course of study prescribed at the *Stift* includes primarily, philosophy, and, secondarily, history and philology; the last three years are devoted to purely theological studies—also an excellent arrangement. Even at this period of his life Baur is said to have evinced a special liking for those philosophical inquiries into the history of religion and doctrine, which subsequently absorbed all his energies. Plato amongst ancient philosophers, and Fichte and Schelling amongst the moderns, were his favorites. There is also little doubt, that his life-long preference for the historical departments of theology was due in part to the example of one of the then professors at Tübingen, E. G. Bengel, who was the first to introduce church history, the history of doctrine, and comparative theology into the regular University course. The other theological professors, though several of them were men of repute—as, for example, the orientalist, Schnurrer and the two Flatts—do not seem to have exerted any special influence on him; at all events, if we may judge from the interesting chapter on the Theological Faculty of Tübingen, which he himself wrote for Klüpfel's History of the University of Tübingen.

It is customary for the ablest of the *Stiftlers*, when their course is completed, after spending two years in some department of practical work, to return to the *Stift* as *Repetents*. Baur accordingly served two years as assistant preacher in a country parish, and assistant teacher at one of the lower seminaries in Schönthal. In 1816, he re-entered the *Stift* as *Repetent*, but his stay was a brief one. Instead of making the scientific tour,

for which the government supplies the necessary funds to meritorious and promising young men—a tour which is sometimes extended to France, sometimes to England—Baur was compelled, after a short time, to look out for a permanent position. In July, 1817, his father died—he had lost his mother two years before—and five brothers and sisters being left very scantily provided for he, as the eldest, and the only one capable of earning anything, felt it to be his duty to assume the position and responsibilities of head of the family. In consideration of these painful circumstances, and of his own great abilities and acquirements, the authorities did what is very rarely done, namely, they made the young *Repetent*, Professor of Philology and History at the Seminary of Blaubeuren, where he himself had been two years as a pupil. At Blaubeuren he remained nine years, and these nine years seem to have been some of the happiest in his life. He married, while there, a wife in every way suitable to his position and character—cheerful, faithful, practical—by whom he had five children, of whom one died during the first months of its life; the other four outlived their parents. The situation of the cloister, a few miles from Ulm, in the midst of the Swabian Alps, surrounded by the hills, and with its fresh, invigorating air, was admirably suited to Baur's disposition and constitution. One of his choicest pleasures was a long walk among the mountains. In other respects, also, he was fortunately circumstanced. One of his fellow-professors, Kern, became his intimate friend, and the two were in the constant habit of wandering together, over hills and through valleys, freely discussing their plans, and communicating the ideas and theories which engaged their attention. The position did not, of course, lack its difficulties; amongst others, the Ephorus, as the head master is entitled, was a very peculiar and eccentric man; otherwise Baur's relation to both teachers and scholars was an unusually happy one. The department assigned to him was the Greek and Roman prose classical writers; his method was mainly critical and philosophical. For example, in reading Herodotus, he introduced his classes to the higher regions and aspects of mythology; in reading Livy, he discussed the critical problems first started by Niebuhr; in reading Tacitus, he pointed out the marvellous psychological art displayed by that greatest of all ancient historians. Nor did the zeal and love with which he devoted himself to his duties fail of their reward.

He had the satisfaction of seeing not a few of the youths who were brought under his influence become distinguished men. Among them were Vischer, the eminent writer on æsthetics; Pfizer, a distinguished publicist; Zimmerman, poet and historian; D. F. Strauss, and many others. In what estimation he was held by the more talented of his pupils, may be seen from the following words from the pen of D. F. Strauss, in the preface to his life of Märklin, another Blaubeurian:—"As far as the teachers were concerned," says he, "we certainly were fortunate beyond all the other cloister-schools of Würtemberg. For two men like Baur and Kern, each so excellent in his own particular way, and supplementing the other so admirably, can surely seldom, if ever, have been connected with the same institution at one and the same time. They both of them had, perhaps, one fault,—that they took too high flights for us fledglings; that there was too little of the letter and too much of the spirit in their instructions. This, however, arose doubtless, from the circumstance, that they themselves were developing whilst engaged in teaching—a circumstance which not a little heightened the value and attractiveness of their method—at all events, for the more talented amongst us. Themselves scarcely outgrown the age of youth, they made us witnesses to, and partakers in, their own growth, and constituted us, as it were, the companions of their own voyages of discovery. This was specially the case with Baur, who was then journeying without a proper compass, over the vast ocean of mythology, and had already touched at not a few points of the coasts, by whose subsequent more complete exploration he so greatly enriched German science. The life and character of our two teachers, were also such as to exert a permanent and beneficial influence on well disposed youths. Baur, in particular, was devoted heart and soul to learned and philosophical inquiries; he lived for science; other enjoyments than his studies he never sought; in this respect he has always remained for me, and, doubtless too, for others who became more intimately acquainted with him, an ideal. This, his own complete devotion to study, was the root of the only complaint we ever could bring against the glorious man—to wit, that he was unable to understand how young blood like ours could yearn for liberty to play and do as we liked on beautiful summer days. In this respect, his colleague, Kern, was much more to our mind.

Our petitions for more time on Sunday afternoons, or for permission to make longer excursions on holidays, had always to encounter the greatest hindrances from Baur. But as we knew that he expected from us merely a small part of what he was accustomed to impose on and exact from himself, this failure did not permanently interfere with the veneration and love we felt for our remarkable teacher."

We shall refer to his inner development and literary occupations during the Blaubeuren period, when we come to review them as a whole: our intention is first to sketch his outward life. The death, in March, 1826, of E. G. Bengel, his former teacher at the University of Tübingen, and to whom we have referred before as having exerted a strong influence on the direction of Baur's studies, was the occasion of a complete change in the latter's prospects. Baur was one of the first men suggested as a successor to Bengel, and the students at once presented a petition to the authorities that he might be appointed. The Theological Faculty, indeed, refused their recommendation; for they deemed him—and not unjustly—to have departed from the supernaturalistic principles which still prevailed in the teachings at Tübingen, and proposed Steudel instead. But the government appointed him, notwithstanding; and to Baur's great joy, called his friend and colleague, Kern, to another vacant professorship. Baur himself did nothing whatever to secure the position offered him, though it was in every respect more honorable, congenial and lucrative than the one he already held. Indeed, so far from seeking it, he was so fearful of not being competent for its duties, that he actually went to Stuttgart for the purpose of requesting that the appointment might not be given to him; but he was too late. In a letter to a friend, also, he spoke of being oppressed by a distressing feeling of his insufficiency to meet the claims which must be made on him. Once appointed, however, he set to work with all the industry and energy that stood at his command. He entered on his new duties in the autumn of 1826. His principal subjects were Church History and the History of Doctrine; then came Comparative Theology and the Exegesis of the New Testament; and in the third rank, Introduction to and the Theology of the New Testament. He delivered lectures, also, for a considerable time, on Protestant Ecclesiastical Law. When we consider how eminent a rank he held, or was capable of holding,

in each of these varied departments, one of which is enough for any ordinary man, we cannot but express great admiration both for his abilities, his previous acquirements, and his indefatigable industry. In addition to his other work, he also preached regularly once every Sunday, until advancing years compelled him to delegate the duty to a substitute; and from 1837 onwards he was one of the conductors of the Theological Seminary. How he could find time for the numerous books, articles, pamphlets, dissertations, and so forth, which flowed from his pen, and most of which evinced a profound acquaintance with both the ancient and modern literature bearing on their subjects, one can scarcely comprehend; but, in fact, he was intellectually a giant, besides being a man of exceedingly regular and industrious habits. Summer and winter he rose at four o'clock in the morning. During the winter, in order to save his servants the trouble of rising unnecessarily early, he worked several hours in a cold room—even when the cold was so intense that his ink was frozen; at noon and in the evening he regularly took a walk—the only recreation he allowed himself. Strauss refers to the beginning of Baur's activity at Tübingen, in the following terms: "When Bengel died, the theological faculty was not a little perplexed to find a suitable successor; for he was a man who, from the weight and energy of his character, and the vigor and clearness of his intellect, had carried the students along with him. The only other professor who could be thought of was Steudel, and he was on many accounts not eligible. Among the younger theologians of the country, the most prominent in every respect were Baur and Kern, our two Blaubeuren teachers; and despite many a difficulty, the greatest of which arose from their being tainted with the pantheistic philosophy of the day, they were appointed. In their opening disputations they raised the banner of Schleiermacherianism, and thus inaugurated a totally new theology and a philosophical era in Tübingen. From that day, the old Tübingen school, founded by Storr, gradually lost its importance, and at the death of Steudel, disappeared altogether; and the new Tübingen school entered on its active and influential existence. As may be imagined, we old Blaubeurians were greatly delighted to have again as our guides our respected teachers, to whom we had occasionally written, complaining of the dearth that reigned both in philology and philosophy, and we naturally entered at

once into a closer relation to them than the rest of the students. Baur worked his way into the enormous domains of church history and the history of doctrine, with remarkable speed and facility. When I heard him, he was lecturing on those subjects for the first time; and yet even then he seemed at home in all the chief branches."

These, it must of course be remembered, are the words of an admiring pupil; but still they are in substance correct. Whatever our judgment may be as to Baur's principles and results, there can be but one opinion as to the profundity of his learning, and the grasp of his mind, in his own peculiar departments. With a measure of excusable pride, he used occasionally to show to friends the drawers and cases in which his immense mass of extracts from ancient and modern writers was piled up. To his publications we shall hereafter make more detailed reference. Of his outward life little remains to be narrated. In 1839, he lost his beloved wife. In 1842, his two most intimate friends, Kern and the Swabian historian, Heyd, died, and created a gap which was never afterwards filled up. Amongst his former pupils were several who enjoyed his friendship; but with all their veneration and attachment they could not supply the place of those who were departed. He felt himself alone. This feeling was deepened too by the relations he held for a considerable time with his university colleagues, who agreed with neither his philosophical nor his critical principles and results. On the one hand, they deemed him to be an enemy of the faith that he was appointed to expound and defend; on the other hand, he judged them to be illiberal and unphilosophical; and accordingly unpleasant scenes could not but occur. The government also took up, at a later period, a different position with relation to the church and its teachers, and began to insist on the latter being men of substantially orthodox opinions. No attempt, indeed, was made to interfere with Baur; but one of his colleagues was removed because of his theological views; every possible hindrance was put in the way of the appointment of such as were known to be his pupils and sympathizers; and he himself was regarded with disfavor;—reasons enough for a man's being uncomfortable, however learned and philosophical. We in this country should say that, with his critical and philosophical principles he ought not to have remained professor, much less a

preacher of Lutheran theology. But several reasons may be urged in favor of a charitable judgment, both in his case and in that of other German theologians. We regard their position from a practical point of view; they from a theoretical. We judge them as the trainers of the future pastors of a church, with a clearly-defined and fixed system of doctrine, who as such had no right to teach what runs counter to it, or is not in substantial harmony therewith: they consider one of their primary duties, if not their primary duty, to be the furtherance of theological science; they believe themselves to be appointed at the University specially, if not solely, for this latter purpose, just as philologians, philosophers, and others are appointed; and accordingly they maintain that it is absurd to attempt to prescribe beforehand the results at which they are to arrive. If this view of their position be correct,—and whether correct or no, it is in substance pretty widely entertained,—then Baur and others like him, who deviate widely from the belief of their respective churches, are so far justified. This view, however, is certainly an incorrect one; for whilst the professors in other faculties are not pledged to any scientific principles at all, theologians are, if not directly, yet indirectly, pledged to teach in accordance with the creeds of the church to which they belong. One thing, however, is certain,—that whatever the letter of the law may prescribe, custom, usage, allows to theologians a far greater degree of liberty in Germany than it does in England. But if latitude be allowed to the professor, surely the preacher ought to stand firmly in the old paths. And yet both charity and other very weighty considerations compel one to assume that he, like others of his class, both living and dead,—men of the highest honor and of unimpeached sincerity,—believed himself to be capable of preaching all that is essential in Christianity, and that what he assailed and sought to destroy, was but the outward and perishable husk. Willing, however, as we are to allow to charity the widest possible scope, we cannot see how such a belief could be arrived at without a measure of unconscious, if not conscious, sophistry. But this is not the place for a full discussion of this interesting and just now very important question, which is seriously threatening the honor and sincerity of other churches, as well as the Lutheran.

During the latter part of his life, though in other respects strong and hearty, Baur suffered from asthma and sleeplessness

to such an extent that he was frequently kept awake the whole night. But he was not a man to succumb under trifles. For the first sixteen years of his residence at Tübingen, he never once omitted a lecture because of indisposition. In the sixty-ninth year of his age, on July 15th, 1860, he had a paralytic stroke, from which, however, he seemed to recover. But he was unable to resume his lectures at the commencement of the winter semester; and the fears excited by his state in the minds of his family and friends soon proved to be well-grounded,—for on the 29th of November in the same year, he was seized during a sitting of the University Senate, with another and severer stroke, which three days after resulted in his death.

The personal appearance of Baur was dignified and imposing; he was tall and strongly built; he had a noble head; and in later years, when his hair had become grey, or even white, he made a fine patriarchal impression. The estimate given of his character by Zeller, his son-in-law, as well as by Vischer and others, is highly flattering. They attribute to him nobility of sentiment; rich tenderness of heart; scrupulous conscientiousness; unwavering faithfulness to duty; self-forgetfulness; a complete absence of pretense and assumption; openness and uprightness; great readiness to sympathize and help where sympathy and help were needed; unwillingness to wound the feelings of others, even of opponents, so long as their opposition was honorable, but the capability of fiery indignation where he thought he discerned impure, ignoble motives; and finally great tolerance towards those who differed from him. They say that a thorough antagonist was always pleasanter to him than a half antagonist, and that on this account when new appointments had to be made in the theological faculty, he gave his voice rather for the out-and-out orthodox than for those who were neither the one nor the other. In his replies to antagonists, however, and in his treatment of works in defence of orthodoxy, he showed frequently a bitterness which scarcely harmonises with the praise just quoted. His industry was unwearied, his power of work immense, his memory excellent, and his devotion to the scientific investigation of truth, according to his understanding of truth and science, undoubted. At the same time, we greatly question his possession of the qualifications specifically necessary to arriving at the truth concerning Christianity. Like many, if not most German scholars, he lacked at

least two of the fundamental requisites in an historian, especially in the historian of a great vital movement like that of the rise and progress of the Christian church, namely, a large practical acquaintance with the varied modes of action found in free communities, and freedom from preconceived theories. But the most serious lack in him as a Christian theologian, was the one indicated in the following words from the pen of an admirer—words which are apparently true, and are intended to convey great praise: "His was a completely objective nature. No trace of personal needs or struggles is discoverable in connection with his investigations of Christianity. The positive beliefs which he had carried with him from the period of youth he suffered to remain as they were, until scientific inquiry had shown them to be untenable." His son-in-law says, indeed, that with the keenness of a critic who is unconcerned about consequences, he combined the conservative spirit of an historian; that the subject of his inquiries was as sacred to his heart, as to that of the most orthodox of his opponents; and that he hoped rather to reveal and preserve, than to obscure and destroy, the true essence of religion, by freely and critically investigating its rise and history. Hence, it was possible for him, as it was possible for Schleiermacher, whilst with cold-blooded and merciless logic, rejecting one after another of the main elements of orthodox Christianity as received by the church, to preach every Sunday with warmth and earnestness. But it is in a much profounder sense that Christianity must be a vital question to the historian who would arrive at true results regarding its rise and progress. He alone who has felt himself to be under bondage to sin and guilt; who has become conscious of the yearning in our innermost nature after a living God; whose most urgent demand is to know how he stands with his Maker, is competent, other things being equal, to weigh the problem of Christianity: in a word, the key to its complicated wards is the cry of the Phillipian jailor, "What must I do to be saved?" And there seems to be no reason for believing that Baur ever felt the need of a Saviour other than himself.

Considered merely in his professional capacity, Baur may be almost described as a model. His complete and burning devotion to science for its own sake; his profound learning; his own constant growth; his clear, manly, unpretending style and manner of lecturing, with occasional bursts of what approached to elo-

quence; all fitted him to fire his youthful hearers, and give a decided impulse to their studies. And in point of fact, an unusual number of eminent men did issue from his classes. One can only wish that more of them had displayed their ability in combating rather than in supporting and further developing their master's perverse theories and results!

But it is time to take a glance at the course of his development, and at the works which flowed from his pen.

He was brought up as a boy, and studied as a young man, under the influence of what is termed in Germany the old Supernaturalistic School of Tübingen, whose principal representatives were Storr and the two Flatts. This supernaturalism was, in reality, a cross between the orthodoxy of the church and rationalism—a combination of Kantianism and Christianity. For whilst differing from rationalism in the recognition of the Bible as a revelation of truths, which human reason could not discover for itself, and of miracles and prophecy, as the main evidences of the divinity of the Scriptures; it, at the same time, approximated in various ways to that system and to Socinianism, in regard to essential elements of Christianity; as, for example, the person of Christ, His works, the work of the Spirit, and kindred topics. In one word, formally it stood on the side of orthodoxy, materially, in many respects, on the side of rationalism.* Here was not much to satisfy an inquiring and able mind like Baur's; and, as he never tasted what living Christian faith is, his mind soon took a direction further and further away from orthodoxy. During his residence as Repetent in the Tübingen *Stift*, if we may judge from a review of a work on Biblical theology which he then published in Bengel's Archiv, and which was probably his first literary attempt, his point of view was that of a philosophical supernaturalism. The work reviewed was decidedly rationalistic, and Baur defends the doctrine both of the Old and New Testament against its author. As this essay stands out in very marked

* This representation of the older Tübingen School is not sufficiently guarded, and would give an erroneous impression. In endeavoring to establish a purely Biblical Theology, the theologians of this school undoubtedly modified some of the forms of statement in the symbols, but they resolutely defended the essential doctrines of the Christian faith against the fashionable rationalistic philosophy, and stood among the most eminent champions of evangelical truth. The "Biblical Theology" of Storr and Flatt was translated by Rev. Dr. Schmucker, of Gettysburg, and published in a second edition at Andover in 1836.—[Ed.]

contrast to his later productions, it will be well to notice some of its most prominent thoughts. Speaking of the various religions of the world, he says, that though one may allow the existence of a general revelation of God, in various forms and degrees, through reason, there is no good ground for denying special revelations. Whether in any particular case we have such a special revelation before us, must be decided by an examination. He affirms that we have such revelations in the Old and New Testaments. He defends the thorough credibility of the Gospel history, and rejects the mythical explanation of some of its narratives. That such mythical additions to history are possible, he allows; but denies their presence in our Gospels. Not even the existence of important discrepances will he concede. Miracles are no stumbling-block in his way; and he expresses himself utterly unable to understand how any one can throw doubt on the fact of the resurrection, concerning which he speaks in the following emphatic terms:—"So certain as the rise of the Christian church was only possible through the firm faith in the Risen One; so certain is it that this faith could rest on no other foundation than the historic truth of the resurrection of Jesus." What a contrast to his later position! As Semler issued from the Orphan House in Halle, and Kant from a pietistic family in Königsberg, so Baur issued from the old Tübingen school of Storr and Bengel.

The first great revolution in his mental history seems to have been caused by the study of the works of Fichte and Schelling. To the former in particular he was strongly attracted, and he completely imbibed his spirit and method. The two great characteristics of Fichte, intellectual and moral vigor, energy of thought and energy of will, awakened such a response in Baur, that the similarity and affinity between the two became and remained unmistakable. Whilst, however, the former was productive, the latter was more reproductive. Fichte's sphere was speculation; Baur's was the philosophy of history. Fichte originated, Baur applied. Their mutual resemblance extended also to their relation to Christianity. Both alike, whilst acknowledging that our entire intellectual life is moulded by Christianity, that we owe in particular to Jesus that most precious element of our present knowledge, the insight into the unity of God and man, and that the life and words of Christ constituted a new

epoch in the world's history, were very indifferent towards what is commonly called historical Christianity. The idea which lay at the back of Baur's later investigations and made him so indifferent to results, cannot be better expressed than in the words of Fichte :—"If a man be really united with God, it matters little in what way he arrived thereat; it would be useless and perverse, instead of living in the thing, to be constantly renewing the memory of the way by which it was attained." "The metaphysical eternal truth alone gives blessedness; history consists of mere facts, each of which is an isolated and independent whole, and as such, is to some extent one-sided and partial; the individual facts or persons in and by which the truth is revealed and embodied are but transition points, and the eternal word has to be born afresh in every new fact or person." He did not indeed, at once arrive at the position indicated above, for he was a man of comparatively slow growth, and other factors were destined to exert a strong influence upon his mind.

The most important step in his development was the result of his study of Schleiermacher's "Glaubenslehre" in 1821. Indeed, so decidedly did that celebrated system of theology color his mind, that for a considerable period he might have been designated a Schleiermacherian, and was in fact looked upon and condemned as such by the theological faculty of Tübingen. His first great work, entitled "Symbolik and Mythologie oder die Naturreligion des Alterthums," (Symbolism and Mythology, or the Natural Religions of the Ancient World), published three years afterwards, in 1824, bears most marked traces of the change through which he had recently passed. Both in his definition of the essence of religion, as the feeling of absolute dependence, and in his classification of religious systems as natural, positive and ethical, does he betray Schleiermacher's influence. In opposition to the essay previously noticed, he now maintains that there is a revelation wherever the Divine stirs the depths of the human soul in a new and peculiar manner; that the distinction drawn between natural and supernatural revelations is untenable; that history as a whole is a revelation of God, and that, consequently, mythology is one of the links of revelation; and that the difference between one religion and another, between one revelation and another, is merely a matter of degree. But thorough as had been his absorption of the spirit and fundamental ideas of Schleier-

macher's system, the original affinity between him and Fichte, and especially the congruity of the principle above referred to, with the entire tendency of Baur's mind, carried him soon out again beyond his new master. Far as Schleiermacher went in undervaluing the historical and objective, and exalting the metaphysical and subjective, he still assigned to the actual Christ, to Jesus of Nazareth, the central place in his system, and looked upon him as in some sort the full realization of the ideal. Baur, on the contrary, considering the union of the ideal and real, of the metaphysical and historical, of the fulness of the eternal Word with the individual man Jesus, to be an impossibility, charged Schleiermacher with inconsistency, and called upon him to speak openly the truth; apparently insinuating that he had been prevented by fear from carrying out his principles to their legitimate consequences. This evoked a rather bitter disavowal from Schleiermacher, which of course estranged the two from each other. Baur used to remark playfully: "In Tübingen I am accused of being a follower of Schleiermacher, and Schleiermacher himself repudiates me." Zeller, indeed, describes his father-in-law as more Schleiermacherian than anything else, even to the end of his days; but this is not the judgment of others quite as competent to form an opinion; still, though the pupil subsequently went beyond the master, the Schleiermacherian element continued to hold no insignificant place in Baur's mental life and activity. An examination, in particular, of one of his most important works—the Refutation of the Catholic theologian Möhler's work on Protestantism and Catholicism, published first in 1833, and again in 1836—would abundantly prove this; but the limited space assigned to this article prevents our entering into details.

About the time when Baur was, as it were, breaking with Schleiermacher, another bright star rose on his horizon, amongst whose satellites he has ever since been popularly reckoned—to wit, Hegel. The work of Hegel, with which he first made acquaintance, was the "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion," the influence of which is clearly discernable in the reply to Möhler just mentioned. Some of the main ideas of the "Reply" may in fact be fairly described as an amalgam of Schleiermacherianism and Hegelianism, which, as he deemed the two to be essentially one, so far as concerned Christianity and religion, need

cause no surprise. In the full sense of the term, he could scarcely be called an Hegelian; for though he appropriated Hegel's general ideas on the philosophy of religion and religious history, he did so probably rather because they fitted into and formed, as it were, the crown of his previous developments, than as part of their author's entire system. These ideas he himself sums up as follows, in his work on Gnosticism:—"The most general pre-supposition of Hegel's system of religious philosophy is the idea that history is a process by means of which, as it were, God, the absolute spirit, comes to himself and gains the knowledge and possession of the contents of His own Being. God cannot be conceived as a living concrete God without ascribing to Him an inner movement, belonging essentially to His nature; and the finite mind is merely one of the forms assumed by the absolute mind in its passage to the full knowledge and possession of itself."*

These words give us the thread running through all his larger works, without a full recognition of which we shall never understand them aright.

But imperfectly as we have indicated the four great factors in

* These words will look very mysterious, perhaps muddy to some of our readers; at the risk of *darkening counsel with words without knowledge*, we will try to make their sense a little clearer. Every one knows that there is much in a man, in the nature, constitution, workings, contents of his mind, of which he is ignorant. Now, to the knowledge of this inner substance, content of himself, he can only arrive by living and acting; in other words, what is in him comes gradually forth in the history through which he passes, and is thus revealed to him. This is what an Hegelian would term the process mediating between me and myself; the process by which I come into the possession of myself; for, be it remarked, though (excuse, gentle readers, the nearness of a Bull!) I *am* myself from the very first—I never properly *possess* myself till I know I understand myself, that is, till a mediation between myself and myself has been effected. What holds good of us, must hold good of God, says Hegel, if God be really a living, concrete God. It is true He is absolute, infinite; but His absoluteness relates to the contents, the substance of His being, as *our* finitude relates also to the substance of *our* being. He is absolute; He is infinite; we *are* conditioned; we *are* finite. Accordingly, if we were to know ourselves into the remotest and smallest corner of our being, our knowledge would be a finite knowledge, and our spirit would be a finite spirit. But though God *is* absolute, He has not, so to speak, at the outset, an absolute knowledge of His absolute substance or being. This He can only attain by passing through an historical process. This process is the history of the world, and the history of finite minds, i. e., their coming to themselves, may be compared to sparks or flashes of light revealing each to the absolute being something of itself.

Such, at all events, is our understanding of the matter. If we are mistaken, we are not the first to misapprehend a man who is said not to have understood himself.

Baur's development—Supernaturalism, Fichte, Schleiermacher and Hegel—we must now pass to the third part of our task, which is to give a brief account of his literary labors.

We have already alluded to his first important work, "Symbolik and Mythologie," in 3 vols., published in 1824, whilst he was still at Blaubeuren. This has excited less attention than any other of its author's productions; for though evincing great learning, and resting on a more thorough philosophical basis—the fruit of his contact with Schleiermacher—than the extensive book of Creuzer, his predecessor in the field, yet it was decidedly defective and unreliable, owing to its combinations being arbitrary and its etymologies frequently very fanciful. Baur's reading, in fact, had been heretofore too exclusively confined to the writers of Greece and Rome for him to be fully competent to such an undertaking. At the same time, all things considered, it was a remarkable production, and not only called forth warm praise from Creuzer, with whom he corresponded whilst engaged in writing it, but it became the occasion of his being appointed Professor at Tübingen.

Amongst his smaller productions between 1824 and 1833, were articles and short treatises on such subjects as "The Gnostic character of Schleiermacher's System" (1827), "Arianism" (1828), "The Ebionites" (1831), "Andrew Osiander's Doctrine of Justification" (1831); but these we must pass over without further notice. In 1833 appeared his first larger monograph on a subject taken from the History of Dogmas, the work, on the "Religious system of the Manicheans, which sought to show that Manicheanism was in its origin a reform of the religious system of Zoroaster, brought about by the influence of Buddhism, and not, as has frequently been maintained, a combination of Christianity and Parseeism. His next work was one to which we have already alluded,—the Reply to Möhler, entitled, "Antagonism between Catholicism and Protestantism,"—a defence of Protestantism against Roman Catholicism. How Baur, who had meanwhile become in some important respects, pretty thoroughly Hegelian, and must have been conscious that his own heart was no longer in harmony with the creeds of the Church, could undertake to defend such doctrines as original sin, justification by faith, and so forth, is a mystery to most men. Like many of his school, both living and dead, he seems to have believed that his

views embodied the genuine substance of Christianity and Protestantism, and that, so far as he had left or gone beyond the creeds he had merely further carried out and developed their original spirit. Both Möhler's work and his, are theological curiosities, in so far as neither of the authors can be said to have agreed with the doctrinal system they undertook to defend Möhler as well as Baur was in many respects a Schleiermacherian; and the only difference between the two was, that the former had not advanced so far as the latter beyond the teachings of his church.

After this controversial *intermezzo*, Baur returned again to his proper and favorite field, the History of Doctrine. In further pursuing our review, however, we shall, for convenience sake, notice his works, not in chronological order, but in two great classes; first, those relating to the History of Doctrine, the History of the Church, and kindred subjects; and secondly, those of a critico-exegetical character. The one class constantly, indeed, trenches on the sphere of the other; but for our present purpose, the division will be sufficiently accurate. The first work that calls for notice is that entitled "Christian Gnosis; or History of the Development of Christian Philosophy of Religion," published in 1835. Unlike his predecessors, for example, Matter and Neander, who (in their histories of Gnosticism) had limited the term and their attention to the old Gnosis and Gnostic systems, Baur includes the various attempts at a philosophy of religion made by Valentinian and other Gnostics proper, by Clemens Alexandrinus, Jacob Böhme, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and Hegel; and classifies them according to the relation in which they stand, and the position they assign, to the three great religions, Heathenism, Judaism, and Christianity. This work, though its account of Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel in particular, is very interesting and instructive, includes either too much or too little; considered as a treatise on Gnosticism, too much; considered as a Treatise on the Philosophy of Religion, too little; for surely Origen, Scotus Erigena, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and a host of others, may be fairly styled Religious Philosophers. Besides, his definition of Gnosticism, and consequent classification of Gnostic systems, is open to serious objections.

Hereupon followed, in 1838, "The Christian Doctrine of the

Atonement in its Historical Development, from the earliest to the most recent times," and in 1841 to 1843, "The Christian Doctrine of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of God," both works based on large independent investigation, and displaying immense learning, but chargeable with one great defect, namely, that the delineation of the actual course of the history is too much colored by the preconceived Hegelian theories of their author. The spirit in which Baur set about his great task may be understood from the following words, which occur in the preface to the work on the Trinity: "That which exists *through* reason must also exist for reason. Without speculation, historical inquiry is a mere dwelling on the surface of things, and the more weighty and comprehensive, the more closely allied to mind itself the subject of inquiry is, the greater the necessity for not merely reproducing in our mind what the various individuals may have thought and done, but for *thinking out the eternal thoughts of that eternal mind whose work history is.*"

The principal ideas underlying the two works may perhaps be expressed as follows:—

God in his very essence is thought. The fundamental function of thought is to mediate between, to unite, to bring together things that are distinct from each other, to bring to light the inner unity of things that are separated from and opposed to each other. Now, inasmuch as God is essentially thought, there must be distinctions in Him, there must be that in Him which is, as it were, other than He; else His thought will lack an object on which to work; it will lack movement, life; it will not be thought. Hence the first act of God as Spirit is to posit distinctions in Himself. In their first forms these distinctions are purely ideal ones, their objectivity is merely ideal; they are, therefore, at once re-absorbed into the original unity, or rather, being merely ideal, they lack the full nature of what they seem to be. God, therefore, goes on to give the ideal distinctions their completest possible objective reality. This realization of the ideal distinction of God from Himself, is the world—the world of nature and the world of mind. The world is the result of God's going forth from Himself, or rather, it is itself the going forth, the world's history is the process by which God returns to Himself. God, prior to the creation of the world, was the *Father;* God, as His own object in the world, is the Son. God, returning

to Himself in the finite Spirit, is the *Spirit*. This is the Trinity. The history of the doctrine of the Trinity is the history of the steps by which the finite spirit arrives at the full reflective consciousness of its oneness with God; or, in other words, it is the history of the process by which the Father returns out of his self-objectification to full unity with Himself, and thus becomes the Absolute Spirit. In himself, indeed, as to His idea, He was of course, from eternity, one with Himself, just as we are ideally one with ourselves, even at the commencement of the process by which we arrive at the understanding of ourselves by which that part of our being which was at first so completely objective to us as to be thoroughly opaque becomes transparent, and as it were, shares the consciousness of the Ego. Between us and God there is, however, this important difference—that whereas what may be called the opaque part of *our* being is passive, and has to be permeated and possessed by consciousness; God's objectification of Himself, being mind as well as nature, has glimmers of its true relationship, and endeavors of itself to arrive at the reunion which is its destiny. God has, it is true, finified Himself in the world, His Son; but still, even in His finite form, He remains God. In one aspect he is eternally, absolute Spirit; in another aspect, the process of history constitutes Him the Absolute Spirit.

But where, on this theory, shall we find a place for the Atonement? As we have said, the object—God, is the world; and the world is not alone Spirit, but also nature; nay, more—the spirit in the world is in its primary form, finite spirit. Now, so long as *naturality* or finitude cleaves to spirit, spirit feels that its actual existence and its ideal reality or ultimate destiny are disparate from each other; it feels that it is not what it ought to be. This feeling is the consciousness of evil. In other words, man in his present state looks upon God as distant from and hostile to him, and yet yearns to be reconciled. How shall the reconciliation be accomplished? Man must be brought to see that the antagonism has no reality in itself; that the world of which he forms a part, whilst distinct from, is also one with God. A two-fold instrumentality has brought home this conviction to the human mind. First, God appeared in Christ, or, better, the veil that hung between the finite spirit and the infinite was rent by Christ: and in gazing on Christ, men see what God is to them and what they are to Him; namely, that both are essentially and eternally

one. Secondly: to prevent men cleaving to the outward husk, and regarding Christ as an unattainable exception, rather than as a general type, He died. The history of the *doctrine* of the Atonement is the history of the steps by which humanity arrives at the consciousness of its unity with God and at peace, or rather it is one aspect of the great process by which God is, as it were, reconciled with Himself. Our readers must forgive us if they find the above account of the Hegelian or Baurian Trinity and Atonement unintelligible. It is no easy task to clothe subtle speculations, which seem totally opposed to common sense, in a language like ours which is prëeminently that of common sense. But we must now hurry forward with our review of the productions of this fertile but misguided mind.

In 1847, Baur published a "Handbook of the History of Christian doctrine;" in 1852, the "Epochs in the mode of uniting Church History,"—a critical review of the method and spirit of his principal predecessors in the field, and a justification of his own principles. In 1853 he commenced an extensive work, intended to embrace the entire history of the Church down to the present day, with the volume entitled, "Christianity and the Christian Church during the first three centuries;" but he did not live to complete his plan. The first volume contains an excellent summary of the results of his own investigations into the rise of Christianity," the last a remarkable clear account of the struggles in Germany during the present century. The whole is well written, though it ought, of course, to be read *cum grano salis*. Since his death there have been published "Lectures on the Theology of the New Testament," also a clear and instructive outline of the Tübingen view on this subject, but valuable almost solely on this ground; for such a position as, that "Jesus designated Himself the Son of God solely because he was conscious of possessing a perfect knowledge of, and of having perfectly realized the moral law," will scarcely be counted a piece of *New Testament Theology*. Between 1832 and 1851 there appeared a considerable number of miscellaneous essays and brief treatises on subjects such as the following:—"Apollonius of Tyana," "The Christian Element in Plato; or Socrates and Christ." "Seneca and Paul," "Montanism," "The Origin of the Episcopate," "The Apostolic Constitutions," "The Ignatian Epistles," and so forth; all which, whilst displaying great acuteness and

learning, are open to the blame which we spoke of as merited by his larger historical works—the blame of sacrificing too much to a theory.

We will now turn our attention to the works and treatises which we have classed as critico-exegetical, and in which he expounded his peculiar views regarding the rise of Christianity and the New Testament writings. It will simplify matters, and enable our readers to form a clearer idea of Baur's position, if we first enumerate the treatises, and then briefly sum up his entire hypothesis of the origin of the Christian Church. We will first, however, refer to a very long article which appeared in the fourth number of the Tübingen *Zeitschrift* for 1831, which was headed, "The Christ party in Corinth; the Antagonism between the Christianity of Peter and Paul in the Early Church; the Apostle Peter in Rome." In 1 Corinthians i: 12, we read "Now this I say, that every one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas; *and I of Christ.*" What the party could be which called itself "of Christ," seeing that they all clave to Christ in cleaving to Peter, or Paul, or Apollos, has always been a difficulty, and a great variety of explanations have been adopted.* Baur takes the following view of the matter: As the Paulines and Apollines must have been substantially one, so there could be no essential difference between the Cephas party and the Christ party. The members called themselves after Peter, because Peter was the first among Jewish Apostles; they called themselves after Christ, because they deemed a direct connection with Christ to be the chief mark of a genuine Apostle. Paul, on the contrary, not having been personally associated with Christ, they refused to treat as equal to the rest. The aim of the essay is to show, from the entire substance of the two Epistles to the Corinthians, and from the character of their controversial portions, that Paul had to do

* Storr supposed it to consist of such as held to James, "the Lord's brother," and therefore deemed themselves to stand nearer to Christ than Peter's party. This opinion was followed by Flatt, Bertholdt, Hug, and others. Another opinion is that they were the neutrals, who said *we* are *Christ's*, and neither Pauline, Petrine, nor Apolline. Neander supposes them to have been Christians, who were puffed up, and regarded themselves as Christians *par excellence*. A fourth opinion is that there were properly but two parties, the Pauline or Apolline, and the Petrine or Christine; the latter Judaizing Christians. With slight modifications, this is Baur's view, though he arrives at it by a different route.

with an influential Jewish party, which, sheltering itself behind the names of the Palestine Apostles, called in question his own authority, and sought to substitute a Judaizing, particularistic Christianity for the universalistic Gospel proclaimed by him. He then follows out what he considers to be the traces of the existence and influence of this party in Papias, Hegesippus, and above all, in the Clementine Homilies, whose Simon Magus he maintains to be in reality a mask for the Apostle Paul. Here then, we have the key-note of all Baur's subsequent productions in this department.

This, as we have said, was in 1831. At that time, however, he was far from having arrived at the results which he subsequently adopted; for several books and parts of books of the New Testament—for example, the 1st Epistle of Peter, the genuineness of which he afterwards questioned—were still accepted. But the genius of his entire theory are contained in the article in question.

In a series of books and articles, the principal of which are "The so-called Pastoral Epistles" (1835); "The Design and Occasion of the Epistle to the Romans" (1836); "Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ" (1845—a new edition has recently been published); "Critical Enquiry into the Canonical Gospels" (1847); "The Gospel of Mark" (1851); he gradually unfolded his new construction of the rise and early history of Christianity and the Church, the main features of which we now propose to sketch. We may premise that in his view the only books of the New Testament really written by their professed writers, are Paul's Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, and John's Apocalypse. All the rest were the production of different men and of a different time from those commonly assigned.

The great aim of Baur's later theological life was to explain the rise of the Christian Church without admitting a supernatural cause, without miracles; not without the *belief* in miracles, but without actual miracles. He views Christianity as an historical phenomenon, owing its existence, and subjected in its progress, to the laws which are commonly considered to hold sway over other historical events. As a general rule, every educated man now would say, if he read in an ordinary history—say the history of Rome, or China, or India—that a particular change had been brought about by miracles, this is a mere story or myth.

Baur treats the New Testament accounts of miracles in the same way. But so remarkable a revolution must necessarily have had profound and far-reaching causes of some kind or other. What were they? If we carefully survey the age at which Christianity arose, we shall find various tendencies at work which so remarkably prepare the way for, and to a certain extent anticipate, some essential elements of Christianity, and of which Christianity seems so entirely to be, as it were, the realization and higher unity, that the question at once suggests itself, might not some merely natural agency, some agency apparently very inadequate when looked at in the light of subsequent history, have been capable of bringing about a combination of these elements, and of thus inaugurating the greatest of all revolutions? A grand characteristic of Christianity is its universalism. Now remarkably enough, at the era of its rise, an universal empire had just come into existence, through whose influence, and that of the culture everywhere diffused by the Greeks, the limits separating nation from nation had begun to be broken down, and a general approximation to be effected. The universalism of Christianity could never have found the recognition it did, had it not had for its forerunner this political universalism. This is one point. But we may go further. Wherein consists the universalism of Christianity? In its spiritual character—in its being far freer from anything merely external, sensuous, material, than any other religion; in its recognizing no other worship, but the "worship in spirit and in truth." Now, do we find elements waiting, as it were, to converge and debouch in such a religion? And if so, what were they? They were both negative and positive. On the one hand, Heathenism and Judaism were falling to pieces; falling to pieces, however, as the old leaves fall off when the new buds and shoots begin to expand, because something higher was pushing them aside. On the other hand, the philosophy of Greece, with its truer and loftier ideas of deity, virtue, man, nature, but especially with its injunctions to man to know himself, to enter into himself—and Judaism with its Alexandrines, Essenes, Therapeuts—what were they but anticipations of the most essential elements of Christianity, of the very elements which constitute its universalistic character?

"We are warranted, therefore," says Baur, "nay, more, we are compelled to conclude that Christianity contains, in reality, nothing

which was not conditioned by a previous series of causes and effects; nothing that had not been long in different ways prepared and conducted onwards to the stage of development at which we find it in Christianity; nothing that had not already previously secured recognition as a result of rational thought, as a need of the human heart, as a requirement of the moral consciousness. We cannot, therefore, be surprised to find that that which had long, and in such various ways, been the goal of all rational efforts, and which had been more and more clearly recognized by the human mind as its own most essential substance, should at last express itself in the most simple, the purest, the most natural form—to wit, in Christianity."

But if the entire significance of Christianity concentrates, as it justly seems to do, in the person and work of its founder, the above considerations do little to explain either its nature, its rise, or its progress. We must, therefore, turn our attention to Him; we must ask, what was this Jesus of Nazareth, who originated this grand movement?

This question naturally suggests an examination of the sources of our knowledge of the person of Christ—to wit, primarily, the Gospels. One thing is certain, (maintains Baur), that the Synoptic Gospels and John present two totally different pictures of Christ. Now, the Christ of John is a so thoroughly supernatural being that if we accept his gospel at all, we must accept it even at the expense of the authority of the other three, and we must give up all attempts to find an *historical*, as opposed to a miraculous explanation of Christianity.* But neither this Gospel, nor the other three, can be regarded as purely historical works. † Mark

* Baur uses the word "historical" in a purely arbitrary manner. It is ordinarily applied to events, whatever the events may be. Whether an event has a miraculous or a natural *cause* we do not ask; but simply was it an event, did it really take place? He and his school, however, maintain that history is an unbroken chain of causes and effects, not one of which is superhuman, or as we commonly, though inaccurately say, *supernatural*. And having laid down this premise, they deduce the sound conclusion that the Gospel narratives cannot be historical, because they report superhuman events and acts. None of them, however, ever condescend to show why a narrative of human events in their inner and outer connection and significance—which is what we usually understand by history—should not include superhuman events. The ultimate root of this definition is the conception of history as the process of Divine life, to which we referred above.

† It is scarcely necessary to warn our readers that we can only give a very bare account of results, and must omit entirely details and connecting links. We shall refer again to the character and position of the Gospel of John.

is in no case an independent authority; Luke's Gospel was written in the interest of Paulinism; and Matthew's is relatively the least corrupted, the most reliable of all; though even in it we must draw a careful distinction between narrative and discourse. The discourses reported by Matthew give the truest representation of primitive Christianity, and in them it is *not the person that gives significance to the words, but the words to the person.* Now the real teachings of Jesus in the sermon on the Mount, in the parables and elsewhere, contain nothing but what has a purely moral tendency and aims to direct man's thoughts to his own moral and religious nature, to show him that he only needs to become fully aware of that which his own consciousness declares to be his highest moral task, in order to be able to realize it. Faith in the person of Jesus is not set forth as an essential condition of the new relationship into which man is brought by him to God. This is one of the grand differences between John and Matthew.

But was this all? How came, then, Jesus to have assigned to him a rôle of such magnitude? These teachings, though ever so pure in themselves, and given to ever so ripe hearers, would have made little impression unless something concrete had been added, on which the popular mind could lay hold; in other words, unless a special significance had attached to the person of Jesus. Wherein consisted this significance? It was the appropriation by Jesus of the idea of the Messiah, with its most truly national character, that gave the spiritual substance of Christianity the concreteness it required, and made the faith in His person the power it became. That he recognized Himself as such is clear, especially from His resolution, notwithstanding the opposition He had hitherto encountered, to leave Galilee for Jerusalem—a step which could only have been dictated by the conviction that the time had arrived when His teachings and person must either be rejected or accepted; when the nation must decide between their old particularistic Jewish Messiah, and the Messiah embodied in His own life and activity. The nation's answer, according to Baur, was His crucifixion. As long as Jesus lived it was very possible that He might continue to be regarded and followed as the Messiah, even by those whose conception of the Messiah was still of the old stamp; but once put to death—especially to the death of the cross, there was henceforth no other alternative than either totally

to reject His claims to the Messiahship, or to accept Him as Messiah in His own sense, and thus break altogether with Judaism. His disciples, much as they loved their master, intense as was their veneration for Him, powerful as the impression was which he had made upon their minds, felt His death to be a severe blow—a blow under which they sorely reeled. And who knows if they would ever have recovered themselves; who knows but that they would have soon relapsed either into their old Judaism, or into what was still worse, the indifference of hopelessness, had not the belief taken possession of them—"The Lord has risen; the Lord has ascended on high; the Lord will come again in the clouds to assume the kingdom He seemed to have lost; His death was the path to victory." How they came to believe in the resurrection of Christ we are now unable to say; all that we are concerned about is the *fact of their belief*. The resurrection itself would be a miracle; and as we are seeking to construct the history without miracles, and as the reasons for asserting that the belief could not have arisen independently of the fact are not such as to warrant us in accepting the mere belief as satisfactory evidence of the reality of the fact, we must relegate the stories about the risen Jesus to the sphere of myths.

Such were the beginnings of the new movement. Let us now see what account Baur gives of its further progress. According to him the immediate disciples of Jesus unquestionably regarded their new faith as the perfection, not as the renunciation of the old; they had no notion of ceasing to be Jews, and wished to limit Christian fellowship either to their own countrymen, or to such as were ready to undergo circumcision; they deemed themselves bound to the prescriptions of the Mosaic law; they looked on Jesus as the Messiah of the Jews, and not as the founder of a new religion destined to embrace, without distinction, both Heathens and Jews. In a word, the chief difference between them and the rest of their nation was, that they believed in a Messiah who had come, the latter still expected him; they believed in a spiritual Messiah, the latter looked for a political redeemer.

As the account of Stephen's martyrdom, and the circumstances which led to it, warrant us in concluding, the Church of Jerusalem contained originally two diverse elements, Jews and Hellenists, the former rigid, the latter freer in tendency, between

whom, as might be expected, slight occasions gave rise to serious conflicts. The freer tendency, represented by Stephen, contained the germs of the Universalistic Gospel, subsequently preached by Paul; the narrower tendency settled down into a Judaizing party, with James and Peter at its head. The history of the conflicts between these two tendencies, which Baur designates Paulinism and Petrinism, of their gradual approximation to each other, and of their final union, is the history of the Christian Church during the first century of its existence, and of the origin of the books of the New Testament. But for Paul and his freer tendency, the Christian Church would have remained a mere Jewish sect; so that he may be regarded as the second founder of Christianity. His four Epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians and Romans, were written to ward off the attacks of the Judaizers. The conflict, however, seems to have continued with undiminished force till he and the first disciples disappeared from the scene; and that notwithstanding all he did to establish his claims to the apostleship and to show his love for the Church in Judea.

The earliest production of the Judaizing party now extant is the Apocalypse, which, according to Baur, was written a year or two before the destruction of Jerusalem, and contains virulent attacks on Paul and Paulinism under the pseudonym of Balaam(!). The earliest monument of Paulinism, after Paul's own letters, is the Gospel of Luke, which is a version of the so-called history of Christ, written from the Pauline point of view, with a corresponding coloring, designed to serve Pauline purposes, and opposed to the Gospel according to Matthew, which was written in the interest of the Judaizers. Even prior to the death of the respective leaders there must have belonged to both parties members who, out of regard to their common origin, desired, and in part sought, to effect a reconciliation; after their death, efforts began to be systematically directed to that end. The successive stages of the movement towards union are marked by the remaining New Testament writings.

This strange theory makes the following hypothesis as to their origin:—The Epistles to the *Hebrews* was a production of the Petrine party, so far conciliatory in its tendency as no longer to condemn Paulinism, but rather to imply, though not in so many words confessing, its substantial validity. The Epistles to the

Ephesians and *Colossians* (A. D. 120), on the other hand, were productions of the Pauline party, designed to conciliate, by treating the differences between it and its antagonists as a mere temporary separation of elements which really constitute a higher unity. The *Pastoral Epistles*, also productions of the Pauline party, indicate the readiness of the party to coöperate with the Petrines in the establishment of a church organization fitted to ward off the heresies that were beginning to arise, particularly Gnosticism, and to which allusions are made. This is the significance of the pastoral instructions put into Paul's mouth, none of which *could* have proceeded from him. The Epistle of *James* and the First Epistle of Peter, which were probably written a short time before the Pastoral Epistles by members of the Petrine party, are also conciliatory in their spirit. Both of them imply the existence of Paul's doctrine of justification by faith; but instead of denouncing it, as the party would have done originally, they content themselves with laying stress on the necessity of purity and uprightness of life as being that aspect of Christianity, about which all were agreed. The *Acts of the Apostles* is an account of the apostolic activity of Peter and Paul, in which Peter is represented as more Pauline than he actually was, and Paul as more Petrine than he actually was, for the purpose of hastening on the pacification now in progress. The writer was decidedly Pauline. The process of union having been, meanwhile, furthered by a number of non-canonical works—as for example, the Epistles of Barnabas, Clement, Polycarp, Ignatius, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Apologies of Justin Martyr—the so-called *Gospel according to John* appeared, and put the top-stone to the whole. It was written probably about A. D. 160–170, in the very middle of the Gnostic movement, by a man who had risen above the old antagonism between Petrinism and Paulinism, and is little more than a religious romance, which sets forth Christ as the Divine principle of light and life, in opposition to Judaism, which is treated as the embodiment of the principle of darkness and unbelief. The great conflict between the two principles is the theme of the work, dramatically represented under the form of the events of the life of Jesus, which are used with full poetical license. The work bears the traces of the lively theological controversies and ecclesiastical movements which marked the middle of the second century; it betrays the influence of Gnosticism and Mon-

tanism; it introduces us to the disputes about the Passover which raged in Asa Minor; its key-note is the Alexandrian idea of the Logos; but combining all these elements in a higher unity, and assuming for itself the sanction of the name of the Apostle John, it contributed very materially to the consolidation of the union and harmony that had been gradually arising, and to the subsequent progress of the Christian church.

We have thus far contented ourselves with an objective and impartial statement of Baur's principles and results; and convinced, as we are, that for every unprejudiced mind they carry their own refutation on their very face, we might here bid adieu to our readers. In order, however, to forefend the charge of indifference which might possibly be raised, and to deliver our own conscience, we will add a few critical observations. At the same time we must add the warning that, owing to the limited space at our disposal, these observations will necessarily be disconnected, and rather hint at lines of argument than be arguments themselves.

The rise of Christianity, some eighteen hundred to eighteen hundred and sixty years ago, is an historic fact. The immediate outcomes thereof were the Christian church and the early Christian literature. Hitherto the explanation of these phenomena accepted by the vast majority of thinkers has been, that Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God; that He died a sacrifice for sin; that He rose again and ascended on high; that He chose Apostles, and endowed them with superhuman powers; that He gave them special enlightenment as to His own mission and work: and that He sent them forth to preach His person and His kingdom. This explanation is sustained by, or rather is derived from, the writings of early Christian writers,—at all events when they are interpreted as has been usual during eighteen centuries. Documents of a contrary tendency were from the beginning rejected as heretical and untrue by the church itself. At various times explanations have been attempted on the basis of an elimination of either a part or the whole of the supernatural; for example, by the Socinians, who, whilst accepting the authorities as true, authentic, and, as far as the canonical Scriptures are concerned, supernatural, eliminated what the orthodox have always considered the *primum mobile*, Christ's Divine Sonship. Thoroughgoing rationalists eliminated the supernatural altogether, by

resolving it into the natural. The reign of this latter method was terminated by Strauss, who showed that such natural explanations are totally unsatisfactory; and he, in his turn, reduced all to myths. The church at the middle of the second century, with its literature, beliefs, life and institutions, he *of course*, left standing, but resolved into mist and cloud nearly all that from which it derived its existence. The result at which he arrived was in reality the purely negative one, that Christianity did not originate in the way usually assumed; and his positive answer to the question, "How, then, did it originate?" is allowed, even by members of the same philosophical and critical school, to be thoroughly insufficient.

Baur's studies convinced him that, though mythical elements are, as he maintains, present in the Christian writings, alteration, modification, intentional invention, play a much larger *role;* and by way of explaining their rise, he worked out his view of the first period of the existence of the Christian community as a long series of conflicts and attempts at reconciliation between the two great parties, the Ebionites or Petrinists and the Paulinists, till both were finally merged into one catholic church. The main difference between him and his predecessors is this: Rationalists maintained that the sacred writers meant merely to narrate natural events, and when they use language having apparently a different meaning, did but accommodate themselves to the then popular modes of representation. Strauss traced the narratives of supernatural events to the unconscious poetizing, and self-glorifying tendency of the church. Baur denies this, and says that with the exception of a few mythical elements here and there, such as all popular traditions contain, the documents owed their origin to party disputes, and were written to serve party purposes. In one respect, the last mentioned has taken a step in advance. The naturalistic theory was essentially dishonest; the mythical theory was absurd; but now we have to choose between the old orthodox view and—to speak in plain English—misrepresentations, inventions, forgeries, lies; for, even supposing we grant that party struggles gave occasion to the writings, and that some excuse may be urged for those who used such unworthy means for the attainment of their evil or good ends, the character of their productions remains the same.

After this brief introduction, we will pass on to our critical

remarks, which we propose to confine to two points—the *general principles* applied by Baur to the Christian history, and the *hypothesis* substituted for the explanation hitherto accepted.

1. We have referred above to Baur's view of history in general as the process of the divine life. Between him and his philosophical master, Hegel, there was this difference—if difference it really be—that he tried to conceive of God as at once fully Himself, and yet gradually coming to Himself; as being the absolute self-conscious Spirit, whilst undergoing the process by which He is constituted the absolute Spirit. Baur objects, indeed, to the term *person*, because he supposes it to involve limitation, finitude; but still deems God to be more than an impersonal principle.

Now, this view seems to us to forbid the law which he, along with Strauss, avowedly, and the Rationalist unavowedly, lays down as universally applicable to history, namely, that it is an unbroken series of *natural* causes and effects. If the events of history be events of God's vital process, they are surely anything but merely natural events with natural causes. Baur may, indeed, reply: "All things are Divine, all human; all finite, all absolute"; but even on this pantheistic supposition, if the process be in any sense the process of a being who is distinct from the process itself, and not the process of a process,—as, in reality, it would sometimes seem to be,—then, where so much of arbitrariness is admitted, why not admit a little more? Why may we not assume that extraordinary events, events out of the common course, are as necessary in the life of the absolute spirit as they are in the life of finite spirits, with that natural difference of character, degree, or even *kind*, which is congruous to the difference between finitude and infinitude?

Before advancing further, however, let us cast a glance at the mode in which this position is set forth by Zeller in his exposition of the historical method of the Tübingen School. It supplies a fair and instructive example of the arbitrary, illogical and confused courses into which men of the most solid learning and brilliant ability fall, when under bondage to an *a priori* theory. Speaking of Strauss, but adding that as to the point under consideration, there was no difference between him and Baur, he says: "He demands that the Gospel histories be tried by the same principles we apply to other traditions, and that the histo-

rian of Christianity go to work without preconceived ideas, and indifferent as to results. He demands a purely historical procedure,—nothing more, nothing less; the simple ascertainment of the actual facts of the case. It is true, freedom from preconceived ideas includes *freedom from a prior faith* in miracles. For as history in general, and the Christian history in particular, is subject to the law of an unbroken series of natural causes and effects, which holds good of all other spheres of existence, the historian cannot in any case whatever be expected to recognize the reality of miracles, even *though metaphysicians had ever so clearly* demonstrated their possibility. A miracle being opposed to the entire analogy of experience, the question assumes for the historian this form: Is it more probable that something has actually happened which is opposed to all the analogy of experience, or that the tradition recording such an event is false? Considering the numberless examples we have of inaccurate and false reports, and *that there is not a single example* of a thoroughly credible report of an event which can be shown not to have been the effect of a natural cause, it is impossible to conceive of a case in which an historian can concede the reality of a professed miracle."

Fully to expose the false premises, illogical conclusions and gross pre-suppositions of this passage, which is a condensed rendering of the orignal, would require almost an article; but we must call attention very briefly to the following points:—1. The required freedom from preconceived ideas.

We have, for our part, no objection whatever to the critic or historian setting about his task without prior *belief* in miracles and regardless of consequences. Nay, more—we would require him to be free from preconceived ideas—totally free; *but free, therefore, from the preconceived idea that a miracle is impossible.* Christian advocates do harm to their own cause by prescribing beliefs and results beforehand. They ought to be the very first and foremost to insist on a thoroughly impartial and critical treatment of the monuments of our most holy faith. Here above all places, where we are fighting *pro aris et focis*, we should fearlessly refuse all compromise. Nay, we are even prepared to go further: we are prepared to say, the Christian inquirer must be as distrustful of single narratives of miracles in the Bible as elsewhere; for we are convinced that the more rigidly and unreservedly we apply purely historical tests, the greater will be our

triumph.* The paramount duty of the historian is "the simple ascertainment of the actual facts of the case." One condition alone have we a right to impose on him—a condition, too, which the Tübingen school, with its professed will to find reason wherever reason has worked, ought to be the last to discard—the *condition* that he shall not eliminate from the beginning of a movement that without which the movement itself is irrational and unintelligible. If the historian finds events recorded as having occurred at the commencement of any movement, and which, whatever else may be said about them, fully account for its rise, he has no right to eliminate them, without supplying an hypothesis, *which, besides explaining the main phenomena, explains also the phenomena eliminated.*

2. The law laid down for History.

a. Apart altogether from the question of the recognition of a supernatural, superhuman, or Divine causality of events, we deny the justness of saying, in any case, that historical occurrences are the work of natural causes alone. The law of causation in the realm of history has never yet been shown to be identical with that which we find in nature. Strictly speaking, indeed, there is no such thing as a *natural cause*; the only finite causes of which we know anything are spiritual, not natural. Until the Tübingen school shall have demonstrated that there is no such thing as spirit, self-determining will, as the ethical, we must pronounce the law to be, even in this aspect, an unwarrantable assumption. If, however, it be prepared to go to the length of maintaining that all is pure nature and fate, then surely it were easier and more rational to account for Christian miracles as a freak of nature—like other freaks, equally irregular and equally irrational.

b. By the common consent of all philosophers, laws are now recognized as based on an induction of facts; facts are ascertained by inquiry, and certified by evidence. This is tacitly conceded also by the Tübingen school when they appeal to the "analogy of experience." Now, to deny miracles to be facts, because they are different from all other facts, because they are not in accordance with the analogy of experience elsewhere, is simply to deny

* We must request our readers not to misunderstand us here. We *are* so convinced that both the inspiration of scripture and the truth of the events it records will shine forth clearer and clearer the more they are criticised and investigated, that we shrink from no concession save the *a priori* concession of that for which we fight.

them to be miracles because they are miracles; for they are called miracles because they are not ordinary events, and because, if they had been ordinary events, they would never have produced the extraordinary effects ascribed to them. They are opposed to *old* experience; but it does not therefore follow that they are not themselves a new experience.

c. In the last clauses of the passage quoted, we are *first* reminded of the numerous inaccurate reports contained in history. Of this we are fully aware, and therefore enjoin the same caution in dealing with Biblical miracles that is observed in dealing with others; but because *many*, or even very many, or even overwhelmingly many reports are unreliable, it does not follow that all are. It is a question of evidence. We are, *secondly*, assured that there is no instance of a well-authenticated account of an event demonstrably not natural.* This is simple assumption, natural enough in writers who would not, under any circumstances, recognize miracles, even if their metaphysical possibility had been clearly established, but quite unwarranted.

11. Let us pass now on to the second point under critical consideration—the hypothesis substituted by Baur for the usual explanation of the rise of Christianity.

1. His first position, as we have seen, is, that Christianity is the ripe fruit of a movement in the entire world, manifesting itself in Greek philosophy, in some of the Jewish sects, and in the establishment of the Roman Empire; and one of whose fundamental features was its universalism.

a. Our first objection here is, that supposing the movement in the Gentile world and in Judea to have been precisely such as is described by Baur, it would not, judging by that "analogy of experience" on which so much stress is laid, have culminated, the fruit would not have fallen, in Judea. If there was one city in the then civilized world, or one district, where these lines of development did not converge, it was Jerusalem, where Christ's mission centered; it was Galilee, whence Christ issued forth. If there was a nation on earth whose leaders and representatives were less than another inoculated with the universalistic ideas and

* We have no space to notice either the logical impropriety of this mode of putting the matter, or the confusion of terms by which it is marked. We may add, however, that these masters of science and logic commit such mistakes more frequently than would be supposed possible.

tendencies of the age, it was the Jewish nation. Whereas, if there was any place or community in which such thoughts and activity did converge as in a common focus, and might have been expected to coöperate towards a tangible result, it was Alexandria and its schools. And yet what do we see? The great world-wide movement culminates in Judea, where it encounters the deadliest hostility; it quits Alexandria, where all was prepared for it. This we maintain is a freak of the "self-developing idea," or of the "divine process," far more inexplicable and irrational than any Biblical miracle, not even excepting the speaking of Balaam's ass. *Baur too has felt this*, though not honest enough to avow it; for whilst out of deference to the four genuine Epistles of Paul, without whose aid he can do nothing, he nominally assigns the *role* of *primum mobile* to Jesus, in reality he afterwards substitutes Paul and Alexandria: with what right and what consistency we have no time now more fully to inquire.

b. But further; to our mind his representation of Christ and account of the means He found it necessary to employ for the accomplishment of His mission, are chargeable with a two-fold inconsistency. It will be remembered that Baur assumes that the pure and lofty teachings of Jesus would probably have remained as fruitless as other similar teachings had remained, if He had not given them a tangible basis, by assuming to Himself the Messianic character, thus setting himself *en rapport*, as it were, with the Jewish nation.

It strikes us, first, as very irrational in the "idea" or the "divine process," to clothe its ripest universalistic fruit in the narrowest and most particularistic dress; a course which, as we know, led to the total and shameful rejection of Jesus Christ, through the new element which manifested itself, and which, as the subsequent events prove, sorely hampered the movement for generations.* And, secondly, the conduct of Jesus (to whose person Baur applies the highest designations of honor), in assuming a title based on ideas totally opposed to those of which He was the historical mouthpiece, and whose interpretation of which excited against His mission the fiercest antagonism, was, to say the least, no great sign of prudence or insight. On any grounds which the Tübin-

* The Hegelian objection that might here be raised, that unity and diversity, harmony and conflict, are the conditioning principles of progress, will be partly met afterwards. Our readers will please not to forget that we are merely *indicating lines of argument.*

gen School can consistently advance, His conduct is utterly inexplicable; for, on the one hand, He must have foreseen that His rejection by the Jewish authorities would overthrow the dawning faith of His disciples, who had hoped in Him, *notwithstanding His new interpretation* of the Messiahship; and, on the other hand, He can scarcely be supposed to have foreseen what proved so very important, that their confidence would be restored by the rise in their midst of a *false and groundless* belief in his own resurrection.

That the world was preparing both negatively and positively, for Christianity, is taught in Scripture, and has always been acknowledged by intelligent writers. But Baur's distinctive position owes any show of reason it may have, solely to the circumstance that he diminishes the distance between Christianity and the movement of which he affirms it to be the outcome; on the one hand, by *heightening* the latter; on the other hand, by *lowering* the former. With regard to the Greek, Roman and Jewish world, we maintain fearlessly that it contained no factors capable, judging again by the analogy of experience, either singly or conjointly, of giving rise to a practical revolution like that which manifested itself in the organization of the Christian Church. If ever there was an age at which humanity *felt* and *declared itself* to be incapable of any grand moral effort, it was this. But *Christianity* is also *lowered.* Baur tells us that its distinctive features were the stress laid on the state of the heart, and the assumption that every man is capable by himself of entering into the right relation to God. Now, apart altogether from the consideration that this was nothing new, nothing distinctive, we maintain that it is a misrepresentation of Christianity. If there was one point on which the early Christians were more agreed than another, it was, that man is impotent to save himself, and that Christ came to accomplish his redemption. And if there is any one point which Paul in his four genuine Epistles affirms with more vigor, clearness, and frequency than another, it is this same one. By what right then does Baur thus contradict the authority of the man who, according to his own statements, best understood the teachings of the Master, and did and suffered most to proclaim them?

2. The second position is, that the first hundred years after the death of Christ were filled out by the struggles between two great parties, the Petrines and the Paulines, of whose hostility,

attempts at reconciliation and final union the Christian writings are the products and monuments.

Our reply is, *not proven.* We do not, indeed, deny that there existed divisions in the early church; we are quite willing to grant that things did not go on so smoothly as they are sometimes vaguely represented to have done; we know that there were Judaizers who insisted that the law was still binding, and libertines who, on the pretence of faith, cast off all law. These facts have never been denied by men of insight; but still we say, Baur's hypothesis is not proven. It lacks two features without which no hypothesis can be valid—(1). The *evidence* on which it is based—for as an historical hypothesis, it must be based on evidence—is unsatisfactory; and (2) it *fails to account* for the phenomena to which it refers.

(1). *a.* The supposed origin of the parties. If Christ's person, teachings, and work, were such as the Church has always taught, we can easily account for the rise of the parties and disputes whose existence has always been recognized. But the elements out of which the Tübingen parties could grow, seem to us to be absent from the Tübingen Christ and Christianity. One can understand neither why the Jewish authorities should have been so jealous of Christ if he were nothing more than what Baur represents Him; nor how He could have gathered disciples such as those He actually did gather; nor how His Apostles could retain any faith in Him after his shameful crucifixion, and remain united in Jerusalem. Baur, too, feels these difficulties, and therefore adds, *somehow or other*, we cannot and need not explain how, they came to believe in His resurrection, though it never took place.

b. The first direct proof adduced by Baur, of the existence of differences among the disciples of Christ, lands us in new perplexities. Stephen and the Hellenists, mentioned in the Acts, are supposed to have been the forerunners of Paul, and their persecution to have been the work both of the Jews proper and the Jewish Christians. Now on the one hand, there is not a particle of evidence in the Acts, which is our only authority on this particular point, that Stephen and the rest were separated by differences of *doctrine.* The evidence is all in the other direction. And, on the other hand, if Stephen's views were identical with those which had occasioned his master's death, what right had his opponents to be called Christ's disciples and a Christian Church

at all? And how could they, believing as they did in the Messiahship and resurrection of a man whom the authorities had just crucified, stand so high in favor with these said authorities as not only to escape persecution themselves, but also partly to procure the persecution of others?

c. But let us now advance further—to Paul, the eventful head and real soul of the liberal party. No greater riddle has ever been originated than that originated by Baur in representing Paul as becoming what he became without the reasons supplied by the orthodox view.

Here is a man of such high intellectual ability, vigor of character, pure morality, and religious earnestness, that he became a principal agent in bringing about the Christian revolution, despite the opposition of Jews and Gentiles. This man was a Jew by birth, a Pharisee by conviction, and one of the most zealous defenders of the traditions of the fathers. Knowing that Christ had been crucified on account of His pretensions to be the Messiah in a new sense of his own; that His disciples were kept together by an absurd and groundless belief in the resurrection of their Master; that they were divided into two parties, one of which, consisting of Hellenistic proselytes, took up a position of open antagonism to Judaism,—he, after being one of the most eager agents in the cruel persecution of the liberal section of the new community, suddenly, and without any outward occasion, constituted himself its leader, and accounts for his change—a change which exposed him to the greatest difficulties, dangers, and losses—by a *delusion into which he had fallen*, of having seen the risen Nazarine. Nay, more: this eminent man gave himself up to a number of other notions, which, according to Baur, were, in plain English, vain delusions, such as that Christ had died a sacrifice for the sins of men; that He ascended up on high; that He was the archetypal man; that He was the Son of God; that He would come again to judge the world; that He had abolished Judaism; and that the only way to salvation was by faith in His person." Baur himself speaks of Paul's conversion as a "marvel" or "miracle," (Wunder), and yet adds, "still it was nothing more than a psychological process." Why he perpetrates the inconsistency of not giving us a fancy sketch of Paul's character and career, in order to bring it into fuller harmony with his other fancy sketches, is more than we can say. But one thing we assert: the original riddle of the supernatural is infinitely easier

of solution than the one we have just described,—another illustration of our Saviour's words, "Ye strain at a gnat and swallow a camel."

d. The principal argument for the existence of the two parties is the passage in Galatians relating to Peter and his conduct at Antioch. Baur asserts that the antagonists with whom Paul had to do were the older Apostles themselves, Peter included; and that the false brethren were their emissaries.

There is surely not a single hint that Peter and his brother Apostles were Judaizers, in any sense that has not always been acknowledged; in any sense justifying this new use of the passage. On the contrary, Paul allows as just, the difference between his point of view and mission and theirs (ch. ii: 7, 8, 9); the inconsistency he blamed in Peter plainly did not consist in his having momentarily departed from the exclusiveness which otherwise characterized him (v. 11, 12); he distinguishes between the "false brethren," who wished to spy out his liberty in Christ, and the Apostles, who, whilst retaining their views, recognized the justice of his own (v. 4–9); he speaks of Peter, and implicitly of all the elder Apostles as having given up the law in the same sense in which he had given it up (v. 13–17); in a word, sharp as may be some of Paul's expressions, their real point lies in the reproach of inconsistency,—not in that of a fundamental difference of view.

e. After exaggerating, and putting a false interpretation on Paul's words in Galatians, it becomes of course easy enough for Baur to detect traces of the same antagonism everywhere in the four genuine Epistles; to show that the Acts give a very colored picture of the relation between the Apostles; and to import into the remaining New Testament books all sorts of tendencies, which would otherwise never have been discovered in them.

On the view of the differences between Paul and his colleagues always held by the church, not only is there no discrepancy between the Acts and Paul's epistles, but each supplements the other. Both imply substantial agreement, with formal dissonance, and both agree in their estimate of the character of the two leaders,—Paul being the man of indomitable energy and persistence; Peter being the man of generous impulse, but not equal firmness.

It would lead us too far, were we to attempt to enumerate and expose the baselessness of the points supposed by Baur to be the

evidence and the result of the conflicts and attempts at reconciliation; but we cannot resist giving the following specimens. Because the circumstance that the Lord "appointed other seventy also," mentioned in Luke x. 1, is not alluded to by Matthew, Baur concludes it to have been invented by the unknown author of the former, for the purpose of opposing the latter, and deprecating the twelve regular Apostles. We are told that there is not a hard or bitter word in the whole of Luke that is not inserted for the same purpose. The "woes" in chapter vi. are directed against them; they are the "blind leaders of the blind;" they are those who say, "Lord, Lord, and do not what Christ says;" they are the "lawyers" of chapter xi. 46; even the genealogy of Luke is a persiflage of Matthew's. We assure our readers that we are merely soberly reporting, and, if space permitted, could adduce scores of such illustrations of blind subtlety. And this is the "higher criticism,"—these are stones in the foundation of the edifice under whose roof we are invited to seek shelter and repose.

f. Other authorities adduced are Marcion, Papias, Hegesipus, and the so-called Clementine Homilies; but neither the one nor the other of these early writings supplies evidence of the sort required and assumed by Baur. Only by dint of the exaggeration and importation of which we have already given a few examples, is he able to use them for his own purpose. Besides, even if their evidence were actually all that is maintained, why should it outweigh the counter evidence of the other contemporary, or even earlier non-canonical writings, the epistles of Clemens Romanus, Barnabas, Ignatius, Polycarp, the epistle to Diognetus, and the Shepherd of Hermas—evidence which is as clear as noonday? One of the most suspicious features of the works of Baur is their superficial treatment of these Apostolic fathers, who, though they contain little to interest in a doctrinal point of view, give, for that very reason, all the more valuable testimony to the state of belief and life in the churches of their time.

(2.) We have affirmed also that the hypothesis, besides resting on little or no evidence, *fails to account for the phenomena to which it relates.*

a. Such parties would not have manifested their hostility in writings of the kind before us. One document did unquestionably owe its origin to a Judaizing party, though, as we have said before, it by no means supplies evidence of the kind needed by

Baur, namely, the Clementine Homilies. It is not unfair to apply this work as a standard to other writings said to be the productions of the same party. Now, the difference between it and the Canonical books ascribed to the Judaizers is so great, that when the two parties united, the Homilies were rejected as heretical; the Gospels and Epistles were received and inspired. This is another of the riddles Baur has fabricated. Parties, the commencement of whose conflicts was marked by such scenes as the stoning of Stephen, would never have been content with abusing each other in a way so subtle and concealed, that for ages the documents were not supposed to have this character. The attacks would at all events have been as open as those of the Clementines. But even in the Clementines, Paul is assailed under the *mask* of Simon Magus—a circumstance quite inexplicable, if that work were backed up by a large number of active adherents. *b.* Nor again would their conflicts have brought about the results attributed to them by Baur. How unlikely that the Jewish party, which opposition rendered for a time more strongly Jewish than at the outset, should ever have given up its distinctive ideas at all. We venture to say that such conduct is altogether opposed to the "analogy of our experience," both of *Jewish* nature in particular, and of human nature in general.

There is no parallel in history, of antagonists so virulently opposed to each other being brought to unite by writings full of false representations. If anything whatever is fitted to widen the the gulf between parties, it is the publication of writings, under the names, and misrepresenting the principles and conduct, of their respective leaders. Baur, indeed, seems to assume that the Gospels and Epistles were accepted by the Church as genuine and true. If they were, the first Christians must have been the most arrant fools the world has ever seen. But it was not so. Jealousy rendered it impossible; the extensive literary intercourse of that time which, be it observed, was far more extensive than is frequently supposed, rendered it impossible. And finally we must protest, in the name even of the pantheistic God, of whose life history is said to be the process, in the name of the reason, which Baur assumes to reign everywhere in history; and in the name of morality and religion, whose perfect realization Baur believes to be the goal of the Church's existence and activity, against tracing the grandest and holiest revolution mankind has ever undergone, to a root of lies.

II.—THE CATACOMBS OF ROME, AND THEIR DOCTRINAL LESSONS.*

The title Catacombs awakens in the minds of those who have never seen the ancient tombs thus designated, images much more majestic than the reality. The Catacombs are simply long interminable passages, crossing each other in a thousand, and often irregular paths, dug in the bowels of the earth at different depths, frequently in stories raised one above another. When the soil is firm, as in the volcanic marl of Naples, the galleries are large and sometimes imposing; especially at times when a ray of light penetrates them, defining the shadows of the large supporting pillars. But when the soil is sandy, crumbling, and in places muddy as at Rome, the corridors allow scarcely a place for one person to pass, and thus lose much of their apparent majesty, but not of their funereal mystery. The ranges of tombs, one above another, are cut in the sides of the galleries. A matter of fact visitor compares them, not without some truth, to rows of shelves in a shop. "Be it so;" we answer; "but the labels are funereal inscriptions engraved or painted upon the marble, the cement or the brick; and the contents of these *loculi* were the bones of Christians and sometimes the remains of martyrs."

There has been a great deal of controversy as to the origin and first uses of the catacombs. The disputants on both sides have been right; one side in affirming that some catacombs were primitively *arenaria* or sand holes; the others, in saying that catacombs were dug specifically for use as cemeteries. In the early days of persecution, the Christians naturally enough sought to hide their dead in caverns already made, which served as quarries to the Pagans; afterwards, little by little they prolonged these caverns into the beds of tufa; and, finally, they doubtless constructed others expressly for purposes of interment. As to the question whether the Pagans used catacombs for burial, it remains doubtful as far as Rome is concerned; it is settled for Naples; in the catacombs there, tiers of tombs are found, some

* Translated and condensed from the *Revue Chrétienne*, May, 1864, by Rev. John McClintock, LL. D.

Pagan with profane paintings, others Christian with sacred paintings. We have personally inspected them many times.

Beside the ranges of wall tombs in the long corridors, there are, in the Roman catacombs, occasional excavations of greater extent, with arched roofs, forming, in fact, recessed chambers. These are often frescoed; the ranges of graves around them were obviously used for family interments. These are the *cellæ*, or *cubicula*, which the Romanist archæologists consider to have been chapels, used for worship by the early Christians. Now nothing is more likely than that, in times of sharp persecution, the Christians should have taken refuge in these crypts from their pursuers. Moreover, it is not at all unlikely that they worshiped God together, while cabined for a time in these subterranean asylums. But the Romanists greatly exaggerate all this. It is no more true that the catacombs were the ordinary worshiping places of Christians in the ages of persecution, than it is true that the majority of the people buried in them were saints or martyrs. No necessity called for such concealment, except on rare occasions. As early as A. D. 230, Alexander Severus gave the Christians a spot for their worship which is now the site of the Church of St. Maria in Trastevere. In the time of Dioclesian, A. D. 303, the Christians had forty places of worship in Rome.

The precise epoch of the construction of these caverns is a complex question which we cannot answer simply from the study of their furniture. The objects formerly contained in the tombs have been scattered among the museums of Rome without special designation of the places whence they were taken. Moreover, the furniture of the crypts must necessarily have been renewed frequently during the course of the first centuries, especially if, according to the Roman theory, these caverns served for a long time, and were much frequented, as religious places. Nor do the *paintings* on the walls afford us any sure indication of dates. We shall see by and by that the most ancient paintings go back in all probability to the third century; and, possibly, the very oldest may be referred to the second half of the second century. As to the *architecture*, in some of the catacombs, especially in the largest, (St. Agnes), it indicates clearly an epoch of decline; the lines are detestable, and the incorrect arches are supported by half columns surmounted by a sort of

table in place of capitals. It is work of which the fourth or even the fifth century might be ashamed. But there are certain pieces of furniture in solid stone, and some even carved from the rock of the crypts themselves, which, say the Romanists, attest the early use of certain religious rites, (*e. g.* of the mass), and the authority of bishops and other grades of the hierarchy. Let us see. It is by no means certain that even these solid articles, stone chairs, tables, &c., did not vary at different periods. The process seems to have been as follows. These subterranean crypts were first used as burial places. In later ages, some of them, supposed to be the resting places of saints or martyrs, were set apart for worship. What was necessary, but to set up an altar, or an Episcopal chair? It was as easy to do it at the later period as at the earlier. Moreover, some of these objects are in *marble*, not found in the catacombs, but brought thither from without.

The chamber in the catacombs of St. Agnes, known as the *scuola grande*, might have accommodated a few dozen worshippers at once; and it is the largest of these so-called chapels. Let us dwell for a moment, on the fixed objects contained in it. Here is a large stone seat; and, on each side of it, a bench, somewhat less elevated, large enough for several persons. The seat may have been the bishop's chair; the benches were for his presbyters. But go to the church of St. Clement, one of the oldest churches in Rome, and you will see an arrangement precisely similar. Was the church copied from the tomb-chapel, or the chapel from the church? Nobody can tell.

But, apart from the question of date, these stone seats teach us something. In the cemetery of St. Agnes, there is a *cubiculum* in which a stone bench is cut in the rock all the way round the cell. Was this a seat for catechumens, or simply a resting place for the grave-diggers? Another *cubiculum* is furnished with two stone arm chairs facing one another;—were these for the catechumens? Would the deacon be seated in one, and the deaconess in the other? But then the pupils would be obliged to stand, as there was no seat for them, unless, indeed, there were extemporary ones of wood. It is certain that the usage of cutting seats out of the rock, or of making them of stone, only sprang up at a late period in the church. The apostles and their immediate followers never dreamed of such a thing. These seats of stone have not then an apostolic character. But some of these

seats were *confessionals*, say the Romanists. If so, why are they in pairs, facing each other, as in some cubicula; too far apart to allow confession in a low tone, if one were the confessor's seat and the other the penitent's; too near for the theory that each seat was a confessional.

The Romanists find also stone *altars*, for the celebration of the mass, in the catacombs. That is to say, in some of the chambers is found a sarcophagus, and on this, it is said, the mass was offered. But no sarcophagus was placed in the crypts, even according to the Roman archæologists, before the time of Constantine. Moreover, some of the so-called altars stand *within* the arched niches; a very unlikely, if not impossible place for the celebration of a mass. Some of these arched recesses, again, are plainly cut out from old tombs, as the original frescoing is obviously covered by them; a fact which clearly indicates a late remodeling, and thereby puts aside all *early* dogmatic import in the altars within, even supposing them to be altars. We are not disposed to deny that after the Church began to venerate the relics and tombs of the martyrs, the tomb of one of them might be chosen for the distribution of the Lord's Supper; but this admission is far away from admitting the *mass*. An unprejudiced person, looking at one of these cells for the first time, would see in it nothing but a sort of little table covering a tomb—none of the necessary apparatus for the Romish mass. Instead of closets for the priest's robes, which Romanist eyes see in the walls, *we* can only see there niches or brackets for lamps. Pompeii furnishes many specimens of niches for lamps; and the fashion exists to this day in Italian houses. In these subterranean retreats, lights were very necessary; and in fact, the Romanist use of lights on the altar arose originally from the usages of the catacombs.

After the so-called altars come the *benitiers*, or holy-water vessels. These are basins found in some of the niches in the catacombs; two such are preserved in the Jesuits' museum; and we are told that they were found at the entrances of the subterranean chapels, and were *benitiers*. But why not baptismal vases? Why not *phialae*, basins for washing the hands, such as Eusebius and other fathers describe in the early churches? Our good Romanist friends forget that the legion of ditchers who must have been kept at work in the catacombs needed such conven-

iences, especially if, as cannot be doubted, they sometimes went from their work to attend worship at a funeral or in one of the small chapels.

Many of the numerous objects found in the catacombs, such as lamps, vases, phials, &c., are collected at Rome in the museum of the Jesuits and in that of the Vatican. The first remark to be made upon these relics is, that their *dates* are not assured, and therefore that it is not safe to argue from them as to Christian doctrine or usage in the first centuries. In the gradual degeneracy of the Church, an article might serve a simply natural purpose in the second century, and a superstitious one in the fifth. Another remark is, that, (taking the articles as they stand) the lamps for the most part are either simple, or, if in figure, are simply symbolical. The writer has four of these lamps in his possession; one of them is in the form of a dove; another of a cock; a third is a chandelier of two branches (not seven); and the fourth is simply the figure of a bird.

The Romanists draw an argument from certain earthen vases of which there are numerous fragments in the Christian museum of the Vatican. Within, are painted in gilded lines, the effigies of Peter and of Paul, sometimes alone, sometimes crowned by Christ, sometimes separated by a figure of Mary in prayer. St. Peter, in these groups, does not always stand on the right side, as he ought to do, on the Romish theory. Moreover, it is obvious, on inspection of these vases, that they date from the first Byzantine epoch, and not from the third century. Their character is well defined, so different from the ancient paintings that no one can mistake it. Among all the ascertained vases of the Roman period, and in all the rich collection of ancient glass contained in the museum of Naples, there is not one with gilded figures. That species of decoration belongs to the Byzantine school. The names written on the sides of the heads are besides a Byzantine feature. The legends simply prove that in the sixth century, perhaps in the fifth, Christians began to join Peter and Paul in a common veneration; *not* that they considered these apostles the founders of the church of Rome.

We pass now from the utensils found in the catacombs, which, as has been seen, are really of no great account in a doctrinal point of view, to the *inscriptions*, which afford a far wider, more interesting, and more important field. Here, as before, the ques-

tion of dates is everything; an inscription favoring some Romanist dogma, if proved to be of the second century, would be of very different importance from one of the sixth century. And to make our case the surer, we shall follow the latest and ablest of the Romanist archæologians, Di Rossi, whose *Inscriptiones sacræ urbis Romæ septimo saeculo antiquiores*, (Rome, 1861), is a monument of his erudition and industry.

Of the first century, there is but one assured inscription, and that is mutilated, so that we can now read only the words and letters following:—VG. VESPASIANO, III COS. IAN. Vespasian was consul A. D. 71. As to this fragment, in the first place there is nothing to prove it a Christian inscription at all; and in the second place, if it be such, it tells us absolutely nothing of value in a doctrinal point of view.

There are two inscriptions shown to be of the *second* century. One of them is a tablet, from a tomb in the cemetery of Lucina, with the words:—N. XXX. SVRA. ET. SENEC. COSS; words which fix its date at A. D. 107. The other is a tablet from the same spot, inscribed SERVILIA ANNORUM XIII. PIS. ET. BOL. COSS., clearly of the date A. D. 111. But here, as in the first century, we find no trace of doctrine.

Let us see if the *third* century is more explicit. Here our first subject is a tablet from a tomb in the cemetery of Priscilla. It contains only the citation of two names of converts of A. D. 204. The second is taken from a large sarcophagus found in the Via Libicana. Upon the back of this monument, erected to *M. Avrelio Aug. liberti benemerenti piisimo*, etc., we read: *Prosenes receptus ad Devm.* This is of date A. D. 217, and it does teach doctrine; but not *Romish* doctrine. The soul is received "near to God," and not into purgatory. As to the expression "well-meriting," it cannot be invoked in favor of the doctrine of good works, as it is a reproduction, probably, without thought of its import doctrinally, of a phrase found very commonly upon pagan sepulchres, as one may easily be convinced in passing through the Lapidarian galleries of the Vatican. This eulogy belonged to the funereal terminology of the times; and the Christians had not yet dropped it. The title of *libertus* (freedman) is rare in the Christian catacombs, where few allusions are made to social classifications. On the other hand, we often find there *alumnus*, the "orphan nourished in the house."

Another inscription of the third century is on a tablet found at the cemetery of Hermes, of date A. D. 234. Below the names of the deceased and of the consuls, are found sculptured a fish and an anchor. These two symbols, reproduced later a thousand times, had evidently a hidden sense. The anchor signified either constancy during life, or the repose of the haven. The fish, as is well known, is supposed, even in the Latin inscriptions, to denote the initials of *Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτήρ*. We know not why this symbol should not also be held to allude to the great fishing net of the kingdom of heaven, into which one more soul had fallen. Upon a funereal lamp we find the same fish at the side of Peter,—the apostle fishing for men.

An inscription found in the cemetery of Lucina bears the words: *Avrelia dvlcissima filia quae de saeculo recessit*, etc., of which the date is fixed, by the consular titles, at A. D. 235. Besides the epithet of *very sweet*, so worthy of a Christian, it is to be remarked that there is only one allusion to immortality in these words: "She is gone from the age."

The eighth inscription is upon a sarcophagus of doubtful source. It is Greek, of the date A. D. 238; and beside the inscription is sculptured the good shepherd with a sheep on his shoulder. On the other side this same good shepherd appears, staff in hand; symbols which are only a reproduction often repeated, of the gospel parable, and of which Tertullian speaks at about the same date. This image, besides being so touching, is one of the first representations of the Christ, under the figure of a young man, without halo or any inscription to indicate even simple veneration, not to speak of the worship that is now rendered to his images. But it is well to take note of the date of this, because we shall meet it among the first paintings of the catacombs.

The ninth inscription of the third century was found in the cemetery of St. Calixtus, and bears date, A. D. 268 or 279. Here, mingled with Latin characters, we see three new signs. Above, that of the dove of the ark; this bird, with the olive branch, signifies that the soul returns in peace; on one side of a vase it signifies that the soul separates from the body—this vase so fragile, which contains only for a time the perfume of life. On this relic there is inscribed an X with a vertical line drawn across its length. The Roman archæologists think they detect here the rudiments of the well-known monogram of Christ, ☧

the date of which is generally fixed at the time of Constantine; and also the beginnings of the use of the sign of the cross. Were this true, in the case before us, it would be the cross of St. Andrew, not of Christ. For our part we see in this figure simply the Roman X with I superposed, to denote XI. But this same relic has also a figure of a heart, with the words VIBAS INTER SANCTIS IIIA. The IIIA is not intelligible: but *vibas* is clearly a form of *vivas;* and the whole forms a wish which the most Protestant of us might utter: *May you dwell among the blessed.* But is there any doctrine of purgatory here?

The next inscription is on a tablet from the cemetery of St. Saturninus, of date A. D. 269. It has a truly barbarous inscription, to the effect that the honest Lenus erected the tomb to his daughter and to her holy spirit. In truth one must be possessed with a dogmatic mania, to seek a very profound sense in the "holiness of spirit" of this poor child, when the father tells us she has died *die Beneris* (read *Veneris*) on Venus' day. The inscription is obviously the work of an ignorant, if pious soul: but it clearly enough shows that the popular meaning of "saint" or "holy" at that date was not at all that which the Roman church now means by those words; and the dogmatic meaning of the inscription, if it has any, is against rather than in favor of, the Romanist ideas of canonization and purgatory.

The next is from a sarcophagus found in the cemetery of St. Pretextatus, of date A. D. 273. The tablet says little. It is ornamented by two or three lambs bearing olive branches. Of no dogmatic import.

The next is an epitaph of the year A. D. 279. On this tablet may be seen two spouses who have lived together seventeen years, when the husband dies, of whom it is said that he lived thirty-two years *in the age.* Belief in an existence beyond the present time must have been very clear, that the special name "the age" should be chosen to designate the earthly sphere of life from which the deceased had passed away.

A more interesting and important inscription follows. It is an epitaph of date A. D. 291, which tells us that in the tomb there marked, a certain Macervonia Silvana is laid (*deposita*). But the lines which precede demand of Roman Catholic controvertists great skill to interpret them in their sense: EX VIRGINIO TVO BEN. MECO, VIXISISTI LIB. ENIC ONJVGA INN. OCENTISSIMA MACERVONIA

SILVANA, REFRIGERA CVM SPIRITA SANCTA, etc. In spite of bad spelling and bad grammar, we can make out from this that the deceased lived *well* and *innocently*, with her Virginius. His conception of "innocence" tells no more for Romanist doctrine than for Protestant. An attempt has been made to find purgatory and saints' prayers in the *refrigera* and *spirita sancta;* but no sane criticism can detect them in these broken words. At one side of the tablet is a figure approaching more nearly to the monogram of Christ than that described above; but it is not yet the perfect monogram.

We come now to the *fourth* century. Here, on a tablet of A. D. 202, we first find the word *pietas*, applied in eulogy. Beside the inscription is a palm, obviously not the sign of martyrdom, but simply noting the victory of the Christian over death. Another, of A. D. 302, has the phrase *in pace*, but without *requiescat:* and inscriptions of A. D. 311 and 319 have the simple indicative, *dormit in pace*, he sleeps in peace. In the year 335, we find, for the first time, "charity" and "modesty" noted in an inscription as virtues. Not that the later Romanist idea of the *merit* of virginity had yet obtained currency; but the Christians began, in view of the revolting immorality of paganism, at an early period, to mark the particular importance of these virtues. The inscription before us relates to a married person, and of course does not indicate the Romish view, in any sense. In A. D. 339, the monogram of Christ, with the P complete, indubitably appears in inscriptions. In A. D. 348, there are divers tablets, the inscriptions of which are far removed from the brevity and sobriety of the earlier age. But they are of special value for the illustrations they afford of the beliefs of the Christians of the fourth century as to the state of the dead. We read that the deceased will repose (*pausabit*, A. D. 353); that he will be in repose (*quiescet*, A. D. 355); that he reposes always in security (*semper quiescis secura*, A. D. 363); that he will repose in peace (*quiescet in pace*, A. D. 363). These phrases may be taken as proving the transition to the later *requiescat;* but yet the doctrine of purgatory finds no support in them. Even as late as A. D. 380, we find *aeterna quies* joined with *felicitas*. An age which engraves upon its tombs "repose," "felicity," instead of bones and flames, is not a favorable one for the trade of dealers in masses for the dead.

In A. D. 389, we find a significant inscription. A certain GAVDENTIVS PRESB, that is to say priest, presbyter, or elder, erected a tomb "to himself and to his *wife*, chaste and very holy." Would to God his successors had such!

We could prolong these quotations, but we have passed the second half of the fourth century without finding a single epitaph of known date of which Rome can avail herself. What conclusion shall we come to, if it is not that the Romish church searches in vain her museums, her past however rich, and even into the bowels of the earth, over which she reigns as sovereign, to make the truth be other than the truth. Whenever Rome expresses herself by the mouth of real men of science, she brings no proofs of the apostolicity of her particular creed. Epigraphical science, at least, does not confirm it. *All* the epitaphs favorable to the Roman dogmas are without date, or posterior to the year 350; and the evangelical character of those which are anterior, authorises us to believe that those which have not this character are of an epoch nearer to us than the middle of the fourth century.

We must pass beyond the year 366, to find the *first* document which is truly favorable to any one of the Roman doctrines, not to speak of *all* of them. We mean the famous *Damasian Inscriptions*, so named because they were written in Latin by Pope Damasus I, (366 to 384), "to the glory of the martyrs." One of them bears upon the margin the word *papa*. But Di Rossi readily admits that this stone is a badly made reproduction by Pope Vigilius, of an inscription broken by the barbarians, of which he (Di Rossi) has discovered some fragments. So that Vigilius might very well be the author of the title *Pope* given to Damasus; but Vigilius was of the *sixth* century. We have seen with our own eyes, in the cemetery of St. Calixtus, an epitaph in which Damasus gives himself the modest name of *episcopus*, bishop.

But the eloquent poem composed by Damasus in honor of St. Agnes has a definite dogmatical importance. The pope clearly invokes the prayers of the youthful saint in the verse

Ut Damasi precibus faveas, precor inclyta Martyr,

which we have read with our own eyes, on the indubitably original tablet, at the entrance to the catacombs of St. Agnes. Here is prayer to the dead, unquestionably. But let it be remembered that we have passed beyond the middle of the *fourth* century.

From this rapid survey of the inscriptions, we turn to the *paintings* found in the catacombs. The history of art helps us to fix the dates of these paintings with tolerable precision; indeed, it is not difficult for one acquainted with that history to say, almost at a glance, to what century a fresco belongs. The first ages of Christianity coincided with a flourishing period of art, which soon degenerated; and the line of distinction is so broadly marked as to be always easily discernible. The relics of the most ancient date have nothing in common with the later Byzantine paintings. But there is an obvious period of transition between the ancient classical style and the Byzantine; and to this period of transition many if not most of the paintings in the catacombs clearly belong. We distinguish it from the preceding epoch, not only by increasing incorrectness of design, but, above all, by the want of that luxury of ornamentation which characterises the truly Roman style. The figures are not so completely surrounded with garlands and foliage; we feel that little by little the personages themselves are become the important part of the picture, the accessories being less and less carefully treated.

As for the pictures of the truly Byzantine period, we shall spend no time on them. It is sufficiently well known that when *they* were produced, the doctrinal errors of the church of Rome had already taken pretty strong root. But a survey of the paintings of the classical and transition periods will amply reward our pains.

In the first place, we do not agree with those Protestant writers who hold that none of the so-called sacred paintings are of earlier date than the fourth century. We do not hesitate to assign to the third century, and even to the end of the second, the small number of classical paintings to be found in the catacombs. A striking feature in these paintings deserves special remark. Their subjects are not personages, (figures of saints or the like), but rather passages of Bible history, both from the Old and the New Testament. The distinction is of great importance. It is one thing to trace a portrait of Christ, with or without tradition for a guide, with the intention of being able to say to the spectator "This is the Christ;" and quite another thing to trace with a light and seemingly negligent hand, in the midst of a circle of arabesques, and among interlaced garlands, a small and modest figure of a Roman youth clothed with a sort of tunic, and bearing

on his shoulders a sheep, the feet of which he holds in front, after the pattern of the Roman shepherds when they carry an exhausted lamb. This figure of the shepherd is, moreover, almost the only sacred figure clearly defined among the classical paintings, especially in the cemetery of St. Calixtus, which is recognized generally as more ancient than the principal part of that of St. Agnes. In this last the same subject appears, but larger in size, and obviously later in date, and with certain additions to the conception of the good shepherd. In one case he is occupied with milking ewes, and in another, whilst he carries a lamb upon his back, he has a bucket at his feet,—simple details which show that the representation is merely that of a pastoral subject. This is still plainer in a painting in one of the *cubicula* of St. Calixtus. Here it is easy to recognize the shepherd with his burden, another sheep at his left, and a he-goat at his right, whilst the apostles endeavor to bring in the whole flock into the fold. Among the sheep, the eagerness of some and the indifference and hesitation of others, are clearly meant to illustrate the different types or dispositions of certain souls. The rudest iconoclast would hesitate to efface this touching and inoffensive picture.

After the picture of the good shepherd, we find a second set of subjects. From the early ages, and conformably to the pagan usage, it was habitual to paint upon the walls, and especially upon the tombs, rude portraits of the deceased, with the hands raised in the attitude of prayer. Specimens of these may be found in the catacombs of St. Agnes. Here also the Romanists show a woman in prayer, to whom they give the name of Madonna, without any reason for so doing. We can only see in the figure a simple *orante*, a woman in prayer, such as may be seen in many other places. The figure is too often repeated in circumstances where there could be no illusion, to allow us to see anything in the figure of the cemetery of St. Agnes more than this.

These three subjects—the good shepherd, the portraits of the dead, and the *orante*,—are the *only* ones of Christian origin and character to be assigned to the earliest dates of the catacomb paintings. It is clear that there is nothing in them, any more than in the inscriptions, to disturb a Protestant mind as to Christian doctrine in the third century.

Let us turn now to the frescoes of what we have styled the

transition period; that is to say, from the end of the third century to the fifth and sixth. Some of them, in spite of their inferiority in point of art, might even be assigned to the latter part of the third century. But what are the subjects? Not *saints* to be venerated, but simple Biblical histories. Among them are the history of Jonas, now under his miraculous gourd; again in the vessel; and again in the throat of the whale; then Daniel in the lions' den, and the three young men in the furnace; Lazarus raised from the dead; Noah in the ark; and the healing of the paralytic. We omit some of them, simply because, of preference, we choose those which we have studied ourselves. We leave out also paintings which are plainly reminiscences of paganism; such as Orpheus with his lyre, the Phœnix, and Mercury. This mingling of mythology with Biblicism should not greatly surprise us among artists who were formerly pagans. These good people little thought that we should one day decipher their hieroglyphics painfully, in order to confirm a doctrine. One scene, however, is worthy of special notice. It is the figure of Moses in the burning bush; and again, of Moses advancing to receive the tables of the Law, which a man's hand offers to him from behind a cloud. This hand is an early artistic anthropomorphism, but it is only *a hand.* It is said, though we have found no proof of it, that a St. Peter, in the form of Moses, struck the rock in the desert; but we shall return to this typical interpretation by-and-by, in the fifth or sixth century.

The paintings of which we have spoken seem to us to belong to the fourth century, although it is possible that they may be rightly assigned to the end of the third. We have found in them Biblical histories, no doubt used symbolically, to express Christian ideas: but no saints to be worshiped, and not even figures of personages separate and distinct from a symbolical or historical subject; each figure is part of some whole. Those which we now proceed to mention belong, at the earliest, to the fourth century.

The first is a "Christ in the garden of Olives," recently discovered in the cemetery of St. Agnes. It is simply a scene from the Gospel History, in no respect, an object or image intended to be adored. To the same period belong also the various representations of Mary found in the catacombs. A glance at any one of them suffices to show that the Christians of that age had

no ideal *Madonna*, such as that cherished by Romanists now-a-days. Thus the Mary of the catacombs of St. Agnes is simply a veiled female figure without halo, bearing upon her knees, it is true, the infant Jesus, but surrounded (in place of worshipers) by portraits of buried persons. Another at St. Calixtus, is a mother, whose infant receives the homage of the eastern Magi,—two, or four, not the later official number three. These Magi resemble somewhat those Parthian kings whom the Roman emperors dragged behind their triumphal cars, as sculptured on so many bas-reliefs. But, instead of royal crowns, they wear the Phygian cap, so terrible to the legitimists of our day; and by no means the head-gear in which modern Romanist art arrays the "Three Kings."

There is shown, also, at St. Agnes, a figure of a woman, with arms extended, and, beside her, two male figures. These three personages have been baptised with the names of Mary, St. Peter and St. Paul. "Mary prays;" it is said; "St. Peter on the right, the place of honor, holds up her hands, as formerly Moses was sustained, so that she may not become weary of interceding; and on the left Paul kneels to pray to the holy Virgin." Now the slightest critical judgment is enough to discern that the woman is certainly only the deceased person buried there, and *not* Mary. The pretended Peter shows no sign of holding up her arms; in fact he is just in the act of turning to the other side. As to the figure on the left, an unfortunate branch of foliage is left out of the account, which directly interposes between the woman and the pretended St. Paul. Now, there is no commentator familiar with ancient frescoes, either profane or sacred, who does not know that such a branch indicates a separation of two distinct scenes. This simple manner of showing that these three personages have nothing in common and do not form one single scene, suffices to overthrow all the hopes of the "virgin worshipers." We are sorry for them, because in truth we see in the catacombs no other argument in favor of their "Madonna," up to the Byzantine period, when she arrives indeed with all her luxury of sacred "glories" about her. But during the centuries which count for something in the history of early doctrine, the catacombs give, to sincere and intelligent observers, absolutely no argument for Mariolatry, or even illustration of it. Our next subject is a "Christ, teaching" in the midst, sometimes of six,

sometimes of twelve apostles. At his feet is a vase or wooden basket, which contains books in rolls, the sacred writings doubtless. It is a scene drawn from Scripture, with some insignificant additions. Nevertheless for those who do not consider this painting in itself alone, but in connection with others, and with regard to its place among a collection of scenes sketched along these august halls, there appears the dawn of a new conception. We feel that very soon, Christ will be represented *alone*, aside from all historical surroundings, and as a portrait to be venerated.

Before the purely Byzantine period the catacombs show another transition. We find Christ under the figure of a lamb, the head surrounded by the *aureole* in the midst of which is the monogram of his name. This lamb is mounted upon a little hill from which run the four rivers of Eden. It is surrounded by saints of all sorts, and we feel that we have plainly arrived at a period of doctrinal degeneracy, and that the reign of images is not far off. The danger of these increasing abuses was already felt, for we know that the Trullan Council prohibited this manner of presenting Christ under animal forms.

As to saints, male and female, the catacombs only show them to us in the midst of Biblical scenes up to the Byzantine period, when they are figured separately, and obviously with a new idea of saint-worship. It is not until the period of known decadence, that we find (in one of the cells of St. Calixtus) the first heads of saints, enriched with a significant aureole,—a Tranquillus if we are not mistaken—beside a Cyprian. Cyprian fell, in martyrdom, A. D. 258; but the recollection of his conflict with Stephen, Bishop of Rome, must have faded away before the African bishop could have received the martyr's crown in that city of long memories!

From the paintings of the catacombs we turn now to their *sculptures*. In the museums of Rome there are gathered numerous sarcophagi, Pagan in form, but with sculptures of Christian subjects. Some of them have inscriptions earlier than the fourth century, but these specimens are not adorned with sculpture. Moreover, in the days of persecution, the Christians were glad to bury their dead secretly; sculpture was not likely to be resorted to in those times of poverty and fear. Besides, the style of these monuments, of itself, suffices to fix their date later than the conversion of Constantine, (A. D. 312). It may be considered a

settled thing, that the best of these sculptures are of the fourth century at the earliest; while the inferior ones are of still later date. It is to be noted also, that many—even the greater part—of the sarcophagi now in the Roman museums, are known to have been taken, not from the catacombs, but from churches built under the early Christian Emperors. But these tombs tell their own story. Let us inquire what it is.

The sarcophagus, the style of which appears to be the most ancient, and which St. Di Rossi himself believes to have been the work of Pagan artists, is found in the museum of the Lateran. It is only a reproduction of different pastorals with adornments which are, plainly, the Pagan expression of a Christian ultra-symbolical idea; *e. g.* a vintage made by little genii, (we were about to say cupids); a harvest scene; a hunting scene, little evangelical certainly; and finally shepherds carrying Virgilian pipes. But the most curious thing is a *Psyche* which comes in, to symbolize, we imagine, the sacred soul. And a fact worthy of remark, in a doctrinal point of view, is that the good shepherd is mounted upon a pedestal which the Roman Catholics transform into an altar. In a similar bas relief, on the contrary, he bears almost the attributes of the god Pan, on account, no doubt, of his character of shepherd. Elsewhere the plough plays an important part. It is therefore puerile to press too far, as the Romanists do, the sense of these pastorals. It is evident, nevertheless, that the good shepherd occupies here a place resembling more that of an idol than could be found in the paintings described above.

The next sarcophagus is of special note. The Saviour appears as a very young man, crowned by a soldier (of the time of Constantine), not with thorns, but with laurel and flowers. The crucifixion is indicated by a *cross*, borne by Simon the Cyrenian. None of the Christian monuments contain the cross, before the end of the fourth century; while the crucifix does not appear before the sixth. In the first three centuries, then, when Christians thought or spoke of the passion of Christ, they represented it not by physical figures, but symbolically, just as Protestants do in our time.

Approaching the fifth century, we find the figure of Christ *bearded*, almost in the Byzantine style. One of the most remarkable bas-reliefs of this period shows us Mary, with the infant

Jesus upon her knees before the magi led by the star. These are the precursors of the Pagan world coming to adore Christ. Behind Mary stands a figure. Is it Joseph? Is it the Holy Spirit? Di Rossi holds to this last interpretation, because, says he, "the old sculptures do not represent Joseph as an old bearded man, but as a young man with a short tunic." This observation, of which we have not had the occasion to verify the exactitude, is not without easy answer. In the old sculptures, also, Christ is sometimes represented as beardless; and sometimes with beard. In the most ancient he is beardless, according to Roman classical usage; in the most recent, he becomes bearded, by approaching nearer the Byzantine type.

Let us resume now the series of actions of the beautiful and beardless young man of the bas-reliefs, who is evidently the Christ. He holds a rod in his hands, a sort of magical wand, such as we may imagine the fifth or sixth centuries to allow. With this rod he touches the water pots of Cana, multiplies the bread, and raises Lazarus. But suddenly this wand passes from his hands into those of a bearded figure. We cannot mistake the new hero—it is Peter with traditional features, his bald forehead, his cock, and further on the two officers who lead him whither he would not go. Has Christ given up his power to Peter? If this monument were of the second century, it would have great meaning on the Romanist side, but as it is of the fifth or sixth century, it simply helps the Protestant in fixing the beginnings of the doctrine of the primacy of Peter. The power *has* passed from the hands of Christ into those of the apostle; you may see, on an adjoining bas-relief, his well-marked figure touching, with the magical wand, a rock from which bursts forth a spring of water. But it must appear strange to the Romanists, that, even at this period, St. Peter appears armed only with a wand; never, as yet, with the indispensable keys. Those unfortunate keys! We for a long time personally sought for them, in all the catacombs and among all the ancient sculptures; but we never encountered them until at last we reached the crypts of St. Peter's, at a very late date. Here they appear, first upon a sepulchre without date; secondly upon a funereal urn, used, second hand, to serve as the tomb of Gregory V, on which Jesus is seen giving them to the Apostle. The sculpture is too wretched to be of a period of any avail in our discussion. As to the sculptures of

later date, their forms become so barbarous, nay, one might say even, so grotesque, that it is easy to see how degeneracy in art accompanies degeneracy of doctrine.

Let us now, in conclusion, sum up the results of our survey. In the first place, the catacombs bear witness to a historical development of doctrines, by their early uses, and by the utensils, inscriptions, paintings and sculptures found in them. As to their early uses, it appears probable that, by the third century, their largest vaults were used as places of worship, with veneration of the martyrs whose bones were buried there. Altars appear on the tombs of saints, in the fourth century. The hierarchy, typified by the bishop's chair, appears in the fifth century. As to the inscriptions, their first testimonies which support, even in the slightest degree, the Romanist dogmas, belong to the fourth century. Not more than the other remains of these centuries, do they give us anything of the first century, and they speak not at all of doctrine in the second. In the third century they imply a belief in *immediate* entrance into the kingdom of heaven, without purgatory. If prayers *for* the dead are not spoken of in the Roman Catholic sense, nevertheless, towards the second part of the fourth century, the inscriptions of Pope Damasus point to the newly born intercession of the saints and the martyrs. The marbles of this century show us also various degrees of the hierarchy, but leave it doubtful whether the bishops of Rome yet gave themselves the title of Pope.

The first paintings of the third century, (it is not certain that there were any in the second) furnish only the "good shepherd," and portaits of deceased persons; the fourth century offers only biblical allegories and histories, with the three magi and the Holy Communion; the fifth gives only the Christ teaching in the midst of his disciples, or the mystical lamb crowned by the monogram. The aureole around the heads of the saints having come later, we can only draw, on the whole, anti-Romish conclusions; admitting meanwhile the signs of slow progress toward image worship.

The sculptures of the fourth century show the good shepherd upon a pedestal or an altar. Elsewhere Peter denies his master; then receives the Gospel from him; whilst the idea of the Passion is developed; and Jesus Christ takes the form of Moses, his

Biblical type. Towards the end of this century the cross first appears. In the fifth or sixth we find the first idea of the transmission of powers from Christ to Peter, who, however, is not armed as yet with his keys.

And this is all . . even to the Byzantine period, which is the point at which it is admitted on all hands that the doctrines of early Christianity had lost their early form.

The catacombs furnish, then, a page of history of the highest interest. In them we can, in part, follow the development of Christian thought from century to century. But while marking gradual additions to Christian belief, they show, in an indubitable manner, the non-apostolicity of certain Romanist doctrines, the beginnings of which are to be traced there; as also they protest by their silence against certain others which are sought in vain in the places where, according to the Romish theory, they should certainly be found.

We close then, by repeating what we said at the beginning; Protestant theology has everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by the most thorough study of these relics of the past, which Rome has been so careful to disentomb and to preserve.

III.—MAN AN ORIGINAL CREATION, NOT A DEVELOPMENT, AS TAUGHT BY DARWIN AND HUXLEY.*

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There are no more explicit declarations in the Bible than those in regard to the distinct creations of plants and animals, and man as separate from all other animals. But some scientific men have taught that the testimony of nature is in direct opposition to these declarations. Especially do they thus teach in relation to the origin of man, of whom these sceptics all agree in asserting that he was not created, but that he came by descent from some other animal, through certain changes that took place in the far past in the physical organization. One of the most prominent of these authors of the present time claims that he has satisfactorily proved that our race descended from the gorilla.

All these writers have kindred modes of reasoning, although they differ somewhat in their forms of expression. The theory of Robinet is more adventurous, and covers more ground than any of the others. Instead of recognizing the common and obvious distinction between dead and living matter, he supposed all matter to be endowed with living properties, and taught that all the objects which we see, whether mineral, vegetable, or animal, are results of progressive efforts of nature, all looking in their progress towards a grand consummation in the formation of man. In advocating this theory he makes much of resemblances and analogies, representing some of the fantastic shapes sometimes assumed by minerals, from their slight resemblance to parts of the human body, "as so many proofs," as expressed by Carpenter, "of this long and bungling apprenticeship of nature to man-making." He fancied that he saw in nature a gradation upward from minerals through plants and animals to man, and inferred that this most complex of all beings was, during the progress of ages long past by, finally evolved by the working out of matter, step by step, in multitudes of forms, each form exceeding in quality and complexity that which preceded it.

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Lamarck, another of the same class of authors, observing the varieties that are produced by circumstances in dogs, fowls, &c., supposed that all the various species of animals were not created separately at the outset, but were produced from each other by circumstances, man coming in this way from the monkey tribe. I will state two examples illustrating his idea of the manner in which this transmutation of species, as it is termed, is effected. He accounts for the existence of long-legged waders among birds by supposing that they came from short-legged birds, who from a constant desire to catch fish had their legs grow long. So he supposed that the long neck of the camelopard came from the stretching out of the neck to reach high branches after it had browsed upon the lower ones.

But coming to our own immediate times, we have the now famous development-theory of Darwin, which is only a mere variation of the tune of Lamarck and Robinet. He supposes that all "animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or less number." But how are all the numberless varieties of plants and animals produced from these few forms which were originally created, for even he allows a creation to this small extent? Does he suppose that the Creator in some way endowed these simple forms with the wonderful power of producing other and more complex forms, till at last the most complex of all, man, is produced? Not at all. He leaves all to chance in reality, though he conjures up a fancied power, which he terms Natural selection. Let us see what this power is, and how he thinks it operates. Observing, like Lamarck, the many varieties that have arisen from the influence of circumstances among the domestic animals, and also the varieties of the human race, he starts with the general idea that animals are apt to vary. Then in this variation, those who happen to be improved, have in the grand struggle for existence, a better *chance* to survive and propagate their kind than those who do not vary at all, or in their variation are not improved. That it may be seen that I have represented his views aright, I will quote his exact language—"As many more individuals are born than can possibly survive, and as consequently there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it varies, however slightly, in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex, sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better

chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected. From the strong principle of inheritance any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form." Though Mr. Darwin uses such terms as natural selection and inheritance, and calls them principles and laws, yet it is obvious that the improvement, and the making of the improvement permanent, are in his view the results of blind chance. Indeed he uses himself the word *chance* in relation to the surviving of the animal that happens to be improved. He attributes omniscience and omnipresence to this power which he calls natural selection, for he says that it "is daily and hourly scrutinizing throughout the world every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good." By doing this, he supposes that his natural selection, like the transmutation of species of Lamarck, and the progressive gradation of Robinet, at length, by its improvements, added through a long series of ages, evolved man; and some at least of the disciples of this school suppose that the improvement is still going on, and that natural selection may yet produce on this earth a being as much superior to man as he is superior to the gorilla.

Some of the illustrations which Mr. Darwin gives of his theory are not a little amusing. I will cite but one of them. Having learned from his friend, Mr. Hearne, that he once saw a black bear swimming for hours with his mouth wide open, instead of thinking, like any reasonable man that had not his brain addled by some theory, that the animal was enjoying a good bath after getting overheated, he fancied that he was, with his open mouth, "catching, like a whale, insects in the water," and so inferred that black bears may have been the progenitors of whales. On this point, he says: "Even in so extreme a case as this, if the supply of insects were constant, and if better adapted competitors did not already exist in the country, I see no difficulty in a race of bears being rendered by natural selection more and more aquatic in their structure and habits, with larger and larger mouths, till a creature was produced as monstrous as a whale."

One of the most prominent disciples of Darwin, Professor Huxley, has published a book that has been widely circulated, in which he attempts to prove, as already stated, that through this transmutation of Lamarck, or gradation of Robinet, or natural selection of Darwin, (all different names for the same thing), the

immediate progenitor of the human race was the gorilla. This is but the echo of the doctrine broached by Lord Monboddo, an eccentric but learned Scotchman of the last century, that man is merely an improvement on the monkey, and really descended from that animal. We suppose that Huxley's idea is, that he has discovered in the recently-found gorilla the intermediate link in the chain of gradation or development between the monkey and man, and that Lord Monboddo was as nearly right as he could be with the means of knowledge possessed at that day.

It would seem as if it were the object of these authors to put away the idea of a present Deity, by shutting up the exercise of His creative power, within very narrow limits, far back in the ages, leaving all that has been evolved since that first supposed production of a few simple living forms, to the agency of mere blind chance, to which they, in their wisdom, ascribe certain laws and principles. In doing this, they exhibit an unseemly pride, by claiming for themselves both superiority of intellect and independence of thought, either by implication or downright assertion. Nothing can well exceed the cool impudence with which Professor Huxley speaks of the superiority of the class of investigators to which he belongs, as compared with those who think that some things are as well settled now as they ever will be, and have been so for a long time past. The language to which I refer is in relation to some of the great inquiries which press upon every thinking mind, as stated by Huxley, viz: "Whence our race has come; what are the limits of our power over nature, and of nature's power over us; to what goal we are tending." Of these, he says: "Most of us, shrinking from the difficulties and dangers which beset the seeker after original answers to these riddles, are contented to ignore them altogether, or to smother the investigating spirit under the feather-bed of respected and respectable tradition. But in every age, one or two restless spirits, blessed with that constructive genius which can only build on a secure foundation, or cursed with the mere spirit of scepticism, are unable to follow in the well-worn and comfortable track of their forefathers and contemporaries, and, unmindful of thorns and stumbling-blocks, strike out into paths of their own." The points to which Huxley alludes are not altogether riddles, as he assumes; for, to say nothing of the testimony of the Bible, which we suppose he would sneeringly call "the feather-bed of respected and respect-

able tradition," a true science has of itself so established some truths by its strict investigations as to afford us some "well-worn and comfortable tracks" which we can follow with safety and profit. And, for myself, I had rather tread in the beaten paths where I find the steps of Cuvier, and Agassiz, and Dana, and a host of other true investigators, than to encounter the inevitable "thorns and stumbling-blocks" which lie all along the mazy paths struck out by such wild though learned dreamers as Monboddo, and Robinet, and Darwin, and Huxley. I like adventure in science, but only when it is rational and reverential, and not when it insults both reason and the revelations of the Deity.

Again and again have such theorizers endeavored to put science in opposition to the Bible; but all past attempts have failed—and so will this, which Darwin and Huxley have inaugurated at the present time. The evil which comes from such attempts does not consist so much in convincing men of the truth of the doctrines taught, as in unsettling, more or less, a rational faith, by raising doubts as to things which are fairly established. It is in this loose way, mostly, that the poison of the fallacious reasoning of these authors is diffused. Few critically read their books; but multitudes receive into their minds, in some shape, their doctrines from various sources—the newspaper, the public lecture, conversation, and incidental remarks in various books, etc.—and, neglecting such examination as would reveal the fallacy, they allow their well-settled beliefs to be shaken.

It is proper to say here, in passing, that the Bible was not intended to teach science, and therefore does not deal in scientific language, but in that which is in common use.

In the elucidation which I now propose to make, I shall leave the Bible out of view, and simply show what science teaches on the subject before us. But as we go on, it will abundantly appear that here, as well as on other subjects, what a true science annunciates is in no way opposed to the Bible; or, in other words, that the revelations of the Creator in His works correspond with those in His Word.

Mr. Huxley entitles his book "Man's Place in Nature." If he had called it Man's *Anatomical* Place in Nature, it would have been a more appropriate title: for he bases his argument alone on structural differences, and leaves mental differences entirely

out of the account. He ushers in his subject with this grave announcement—"The question of questions for mankind—the problem which underlies all others, and is more deeply interesting than any other—is the ascertainment of the place which man occupies in nature, and of his relations to the universe of things. Whence our race has come; what are the limits of our power over nature, and of nature's power over us; to what goal we are tending—are the problems which present themselves anew and with undiminished interest to every man born into the world." Such problems are indeed grave ones, and they obviously have especial relation to the soul of man, and comparatively little, exceedingly little, to the body which that soul temporarily inhabits. And yet Huxley entirely ignores the soul, and dwells only upon material structure, as if physiological science should have nothing to do with the phenomena of mind, and can, with the scalpel of the anatomist exploring bones, and muscles, and brains, tell "whence our race has come," and "whither we are tending."

My course on this subject will be the reverse of this. I shall *begin* with the mind, and regard material structure not only as immeasurably less important, but as subsidiary to mind.

How then does man, let us inquire, differ mentally from other animals?

It has sometimes been said that man is governed by reason and animals by instinct. To nearly the same purport, says St. Hillaire, an eminent French naturalist, "the plant lives, the animal lives and feels, man lives, feels and thinks." The truth is, that both man and the animal have instinct, thought and reason. That common animals think, I need not stop to prove. It is obvious, also, that they reason, if we call the making of inferences reasoning. If you hit a dog with a stone, and he afterwards sees you take up another stone, he *infers* that he had better get out of the reach of that stone if he can. This inferring, or reasoning, is through the mere association of ideas, and differs from a higher kind of reasoning, soon to be spoken of as belonging exclusively to man. Sometimes this reasoning by association is more complex than in the case just cited. I will give a few examples. A bird built its nest in a quarry, where it was liable to disturbance from the blastings. It soon, however, learned to fly off when it heard the bell ring to warn the laborers previous to a blast. They sometimes rung the bell when there was to be no

blast, for the sake of amusement in seeing the bird start off when there was no need of it; but it did not allow itself to be many times deceived in this way, for it soon added another mental association to the first one from which its inference was made, and did not quit its nest till it saw the men run. Some horses in a field were supplied with water in a trough occasionally filled by a pump. One of the horses, more sagacious than the rest, if he found the trough empty, would take the pump-handle in his teeth, and pump into the trough. The other horses, seeing this, would, whenever they found no water in the trough, tease the horse that knew how to pump by biting and kicking him, till he would fill the trough for them. In this case, the horse that did the pumping *associated* in his mind the motion of the pump-handle in the hands of his master with the supply of water, and he inferred that his mouth could do as well as his master's hand. And while they *associated* this supply with his pumping, he inferred what their teasing him meant from *associating* it with their motions about the trough, indicating so plainly that they wanted some water.

Instinct is a very different thing from this reasoning by association. It makes no inferences. It is unreasoning and blind. The hen will sit on pieces of chalk, shaped like eggs, as readily as on real eggs. The flesh-fly often lays its eggs in the carrion-flower, the odor of which so resembles that of tainted meat as to deceive the insect. An amusing example of the blind disregard of circumstances in obeying instinct is furnished by an English gentlemen, Mr. Broderip, in an account of a beaver, which he caught when very young. He gives a circumstantial narration of his operations in a room in which he placed him, where there were also placed materials in great variety—rush-baskets, hand-brushes, sticks, books, boots, clothes, turf, coal, hay, etc. He went to work busily constructing out of these a dam and a nest, very much as he would if he were on the banks of a stream. Now, if his instinct were at all rational, it would not have impelled him to make a dam and a dwelling in a common room. Reason would have dictated the construction of a nest, and nothing more.

Instinct operates in many wonderful ways, but these we cannot stop to notice.

Reasoning by association is more prominent in some animals

than in others, but in none is it so much so as in man. It is with him a very abundant source of knowledge.

But there is a higher kind of reasoning, which belongs to man alone—a reasoning by which he arrives at principles—abstract reasoning, as it may be termed. I will illustrate, in a very simple way, the difference between this reasoning and that which is common to man and the brutes. Newton had a favorite dog, Diamond. We will suppose that, happening to be under an apple-tree with his master, he was hit by a falling apple. He would infer, if he saw other apples falling, that it was best to keep out of the way of them. This would be the extent of his reasoning. But how was it with his master? It is said that the seeing of an apple fall led him to such thoughts and reasonings on falling and moving bodies that he at length discovered the great fact or principle of gravitation.

Here we have disclosed to us the grand distinction—the "impassable chasm"—between man and other animals. No animal, however extensive may be its mental associations, and inferences from them, can ever evolve a principle, or receive one into its mind by instruction. This is not a difference of degree merely, but of *kind*. Man is not merely a wiser being than any other animal, but the main source of his wisdom is a faculty or power which is not possessed in the smallest degree by the most highly endowed of the brute creation. This introduces him into a sphere of thought, and consequently of feeling, in which he moves in common with angels, and, we may add, in common with the Deity—the only difference being that God knows all principles without the tedious processes of thought and reasoning which must be gone through with by man. It is plainly this which is signified when it is said of the creation of man, "In the image of God created he him."

Let us see now what results come from the possession of this power.

First, it is only by a recognition of principles that man infers from nature the existence of a Creator, or can teach this inference to others. And he can teach this to no brute, simply because it has no power of admitting into its mind the simplest principle.

Again, as the distinction between right and wrong is founded on principles, it is obvious that no animal but man can know this distinction; and so no animal but man can act in obedience to

conscience. Sometimes this knowledge is loosely and inconsiderately attributed to brutes of the higher orders. It has been said by some one, that man is the god of the dog; but it is irreverent trifling thus to compare the regard of the dog for his master to that which man should bear to the Creator. We usually recognize the distinction between man and animals in respect to the existence of a conscience in the very language we use. We are not apt to speak of *punishing* a dog, for the word implies a moral fault as the reason for the infliction. We *whip* him simply to associate in his mind the pain with the act done, to prevent him from doing it again; or, perhaps, to vent our ill-feeling for the harm done upon the innocent cause of it.

It is the power of abstract reasoning that is the source of language in man. This is manifest if we consider what is the nature of language. What we ordinarily term language is made up of vocal signs of an arbitrary character, with corresponding written signs. As general principles are recognized in the construction and arrangement of these signs, we see at once the reason that brutes have no artificial language—that is, no signs that are agreed upon as expressive of ideas. They do indeed have a natural language, made up of natural signs, cries, and motions, which vary in different tribes of animals; but artificial, that is, constructed language, is a wholly different thing, although it may incorporate into itself features from natural language. The parrot is indeed said to talk, but it is sheer imitation; and he never originates any language. It is not the mere possession of talking organs that gives to man the power of talking; the presence of the *mind* of man is essential for this use of those organs. The talking of Balaam's ass was a miracle; but all asses, and, in fact, all animals that have vocal organs, would talk at once, without any miraculous agency, if their minds could be endowed, as man's mind is, with the power of abstract reasoning; that is, they would both learn and invent words as expressive of their thoughts. The distinctness with which they would utter these words would differ according to the construction of the vocal organs; but most of the animals that we see around us would have a better utterance than the parrot has with his stiff and dry tongue.

It is a well-ascertained fact, that animals never recognize any meaning in outlines of objects; and yet the rudest outlines are readily interpreted by even very young children. To get at the

explanation of this, observe what the outline of any familiar object, as a cat, is to the child. His thought is not that it is a cat, but that some one has drawn certain lines by which he intended to give the idea of a cat. In other words, it is a form of language—picture-language, as it may be called—a language which the child can understand, because he has a reasoning mind, capable of filling out the outline and putting in the appropriate colors, which the animal cannot do. Ancient inscriptions show that this picture-language was in common use in rude nations before the art of writing was introduced.

Again, it is from man's capability of recognizing principles that comes all his knowledge of what is ideal and representative. On this point, says Figuier, a recent French author, "Thanks to this faculty, man has conceived the ideal and realized poesy. He has conceived the infinite and created mathematics." I need not stop to show that no brute ever stept within the realms of such knowledge.

No animal but man makes tools; and Franklin characterized man as a tool-making animal. Animals do, indeed, use such tools as nature provides for them—for teeth, claws, bills, etc., are tools—but they never contrive tools for themselves, and do not use any of man's tools in imitation of him, except it be in the case of a few of the higher animals, especially those that are peculiarly imitative. The tailor-bird uses its bill in sewing together leaves for its nest with threads that it picks up, but it never would invent a needle, or even think of using one, if it fell in its way, after seeing it used by any of the human race. The explanation of all this is, that in the use and construction of all tools, from the simplest instrument up to the most complicated machinery, we have the application of principles—the principles of mechanics; and of these no brute, from the constitution of his mind, can have any knowledge.

There is a marked difference between man and animals in regard to the continuance of natural affection. In the brute parent it lasts towards its offspring only so long as the necessity of parental care exists. It is not so with the human parent; and it is, partly at least, because the higher reason of the human mind, looking forward into the future as well as back into the past, and recognizing the principles which are the basis of relations and duties, associates such thoughts with the object of care as would awaken and perpetuate affection.

I have thus briefly noticed the chief results that come from the grand characteristic which distinguishes the mind of man from that of the higher brutes. It is a characteristic which belongs alike to the most cultivated and elevated, and the most rude and degraded of our race. There is no truth in the assertion which is sometimes made, that races who are depressed and brutalized by the circumstances of their condition, are midway between the cultivated races and the brutes. They are all with us on this side of the "impassable chasm" of which I have spoken, and have within them the germs of the same intellectual and moral power, needing only the influence of the same propitious circumstances that we have had for their full development.

While many, from Locke downward to the present time, have (and often independently of each other) fixed upon the power of abstract reasoning as the characteristic distinguishing the soul of man from the mind of the brute, there are many eminent men who have failed to arrive at this conclusion, and have made out other points of distinction. Thus, Carpenter and Owen, two of the most eminent of English physiologists, speak of the mental difference between man and the brutes as one of degree merely. This seems to be the teaching of Lord Brougham in his dialogues on instinct; and from some expressions of Agassiz, we infer that it is his opinion. Cuvier taught that the gift of speech is the distinguishing characteristic of man. This is the doctrine of Huxley, though his ideas of the nature of the endowment seem to be confused, for at one time he speaks of it as merely "the possession of articulate speech," and at another as "the marvellous endowment of *intelligible* and *rational* speech." He even appears to doubt whether it is really a positive distinction; for he uses the expression in one place, "whether it be absolutely peculiar to him or not," and in another he makes man's intellectual power depend upon various things, this being one of them. If the view of the subject which we have taken be correct, Huxley has committed the error of calling one of the many results of the grand distinguishing characteristic of man the cause, or one of the causes, of the difference between him and the brutes.

Let us look now at the physical organization of man, to discover how far differences there between man and the brute correspond with the grand mental difference. If the ideas of materialists are correct, then we ought to find that the organ of the

mind, the brain, exhibits in man a very marked difference from the same organ in the animal. For observe what the doctrine of materialists is. They assert that the manifestations of mind are wholly dependent upon matter; in other words, that thought is produced by the brain very much as bile is made by the liver. Now we will suppose that a physiologist found that in man, besides the bile usually secreted by the liver in the higher animals, another fluid substance totally different from the bile is also secreted. He would certainly expect to find, and would find, that this organ is different in man, to correspond with this addition of function. Suppose again, that he found that the eye of man performed the office of hearing in addition to that of seeing; he would expect to find, and would find, that there is some apparatus in the organ different from that which he finds in the eyes of other animals. So also, to take an illustration of a different character, if he saw two factories, in one of which he was told that swords are manufactured, while in the other they made both swords and guns, he would expect to find, and would find, in the latter some machinery which is not to be found in the former. So now, if he be a materialist, as there are some mental productions—mental secretions or manufactures, as he might term them—in man different from any that he finds in animals, he should expect to find apparatus or machinery in the brain of man which he does not find in other brains. The case is even stronger than the cases that I have given in the illustrations, for the difference between the higher manifestations of mind in man and those which he has in common with animals, is immeasurably greater than that between bile and any other fluid that you can think of or imagine, or that between seeing and hearing, or that between a sword and a musket.

But what is the truth about the comparison of the brain of man with that of brutes? It is, indeed, larger in proportion to the body than it is in the highest orders of animals; but there are no essential differences in structure or arrangement. The differences even in arrangement are so indistinct that they are matters of dispute among eminent physiologists, and Huxley himself has been quite prominent in the discussion. There certainly is no provision here in mere organization—machinery—for the production of that higher range of thought which is strictly peculiar to man, and which makes the race capable of evolving such minds as Newton, Bacon, Milton, and Cuvier.

On this point, Mr. Huxley says: "The argument that because there is an immense difference between a man's intelligence and an ape's, therefore there must be an equally immense difference between their brains, appears to me about as well based as the reasoning by which one should endeavor to prove that because there is a 'great gulf' between a watch that keeps accurate time and another that will not go at all, there is therefore a great structural hiatus between the two watches. A hair in the balance-wheel, a little rust on a pinion, a bend in a tooth of the escapement, a something so slight that only the practised eye of the watchmaker can discover it, may be the source of all the difference."

Now, granting for the moment that this illustration of Professor Huxley is pertinent, his inference is wrong. It should have been thus: as the difficulty in the watch that does not go can be found by the search of the watchmaker, so whatever it is in the brain of the brute that prevents it from doing what the brain of man can do, ought to be found by the anatomist.

But there is a palpable fallacy in the illustration. It is not at all pertinent to the case. The comparison is not between a brain that does certain things and one that does nothing, but between two brains one of which does some things in common with the other, and at the same time does some other very extraordinary things that the latter cannot do; and, therefore, in the illustration the comparison should be not between a watch that goes and another that does not, but between a watch that besides keeping time, does some very extraordinary things and a watch that simply keeps time. The inference should be, that as you would find in the watch that does uncommon things uncommon apparatus, so the materialist, if he be correct, should find in the brain of man apparatus that he does not in the brute, because it does some things vastly beyond the compass of the brute's brain.

The inference, then, is inevitable that the mental distinction which I have shown to exist between man and animals is not the result of organization. Mind is, in a certain sense, independent of organization—we say, in a certain sense—that is, so far as origination of the mind is concerned. But in a certain other sense, it is dependent upon organization. The mind and the brain are so connected together, that they are mutually dependent. This dependence is shown very clearly in the connections

which the mind has, through the brain and nerves, with the senses, by which alone it acquires its knowledge of the world of things around it, and with the muscles, by which alone it uses this knowledge in producing impressions upon the things and beings with which it is in communication. The dependence of the mind upon the brain is shown in the influence of bodily disease upon the mind, and in the waning of the mental powers in the bodily decline of old age. It is especially shown in accidents that directly affect the brain. Let this organ be pressed upon strongly by a fractured skull, and not only is the connection of the mind with the senses and the muscles cut off, but the mind stops its thinking.

This mutual dependence of mind and body, existing so long as they are connected together, does not prove at all that the mind may not leave the body at the time of its death. In other words, it does not prove that the mind is involved in the destruction of the body. Physiology gives us no evidence on this point, but leaves us here to the light of revelation. What that light so clearly shows us, it is not within our purpose to notice; because the discussion that we are pursuing is purely physiological.

We now go a step further. As the mind of man is not dependent upon organization so far as its origination is concerned, it follows that when the parent of our race was created, though the creation of soul and body were probably simultaneous, they were in a certain sense separate creations. The facts which physiology reveals demonstrate, as I have shown, that there is no foundation for the supposition that a body merely was created, and that mind was an out-growth from it—a mere result of physical organization.

Much less, I remark further, is it possible that man could come in any way from any other animal. If organization could be so changed as to effect this, so far as that is concerned, mind could not be, for the change of the mind of a brute into that of a man is a radical change—a change in kind and not merely in degree—a change which would imply a new creation.

The idea of Prof. Huxley is, as already stated, that man came from the gorilla. In attempting to establish this, his argument is, briefly stated, this: that in certain important items of structure or physical organization, there is more difference between the highest ape (the gorilla), and the lowest of the class, than

there is between men of the highest mental manifestations and those of the lowest; and therefore it is not impossible but highly probable that man came from the gorilla, long ages ago, as the result of the general tendency of nature to improvement, or as Darwin has it, by the force of natural selection. But, to say nothing of the minute points of the argument, we remark in the general, that this is an argument from anatomy alone; it refers to material structure only, and does not reach the mind, the soul. It leaves that wholly uncared for. If we grant, which is granting a great deal, that man's organization could come by various spontaneous changes from that of the gorilla, it is impossible that his soul could originate from the mind of that animal. It is the sheerest trifling to attribute such a change as this would imply to mere changes in anatomical structure, as is indicated by Huxley. Not even the Creator himself (I say it reverently), could effect such a change. We might as well say of Him that He could make one to be two, or right to be wrong. The evidence of a true science, aside from the Bible, goes to show that the soul was not evolved from something else by accidental changes, but was created; and looking at its capabilities as developed under the highest cultivation to which it has been subjected, we may say that this is the grandest among all the creations of the Deity within the range of man's observation.

Although there is so essential a mental difference between man and animals, there is much that is common to them both naturally and physically. We have already seen what they have in common *mentally*, in speaking of instinct and the lower order of reasoning. It remains for us to notice now the *physical* or structural correspondence. This exists simply because man lives amid the same circumstances as the brute. He breathes the same air, and therefore must have similar lungs; sees by the same light, and therefore must have similar eyes; treads the same earth, and must therefore have similar muscles to execute motion, &c., &c. But with the general similarity of structure, there are endless variations to meet endless varieties of wants and modes of life. If we had time, it would be interesting to follow out some of these variations in regard to some particular organs. I cannot dismiss this subject, however, without noticing the fact that amid all these variations there is the most marked evidence of a general plan. Thus, for example, the upper extremities of all the animals

that are called vertebrated, while they differ so much in man, cattle, beasts of prey, birds, bats, &c., in adaptation to the wants and modes of life of each order, and genus, and species, if you examine the bony frame-work, you can see a general idea running through the whole, the variation of the application of that idea being almost endless. Even the bones in the flipper of the whale have an obvious resemblance to the bones of the hand of man.

There is nothing derogatory to man in this physical alliance to other animals. There is not, even when we observe the resemblance in the brain and nervous system, that part of the organization most immediately connected with the mind, for the necessities of the brute as a sentient and voluntary being, require such organs. Neither is the mental alliance, so far as it goes, derogatory to man; for it does not touch that higher mental nature which gives him all his dignity, putting him "in relation with the Infinite," and indicating the truth of the expression of the Bible, "created in the image of God." But when we are called upon to believe that these higher attributes which distinguish man so decidedly from the brutes, originate, however remotely, from an ape, we instinctly revolt at the idea of such parentage, in spite of the learned ingenuity with which Huxley and other philosophers put in the claim. Huxley meets this feeling with the assertion that it is no more degrading to us to trace back our parentage to an ape than a savage. "Is it indeed true," he asks, "that the poet, the philosopher, or the artist, whose genius is the glory of the age, is degraded from his high estate by the undoubted historic probability, not to say certainty, that he is the direct descendant of some naked and beastial savage, whose intelligence was just sufficient to make him a little more cunning than the fox, and by so much more dangerous than the tiger?" In regard to all this I would simply say, that though Prof. Huxley may be content with the gorilla as his progenitor in the distant past, I would for myself prefer by far the savage, for he was a man—his faculties repressed and degraded indeed, but still there, and capable of being raised to a full and glorious development under propitous circumstances. A savage is not a beast, but a ruin of a man, and the dignity of his origin can be seen even in the ruin; but the gorilla is simply a beast, and no trace of past glory or promise of future improvement can be seen in him.

Now let us inquire whether there is any part of the human frame that can be considered in any good degree an exponent of the grand mental difference between man and the brute.

We should expect as a matter of course, that, as the mind of man has a vastly wider range of action than the mind of the brute, there would be provision for a corresponding wider range of bodily action; in other words, that there would be in the general more completeness and variety in the machinery of the frame. We should not look for a difference in this respect in those organs which are devoted to the growth of the body and its continual repair—the digestive organs, which take the nutriment from our food to furnish it to the blood; the circulating organs, which distribute the blood where it is wanted; and the lungs, which constantly renovate it by aeration. These are quite as complex in all the higher animals as in man. The difference is in the parts of the frame which are employed in executing the orders of the mind,—the bones, but especially the muscles that move the bones, and the nerves which are the means of communication between the mind and the muscles.

Now in looking at the whole frame, we find no part of it in which the difference between man and animals in variety of action is so great as in what is called the upper extremity in man and the anterior extremity in animals. What a wonderful instrument, or rather set of machinery, is the human hand. It looks, indeed, like a very simple machine, and not capable of doing much. There it is at the end of the arm, having four fingers and a thumb, extending out from the edge of a concave surface. But see what a variety of movements it can execute. We will mention some of them. It can point—punch—push—poke—pick—scratch—strike—pound—stroke—rub—dig—scrape—scoop—pull—lift—carry—roll—toss—throw—squeeze—wring—pinch—hook—knead. Then it can be used as a cup to drink from. It is the part principally used in gestures, and its movements in this way are exceedingly various, especially in the case of the deaf and dumb in their sign language.

These are some of the things which the hand can do by itself. But the variety of the things which it can do with tools and instruments is endless. See what extremes there are in what it can execute. It can do alike the coarsest and the most delicate work. Look at the hand of the blacksmith wielding the pon-

drous hammer, and then see that same hand using the pen, or look at the hand of the engraver, moving the graving tool in work so fine that he is obliged to use a magnifying glass to see how to do it.

There is one endowment of the hand that I have not yet noticed—its sense of touch. This is very acute in the tips of the fingers, especially when it is thoroughly educated. In the blind, who are obliged to rely upon it so much, we often see its capabilities developed to a high degree by cultivation. In the exceedingly varied movements of the hand and arm of the musician, as he plays upon certain instruments, as the piano and violin, this sense of touch is a great source of the variety, especially in regulating the degree of pressure, the variations in loudness being often of very wide range. As I heard Ole Bull play on his violin, so varied and quickly changing sometimes were the movements of that hand and arm, that it seemed as if half a dozen violins were being played upon at once, the acute touch of the tips of his fingers guiding the bow over them all.

Having thus noticed the variety of motion of the hand and arm, let us contrast it with the limited range of motion which we find in the correspondent limb in some animals. How very limited is the variety of motion of the fore foot of the horse. He can do little else than walk, and run and paw with it. Animals that have paws with nails, can execute a few more motions, but the variety is nothing as compared with the hand of man. The animals that approach the nearest to man in this respect, are the monkeys and apes; but the approach is really a very distant one. They are indeed in the classifications of Zöologists quadrumana —four-handed—but this is a gross misnomer. It is true that they have a sort of thumb, but so imperfect that a distinguished ancient anatomist said very truly of it, that regarded as an imitation of the thumb of man it is a ridiculous affair. The real test in this matter is the observation of the actual variety of motion which these pretended hands can execute. And so exceedingly narrow is this variety in comparison with man, that every candid mind must agree with that eminent physiologist, Sir Charles Bell, who said that "we ought to define the hand as belonging exclusively to man."

These extremities of the ape and monkey tribe are possessed of some of the properties of both hands and feet. They are given to these animals chiefly to enable them to grasp branches of trees

in climbing and to take their food; and they have nothing of that infinite variety in motion which is so striking a peculiarity of the hand of intelligent man. Even a monkey that has been trained at long and vast pains can do but few things with his foot-hands, as they may fitly be termed.*

Prof. Huxley, in endeavoring to prove man's alliance to the gorilla, tries to make it appear that the posterior extremity of this animal has a real foot. But in this he fails, for not to examine his anatomical argument, the actual uses to which the gorilla puts this extremity show that it is a foot-hand. He cannot bring it flat to the ground, as man does his foot, and most of his walking he does upon all fours. What Huxley would call the great toe, is so situated and so separated from the body of the foot as to make the limb look, as Huxley acknowedges, very hand-like, and enable the animal, in its life among the trees, to grasp the branches with this as well as with the other extremity.

Now let us see in what other points the physical organization of man differs from that of the higher animals.

If the faculty of speech were wholly dependent upon the vocal organs, we should expect to find a great difference here. But as we have before seen, there is not this dependence, and we find that there is much correspondence in the arrangements of these organs in man with those in many animals, they being in him only more complex and perfect than in any of them.

There is a marked difference between the countenance of man and that of those animals that come nearest to him in organization. None of them can laugh or cry, for they have not the muscles that are requisite for those acts, and so some one has proposed to designate man as a laughing and crying animal. But besides this, while there are some particular acts of expression in some animals which man has no muscles fitted to execute, as snarling, for example, man has a vastly wider range than any of them.

Man is the only animal that can fairly be said to walk erect, for though apes and monkeys sometimes assume the erect posi-

* I have said that the term quadrumana is a misnomer. Pedimana should be substituted. With this alteration a very simple classification of the Mammalia suggests itself. We would make five sub-classes. 1. Bimana, two-handed. Man is the sole representative. 2. Pedimana, having extremities which partake of the character of both hands and feet. 3. Cheiroptera, hand-winged—the bat tribe. 4. Quadrupeda, four-footed. 5. Cetacea, the whale tribe, which have neither hands nor feet.

tion, or nearly so, it is but an exception, and a rare one, to their usual attitudes. This distinction which is a marked one, and very significant as coinciding with the dignity of man's nature, is dependent upon the general arrangements of the framework and the muscles of the body.

These points of superiority, though appropriate accompaniments of that which we have seen to exist in the upper extremity, are yet rather indefinite, and the hand must be pronounced to be the grand physical mark of distinction in man. It is the fitting executive of the intelligent mind, carrying out its various purposes by the extreme variety of its motions.

And what a mind it is to which the hand so well ministers! To what a range of action does that distinctive quality, the power of abstract reasoning, introduce it! When this power of the mind is fully developed, its achievements are often so wonderful, that they give us some conception of the great truth, that man is created in the image of God. When we look at the discoveries of Newton or the unerring calculations of the return of an eclipse, or listen to a perfect argument, as it develops grand truths, and leads us with a majesty of thought almost divine, straight on to mighty conclusions, we take in the full meaning of the assertion, that "the soul is that side of our nature which is in relation with the Infinite," and we see the folly of those dreamers in science that look upon man as making merely the highest order in the animal kingdom. We see that the "chasm" between him and other animals is truly "impassable," as asserted by Guyot. We see that we are in a mental region, of which the most intelligent of them know nothing—that, though they live like us, having the same senses, seeing the same beautiful things, and hearing the same voices of nature, and like us have thoughts, emotions and desires, they are shut out from an upper region of thought and feeling, in which we freely roam, and from which we look with aspirations unknown to them to another world beyond—aspirations which the Bible tells us shall be realized in that world, the soul being there united to a more glorious body, and endowed with such additional powers, that we shall know even as we are known, and be introduced into a range of thought and feeling immensely wider and higher than that which we here enjoy.

IV.—THE APOSTOLICAL FATHERS.

These two series of volumes bid fair to form a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of Ante-Nicene theology. They are entirely independent of each other, save in the fact that the author of the "Critical History" is one of the editors of the translations. Dr. Donaldson has undertaken an important but very formidable task; he brings all the writings of that period to the bar of a close criticism, passes judgment on their genuineness, their authenticity, the theological opinions represented by each, and the manifold influences which determined their character. His aim is to furnish an exhaustive introduction to the study of the whole body of those documents which the library of Ante-Nicene theology purposes to translate. Should the two enterprises be encouraged as they deserve, the Christian theology of the age between the apostles and the Nicene Council will be placed before the English reader with advantages for its study never before enjoyed.

We shall at present limit our review to the first volume of the two series containing the "Apostolical Fathers;" and at the outset we find that the two volumes do not cover the same ground. Dr. Donaldson's principles are severe; he reckons only five names in this earliest class of uninspired writers, and one or two even of them barely maintain their position. Barnabas and Hermas he does not regard as proved to be the persons mentioned in the New Testament, though he admits that their writings are of very early date, and fairly belong to the time immediately following the Apostles. Hence he limits the venerable name of "Apostolical Fathers" to Clement, Polycarp, and Papias. Ignatius he summarily excludes, on the ground that his letters "contain opin-

* From the *London Quarterly Review* (Methodist), April, 1867. A review of, 1. *A Critical History of Christian Literature and Doctrine, from the Death of the Apostles to the Nicene Council.* By James Donaldson, M.A., LL.D. Vol. I. *The Apostolical Fathers.* Macmillan & Co. 1864. 2. *Ante-Nicene Christian Library. Translation of the Writings of the Fathers down to* A. D. 325. Edited by the Rev. Alexander Roberts, D.D. and James Donaldson, LL.D. Vol. I. *The Apostolical Fathers.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1867. [J. McC.]

ions and exhibit modes of thought entirely unknown to any of the ep-apostolic writings." The Epistle to Diognetus is not alluded to. In the translation, however, we have the complete Seven, as they are generally accepted. The version is faithful and readable; much pains has been taken with the text; and, with a praiseworthy anxiety to leave the reader's judgment unfettered, all the disputed writings of the several authors are inserted, with such prefatory matter as was necessary in order to set the question of their genuineness in a fair light. The principles on which the translation is based, and the style in which it is presented to the public, are unexceptionable. We greatly admire this specimen, and may with great confidence recommend the series which it commences so nobly.

Taking this volume as our guide, we are introduced to a series of writers occupying a definite place of their own in Christian literature, and whose productions have, on many grounds, a surpassing importance. They mark the epoch of transition from the reign of inspiration to the ordinary action of thought and language. They show what was the impression produced upon their own contemporaries by the conversion and the writings of the Apostles. They are the first reflection of the New Testament in the uninspired literature of the Church. These documents are about the same in quantity as the New Testament, and are written by about the same number of writers, on the same topics generally; some of them being letters sent to the same churches. Had such a collection of writings been concealed during the intervening centuries, as some of them were till a comparatively recent period, with what intense curiosity would they be appealed to and studied by all classes of Christians! Before estimating their general value, let us glance at the series individually.

The Epistle of Clemens Romanus is a document of peculiar interest, being the first specimen extant of uninspired Christian literature. If we accept the period of the Domitian persecution, about A. D. 97, as the date of its composition—a date which both external and internal evidence mutually confirm—it was written immediately after the spirit of inspiration had dictated the last book of Holy Scripture to St. John in Patmos. Again, as we may assume, according to the unanimous testimonies of antiquity, that its author was the Clement mentioned by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Philippians, it is the only production that has an

indisputable claim to be regarded as proceeding from a companion of the Apostles. Further, as from the date of the earliest uninspired document that followed, it cannot, as we shall see, be placed earlier than the middle of the second century, this letter of Clement stands alone for a space of fifty years as representing the earliest thoughts of Christian literature. Lastly, it was written from the Church at Rome to that of Corinth, from one great center of St. Paul's influence to another—the only instance of the kind—and this also bespeaks its importance. Thus, by a variety of concurrent notes, both the writer and the writing are stamped with a peculiar dignity; the letter is invested with a special sacredness as the primitive document of the Christian archives outside the New Testament, and the name of Clement has another memorial second only to that of being "written in the Book of Life."

It may be supposed, therefore, that the letter was highly esteemed in the early church. The testimony of Eusebius—"There is one acknowledged epistle of this Clement, great and admirable, which he wrote in the name of the church of Rome to the church of Corinth, sedition having arisen in the latter. We are aware that this epistle has been publicly read in very many churches, both in old times and also in our own day"—indicates that it held, during the first two centuries, a place almost on a level with the canonical writings. To this high estimate we owe its preservation; the only copy extant being that found in the "Codex Alexandrinus," presented, in 1628, by Cyril, Patriarch of Constantinople, to Charles I., and now preserved in the British Museum.

Since its restoration to the light of Western criticism, this letter has been studied by all parties of theologians with deep interest. The modern Rationalist school have manifested a keen anxiety to discover its points of divergence from apostolical doctrine; but any reader who takes up the faithful translation now lying before us, will be able to judge for himself how futile are their attempts. He will see that there is nothing in the epistle inconsistent with the writer's character as a hearer of the Apostles; always allowing for the infirmities of an uninspired and perhaps somewhat credulous man. His object being a friendly admonition to the Corinthians on account of their dissensions—a suggestive fact in the first document of the Church's common lit-

erature—that object is kept in view throughout. The history and evil effects of jealousy are traced in the Old Testament, and in the persecutions of the early Christian age. The opposite graces of humility and meekness are descanted upon at length, and the duty of preserving the unity of the Church enforced; the Corinthians are referred to the Apostle's letter, and urged to repent and renew their concord. The whole ends with a hope that the deputation sent by the Roman church to visit them, will return with the glad tidings of the restoration of harmony—followed by the customary benediction of St. Paul.

When examined in detail, this primitive document will be found to be a faithful reflection of apostolical doctrine; but, on the other hand, it will mark very emphatically the tremendous descent from the style of inspiration to that of men's ordinary thought and composition.

The former assertion has been much disputed, and many who do not contradict it on the whole yet seem to be solicitous to prove that this earliest exponent of the Church's interpretation of apostolical doctrine is not in harmony with what is called modern orthodoxy. Something of this spirit appears in Dr. Donaldson's volume. While he admits, for instance, that Clement regarded Christ as more than human, "for he describes Him as the reflection or radiance of God's greatness, and as being so much greater than the angels, as He has inherited a more excellent name than they," he nevertheless strives to invalidate Clement's testimonies to the Divinity of our Lord, by the application of a kind of criticism which, if applied to the New Testament, would go far to rob it also of that doctrine. In the second chapter of the epistle occurs the following sentence: "Content with the provision which God had made for you, and carefully attending to His words, ye were inwardly filled with His doctrine, and His sufferings were before your eyes." These words are quite in harmony with the spirit and style of the New Testament, and do not involve, as Dr. Donaldson thinks, an imputation of Patripassianism. Following Junius, he would change the first letter of the word, and substitute "instructions" for "sufferings:" a change which would make the sentence tautological, and take away the striking connection between the contemplation of Christ's sufferings and the grace of humble self-renunciation, which Clement is referring to as having formerly characterized the Corinthians. We, therefore, hold to

the text, with all its weight of doctrine, as it is faithfully rendered in the translation of Clark's series. We must deny, also, that Clement's frequent references to the Holy Word "contain no express declaration of the Logos idea." To us they seem to be a remarkable application of language which had already been made current by the Apostles, and which St. John had recently set forth, in all its fullness of meaning. And when Dr. Donaldson endeavors to invalidate the force of the argument derived from the doxologies, he seems to forget that, even if they were merely ascriptions of praise to God through Christ, the invocation of the grace of Christ is itself an acknowledgment of His Divinity. The phraseology used by Clement with regard to Christ is precisely the same as that of St. Paul. It is language which recognizes Him as the Mediator between God and men, who does not merely impart a grace which He receives for us, but sends us down His own grace. There is the same tone of reverence in every allusion to Christ; and we confess that we are among the number of those moderns, "more prejudiced than Photius," who think Clement's epistles perfectly loyal to the supreme Divinity of the Redeemer. Dr. Donaldson says: "Indeed, the way in which Christ is spoken of is one of the most striking peculiarities of the letter,"—an idle assertion, which he goes on to establish by quoting a series of expressions that read exactly like extracts from the epistles of St. Paul. Peculiarities there are in the document, as we shall see; but it does not vary by a shade from the New Testament in the style in which it speaks of the Redeemer's majesty.

The first uninspired statements concerning the virtue of Christ's death are, in our judgment, entirely faithful to the doctrine of an atonement offered by a vicarious sacrifice. Were it otherwise, the fact would be a very solemn and important one. The tone of Dr. Donaldson's remarks tends to a denial of this. He admits that Clement attached a "mysterious efficacy" to Christ's death; but pleads that he did not "attempt to explain the mystery." This may be readily admitted. The apostle Paul does not explain the mystery; but, like Clement after him, he sets forth, under every possible aspect, the vital importance of the death of Christ to the salvation of man. When we remember that the epistle was written for a specific purpose, and that allusions to the atonement enter only incidentally, such sentences as the following will be thought a very true reflection of the scriptural and

orthodox doctrine: "Let us look steadfastly to the blood of Christ, and see how precious that blood is to God (the Father), which, having been shed for our salvation, has set the grace of repentance before the whole world. Let us turn to every age that has passed, and learn that, from generation to generation, the Lord has granted a place of repentance to all such as would be converted to Him." Again, speaking of Rahab's virtue, he says: "Moreover, they gave her a sign to this effect, that she should hang forth from her house a scarlet thread; and thus they made it manifest that redemption should flow through the blood of the Lord to all them that believe and hope in God. Ye see, beloved, that there was not only faith, but prophecy in this woman." The unprejudiced reader, remembering that this is not a dogmatic treatise, will find such constant references to the death of Christ on behalf of man, as to warrant a different opinion from that of our critic, who coldly remarks, "Little is said of the death of Christ."

As to Clement's way of exhibiting the method of salvation, the fundamental passage is as follows: "All those, therefore, were highly honored and made great, not for their own sakes, or for their own works, or for the righteousness which they wrought, but through the operation of His will. And we, too, being called by His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, nor by our own wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have wrought in holiness of heart; but by that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God has justified all men; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen." Interpreted by this passage, all those sentences which are referred to as indicating divergences, more or less important, from apostolical teaching, may very fairly be regarded as containing variations only in the method of expression. Certainly, his view of faith is, really, though not so precisely expressed more than once, faith in Christ; his salvation by works is that of St. Paul and St. James; and his doctrine of election is almost verbally that of the Epistle to the Ephesians.

The morality taught by this epistle is as faithful to the New Testament as its doctrine is; and yet there is a very wide interval between Clement and the Apostles. It is not, that, when we look upon his page, we find something different from the more familiar page of Scripture; the entire cast of the composition

betrays that man's own mind is governing its own movements. There is the human element in the following beautiful passage which Professor Donaldson quotes, as containing a more enlarged reference to the operations of God in nature. It is the first specimen of Christian oratory; as such, forming a distinct paragraph, in which the writer deliberately sets himself the task of a rhetorical glorification of the Creator:

"Let us look steadfastly to the Father and Creator of the universe, and cleave to His mighty and surpassingly great gifts and benefactions of peace. Let us contemplate him with our understanding, and look with the eyes of our soul to His long-suffering will. Let us reflect how free from wrath He is towards all His creation. The heavens, revolving under His government, are subject to Him in peace. Day and night run the course appointed by Him, in no wise hindering each other. The sun and moon, with the companies of the stars, roll on in harmony according to His command, within their prescribed limits, and without any deviation. The fruitful earth, according to His will, brings forth food in abundance, at the proper seasons, for man and beast, and all the living beings upon it; never hesitating, nor changing any of the ordinances which He has fixed. The unsearchable places of abysses, and the indescribable arrangements of the lower world, are restrained by the same laws. The vast immeasurable sea, gathered together, by His working, into various basins, never passes beyond the bounds placed around it, but does as he has commanded. For He said, 'Thus far shalt thou come, and thy waves shall be broken within thee.' The ocean, impassable to man, and the worlds beyond it, are regulated by the same enactments of the Lord. The seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter, peacefully give place to one another. The winds, in their several quarters, fulfill, at the proper time, their service without hindrance. The ever-flowing fountains, formed both for enjoyment and health, furnish, without fail, their breasts for the life of men. The very smallest of living beings meet together in peace and concord. All these the great Creator and Lord of all has appointed to exist in peace and harmony; while He does good to all, but most abundantly to us, who have fled for refuge to His compassions through Jesus Christ our Lord, to whom be glory and majesty for ever and ever. Amen."

The translation of this passage does not force the original; it simply does it justice. The passage itself strikingly illustrates the transition from the style of the Holy Ghost to the ordinary reflection of the pious mind. But it is chiefly remarkable as exhibiting that tranquil reconciliation of Providence and redemption

which reigns throughout the earliest Christian writings. In them Christ is the harmony of all things most seemingly diverse; a new Providence, and yet the same that was from the beginning; restoring to His people, even in this life, the blessedness which was the design of man's existence; and pronouncing once more upon the disordered elements of creation the original benediction of "very good."

While Clement perfectly agrees with the Apostles in the reverence with which he acknowledges the inspiration and authority of the Old Testament writers—expressly declaring that the Holy Ghost wrote and spoke in them—he takes more liberty with the letter of the Scripture than the Apostles; and, in fact, betrays much confusion in his mosaic style of quotation. Thus this primitive Christian document gave earnest of the license which men would allow themselves in their treatment of the Bible. But in the case of Clement, there is scarcely an instance in which the misquotation affects any important element of truth. Let the following example be witness; God is spoken of as crying: "Say to the sons of my people, If your sins reach from the earth to the heaven, and if they be redder than scarlet, and blacker than sackcloth, and ye turn to me with the whole of your heart, and say, O Father, I will hear you as a holy people," where there is nothing but the truth, although the words can be represented as God's only by combining three or four passages in the Prophets.

There are some fanciful analogies in the latter, which are indicative of the tendency of Clement's mind. Not content with the one grand argument for the resurrection, which he gives from St. Paul, he goes on, in a feeble but pleasant style, to speak of day and night, bud and flower, as figuring the future change; and winds up with the myth of the phœnix, without any note that he is introducing a fable. But the declension from the style of inspiration is not exhibited in detached passages so much as in the diffuse tone of the whole. The effects of strife, in the persecution and martyrdom of the saints, ancient and modern, are dwelt upon almost wearisomely; while we miss the sublime views that really dignify persecution and death, by making them sufferings endured with Christ. And the graces of faith, obedience, and hospitality, with the benediction God has granted to them from the beginning, are depicted in a style very different from that in which the same things are dwelt upon in the Epistle to the

Hebrews, and elsewhere in the New Testament. We feel at once, that, with Clement, a new order of things has come in sacred literature.

We have dwelt rather disproportionately upon Clement, in deference to his claim as the first of the fathers. The next name—that of Ignatius—is of far greater importance, not so much on account of the superior intrinsic value of his writings, as on account of the disputes of which they have been the center, and their great weight in certain points of controversy. Whatever is known concerning his personal history is gathered from an account of his martyrdom, professing to be written by some of his companions—an account that has been held in suspicion because no mention was made of it during the first six centuries. Notwithstanding this fact, the simplicity of the narrative—allowing for a few of those accretions which such records were liable to gather in course of time—pleads strongly in its favor; and we agree with the translator of the "Apostolical Fathers" in accepting it. We learn that Ignatius was a disciple of St. John, and, at the time of his death, chief presbyter or bishop of Antioch. In the persecution that raged under Trajan, about A. D. 117, he was brought, or voluntarily presented himself, before the Emperor, then on an expedition against the Parthians, and was condemned to the wild beasts at Rome. It is remarkable, that before Trajan he explained his name Theophilus to mean "One that beareth God in his heart;" the narrative making no reference to the legend which identified him with the child borne in Christ's arms (Matt. xviii : 2), a distinction that certainly would not have been passed by in a later forgery. During the series of voyages by which he made his slow pilgrimage to death, he wrote the epistles which have made his name memorable.

These letters have been the occasion of more controversy than any other remains of Christian antiquity. There are fifteen assigned to him; eight, however, are now almost universally regarded as spurious, betraying by their very addresses their absolute inconsistency with the known principles of the second century. The remaining seven were acknowledged by Eusebius, and are now generally regarded as the productions of Ignatius. But they are found in two recensions, a longer and a shorter. In the seventeenth century there was a high discussion as to which of the two forms was the original, and whether both were

not much interpolated in the editions transmitted. Bishop Pearson's *Vindiciæ* established on an immovable foundation the genuineness of the shorter recension, that is, as compared with the longer; but it did not suffice to preclude controversy as to the question whether the letters generally are rightly attributed to Ignatius. During the present century a Syriac version of the three most important epistles has been found in an Egyptian monastery; the epistles to Polycarp, to the Romans, and to the Ephesians. This Syriac version is still shorter than the shorter of the Greek. The late Dr. Cureton labored hard to prove that it is the only trustworthy representative of Ignatius, "the only true and genuine letters of the venerable Bishop of Antioch, that have either come down to our times, or were ever known in the earliest ages of the Christian Church." Learned men are far from unanimous in accepting this verdict; the controversy still goes on, and is likely to continue. Meanwhile, it may be observed that the three epistles contain the substance of the Ignatian theology, and it is wise to confine ourselves to them in illustrating the character of that theology.

We shall select a few passages from the Epistle to the Ephesians in the shorter Greek recension (Clark's translation), as exhibiting at one view the salient points in the Christian teaching of Ignatius.

"I have become acquainted with your name, much-beloved in God, which ye have acquired by the habit of righteousness, according to the faith and love in Jesus Christ our Saviour. Being the followers of God, and stirring up yourselves by the blood of God, ye have perfectly accomplished the work which was beseeming you. For, on hearing that I came bound from Syria for the common name and hope, trusting through your prayers to be permitted to fight with beasts at Rome, that so by martyrdom I may indeed become the disciple of Him 'who gave Himself for us, an offering and sacrifice to God'—I received therefore, your whole multitude in the name of God, through Onesimus, a man of inexpressible love, and your bishop in the flesh. It is therefore befitting that you should in every way glorify Jesus Christ, who hath glorified you, that by a unanimous obedience 'ye may be perfectly joined together in the same mind and in the same judgment, and may all speak the same thing concerning the same thing, and that, being subject to the bishop and the presbytery, ye may in all respects be sanctified. For even Jesus Christ, our inseperable life, is the manifested will of the Father: as also bishops, settled everywhere to the utmost bounds, are so

by the will of Jesus Christ. Wherefore it is fitting that ye should run together in accordance with the will of your bishop, which thing also ye do. For your justly-renowned presbytery, worthy of God, is fitted as exactly to the bishop as the strings are to the harp. Therefore in your concord and harmonious love, Jesus Christ is sung. And do ye, man by man, become a choir that, being harmonious in love, and taking up the song of God in unison, ye may with one voice sing to the Father through Jesus Christ, so that He may both hear you and perceive by your works that ye are indeed members of His Son. It is profitable, therefore, that ye should live in an unblameable unity, that thus ye may always enjoy communion with God. Let no man deceive himself: if any one be not within the altar he is deprived of the bread of God. He therefore that does not assemble with the Church has even by this manifested his pride. It is manifest, therefore, that we should look upon the Bishop even as we would upon the Lord Himself. There is one Physician who is possessed both of flesh and spirit; both made and not made; God existing in flesh; true life in death; both of Mary and of God; first passible then impassible, even Jesus Christ our Lord. Being stones of the temple of the Father, prepared for the building of God the Father, and drawn up on high by the instrument of Jesus Christ, which is the Cross, making use of the Holy Spirit as a rope, while your faith was the means by which you ascended, and your love the way which led up to God. Faith and love towards Christ Jesus which are the beginning and the end of life; for the beginning is faith, and the end is love. Now the virginity of Mary was hidden from the prince of this world, as was also her offspring, and the death of the Lord: three mysteries of renown which were wrought in silence by God. Hence every kind of magic was destroyed—God Himself being manifested in human form for the renewal of eternal life. That ye come together, man by man, in common through grace, individually, in one faith, and in Jesus Christ, who was of the seed of David according to the flesh, being both the Son of Man and the Son of God, so that ye obey the bishop and the presbytery with an undivided mind, one and the same bread, which is the medicine of immortality, and the antidote to prevent us from dying, but that we should live for ever in Jesus Christ. Farewell in God the Father, and Jesus Christ, our common hope."

Constrained as we are to believe that, however much in the *Corpus Ignatianum* belongs to a pseudo-Ignatius, the genuine Ignatius writes in the epistle from which these extracts are taken, we are bound to accept them as striking the key-note of his theology. It is certainly very strongly marked; and the difference between this strain and that of Clement is so obvious that we do

not wonder at the conclusion to which many thoughtful critics have come—that the whole series of the Ignatian epistles must be transposed into a later period. But to us it seems that there is nothing in the above passage that may not be explained on the principles of the apostolical epistles, and on the assumption of some special design actuating the writer throughout. Divisions and heresies were distracting the Church at that period; and hence the urgency with which Ignatius proclaims the note of Catholicity as a rallying around the chief presbyter or bishop, in the midst of his presbytery. Of any episcopal succession to the prerogatives of the apostles, Ignatius never speaks; on the contrary, while making the bishop a representative of Christ in the Church, he always places the presbytery in the place of the apostles. There can be no doubt that both representations were to be understood rather figuratively than literally. The same may be said of the language used concerning the Eucharist as the food of immortality. A spirit of exaggeration pervades all his views; but the principles he exaggerates are sound and apostolic. There is a unity of every section of the visible Church which cannot otherwise be secured than by the assembling of that Church around the appointed ministry, which ministry, by whatever name known, must have one recognized head in every community. But in his statements on this subject, and in his overstrained eagerness for martyrdom as the perfection of disciples, Ignatius only translates inspired doctrine into uninspired and unauthoritative, and, perhaps, indefensible language of his own. So far as he diverges from the style of the New Testament, he only bears witness to a tendency that began very early, and that steadily went on in the current and course that his exaggeration indicates.

On the other hand, if by discarding Ignatius from the company of the Apostolical Fathers we rid the sub-apostolic age of some elements of difficulty, we lose some most noble confirmations of its fidelity to the truth. Throughout these epistles the fundamental doctrines of the faith, the Divinity of Christ, the relations of the Holy Trinity, the redemption effected on the cross, and all the obligations of the purest morality, are set forth in the most perfect exhibition; and the personal character of Ignatius—whose "love was crucified," and who sealed his devotion by so glorious a death—renders him worthy of an eminent place among the *Isapostoloi.*

Of Polycarp, one of the most venerable names in Christian antiquity, the records are very limited. We know him only through a few enthusiastic notices of Irenæus, his disciple, the account of his martyrdom (professedly written by the Church of Smyrna), and his own undoubtedly genuine epistle to the Philippians. "I can tell," says Irenæus, in his letter to Florinus, "the spot in which the blessed Polycarp sat and conversed, and his outgoings and incomings, and the character of his life, and the form of his body, and the conversations which he held with the multitude; and how he related his familiar intercourse with John and the rest who had seen the Lord; and how he rehearsed their sayings, and what things they were which he had heard from them with regard to the Lord and His miracles and teaching." According to the *Martyrium*—originally a plain and pious statement, which afterwards was embellished with many touches of fiction—Polycarp, constrained by his friends, withdrew in the heat of persecution from the city. In his concealment he prayed day and night, but with little thought of final escape. In one of his broken slumbers, he dreamed that his pillow was on fire, and said to those who were around him, "It behooves me to be burnt alive." Betrayed by a servant he was brought before the proconsul, and commanded to revile Christ. "Eighty and six years," he replied, "have I served Him, and he has done me no ill, and how can I blaspheme my King who has saved me?" He died heroically at the stake, and the constancy of his spirit to the end left him a memorial that needed none of the fanciful miraculous interpositions that were invented as accompaniments to his death.

Polycarp wrote other letters, but this alone has come down to posterity. It is a very artless effusion, adding nothing of any value to the theology of the second century, but deeply interesting on many accounts. The Philippians had requested him to write, and he wrote precisely such a letter as might have been expected to proceed from a very aged companion of apostles. His doctrine contains the fullness of the gospel of grace. His invocations of mercy and grace from Christ and the Father; his inculcations of faith in the Redeemer, the denial of whose real incarnation he terms the doctrine of Antichrist; his declarations that Christ died for us, "carrying our sins in His own body to the tree," and "enduring all things that we might live through Him;" his assertion that they knew that "they were saved by

grace, not from works, but by the will of God through Jesus Christ;" and indeed the entire tenor of his doctrine, is in strict harmony with what we regard as the evangelical doctrine of the apostles. But the striking peculiarity of this epistle is that of being little more than a mosaic of quotations from the epistles of St. Paul and St. Peter, not without, as might be supposed, some reminiscences of St. John. The following passage is remarkable as an echo of St. John's first epistle, and as vividly realizing the Docetæ of the second century:—

"For whoever does not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is Antichrist; and whosoever does not confess the testimony of the Cross is of the devil; and whosoever perverts the oracles of the Lord to his own lusts, and says there is neither resurrection nor judgment, is the first-born of Satan. Wherefore, forsaking the vanity of many and their false doctrines, let us return to the Word which has been handed down from the beginning; watching unto prayer and persevering unto fasting; beseeching in our supplications the all-seeing God not to lead us into temptation, as the Lord has said, 'The spirit truly is willing, but the flesh is weak.'"

Here we have a striking specimen of the familiar use which was made of the writings of the New Testament during the period when the canon was not yet complete. There is not a sentence which is not derived from the Scripture, and every sentence so appropriated is assumed to be absolutely authoritative. Moreover, we cannot help seeing how strong is the appeal to the word handed down, which could be no other than the body of truth preached in the Church, and confirmed in written documents. The heretics here alluded to, but not named, were the Docetæ whom St. John had denounced, but whom his words had not rooted out. Regarding matter as the root of all evil, they would never allow that Christ's body was a reality. This obstinate error, the hold of which upon the Oriental mind it is hard for us to appreciate, Polycarp meets with the simple word of God, as it had been handed down from the apostles. At the same time, this passage—as a specimen of the loose though reverent manner in which the language of the New Testament documents was interwoven into the texture of the early Fathers' writings—illustrates the importance of a speedy determination of the authoritative canon. The free and affectionate manner

in which the thoughts and words of Holy Writ were blended with their own thoughts and words, while it paid a noble tribute to the supremacy of the language of inspiration, at the same time involved an element of great danger to its uncorruptness.

The Epistle of Polycarp, like that of Clement, was held in high esteem in the early churches. Many testimonies to this might be collected, but the best proof is found in the fact that it is one of the few documents appended to the Scriptures, and scarcely distinguished from them, in the *Codex Sinaiticus*. In many churches, and for several generations, it served the purpose of public edification; and, although destined, like many other writings blended for a time with the Scriptures, to be sifted out by the determination of the canon, it was not unworthy to be used by the Holy Ghost in the encouragement of Christian people to a life of simple trust in Christ, of firm reliance on truth, and of devotion unto death.

The Epistle of Barnabas may fairly be classed among the writings of the Apostolical Fathers, although a faithful criticism will strip it of its highest honor as the production of a companion of the apostles. Nothing is more firmly established than that the early Church regarded it with deep respect because they held it to be the work of Barnabas the Levite, the colleague of St. Paul in his first missionary journey. Hence it was reckoned by Origen to be a portion of Scripture; and it is found appended to the new codex of Tischendorf, without, however—and that is a sufficient fact—being attributed directly to the *Apostle* Barnabas. Dr. Donaldson has very ably summed up the evidence on both sides; weighing against the strong internal testimonies in favor of the Barnabas of the Acts being the writer the still stronger internal testimonies against that theory. With his result we entirely concur—that no companion of St. Paul could have written such an epistle. In such a case as this, internal evidence must be an almost certain guide. The writings of the three other companions of apostles exhibit no absolute contradiction between their sentiments and those of their inspired teachers, although evidences of occasional weakness and exaggeration of their teaching may be found. But this letter is a studied attack on Judaism—not on corrupt and obsolete Judaism, but on the ancient Divine economy—conducted in a spirit entirely alien from that of St. Paul; and displaying so much ignorance

of the meaning of Jewish enactments, so much trifling combined with lofty pretensions to knowledge, that it is almost impossible to believe that one who had been taught by St. Paul, or had even read his writings, could have written it. The writer was probably named Barnabas, and he must have composed it during the post-apostolical age; before the time of Clemens Alexandrinus, who quotes it, and yet late enough to secure acceptance and general popularity for views which at an early period would have been distasteful to all Christians, both Jews and Gentiles.

On the other hand, the Epistle of Barnabas was the production of a true Christian, and one who, ignorantly but sincerely, endeavored to save his fellow Christians from lapsing into Judaism. Its positive Christian doctrine is sound, and its morality of the highest order. We shall quote a passage which combines in itself all the good and all the evil of this unknown father: his confusion of apocryphal books with Old Testament Scripture; his loose and inaccurate style of quotation; that tendency to find mystical meanings, which no doubt commended him to Clement and Origen, his best supporters; and, at the same time, his fidelity to the cross and sacrifice of Christ:

"In like manner He points to the cross of Christ in another prophet, who saith, 'And when shall these things be accomplished? And the Lord saith, When a tree shall be bent down, and again rise; and when blood shall flow out of wood!' Yet again He speaks of this in Moses, when Israel was attacked by strangers. And that He might remind them, when assailed, that it was on account of their sins they were delivered to death, the Spirit speaks to the heart of Moses that he should make a figure of the cross, and of Him about to suffer thereon. Moses therefore placed one weapon above another in the midst of the hill, and, standing upon it so as to be higher than all the people, he stretched forth his hands, and thus again Israel acquired the mastery. But when again he let down his hands, they were again destroyed. And in another prophet He declares, 'All day long have I stretched forth mine hands to an unbelieving people, and one that gainsays my righteous way.' And again Moses made a type of Jesus, that it was necessary for Him to suffer, and that He would be the author of life. For since transgression was committed by Eve through means of the serpent, the Lord brought it to pass that every kind of serpents bit them, and they died. Moses then makes a brazen serpent, and places it upon a beam, and by proclamation assembles the people. When, therefore, they were come together, they besought Moses that he would

offer sacrifice and pray for their recovery. And Moses said to them, 'When any of you is bitten, let him come to the serpent placed on the pole; and let him hope and believe that, even though dead, it is able to give him life, and immediately he shall be restored.' And they did so. Behold, again: Jesus who was manifested, both by type and in the flesh, is not the son of man, but the Son of God."

The following passage is remarkable, as showing what was the sentiment of that time concerning the institution of the Sabbath, and that the Christian Lord's-day was kept as a festival with a special religious joy:

"Further, also, it is written concerning the Sabbath in the decalogue which the Lord spoke face to face to Moses on Mount Sinai, 'And sanctify ye the Sabbath of the Lord with clean hands and a pure heart.' Attend, my children, to the meaning of this expression, 'He finished in six days.' This implieth that the Lord will finish all things in six thousand years. Therefore, my children, in six days, that is, in six thousand years, all things will be finished. 'And He rested on the seventh day.' This meaneth: when His Son, coming again, shall destroy the time, and judge the ungodly, and change the sun, and the moon, and the stars, then shall He truly rest on the seventh day. Then shall we be able to sanctify it, when we are sanctified ourselves. Further, He says to them, 'Your new moons and your Sabbaths, I cannot endure.' Ye perceive how He speaks: your present Sabbaths are not acceptable to me; but that is which I have made, when, giving rest to all things, I shall make a beginning of the eighth day; that is, a beginning of another world. Wherefore, also, we keep the eighth day with joyfulness, the day on which Jesus rose again from the dead. And when He had manifested Himself, He ascended into the heavens."

This writer forcibly illustrates the difference between the New Testament Scriptures and the writings that followed them. Scarcely have we reached the second generation from the Apostles, and the fourth extant writer in uninspired literature, when we find the light of man's fallible interpretation growing very dim, and the beginnings of theological corruption very distinct. And this letter of Barnabas was widely diffused, and read, and admired; otherwise it would not have descended to our times. An argument for its great popularity may be found in the fact, that is appended to the Scriptures in the *Codex Sinaiticus*, which indeed has given the epistle in the only form of the original

This indicates that in early times the minds of men wavered as to its inspiration. But, as the suffrages of the churches, under the direction of the Divine Spirit, gradually sifted the mass of writings that laid claim to be authoritative, the defects and errors of this document became evident, and it was silently dropped. Even the general opinion that it was written by an apostolic man could not save it from rejection.

Papias, the fifth among the Apostolical Fathers, stands now in literature as little more than a name; his history being nearly forgotten, and his works preserved only in a few fragments embedded in the writings of others. He was probably, almost certainly, a hearer of the Apostle John in early life. In later life he was bishop of the Church of Hierapolis in Phrygia, and suffered martyrdom, according to the testimony of some, with Polycarp—certainly at some time. Three things, therefore, concurred to give him a prominent place in early tradition; his having been taught by the last Apostle, his presiding over the presbytery of an important church, and his confession sealed by martyrdom.

Papias conceived and executed a sublime project—that of writing an "Exposition of the Words of Jesus." The work is lost, with the exception of a few historical notices derived from it; but when we consider the testimony of Eusebius, that it was based mainly on unwritten tradition, and contained a great mass of mythical saying and parables, we may infer that the loss to theology is not great, however profoundly interesting it would have been as a curiosity of early Christian tradition. The authority of Papias is frequently adduced to prove the early acceptance of millennarian doctrine; but, as Dr. Donaldson has shown, it is very doubtful whether he believed in a personal reign of Christ after the Resurrection, or only in the general inhabitation of the renewed earth by the saints. At any rate, a glance at the fragment preserved concerning the wonderful grape-bearing vines, will satisfy any one that his opinion, whatever it might have been, had but little value. His testimony, however, to the composition of the Gospels, and the genuineness and authenticity of the Book of Revelation, is of considerable importance. But, on the whole, Papias is a name that signifies little in Christian theology. He must be classed among the Apostolical Fathers; but it is remarkable that, enjoying, as he did, every advantage in dignity during life and sanctity in death for the safe transmis-

sion of his works, none of them have come down. Neither the Church, nor the Holy Spirit watching over the literature of the Church, would have suffered the first professed exposition of the sayings of Christ to have passed into oblivion had the task been worthily done.

The sixth name is that of HERMAS, author of the remarkable work called *The Pastor*. In very early times he was very generally supposed to be the Hermas mentioned in Rom. xvi. Hence his book was highly esteemed, and indeed long supposed to be an inspired writing. It was publicly read for three centuries in many churches, and is found in the same roll with the New Testament in the *Codex Sinaiticus*. There are some traces to be met with of another opinion as to the author, viz. that it was written by a later Hermas, in the city of Rome. Many have supposed that the name was merely assumed by an anonymous writer of the fiction. The matter is not of much importance. The apostolic Hermas might have written it; there is nothing in the work absolutely inconsistent with such a supposition, and it is certain that the book was well known and highly esteemed before the middle of the second century, the age of the Apostolical Fathers.

The *Pastor* is the first specimen of a Christian allegory, and was to our forefathers of the ante-Nicene church what the *Pilgrim's Progress* is to us. This of itself gives it peculiar interest; but no one can read it, making every proper allowance, without being deeply impressed with its intense piety, and acknowledging that it is really a manual which might have been useful in helping many souls on their way to repentance, to the mystical church of Christ, and to God. It consists of three parts—at least in its modern form; a series of visions, in which the Church and the cardinal virtues are fancifully but reverently exhibited; followed by a number of commandments given to Hermas by an angel under the guise of a shepherd; and ending with certain similitudes which illustrate both. The work is loose and defective in its theology, betraying particular confusion in its views of the relations of the Trinity. Still, the Three Persons are undoubtedly recognized, and the Son of God is exalted to the uttermost. The doctrine of repentance is not consistently set forth; and the exhibition of the atonement is capable of opposite interpretations. It is remarkable also—especially in an author who knew St.

Paul—that the word "Christ" never occurs; as also that not a single passage of Scripture is quoted from beginning to end. Hence, the *Pastor*, while very interesting in itself, must not be taken as presenting a true picture of the theology of the Apostolical Fathers; and Eusebius must have been wrong in assigning as a reason for its having been publicly read in the churches, that it formed an admirable introduction to the Christian faith. It must be taken for what it professes to be, a powerful exhortation to religion, written without any restraint of dogmatic theology, in which the fancy plays a part that often misled the writer, but need not mislead the modern reader. We will illustrate and close these remarks by quoting Commandment XII. from the version before us, a passage which gives a noble view of the power of religion to release the spirit from sin, and to diffuse through the soul a joyous confidence in God. It is this tranquil assurance of the possibility of a full salvation that gives the book its refreshing influence and glow. And for the sake of this, much else in it may be pardoned or condoned:

"'Remove from you,' says he, 'grief; for she is the sister of doubt and anger.' 'Those who have never searched for the truth, nor investigated the nature of the Divinity, but have simply believed, when they devote themselves to, and become mixed up with business, and wealth, and heathen friendships, and many other actions of this world, do not perceive the parables of Divinity: for their minds are darkened by these actions, and they are corrupted and become dried up. Even as beautiful vines, when they are neglected, are withered up by thorns and divers plants, so men who have believed, and have afterwards fallen away into many of those actions above mentioned, go astray in their minds, and lose all understanding in regard to righteousness; for if they hear of righteousness, their minds are occupied with their business, and they give no heed at all. Those, on the other hand, who have the fear of God, and search after Godhead and truth, and have their hearts turned to the Lord, quickly perceive and understand what is said to them, because they have the fear of the Lord in them. For, where the Lord dwells, there is much understanding. Cleave, then, to the Lord, and you will understand and perceive all things.

"Both these are grievous to the Holy Spirit—doubt and anger. Wherefore remove grief from you, and crush not the Holy Spirit which dwells in you, lest he entreat God against you, and He withdraw from you. For, the Spirit of God which has been granted to us to dwell in this body does not endure grief nor straitness. Wherefore put on cheerfulness, which always is

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agreeable and acceptable to God, and rejoice in it. For every cheerful man does what is good, and minds what is good, and despises grief; but the sorrowful man always acts wickedly. First, because he grieves the Holy Spirit, which was given to be a cheerful spirit to man; secondly, grieving the Holy Spirit he works iniquity, neither entreating the Lord nor confessing to Him. For the entreaty of the sorrowful man has no power to ascend to the altar of God.

"Put you on the desire of righteousness; and, arming yourself with the fear of God, resist all evil desires. If evil desire see you armed with the fear of God and resisting it, it will flee far from you, for it fears your armor. Go, then, garlanded with the crown which you have gained for victory over it, to the desire of righteousness; and, delivering up to it the prize which you have received, serve its will.

"The man who has the Lord in his heart can also be lord of all, and of every one of these commandments. But to those who have the Lord only on their lips, but their hearts hardened, the commandments are hard and difficult. Put, therefore, ye who are empty and fickle, on your faith, the Lord in your heart, and ye will know that there is nothing easier, or sweeter, or more manageable, than these commandments. Return, ye who walk in the command of the devil, in hard, bitter, and wild licentiousness, and fear not the devil; for there is no power in him against you, for I will be with you, the angel of repentance, who am Lord over him. The devil has fear only, but his fear has no strength. Fear him not, therefore, and he will flee from you."

Professor Donaldson's elaborate summary of the doctrine and tendency of the *Pastor* is hardly just to its orthodoxy. "The whole style and tone of the book," he says, "are directly opposed to modern theology." This is one of those sweeping remarks which betray, if we mistake not, that the critics own style and tone are so opposed to what he calls modern theology. In regard to the *Pastor*, if allowance be made for the allegorical wrapping which is preserved with remarkable consistency throughout, there may be found in it a constant reference to the doctrines of the Gospel. The Son of God is "more ancient than every creature, present in counsel with His Father at the founding of the universe." The world is sustained by Him. He came into the world in the last times to purge away the sins of men, and open the way of repentance. He is the rock on which the Church is built, and the only gate of the Church and of heaven. He is preached everywhere among the nations; those who deny Him in this world will be denied by Him in the next. The personal-

ity, indwelling, and sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit pervades the work. If "forgiveness of sins is granted at once on a change of mind," it is only, as the Shepherd says expressly, because God is merciful and patient, and would do honor to His Son's invitation; in other words, it is granted solely in virtue of the atonement. The critic thinks that Hermas' denunciation of sadness would find no response among many modern Christians. We think there are none worthy of the name who would not agree with the pastor.

It has been observed that this first treatise on the religious life does not contain the name of Christ, and does not quote Scripture. But it will be found by those who read it attentively—and it is well worth an attentive reading—that the work of Christ is everywhere taken for granted in all its official relations to man, and that the language of Scripture impresses its style upon the general cast of the whole composition. Both assertions will be proved by the passages we have quoted, as well as by what follows:—

"'This rock,' he answered, 'and this gate are the Son of God.' 'How, sir?' I said; 'the rock is old and the gate is new.' 'Listen,' he said, 'and understand, O ignorant man. The Son of God is older than all His creatures, so that He was a fellow-counsellor with the Father in His work of creation: for this reason He is old.' 'And why is the gate new, sir?' I said. 'Because,' he answered, 'He became manifest in the last days of the dispensation; for this reason the gate was made new, that they who are to be saved by it might enter into the kingdom of God. You saw,' he said, 'that those stones which came in through the gate were used for the building of the tower, and that those which did not come were again thrown back into their own place?' 'I saw, sir,' I replied. 'In like manner,' he continued, 'no one shall enter into the kingdom of God unless He receive His holy name. For, if you desire to enter into a city, and that city is surrounded by a wall, and has but one gate, can you enter into that city save through the gate that it has?' 'Why, how can it be otherwise, sir?' I said. 'If, then, you cannot enter into the city except through its gate, so, in like manner, a man cannot otherwise enter into the kingdom of God except by the name of His beloved Son.'"

The writer of this first Christian allegory, which has been both unreasonably admired and unreasonably despised, evidently wrote as an artist, with a fixed ideal and on a rigid theory. His theory

was not a sound one; and hence the measureless inferiority of his dream to that of Bunyan. The allegory is everywhere too faithfully maintained; there is no interweaving of sacred facts and doctrines in their simple reality, such as might have been occasionally placed in the mouth of the interlocutors, to the great advantage of the whole. The effort to constrain everything into the region of figures is too manifest. But, with every deduction, the *Pastor* of Hermas is, as we have already pleaded, one of the most interesting, and, to a discriminating reader, one of the most profitable of the earliest remains of Christian literature.

The last document of the post-apostolic age is the epistle to Diognetus, sometimes, but erroneously, attributed to Justin Martyr, and now very generally regarded as the production of "an apostolic man who lived not later than the beginning of the second century." This is the opinion of the translator of the volume before us; but Professor Donaldson entirely omits it in his notices of the Apostolical Fathers. The author must have been a man of great eminence, but as humble as great. He carefully conceals himself, leaving no clue whereby he may be traced; but there is no composition of the ante-Nicene age more compact, more eloquent, and more true to the faith and discipline of Christianity. The Diognetus to whom it was addressed was evidently an earnest inquirer after the truth—one of the multitudes who, in those days of transition, felt the mystic attraction of the religion of Christ upon their hearts, and were groping their way out of the darkness that was passing away into the true light that was shining in the world. It is refreshing to turn from the dimness and uncertainty of the allegorizing pastor to the clear, straightforward, and satisfying statements of this author. Instead of giving an analysis of the letter, which our readers may read in this admirable translation, we will quote a single passage (chapter xi), dealing with a question of profound interest to that early age, and to our own, and to every age:

"As long, then, as the former time endured, He permitted us to be borne along by unruly impulses, being drawn away by the desire of pleasure and various lusts. This was not that He at all delighted in our sins, but that he simply endured them; not that He approved the time of working iniquity that then was; but that He sought to form a mind conscious of righteousness, so that being convinced in that time of our unworthiness of attaining life through our own works, it should now, through the kindness of

God, be vouchsafed to us; and, having made it manifest that in ourselves we were unable to enter into the kingdom of God, we might through the power of God be made able. But, when our wickedness had reached its height, and it had been clearly shown that its reward, punishment and death, was impending over us; and when the time had come which God had before appointed for manifesting His own kindness and power, how the one love of God, through exceeding regard for man, did not regard us with hatred, nor thrust us away, nor remember our iniquity against us, but showed great long-suffering, and bore with us; He Himself took on Him the burden of our iniquities; he gave His own Son as a ransom for us,—the Holy One for transgressors, the blameless One for the wicked, the righteous One for the unrighteous, the incorruptible for the corruptible, the immortal for them that are mortal. For what other thing was capable of covering our sins than His righteousness? By what other one was it possible that we, the wicked and ungodly, could be justified, than by the only Son of God? O sweet exchange! O unsearchable operation! O benefits surpassing all expectation! that the wickedness of many should be hid in a single righteous One, and that the righteousness of One should justify many transgressors! Having therefore convinced us in the former time that our nature was unable to attain to life, and having now revealed the Saviour who is able to save even those things which it was formerly impossible to save, by both these facts He desired to lead us to trust in His kindness, to esteem Him our Nourisher, Father, Teacher, Counsellor, Healer, our Wisdom, Light, Honor, Glory, Power, and Life, so that we should not be anxious concerning clothing and food."

The simplicity of such statements as these, and their freedom from any influence of mystical speculation, effectually preclude the notion that Justin Martyr, or any later writer similarly trained in Greek philosophy, was the author. It is a document that comes straight from the heart of apostolic times; and it is a strain in which we may fitly close our specimens of the first series of uninspired Christian authors.

On a review of the whole, we cannot but be struck with the fact that the writings of the generation that knew and succeeded the apostles are so scanty. When we think of the number of names, some of them illustrious, that occur in the New Testament as under apostolic influence, and of the desire that would be felt for permanent memorials of their experience, it seems strange that so few wrote, or that so little of what they wrote was preserved by the church. From the destruction of Jerusalem

down to almost the middle of the second century, we have but one uninspired writer, Clement of Rome. This fact seems to point to the conclusion that, while Inspiration was speaking, and when it ceased to speak, men were slow to break the silence with their own words. And this harmonizes with the tone of those uninspired writers in all their allusions to their inspired predecessors. They are conscious of their own infirmity, and glory in it. They take pains in every variety of way to impress it upon the minds of their readers that they do not speak with the authority of the apostles; in fact, they were not anxious to leave any permanent memorials of their own teaching. Hence their writings are incidental, produced by the pressure of strong need—all, with the exception of Hermas, extorted from them rather than spontaneous. Doctrine, as such, scarcely enters into their plan. Enforcement of practical duty and exhortations to a perfect Christian life are all that they aspire to. There is no apology or defense of the faith; there is scarcely an allusion to doctrinal error in all their pages; and, when they refer to it, the reference is not in the way of controversy, but simply as a matter of practical exhortation. The time of Apologetics—which, when it came, came not to cease again,—had not yet arrived. The Apostolical Fathers write only, as it were, postscripts to the New Testament, with the consciousness of infallible truth behind them.

There is another aspect of these writings. They serve to show how important it was for the well-being of the Church of Christ, and its spread in the world as a depositary of sound doctrine, that the time of dogmatic decisions should come, at least for the decision and definition of the few fundamental doctrines on which the edifice of Christianity is built. It is the habit of many to decry the ancient councils, and to sneer at the dogmatic canons of later times. They write as if they think it would have been better for the truth of religion had no creed ever been written, and no controversy ever been held over the mysteries of the faith; if, in short, the Church had left the Bible alone to leaven its literature as its morals. But we cannot read the writings of the Apostolical Fathers without feeling that this notion, however fascinating, is a delusive one. They had, as we have, the apostolic writings; they had the echoes of the apostolic teaching in their ears; they were not without some learning and much reverence.

But we cannot trust them as a whole for the statement of any refinement of doctrine. The aggregate of their teaching as to the Trinity and the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the aspects of the Atonement towards God and towards man, is, to say the least, somewhat confusing. And we cannot but think that the very best of them would have written much better and more satisfactorily, had they had the Nicene, and Ephesian, and Constantinopolitan creeds well digested in their faith. So that while, on the one hand, they show retrospectively the supremacy of Holy Scripture, they show on the other, by anticipation, the necessity of those universally accepted definitions which the Church struggled for in the beginning and now maintains.

At the same time, it is only right to assert that the Christianity they teach is essentially that of Scripture, and that which we hold as orthodox. It is another prevalent habit of our freer theologians to point with a certain exultation to the Apostolical Fathers as teaching a Christianity more unfettered than that of modern evangelical teaching. It is asserted that they did not dream of our distinctions in the Trinity, of our doctrine of propitiation in heaven as well as upon earth, of our rigid notions upon repentance and faith. The assertion is not true. Notwithstanding their aggregate confusion, we may extract from them individually, by careful elimination, all we could desire. It is simply an appeal to fact. The passages that have been quoted—which could be largely multiplied—are pitched in the key of modern evangelical theology. And their defects are vital only to those who do them the injustice of regarding them as authoritative exponents of Christian truth.

Sufficient reference has scarcely been made as yet to their value as witnesses to the canon. That cannot be exaggerated; yet great as it is, it would have been much greater but for their habit of referring to the apostolic writers rather as living men than as writers of books. As it is, Clement, Ignatius, and Polycarp, refer distinctly to the Epistles of St. Paul written to the churches to which they themselves wrote, quoting, too, their very words. And, with the exception of a few of the last writings of the New Testament, all the books are either directly or indirectly alluded to, in a way to defy dispute, as written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Exactness of quotation they never aimed at, either as to the Old Testament or the New; and this

was the parent of many an error; but it may safely be averred that nearly the entire canon of the New Testament might be established on their authority alone. As it regards the four Gospels, it must be remembered that they were very slowly diffused throughout the Church. A body of living tradition, of which we can have now but a faint conception, engrossed the minds of men, and the Apostolical Fathers referred perhaps oftener to that than to the documents. Still there are not wanting direct references: the following passage, (borrowed from Westcott's *History of the Canon*) is a *catena* of their remarks on the life of Christ which shows that they must have been familiar with the Gospels that we now hold:—

"Christ," we read, "our God, the Eternal Word, the Lord and Creator of the world, who was with the Father before the world began, humbled Himself and came down from heaven, and was manifested in the flesh; and was born of the Virgin Mary, of the race of David, according to the flesh; and a star of exceeding brightness appeared at His birth. Afterwards He was baptized by John, to fulfill all righteousness; and then, speaking the Father's message, He invited not the righteous, but sinners to come to Him. At length, under Herod and Pontius Pilate, He was crucified, and vinegar and gall were offered Him to drink. But on the first day of the week He rose again from the dead, the first fruits of the grave; and many prophets were raised by Him for whom they had waited. After His resurrection He ate with His disciples, and showed them that He was not an incorporeal spirit. And He ascended into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of the Father; and thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead."

The Old Testament remained for a long time the Scripture, to which all Christians appealed; but the New Testament was, from the beginning, instinctively anticipated as its supplement, complement, and perfection. "I have heard some say," Ignatius writes, "unless I find in the ancients (Old Testament), I believe not in the Gospel; and when I said to them, 'It is written in the Prophets that Christ should suffer and rise again,' they replied, 'That must be proved.' The question lies before us. But to me," he adds, "Jesus Christ is the substance of all records. My inviolable records are His cross, and death, and resurrection, and the faith given through Him." The Apostolical Fathers could not know what was the final intention of the Holy Spirit as to the writings of the Evangelists and the Apostles; nor do we

hear them expressing any sentiments or anticipations on the subject. But they unconsciously prepared the way for the completion of the Bible by giving their testimony to the individual books.

These Fathers bear very important testimony to one point of great significance in these times—the establishment and spread of Christianity as an organized system, sustained according to a decent and uniform order. Their representations of the nature of the Church are faithful both to the spiritual and to the visible idea of it. They assert the heavenly dignity of the Christian commonwealth as a mystical community or living temple, every portion of which derives its sanctity from the invisible presence of the Redeemer. This, indeed, is a favorite theme with them, as it was with their master, St. Paul. But they also tacitly assume, and, when necessary, insist upon, the unity of the Church in every place as governed by a bishop or overseer surrounded by presbyters—a body of presbyters, of which one was the head, and, therefore, the representative of the Church's unity. This point we have seen dwelt upon with such strenuousness, and with such iteration, by Ignatius, as to bring suspicion upon the genuineness of the epistles that bear his name. But, in a less obtrusive manner, they all maintain their protest against both schism and heresy. And theirs are the only principles on which any individual church can prosper: the proof being that there is not a single allusion to the question in this volume which might not be read out appropriately as an exhortation from any pulpit. As to the modern view of external unity that would bind the whole aggregate of churches into one vast confederation under episcopal regimen, there is simply no reference to it; the same may be said as to most of the errors that affect the ritual and ordinances of the Church. The enormous perversions that subsequently darkened the faith and encumbered the worship of the Church are negatively pleaded against by these earliest teachers. Here and there a suspicious germ may seem to be detected; but, on the whole, the great corruptions of Christendom must seek their origin lower than the times of the Apostolical Fathers.

We are persuaded that a candid study of their writings will vindicate them at least from the impeachment which in the following unguarded passage of Dr. Donaldson's volume, is indirectly aimed at the entire body of Christian writers from the Apostles to the end of the ante-Nicene period:—

"Yet surely this subject ought to engross the attention of Evangelical Christians. If the early writers were heterodox on the trinity; if they knew nothing of a satisfaction of Divine justice; if they wavered in regard to original sin, some denying it entirely, and others expressing themselves with great uncertainty; if their testimony to the inspiration of the New Testament is unsatisfactory and inconclusive—where was Christianity in those days? Did it really sleep for three long centuries? Are we to suppose that there were Christians in those days, but that they never wrote books? Or how is the chasm to be bridged? Or may not the Evangelical school be wrong in asserting that it is necessary for a man to believe in original sin, the trinity, the atonement, and similar dogmas, before he can be a Christian?"—P. 64.

We cannot conclude without pointing to the sublime Christianity which these Fathers taught. As to its experience and practice, nothing can be loftier than their views of the religion of Christ. Deep and glowing piety is their preëminent characteristic; they are men who have entered into an eternal fellowship with Christ; the vanities, follies, and sins of the world are remembered only with horror. In this respect, at least, whatever may be the case in others, there is no long interval, no sudden fall from the pages of the Apostles to their pages. It is most refreshing to turn from the fierce polemics of later times, with their interminable philosophical and metaphysical subtleties, to the child-like simplicity of these patriarchs of Christian literature. These men lead the long array of ecclesiastical writers with a dignity and sanctity worthy of that eminent position.

Their writings are now presented in a faithful and readable translation, and we have no doubt that they will have a larger circle of readers in England than they have ever yet had. This volume, and the series of translations which it introduces, we most earnestly recommend to our readers; and we can also recommend, though with the deductions that we have been obliged to make in the previous pages, Dr. Donaldson's companion series of learned and exhaustive critical volumes. The two combined will form a good introduction to the history of the Church, the formation of Christian doctrine, and the treasures of patristic divinity.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

The first volume of the expected *Cyclopedia* of Dr.'s McClintock and Strong,* which will be, when completed, the most extensive and comprehensive theological dictionary in the English language, has just been issued. The plan of the work is much broader than that of Kitto and Smith, since in addition to the department of Biblical literature, it is intended to embrace the entire field of systematic, historical and practical theology, and thus to resemble the German Cyclopedias of Herzog, and Wetzer and Welte. The design is to give a condensed statement of every subject in theological science, with lists of the most important books. The publishers appear to expect that the whole work will not extend beyond six volumes, but in this they are probably mistaken. At least twice that number will be required. The project of such a work is honorable to the enterprising denomination from which it emanates, and if steadily carried out on the Catholic principles announced in the preface, and with sound judgment, and a careful attention to accuracy, will be certain to secure the warm interest of Christian scholars and ministers of every name. In type, paper, and pictorial illustration, the specimen before us is all that could be desired.

The articles in the present volume appear as a whole to be carefully and judiciously prepared from the best sources, though minor errors occasionally occur. One of the most striking and valuable features of the work, is the constant reference to the literature of the subjects treated of, which will serve as a stimulus and guide to further investigations on the part of thorough students, and compensate, to a good degree, for the necessary brevity in the treatment of some of the subjects. Some of the most recent books, however, which have appeared probably since the articles were first written, are not mentioned. Perhaps their titles will be given in an appendix or supplement. On the whole, this noble volume justifies the hope and expectation that the work, when completed, will be generally recognized as a truly valuable addition to the literature of theology, and be welcomed to a place in the library of ministers and intelligent laymen of all denominations.

Professor Chadbourne's *Lectures on Natural Theology* † are an able exhibition of the new sources of evidence in respect to the existence and attributes of the Creator, drawn from the recent progress of natural science. They are written in an uncommonly vigorous and attractive style, and will be likely, as the author hopes, to awaken a love for the study of nature, and lead the student to independent observation. The titles of the several lectures after the Introduction, are: Principles of belief; Adaptation of our bodies to our wants and to the world; Adaptation of animals to the world by structure, function and

* *Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature.* Prepared by the Rev. John McClintock, D.D., and James Strong, S.T.D. Vol. I, A–B. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1867. Royal 8vo. pp. 947. $5.00.

† *Lectures on Natural Theology; or Nature and the Bible from the same Author. Delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston.* By P. A. Chadbourne, M. D., Professor of Natural History in Williams College. New York, G. P. Putnam, & Son, 1867. 12mo. pp. 320.

instinct; Special contrivances—Preservation and species; Adaptation of plants to the world; Production of varieties and their final cause; Chemical elements and their mutual relation; Provision for the intellect of man in the structure of minerals and laws of chemical combination; Provision for man's intellect in the relations of organic beings and in the crust of the earth; Provision for the emotional nature and the varied intellectual tastes and powers of man; The moral nature of man and the Bible as a natural provision for him; The Mosaic and geologic records.

—Under the title *Liber Librorum** an unknown English writer endeavors to meet the difficulties commonly urged by sceptics against the Scriptures, on the ground more or less distinctly taken by Coleridge, Morell, Dr. Arnold and others, that the inspiration of the Scriptures must be restricted to the domain of moral and religious truth. For faith in the whole Bible as in some true and proper sense given by inspiration of God, he would substitute "the verifying faculty," or spiritual insight, by the help of which he thinks, "we may, without weakening faith in Scripture as a whole, separate its parts, and distinguish between that which is divine and that which is human." His doubts in the face of our Lord's teaching in respect to the final punishment of the wicked is a rather unfortunate commentary on his theory, while the shifts to which he is obliged to resort, in respect to some of the alleged difficulties of Scripture, bring no real relief. We may admit that extreme and untenable ground has been sometimes taken in respect to the inspiration of the Bible, and that the frank recognition of a truly human element is necessary, in the present state of Biblical science, to any sound view; but this does not prevent our conceiving of this human element as so embraced in the divine, and made by divine guidance so to contribute to the end for which each book was written, that its entire contents, spirit and aim were in some true sense "given by inspiration of God." While recognizing, therefore, the sincerity and honesty of the writer, in his attempted refutation of sceptical difficulties, we deny that the critical study of the Scriptures justifies the concessions he makes, much less renders them necessary.

—It is gratifying to know that the excellent edition of the essay of Plutarch on the delay of the Deity in punishing the wicked, with notes, by Professors Hackett and Tyler, originally published in 1844, has been so well received as to justify the issuing of a new and revised edition.† It has fuller explanatory and gramatical notes, and an admirable summary of the contents.

The Greek of Plutarch stands removed at but one degree from the idiom of the New Testament, and the grand theme of a retributive providence is here so ably treated and vindicated against all objections, that both philologically and theologically, the reading of this treatise, with the aid furnished by the scholarly editors, cannot fail to reward the Christian student.

* *Liber Librorum: its Structure, Limitations and Purpose. A friendly communication to a reluctant sceptic.* New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1867. 12mo. pp. 232.

† *Plutarch on the Delay of the Deity in Punishing the Wicked.* Revised edition with notes, by Professors H. B. Hackett and W. S. Tyler. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 12mo. pp. 171.

V.—THE CONFESSIONS OF AUGUSTINE.*

BY WILLIAM ALEXANDER.

There are few books in the world which present attractions to so many different classes of readers as the Confessions of Augustine. In this more fully than in any other among his voluminous productions is reflected "that mixture of passion and gentleness, of authority and sympathy, of largeness of mind and logical rigor," † which has given him such rare influence in the Christian Church. The man of letters finds in it the very first specimen of those revelations of an inner life, utterly unknown to classical antiquity, which have an especial charm for the modern spirit. He recognizes in it a style, unquestionably clouded by the false and affected rhetoric of a declining civilization, yet rising at times into flights which human oratory has never surpassed, whose contorted antitheses are more than atoned for by touches of irresistible tenderness, and by those occasional utterances which become lodged in the memory of the human race, those one or two words engraven by the hand of genius upon the rock, which are better than a thousand written upon the sand. The psychologist who turns over the pages feels, perhaps, at first, some impatient contempt of the sighs and prayers which interrupt a scientific discussion. But he is startled by some subtle piece of mental analysis, by speculations on Creation, Time, Eternity, Memory, which seem to anticipate not only Reid and Jouffroy, but even Kant and Descartes. The preacher who understands his art may find in the Confessions, not, indeed, ready-made weapons for the nineteenth century, but materials which may be forged into weapons that will reach the soul of every man in every age.‡ The greatest sacred orators have seldom appeared

* From the *Contemporary Review*, June, 1867. [H. B. H.]

† M. Guizot, in his admirable *rationale* of the Pelagian Controversy.—Histoire de la Civilisation, i. 180–189.

‡ I may instance the use made by Massillon in his sermon, *Délai de la Conversion*, of the passage:—Retinebant nugæ nugarum . . . . . et subcutiebant vestem meam carneam, et submurmurabant: dimittisne nos? et a momento isto non erimus tecum ultra in æternum? et a momento isto non tibi licebit hoc et il ud ultra in æternum? —Confess, viii. 11.

more original than when they were borrowing judiciously from the Confessions. The theologian of our own Church will discover in the book occasionally expressions—and occasionally something more than expressions—some of the unguarded rhetoric which was frozen into logic by succeeding generations, some of the tares that already began to grow rankly in the field of the Church—which may be triumphantly quoted by the Roman Catholic controversialist. Yet he will discover also abundant indications of a theological system, to which, as a whole, he may apply that which Gibbon has shrewdly observed of one portion of it—namely, that "it has been received with public applause and secret reluctance by the Latin Church." * Still more may he trace the consistent lines of a method, of which it is no exaggeration to say that with its lofty reverence for human reason and its deferential appeals to Holy Scripture, it is anti-Roman in its very substance.† Nor among the readers of this delightful volume are we to forget those whose approbation its author most valued, the men who give it a place among the books which they read before or after they have knelt in their Saviour's presence, who feel in it, across the gulf of years, the very heart-pulse of its saintly author's religious affections, who bless him for wise warnings and undying hopes.‡ We may, I think, go even further than this. It is true of Augustine's Confessions more than of most uninspired books, *ea est quæ crescit cum parvulis ;* it grows with our growth. Each age of human life finds in it a peculiar line of attraction. In youth it charms us by its delineation of passion, by those living sentences which vibrate as we touch them, and of which, as Montaigne has said, we feel that if they were cut they would bleed. But its psychology seems hopelessly obscure, its metaphysics hopelessly mystic, the whole mass of the composition destitute of those notches and marks for analytic measurement

* *E. g.* the invention of the bodies of Protasius and Gervasius, x. 7, and the request for prayer for Patricius and Monica, ix. 13.

† Chapter xxxiii.

‡ Cardinal Perrone may have had the system and method of Augustine in view, rather than particular "texts," when he said, "Otez à ceaux de la religion cet Autheur, ils sont défaits, et n'ont plus rien."—Perroniana, p. 100. An amusing passage follows, from which it appears that it was the habit of French preachers to speak of Monseigneur St. Paul as in the first chapter, "De la Prognostication Pantagrueline." The other saints of the Roman calendar they treated only to Monsieur and Madame. "Monsiur d'O. said that those who in preaching talked of Monsieur Saint Augustine only proved that they were not familiar with that saint."

which are exacted by a student trained in our modern schools. Yet after we have not only studied other men's thought, but thought ourselves; after we have felt, and suffered, and doubted, there are rays which open up an avenue of light into the very heart of that which once appeared to us but a silver mist, and the intellect perceives substance where it suspected nothing but confusion. We may even say that these Confessions have been almost equally appreciated by dogmatism and free thought, by Christians and skeptics—by the latter, for the marks which they bear of having come from an age of doubt and distraction; by the former, for the passionate self-surrender from the days of the voice in the garden and the baptism at Milan. Those who dislike the journey love Augustine for his inimitable appreciation of the rest to which it brought him. Those who look upon the rest as a delusion are ready to proclaim that the journey was never traversed with a freer step, or described by a more opulent pencil.

No stronger evidence of the truth of these remarks can be adduced than the various points of view from which the Confessions have been studied in France within the last fifteen or twenty years. Besides a new translation by M. Janet, they have been handled by Villemain, as a historian; by Saint-Marc Girardin, as a man of letters; by Nourrisson, as a psychologist; by Gratry, Flottes, and Pressensé, as philosophical theologians. More than once eminent lawyers among ourselves, like Sir Joseph Napier, have devoted their leisure to the severe relaxation of writing discussions upon Bishop Butler. A distinguished French advocate, M. Desjardines, has produced a careful analysis of the Confessions as the fruit of one of his summer recesses. By none, however, has the Bishop of Hippo's immortal book been used more freely, or after a more singular fashion, than by a French philosopher who died last year, M. Saisset. Himself a Deist, but enthusiastically devoted to the spiritual school of philosophy, and clinging intensely to those preambles of the faith—God, Immortality, Providence, and Prayer—in which it seemed to him possible for a philosopher to intrench himself securely in a safe but limited dogmatism, he produced a work, in some respects of great merit, upon the Philosophy of Religion, with special reference to the Personality of God. The portion of this discussion which sounds the most original is really the least valuable. It contains an

argument for the quasi-eternity and quasi-infinity of Creation, intended to meet the objection of those Pantheistic philosophers who treat the Christian and Theistic dogma of Creation as if it attributed change and caprice to God. This theory of the quasi-eternity of Creation is certainly borrowed from an Alexandrian speculation, which has been handled with some gentleness by Augustine.* M. Saisset scaffolds the whole structure of his theory upon a doctrine of Time, which he has learned from the Confessions. It is singular to see a work upon the philosophy of religion based upon Plato and Augustine, put forth by one who, however he may have used Christian language, and hung with sad and regretful love about the outskirts of the City of God, must unhappily be classed as a philosophical Deist.†

Since the rise of the Church movement in England, the Confessions have been a good deal read among ourselves, but chiefly, doctrinally or theologically. I have not myself met with much in print upon the subject which could serve as an introduction to the treatise for the use of the general reader.‡ It is not my intention to produce any regular analysis of a book which so little admits of that kind of handling. The success of some able French writers would certainly not encourage one to make the attempt. Dr. Newman has somewhere laughed at the late learned Bishop

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* Sed quid placuit Deo æterno tunc facere cœlum et terram quæ antea non fecit? Qui hoc dicunt [sc. the Epicurean materialists], si mundum æternum sine ullo initio, et ideo nec a Deo factum videri volunt, nonne aversi sunt a veritate, et letali morbo impietatis insaniunt? Qui autem a Deo factum fatentur [sc. the Alexandrine School] non tamen eum volunt temporis habere, sed suæ creationis initium, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus, dicunt quidem aliquid; unde sibi Deum videntur velut a fortuita temeritate defendere, ne subito illi venisse credatur in mentem quod nunquam antea venisset, et accidisse illi voluntatem novam, cum in nullo sit omnino mutabilis, sed nec video quomodo eis potest in cæteris rebus ista ratio subsistere."—De Civ. Dei, xi. 4.

† The natural alliance between high and low philosophical, and high and low Christian, doctrine, has been remarked by Coleridge and Leibnitz. "I cannot doubt that the difference of my metaphysical notions from those of Unitarians in general contributed to my re-conversion to the whole truth in Christ; even as, according to his own confession, the books of certain Platonic philosophers commenced the rescue of St. Augustine's faith from the same error, aggravated by the far darker accompaniment of the Manichean heresy."—Coleridge "Biog. Lit." i. 200, 201. "Inclinâsse eum (Locke) ad Socinianos, quorum *paupertina semper fuit de Deo et mente philosophia*."—Leibnitz, Epist. ad Biesling.

‡ I do not wish to be ungrateful for Dr. Pusey's excellent edition of the Confessions in the Bibliotheca Patrum, with its well-selected parallel passages.

Kaye's arrangement of the thoughts of Augustine's fervid countryman, Tertullian, in the framework of the Thirty-nine Articles. What shall we say of torturing the Confessions into the pigeonhole of some division of philosophy or classification of the human faculties, received from the Scotch School of Mental Philosophy into the French Normal School? I shall merely try to present the Confessions from some general points of view which may open the way for some students to a further enjoyment of them, and bring together preliminary information which, so far as I know, cannot be conveniently found in any one English work.

I.

The first question which naturally arises is upon the exact meaning of the title. Augustine has answered it elsewhere. It has a double signification. Confession is the voice of *adoration* as well as *penitence*. This two-fold acceptation gives its significance to the Confessions. They stand alone. Others have written memoirs, autobiographies, religious lives; Augustine alone has written Confessions.

The volume is as far as possible from being exactly a memoir. All that is properly auto-biographical ends with the tenth book. To a certain extent the author writes for himself; yet not for himself alone. He confesses himself to God; but he holds his soliloquy in such tones that men also can hear. He feels bound to this course, for he has been two years a Bishop of the Church, and he expects good results from it. His example will excite "the heart of some not to sleep in desperation, and say *I cannot*, but rather to waken up in the love of Thy mercy, and in the sweetness of Thy grace." The good are delighted to hear the past evils of those who have now repented of them, not because they are evil, but because they have been and are not. The curious ear of man is not, cannot be, at his heart. But he will proclaim what he is. "With a consciousness which is not doubtful, but certain and plenary, O Lord! I love Thee. Thou hast stricken through my heart with Thy word, and I have loved Thee!"

The saintly Bishop had not lived so little in the world as to be ignorant of its ways. He knew that he was baring his breast to his own enemies, and those of the Church. The sobs which he

uttered at the feet of Christ; the long cry, in which he wailed out the sins and offences of his youth to his reconciled Father; the broken words of those short sentences which seem to set themselves to some mystic chant at the foot of an altar; he had allowed the world to hear them, and the world was not likely to let them drop. He could bear such taunts quietly enough. But when they were used to weaken his authority, and discredit the Church, he found words at once masculine and humble. He answers the Donatists thus, in one of his popular discourses:

"Let them say against us what they will, we will love them, though they will it not; we know, brethren, we know their tongues, for which we will not be angry with them. Be ye patient like us. For they see that they have nothing in their cause, and so turn their tongues upon us and begin to speak evil of us, much which they know, much which they know not. That which they know is our Past. Why dost thou give up the cause like a heretic, and go to man? For what am I? am I the Catholic Church? We lived ill: I confess it. So much as I glory concerning God's grace, so much—shall I say?—I grieve for my guilty Past. I would grieve were I yet in it. But what shall I say? do I glory? I cannot; for O, that I had never been such! But whatever it were, in the name of Christ it is past. I cry unto God in my weakness; with me it is a very small thing, saith the Apostle, to be judged of you, or of man's judgment; yea, I judge not mine own self. For I know myself better than they know me, but God knows me better than I myself do." *

Every one is aware that Augustine, in his confessions, repeatedly touches upon that kind of sin which every motive of moral prudence as well as of natural delicacy should lead ordinary people to conceal from others, or to confess with the most guarded generality. It is not only that between us and other men there is drawn a veil of flesh, through which God only has the right to look, and where the glance of a mortal eye inflames that wounded human modesty which remains in every nature that is not quite brutal. By such confessions we may injure our own souls, retouching the faded lines of dangerous pictures, regretting, it may be, that we have not sinned more, and that we have lost opportunities.† We may also do incalculable injury to others by unin-

* Serm. 3, in Ps. xxxvi, § 19.

† "Recordari volo transactas fœditates meas, et carnales corruptiones animæ meæ; non quod eas amem: sed ut amem te, Deus meus."—Confess., ii. 1; cf. iv. 1.

tentional suggestions. What shall we say of this element in Augustine's writing?

His example, in his public confession, stands out almost alone for profit and for wonder, not for imitation. He had never been a profligate in the ordinary acceptation of the term. Measured by the standard of the word even now, much more by that of the society in which he lived, he might have passed without much censure.* It is unworthy of a writer, who I believe is usually as accurate as he is elegant, to speak of Augustine as the promiscuous lover of the frail beauties of Carthage. More unworthy still is the comparison which others have instituted between Rousseau and the young Augustine. At the very moment when two men are groveling in sensual sin, there may be a distinction between them. The one, perhaps, feels that he is plunged in a hell of filth, only less dreadful than the hell of fire. The other loves what "the degraded soul unworthily admires." He has a deliberate sympathy with his position, and with those who are like him. He is perfectly satisfied, and thinks it is well for him to be here. One has fallen into the sty, the other lives in it. Of his guilty connection Rousseau exclaims, "It stood me instead of all. The future did not touch me, or only as a prolonged present." But even in the first flush of youthful passion, Augustine exhausts all the energy of his imagination to find language which may give us a conception of his misery. He was beaten as with burning rods of iron.†

Correspondent to this difference between the men is the difference of their Confessions. No man ever read the earlier portion of Rousseau's without a permanent taint, or a permanent trial,

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* Thus writes one of the highest authority upon Augustine: "Talis erat, etiam quum ipse foris esset, ut ab eis qui erant intus, vir bonus haberi possit, in suo quidem genere. Adolescens habuit concubinam, quod humanæ permittunt leges.—Hâc non repudiatâ sed ereptâ adamavit alterum. Verum utrique servevit conjugii fidem, quòm probitatem hodie non temere reperias in sacerdotibus aut Abbatibus.' August., tom. i. (Basil. 1569.) Erasmus Alfonso Fonsecæ Archiep. Toletano. [The references in this article are generally to that edition.] "In illis annis unam habebam, sed *unam* tamen, ei quoque servans tori fidem."—Confess., iv. 2. When she returned from Italy to Africa, vowing herself to a pure and single life, he formed, for a time, a second connection of the same nature, intended to be limited to the two years during which he was waiting for a wife. (vi. 15.) It is only right to notice the dark shadow which hangs over Augustine's youth from such expressions as those in Confess., iii. 1; ii. 2.

† Confess., iii. 1.

to his soul. We feel that he took an artist's reflective pleasure in every line of the picture. It is the thoughtful and deliberate masterpiece of a libidinous imagination. On the contrary, no prurient women ever said of Augustine as they have been known to say of others in our own time, who make confessions in fashionable drawing-rooms: "Come and hear him. He is so handsome, and has been so wicked, and will tell us all about it." There is a coldness and a whiteness as of winter snow over the crater of the extinct volcano. There is a reserve in all that effusion. The style is without that affected periphrastic delicacy which is essentially indelicate. His heart might be ulcerated, and leave trailing drops of blood; he is determined that no sentimental sighs shall be heaved over the parting scene between his mistress and himself. The mother of Adeodatus walks, veiled and spectral, a memory without a name, from her sixteen years of shame, into the presence of God, with a sigh of penitence and a prayer of hope. The most brutal lines that Byron ever wrote —it is saying much—are those in which he attributes to the Confessions the power of awakening an envy of the youthful transgressions of the saintly Bishop.*

If Augustine's temperament was naturally deep and passionate, his Confessions present to us the spectacle of such a nature turning to God with all its depth and all its passion. We can detect in many religious biographies that the mere physical cooling of the bubbling caldron of sensuality passes for conversion; or the passive fear of the consequences of sin presents a maimed gift to God. God forbid that we should scorn or depreciate any motive which brings back a sinner to his Father. We must only maintain that they were not such processes, as figure almost exclusively in modern religious biographies, which won Augustine to Christ, and that the oblation which he made was richer and more complete in consequence. It was his favorite doctrine that the

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* "Sermons he read, and lectures he endured,
And homilies, and lives of all the saints;
To Jerome and to Chrysostom inured,
He did not take such studies for restraints.
But how faith is acquired, and then insured,
So well not one of the aforesaid paints
As Saint Augustine in his fine Confessions,
Which make the reader *envy his transgressions.*

"This, too, was a sealed book to little Juan."

passions and affections of our nature were not intended to be eradicated by grace, but turned to their proper objects.* We may say of the Confessions that they are the most vivid illustration which post-Apostolic Christianity has produced of Bishop Butler's Sermons upon the Love of God. What have we there but the spectacle of a human heart "referring itself implicitly to God, and casting itself entirely upon Him, its whole attention of life being to obey His commands, and its highest enjoyment arising from the contemplation of His character and its relation to Him, from a consciousness of His favor and approbation, and from the exercise of those affections towards Him which cannot but be raised from His presence?"

I must now refer to those points of personal character which we can very distinctly trace in these pages. Augustine was naturally ambitious to excel in all things. He aspired to poetical as well as rhetorical distinction, and was possessed with an ungovernable desire to obtain a theatrical prize poem. His filial love is beautiful. All ages have loved to see him listening with Monica to Ambrose, at Milan, or smiling gently at the frugal fare which she provided for his birthday feast on that soft November day in the meadow of Cassiciacum.† Above all they stand before us as they have been represented by the pencil of Ary Scheffer, in the garden at Ostia, "in sight of a sea lit up by a thousand fires, and under a sky without a cloud,"‡ enjoying some of those moments, even upon earth, from which we know that if eternal life were but their prolongation, it would be an entering into the joy of the Lord. This filial love may be read, not only in the fuller delineations which he delights to give, and in the description of his grief for her loss, but in a hundred minute touches.§ His parental love is equally touching. It would be almost sacri-

* Augustine enforces this very beautifully by the example of St. Paul and of our Lord, De. Civ. D., xiv. 9. *Cf.* "As we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business on it, so neither can we alter our real nature. Religion does not demand new affections, but only claims the direction of those you already have, those affections you already feel."—Butler. Upon the Love of God. Sermon xiii.

† De Ordine. Lib. ii., Tom. i. 471. De Beata Vita, Ibid. 498.

‡ See an eloquent passage in M de Broglie, L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain, Part iii, Tom. ii., 183–197.

§ *E. gr.* "Et mentitus sum matri et illi matri, et evasi," v. 8. "Meum quiddam puerile, quod labebatur in fletus, juvenili voce cordis tacebat . . . . constringebam fluxum moeroris . . . . . rursus-que impetu suo ferebatur non usque ad eruptionem lacrimarum . . . . . *sed ego sciebam quid corde premerem.*"—Confess., ix. 12.

lege to translate those words, which might form a yet nobler epitaph for a Christian father to place over his child than the lines from Dryden's Eleonora, which Burke had engraved over the only son who gave promise of so much virtue and so much genius.* The critics have adduced as a parallel Quintilian's celebrated Proœmium to the fifth book of the Institutes. If, in reading that finished production, we are sometimes reminded of Tickell's lines—

> "Grief unaffected suits but ill with art,
> Or flowing numbers with a bleeding heart,"—

if the warmth of our emotion is chilled by the rhetorical tricks and the theatric adjuration, there is undoubtedly an undertone of true pathos which is exquisitely affecting. But the words of Augustine need no critic. He who is unmoved by them wants not so much a critical judgment as a human heart. His susceptible nature was especially formed for friendship. In the one interval of leisure in his busy life, at the villa of Cassiciacum, lent him by Verecundus during the months between his conversion and his baptism, he is surrounded by a group of African friends, who have followed him from Tagaste, Madaura, Hippo and Carthage. One of these, Romanianus, was of higher rank than the rest. In addressing one of his books to him, Augustine incidentally gives us a notion of the life and aims of a fine gentleman of the fourth century. The fine gentleman presented the public with shows of wild beasts and other unusual spectacles. He lived at a great rate, keeping almost open house. He was expected to build largely, especially baths with tesselated pavements. His reward was popular applause. If he succeeded in his appeal to the affections of the people; if his agents were so honest and capable that he did not become bankrupt; he was received in the theater with a roar of welcome. His statue was set up, not only in the city, but in the neighboring towns. He was hailed as "liberallissimus, mundissimus, humanissimus, fortunatissimus." Augustine's relation with Romanianus, Alypius, Licentius, and others, proves that he possessed that undefinable thing called influence, which Archbishop Whately proposed to call *effluence*, which acts upon men's natures through some intangible medium quite distinct from an appeal to their logical faculties.

* "Cito de terra abstulisti vitam ejus, et securior eum recordor, non timens quid quam pueritiæ, nec adolescentiæ, nec omnino homini illi."—Confess., ix. 6.

There are many passages in the Confessions, and in his other writings, which reveal to us even the physical temperament of the man. Born under the intense light of an African sky, compared with which the very suns of Italy are pale; used to gaze forward where the sight is not limited by the dimness of the medium, but by the weakness of the organ, he speaks of his love of light, "the queen of colors, washing round all things which we see with its perpetual and multitudinous flow," and connects it with one of the grandest movements in the literature of the world. Habituated to view from the coast the Mediterranean clothed in a many-colored vesture, with shooting green of every tint, sometimes deepening into purple, more often like a blue band drowned in a vermilion sky of evening or morning, he can paint at times in colors like those of Ruskin.* His comparisons are frequently drawn from light; it is to him the very luxury of existence.† He possesses the picturesque feeling and touch which are so peculiarly modern. His account of a fight between two cocks is colored and animated.‡ The loving and minute subtlety with which he transfers mental impressions to nature reminds us at times of the latest school of poetry among ourselves.§ His other senses were equally keen and susceptible. Of scents, indeed, he says that he does not refuse them when present, nor miss them when absent; confessing, however, "fortasse fallor." A passage in his chapter on Memory shows us that he anticipated the subtle beauty of Shelley's lines—

> "Odors, when sweet violets die,
> Live within the memory." ‖

The repairs of the table—as Dr. Johnson called them in language strikingly like Augustine's—had for him, as he tells us, a fasci-

* "In ipsius quoque maris tam grandi spectaculo, quum sese diversis colonibus induat velut vestibus et aliquando viride atque hoc multis modis, aliquando purpureum, aliquando cœruleum."—De Civ. Dei, xxii. 24.

† "Proptur hæc volunt vivere."—De Lib. Arb. ii. 13, Tom. i. 656. "Ad quietis ipsius penetrale cujus jam luce mens eorum velut in longinquo radiante perstringitur pervenire non possunt. Dorsum enim habebam ad lumen et ad ea quæ illuminantur faciem; unde ipsa facies mea, qua illuminata cernebam non illuminabatur."—Confess., iv. 16.

‡ "In eisdem gallis erat videre intenta projectius capita, inflatas comas, vehementes ictus . . . . . et in omni motu animalium ratione expertium nihil non decorum."—De Ordine.

§ *E. gr.* "Lunam nocturnas tenebras *solantem*."—In Psalm xcix. 5, p. 1112.

‖ "Sicut odor, dum transit et evanescit in ventos, olfactum afficit, unde trajicit in memoriam imaginem sui, quam reminiscendo repetamus."—Confess., x. 9.

nation with which he sometimes reproached himself.* His sense of hearing was evidently acute and delicate. As he lies awake at Cassiciacum, he hears the sound of water trickling into the baths, making an uneven sound as it runs over the pebbles, from the accumulation here and there of the autumnal leaves. This leads to the chief subject of one of his most interesting discussions.† Religious men, who religiously love choral services, have no reason to be angry with those who warn them against possible dangers and excesses. Such warnings may be found in quarters where by some they would be least expected. For instance, "In reference to singing, I fluctuate between the danger of being carried away by the pleasure of taste, and the personal experience which I have of the profit of the practice. I am inclined rather to approve of the practice of singing in church; not, however, giving an opinion which I might not conceivably retract. Yet when it happens to me to be moved by the musical modulation more than by the thing which is sung, I confess that I sin gravely, and that I had rather not hear the voice that sings." ‡ It is sin-

* "Crapula autem nonnumquam surrepit servo tuo. Reficimus quotidianas ruinas corporis edendo et bibendo."—Confess., v. 31. A furious controversy, which made much noise in its day, arose upon the signification of the word *crapula*, in which a physician Petit, Bayle, and others, took part. See Flottes, "Etudes sur Saint Augustine," pp. 149–153. It is to be remarked that Augustine's Christian common sense preserved him from the Manichean extravagance which afterwards found something degrading to the saintly character in the use of animal food. Görres lays it down as a law of saintship, that in its higher manifestations it gives up flesh-meat, and lives upon vegetables, milk and honey. We know from Posidonius that the Bishop of Hippo had meat upon his table, some days in the week at least. He himself says, "Non ego immunditiam obsonii timeo, sed immunditiam cupiditatis."—Confess., x. 31.

† De Ordine, i. 3, Tom. i. 459–462.

‡ Confess., x. 33. Instrumental music was long in finding its way into churches. "Musical instruments rather excite the mind to pleasure than tend to form good dispositions within it. In the Old Testament such instruments were used, partly because the people were more cold and carnal—stimulated by such things even as they were stimulated by earthly promises; partly because these material objects had a figurative signification. *Ecclesia non utitur organis, ne Judaizare videatur.* D. Thomæ. *Summa Theologiæ cum Commentariis Cajetan.* Quæstio, xiii, Art. ii., Vol. iii., pp. 228–230. Cajetan mentions the curious fact that instrumental music is not permitted when the Pope officiates in person. We may well be thankful that, in the noble language of our own Milton, in our cathedrals and churches "the solemn and divine harmonies of music are heard whilst the skillful organist plies his grave and fancied descant in lofty fugues." It would be well for some of the young gentlemen who sneer "at the intellectual coldness of the Anglican service," to read the Confessions, x. 33.

gular to find this jealousy of harmony in religious services, when we remember the sweet and consolatory tears for his lost Adeodatus which were drawn from him by the hymns of Ambrose,* composed to soothe and occupy the people during their watches with their Bishop, at the time of the persecution of Justina. There are some men who are so constituted that beauty of every kind is not to them a distraction or a recreation. The light of a spring day, the blue range of the mountains, the vast soft whiteness of the breaking waves, fill them with a sensation which is not unmingled with suffering. The greater the beauty which they see, the more it leaves them unsatisfied and full of longing. Augustine was one of these men. If they frame to themselves a theory of Art and Beauty, it will be like his and Plato's.†

II.

To understand and enjoy Augustine's writings in general, and more especially his Confessions, we must know something of the Roman-African life and thought of that day.

The normal state of the descendants of the Roman settlers in Africa‡ was—as M. Saint-Marc Girardin has well shown—that which has been reproduced in modern Algeria; small groups of civilized men, surrounded by barbarous nomads. In such a state of society, complicated relations arise between the two parties. Occasionally the barbarian is molded and elevated by his neighbor. Roman letters and education filtered into the Phœnician and Numidian villages, and a succession of orators and legists was produced by the natives of Africa. The more usual relations between the tribesmen and the colonists were of a much humbler kind, founded upon mutual convenience. In one of those interesting letters,§ which testify to the masculine good sense of Au-

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* Confess., ix. 6.

† "Pulchra trajecta per animas in manus artificiosas ab illa pulchritudine veniunt, quæ super animas est."—Confess., x. 34; *cf.* xi. 5.

‡ It will be remembered that Sallust received from Cæsar the government of Numidia. The historian did not practice the lessons which he inculcates so eloquently. His splendid mansion and gardens, still so frequently visited at Rome, were built and beautified by money extorted from Hippo, Tagaste, and other African towns. In the Jugurthine war of Sallust there is a description of Africa, in which the name of Hippo occurs

§ The worthy Publicola's cases of conscience are of this kind—Is it not sinful to make a compact with barbarians, when they swear by false gods? Is it not sinful to partake of grain or oil of which an offering has been made to a devil? Whether

gustine, it comes out that the native tribes frequently acted as conveyers of merchandise, conductors of caravans, and guardians of harvests. Compacts were entered into between them, sealed by oaths, which often caused scruples to timid Christians.

The civilized life of Africa is more directly connected with our subject. "The long and narrow tract of African coast was filled with frequent monuments of Roman art and magnificence, and the respective degrees of improvement might be accurately measured by the distance from Carthage and the Mediterranean." One fact impresses us with the highest sense of the fertility of the district, and of the industry of the people. Thickly populated as it was, it exported vast quantities of wheat; and after providing abundantly for home consumption, sent the bread-stuffs which mainly supplied the vast population of Rome. This civilized life of Africa found its center at Carthage—the Rome of Africa, as it was frequently called. It has been observed by M. Villemain, if I remember right, that we think of no other Carthage than that of Hannibal. But Carthage, from the period of its new foundation under Augustus (A. D. 29), was essentially a Roman city. On its topography and scenery we need not dwell. The undecaying framework of nature, common to the Punic with the Roman city, has been described in M. Flaubert's Salammbô.* Those unwholesome and libidinous pages are occasionally redeemed by the antiquarian learning and accurate observation of the scholar, the traveler, and the devotee of realism in romance. Carthage was the child of Roman genius in its grandest

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a Christian may use wood from a consecrated grove? Whether he may drink from a tank in a deserted temple? On the question of the lawfulness of using arms in the Gospel dispensation, it is hard to believe that the bishop wrote without a smile. "Perhaps Christians had better keep hornless oxen, and have houses without windows, for fear some one should be killed. If a Christian is not to drink of streams which have been polluted by idolatry, he had better give up breathing—for the incense of heathen rites is taken up by the winds."—Tom. ii. 705.

* Perhaps the following bit of description may assist us in giving the color to some of the scenes of Augustine's earlier life. "The waves glittered round Carthage, for the moon shone at once upon the mountain locked gulf and the lake of Tunis, where the phenicopteri formed long red lines among the sand banks, while beyond, under the catacombs, the great salt lagoon glimmered like a plate of silver. The vault of the blue heaven lost itself in the horizon, on the one side in the white powdered dust of the plain, on the other in the fine silver mists of the sea. On the summit of the Acropolis, the pyramidal cypresses swayed and murmured like the regular waves which flapped slowly the whole length of the mole."

hour. It was described as a most glorious city. Its streets, glittering with gold and gay with marbles, ran in long parallel lines. It possessed numerous schools, and affected to rival Rome as a creator of Latin literature.* The old Punic passion for commerce appeared to revive upon its ancient soil. Countless ships pressed into the one great port of a havenless sea. If Christianity had spread with singular rapidity over the surface, it does not seem to have sunk into the heart of society. The sunshine and fertility of the country were bitterly contrasted with the character of the inhabitants. The ancient reproach of the Punic faith sank into insignificance compared with the shameless exhibition of vices which humanity abhors. The garb of religion was the signal for outbursts of derision and hatred.† Significant passages in Augustine's letters prove that the clergy themselves were far from immaculate.

One result of the Roman character of African society and education upon Augustine's intellectual history and theological acquirements is too important to be omitted. At neither period of its history was there any tincture of Hellenism in the population or culture of Carthage. It will be remembered, by every reader of the Confessions, how Augustine as a boy hated Greek; how the difficulty of learning a foreign language sprinkled with gall the sweetness of the glorious Grecian poems, which a nature like his was so capable of enjoying. This may be a convenient place for considering the question of Augustine's Greek scholarship, which has been so severely discussed.

An eminent prelate of the Irish church is said to have been in the habit of stating that, had St. Augustine applied to him for orders, he must have been rejected for ignorance of Greek. Possibly there may have been among the clergy of his Grace some who were far from being the saint's equals even in this respect. He may, indeed, have been unable to understand thoroughly portions of the Greek ecclesiastical writers. He used translations of Plato.‡ The accurate Clausen sums up the evidence on this subject as follows:—

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* "Duæ tantæ urbes Latinarum literarum artifices, Roma atque Carthago."—August. Epist. ad Dioscorum. Tom, ii. 257.

† See quotations in Gibbon, chapter xxxiii, notes 38, 39, 40. Gurges morum Carthaginensium.—Confess., iii. 7.

‡ Confess., viii. 2.

"In these observations and corrections of the Latin translation of the Scriptures, if we make some grains of allowance, it is indisputable that Augustine attained the truth. If I am right, he is so far from being chargeable with gross ignorance of Greek,* that he should be considered fairly instructed in grammar, and a subtle distinguisher of words. But it is evident that this knowledge, which does not go beyond the elements, is insufficient for a thorough comprehension of Greek books, and much more for those in the Hellenistic dialect, which have forms of words, notions, and constructions, peculiar to themselves." †

Among the sights of Carthage, there was one of peculiar fascination to the susceptible boy. I single it out, because it will naturally lead us to Augustine's judgment upon the study of classical antiquity. The spectacles of the Latin theater in Carthage were numerous and splendid. They furnished fuel for the unquiet fire of his soul, scenes which haunted his imagination, and passages which he loved himself to declaim. The Christian Church, it need hardly be observed, abhorred the Pagan theater. The idolatrous rites, the lascivious attitudes, the gladiatorial shows, which were its inseparable accompaniments, were equally opposed to the dogmatic Monotheism, to the purity, and to the mercy of the Gospel. The very fact of a man's habitual absence from the theatre afforded presumptive proof that he was a Christian.‡ In his Confessions, Augustine goes more deeply to the root of the matter. Supposing obscenity and idolatry to be banished from the stage, and taking it at its best estate, are its effects morally wholesome? Is it good that the passive emotions should be ex-

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* "Augustinus extitit ut alii, Ebrææ ac Græcæ linguæ ignarus."—Walch, Bibl. Patrist, p. 352. "Imperitus non tantum Hebraicæ sed etiam Græcæ linguæ, ipsos fontes adire non potuit, sed solam fere translationem Latinam explicare conatus est."—Rosenmüller, Hist. Interpret. iii. 40.

† Clausen's chapter on Augustine's knowledge of Greek contains an analysis of all the Greek words correctly treated by him. Augustine gives the derivation of several terms, and discriminates accurately between several others. He corrects the ancient Latin translation of the lxx, in *thirty* places, and of the New Testament at least three times. (John viii 25, xviii. 37: Romans, i. 3.—Clausen, August. S. Script. Interpres., pp. 30–40). To this it may be added that when Marcellinus consults him on some difficulties in the Psalms, he speaks of not having the Greek of all the Psalter at hand, but of referring to one portion, and finding that it agreed with the Latin.—Epist. lix. ad Marcellinum, Tom. ii. 294.

‡ *Spectacula non visitas,* says Cœcilian in his invective against the Christians.—Min. Fel. Octavius, cap. ii. See also de Broglie's L'Eglise et l'Empire, Part ii. Vol. i. 2.

cited, when no active exertion is intended to follow,* when the very intensity of the emotion is a delicate luxury whose end is itself? Augustine seems to doubt it. †

His early education was that of a rhetorician of the day. The practice was to make the boy render into fluent Latin prose that which he had read in Latin verse. Few rhetorical exercises could be devised so likely to give copiousness of vocabulary and readiness of expression. He is early successful in the school of rhetoric, goes from Tagaste to Carthage, is disgusted with it, thinks of Rome, and dedicates to Hierius his lost work, De Pulchro et Apto. From Carthage he had been driven by the wickedness of the wild students. At Rome, he recoils from the stories of their meanness. It appears that it was a common trick among them to take out a course from one professor, shirk payment, and go off in another body to another teacher. He is proud of being sent to Milan, by public conveyance, as a traveler at the public expense, with a salary from the State as well as private pay. This post was procured for him by the kindness of Manichean friends. Gibbon has sneered at the professional acquirements of Augustine. But surely he gave a proof of his power as an orator who persuaded the fierce population of a town in Mauritania to give up those murderous *catervæ*, compared with which the faction fights of the "Two-year Olds" in Tipperary were mild indeed. And the man must be admitted to know something of an art who has written a treatise upon it, which has not been superseded after fourteen hundred years. To Dioscorus he might write with irritation, "Oratoris libros, et quæ sunt de oratore omnia prætermisi." Yet the rhetorical knowledge, acquired by many years of indefatigable toil, is packed into the fourth book of the treatise on Christian doctrine. Has the Christian Church any more valuable manual on the subject?

The touching story of Victorinus,‡ who was himself also an African, shows how important a career was open to the rhetorician of the day. The teacher of nobles and senators might aspire to the honor of a statue. His position was like that of the

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* "Non enim ad subveniendum provocatur auditor, sed tantum ad dolendum invitatur."—Confess., iii. 2.

† Perhaps he vacillates for a moment towards a more favorable view, "Ergo amentur dolores aliquando, sed cave immunditiam, anima mea."

‡ Confess., viii. 2.

contemporary Sophist in the eastern portion of the Roman empire, if we make some allowance for the extravagance of the later Greek provincial spirit—not, perhaps, posing himself, be-ringed, crowned, and jeweled, before admiring crowds, holding his rhetorical jousts from city to city; but courted, feasted and patronized. True oratory is the strong expression of the freeman's thought, and is extinguished with the extinction of liberty. There remains nothing but the declaimer. Augustine's taste in rhetoric may have been vitiated, at least as to verbal details. No man can escape with perfect impunity from the spirit of his times. The very fountain of the intellectual life is tinged by our birthplace and earliest associations. It tells for something in an orator's life that he is born in Ireland, or in Africa, the Ireland of Rome. But Augustine's taste from the earliest period was for that which was solid. He thirsted for the wine of truth, and the beauty or livery of the cup-bearer was nothing to him. He had longed to hear the great popular preacher of the Manicheans, Faustus; but he soon found that the graceful orator, who could say whatever he pleased, had little or nothing to say. Faustus had but a scanty stock-in-trade—a few orations of Cicero, a very few books of Seneca, some poets, and the narrow literature of his own sect. However skillfully handled by a practiced speaker, not much could be made of such poor materials. Augustine soon knew at what price to value these embroidered inanities. When he hears Ambrose at Milan, he detects at once the ring of the true metal.* He carried with him into his judgments upon the Christian pulpit the same masculine discrimination. The grease-pastry style of rhetoric,† so characteristic of provincialism in all ages, was his abhorrence. He illustrates this by admirable images in the fourth book of the treatise upon Christian doctrine. The strong man in the battle may possibly use a golden-hilted and jeweled sword; but it is because it is a sword, not because it is embossed. Eloquence is a rapid stream, and sweeps along flowers of speech, if they come in its way; but does not go out of its course to find them. A key of gold is useless, if it will not open the lock to which it is applied. The florid redundancy indulged in, once at

* Confess., v. 13. "Delectabar suavitate sermonis, quamquam eruditioris, minus tamen hilarescentis atque mulcentis quam Fausti erat, quod attinet ad dicendi modum."

† Adipata, Cic. De Oratore.

least by his countryman, Cyprian, the Taylor of Africa, is but faintly excused.* With regard to minor points, the young African professor of rhetoric was accused at Rome and Milan of provincial pronunciation of many words. He did not altogether escape the charge of occasional solecism; but, as he adds, with an amusing touch of unconscious vanity, only from those who, like a dilettante of his acquaintance, argued with plausibility that Cicero himself had committed errors in this kind. But, no doubt, these minor blemishes were more than redeemed by the subtle tenderness and thoughtfulness peculiar to himself. The misfortune of provincialism is not altogether unmixed. The African style was evidently characterized by bold, incisive phrases. Under that burning sky, the Roman language seemed to lose something of its massiveness, and to acquire, in return, a speculative subtlety, which reminds us at times of the Greek ecclesiastical writers. As a preacher, it is evident that his powers were very great. He could charm alike the clergy of Carthage and the fishers of Hippo, and move a ferocious audience—first, to the burst of applause which were not unusual in churches, and then to abundant tears. Cold criticism of his style, as such, is scarcely permissible. He had no time for classic finish, for perfection of form. Every drop of time cost him so dear. The author of the apostrophe to Light is scarcely inferior to the greatest orator of any age.† He possessed that severe moral restraint which is often artistically at one with the most delicate taste. In describing the death of an early friend at Tagaste, he uses a phrase of questionable propriety,‡ apparently rather for effect than as an accurate exponent of his emotions. He is resolved that no taint of self shall rest upon his heart's offering to God, and the expression finds a place in the Retractations.

From Augustine's views upon rhetoric, we may pass by no unnatural transition to his judgment upon Pagan antiquity gen-

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* "Ait ergo quodam loco" [Cyprian ad Donat. Ep. i.] "Petamus hanc sedem; dant secessum icina secreta, dum erratici palmitum lapsus pendulis nexibus per arundines baiulas repunt, viteum porticum frondea tecta fecerunt." "Non dicuntur ista nisi mirabiliter adfluentissima fecunditate facundiæ, set profusione nimia gravitati displicent."—De Doct., iv. 14. The reader will be reminded of South's caustic allusion to Taylor in one of his sermons.

† Confess., x. 34.

‡ Ibid. iv. 6. "Quæ mihi quasi declamatio levis quam gravis confessio videtur."—Retract., lib. ii. 6.

erally. In an age like that in which he lived, it is evident that classical literature must have been estimated differently, not only by different minds, but by the same minds from different points of view. Literature and philosophy are so estimated in our day. In a Church so dogmatic as Rome, we find Newman praising and De Maistre abominating Lord Bacon. In the fourth century Paganism was yet standing. The heart of the tree, indeed, was dead, but, as may sometimes be observed in trees, the vitality had gone from the center to the circumference, and the tenacious bark communicated with still living fibres at the root. In the Eastern Church, classical literature was indulgently treated from the beginning by the Christian fathers. Its philosophers were looked upon by some among them as the prophets of human reason. In the West, there was more hesitation upon the subject. "The Apostle had been at Athens," exclaims Tertullian, almost fiercely, "and knew human wisdom by meeting it. What have Athens and Jerusalem in common? Let them look to it, who have brought in a Stoic, a Platonic, or a dialectic Christianity." On the other hand Arnobius confidently appeals to Plato.

Augustine's mature and definite judgment on heathen philosophy is not difficult to gather, in spite of some apparent inconsistencies of expression. The Gospel did not come to destroy the law, but to fulfill it. Nor did it come to destroy the crude fruit of human wisdom, but to form and mellow it. He never grounded faith upon a universal skepticism. Opposed as Aristotle and Plato might seem to be, he believed that one consistent mass had been strained out by the cautious wisdom of successive ages. Of Cicero and Plato he speaks with almost unvarying respect. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? In the wonderful providence of God, the first little flame of Divine love had been kindled in his heart by them, though the odor and the blaze were from the unguents of Holy Scripture.* To the Hortensius of Cicero he owed the first prelude to his conversion, the first initiation into those high problems which are the intellectual principles of the spiritual life. The tremulous impulse which it imparted to his spirit may

* This is his language to Romanianus, "Nunquam cessavimus inhiantes in philosophiam. . . . . Nondum aderat ea flamma, quæ summa nos arreptura erat, cum ecce tibi libri quidam pleni bonas res Arabices ubi exhalarunt in nos, ubi illi flammulæ instillarunt pretiosissimi unguenti guttas paucissimas, incredibile, Romaniane, incredibile, et ultra quod fortasse de me, et tu credis, etiam mihi ipso de meipso incredibile incendium concitarunt."—C. Acad., lib. ii. 2, Tom. i. 425.

be compared to the motion of the spray that hangs over the cataract before it is touched by the waters. With Plato, I suppose that it may be looked upon as certain that he was never profoundly acquainted, that he had read but little of his works, and that little in Latin translation. Yet, predestined Platonist as he was, he seized upon the lofty Theism of the Timæus, upon the high morality of the Euthyphon, upon the doctrines of Ideas, and with the instinct of genius thinking out these principles to their conclusion, gave that Platonic mold to Christian thought which it has never lost. "Quicquid dicitur in Platone, vivit in Augustino." To him we owe that noble passage which forever puts to shame the faithlessness of those who in this, or in any other age, have considered human learning a curse or a superfluity outside the Church. The passage to which I refer* is the more remarkable when we remember that the treatise in which it occurs was written, in part, to combat the passion for secular learning, dangerous in that day, which prevailed among a section of the African clergy. †

Turning from philosophy to literature, we find that Augustine had scruples as to his fondness for Terence and Virgil. In reference to Terence, this can easily be accounted for. His lines were much used to afford ground-colors for the rhetorical style, and the Christian Bishop had learned to despise those retail dealers in words.‡ There are also obscene passages in his plays. Indeed, his very connection with the stage was a strong objection to him in Augustine's judgment. He could not forget the voluptuous excitement throbbing in the very air, the sanguinary fanaticism of the circus, which he describes with so masterly a touch in the case of Alypius.§ Wherever the Latin language was spoken, the writings of Virgil had acquired a popularity which at first sight seems unaccountable. Such exquisite finish, such curious

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* De Doctrinâ Christ., ii. 28–31, 40.

† This view is quite consistent with the fact that after he was called to the episcopate he had no further time for such studies, and even used very severe language occasionally when he saw danger of excess in that direction. "Innumerabiles fabulæ poetarum, oratorum inflata et expolita . . . . mendacia, philosophorum garrulæ argutiæ . . . . posteaquam mihi curarum ecclesiæ sarcina imposita est, omnes illæ delicæ fugere de manibus."—Epistola Memorio, cxxxi., Tom. ii. 647.

‡ Venditorem verborum.—Confess., ix. 5. Nundinis loquacitatis, ix. 2.

§ Ibid iii. 8. Even in reference to Terence, he will not accuse those words which are elect and precious vessels, but that wine of devils which we are given to quaff in them.—i. 16.

felicity, requires culture to be appreciated. Yet lines of Virgil are scrawled on the poorest tombs among the catacombs, and scratched upon the walls of Pompeii by the hands of the lowest of the people. I leave it to others to discover reasons for this popularity, of which I am ignorant. For my part, I am content to find the cause in that subjectivity with which he is sometimes reproached, in that pathetic tenderness which, as has been well said, makes Virgil the first of the moderns. The people excuse refinement when it is pathetic. They pardon the finish of the line, when they can still see that it is written by one whose eyes were moistened with a tear. To this peculiarity of Virgil's genius no more delicate tribute has ever been paid than the sweet and burning tears shed by the passionate and imaginative boy, and for which the Bishop so bitterly reproached himself, "Tantillus puer et tantus peccator." To estimate fully the enchantment which Virgil exercised over Augustine, we must turn to those treatises of his which fill up a gap in the Confessions, the works against the Academies, On Order, and Concerning the Blessed Life. After his memorable conversion, and resignation of his professorship, his friend Verecundus kindly lent him his villa at Cassiciacum. There he retired for some months to prepare himself for his baptism, accompanied by Monica, by the son whom he was so soon to lose, and by a select circle of African friends, by Alypius, Navigius his brother, Trygetius, Lastidianus, Rusticus, and Licentius, the poetical son of Romanianus. There, in the evening generally, after their letters were written, and the superintendence of the farm completed for the day, the party discussed philosophical questions, such as the power of wisdom to give certainty, happiness, order. A singular freedom and toleration breathed through the conferences of these delightful days. Of one of the party, at least—Licentius, in whose subjective and melancholy strain there is an undertone which reminds us of the poetry of our own day—we know that even many years later he was not distinctively a Christian. Among the company there was not a single ecclesiastic to precipitate the work. Cassiciacum* was situated in a country of lakes and hills, upon the first

† Local tradition identifies Cassiciacum with Cassago, a village about eight leagues north-east of Milan. The oldest authority for this is, however, a note in a parish registry, stating, *memoriæ proditum esse*, that Augustine had sojourned in the place. Manzoni gives strong etymological reasons against the substitution of

stage of the Alps on the side of Lombardy. In that fair spot, "full of the serenity of the Italian sky, and the verdure of the valleys of Switzerland," the time passed away in a quiet and uneventful happiness. In the narrative of these months at Cassiciacum, Virgil is repeatedly mentioned. Upon the lower Alpine slopes—

> "Beneath them spread like a green sea
> The waveless plain of Lombardy,
> Bounded by the vaporous air,
> Islanded by cities fair,"

in the meadow-lawn of the farm of Verecundus, during one of those summer days, which seem to give light and clearness to the intellect as well as to the eye, or in the soft winter sunshine, the cadence of Virgil's lines seem to mingle with the household cares of the little group, with Monica's gentle house-work, and the lowing of the oxen. In our age of business and distraction, we are tempted to ask, with the poet—

> "What shelter to grow ripe is ours,
> What leisure to grow wise?"

We feel that—

> "Too fast we live, too much are tried,
> Too harassed to attain"

the "sweet calm" or "luminous clearness" of the thinkers of old. We cannot help envying Augustine his seclusion at Cassiciacum.

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ago for *iacum*. Besides this, the view from Cassago is common-place, and by no means agrees with Augustine's indications. On the contrary, *Casciago*, another Lombard town, in the opinion of Manzoni and Cossa presents no etymological objection. "It is situated on a prominence at the foot of a group of hills. On its western horizon is Monte Rosa, and the line of the Alps to their junction with the Apennines. To the south-east, a vast opening in which sight is lost; to the east and north-east, the mountains of Bergamasqui and of the lake of Como; within this magnificent frame-work, a part of the Lago Maggiore, four other small lakes nearer; further off, the entire plain, like the hills, sowed with villas, towns and villages, several of which at least must have existed in the time of Augustine." Another circumstance is mentioned of much importance in deciding the question. A Casciago there is a little torrent which is frequently dry, but which has enough water in autumn to justify the *silicibus irruens* of Augustine, and which in one place is pent up between two rocks, so as to admit of being described as *angustiis canalis intertrusa*. There is also a small valley falling off into a slope, and covered with a meadow, which agrees exactly with the words, *ad pratum descendere*, in *pratuli propinqua descendere*. But at Cassago there is no running water at any season See Manzoni's letter to M. Poujoulat upon the locality of Cassiciacum.

Yet let us remember that it was redeemed afterwards by toils that ended with one of the busiest of human lives. To him, at least, the retreat was not one of idleness. He wished deliberately to place his knowledge upon a certain basis, to understand as well as believe, to reconcile faith with reason, and that in him which thought with that which prayed. Like Butler at twenty-one, Augustine at thirty-three "proposed the search after truth as the business of his life." After many years, the rest and perfume of those months were still fresh in the old man's memory. He says, in words that bring before us a picture of green fields, and forms stretched under sheltering trees: "Thou, O faithful Promiser, givest to Verecundus, for that farm of his at Cassiciacum, where we rested in Thee from the fierce summer-tide of the world, the pleasant greenery of Thy Paradise, since Thou hast forgiven him his earthly sins in Thy mountain." But the quiet work of their morning must soon be over. Before the evening falls, they must lift up their minds to the great problems that tower before our existence and theirs—like the Alpine heights on which they looked at sunset. It must pass away in a few weeks. From the day of his baptism, to the day when in mortal sickness, he must lie down in the little chamber at Hippo, with the sounds of battle ringing in his ear, he can never know rest again. His eyes will not then be fixed upon the pages of Virgil, but upon the psalms of David hung before his eyes at the foot of his humble bed. Yet it may be that at times, in that busy and holy life, the most musical words which he has heard upon earth will fall upon the ear of memory, when he is listening most intently to catch the strains that come from the City of God.*

This sketch would be very deficient without some reference to the state of religion in Africa in the fourth century. More than in most countries, Christianity there was tinctured by the soil in which it grew. Donatism may be considered as the expression of national and religious jealousy. The "fractionary" ecclesiastical spirit of the African Christians has been traced in the enormous numbers of the African bishops. For instance, in one conference in Carthage, (A. D. 411) we read of 279 Donatist, 286

* M. Saisset has pointed out a curious Virgilian reminiscence in the De Civ. D. xiv. 27. "Sine ardoris illecebroso stimulo infunderetur gremio uxoris."—*Cf.* Æneid viii. 406. "Conjugis infusus gremio." Another such reminiscence may be cited—the reference to Dares and Entellus, in his letter to Jerome.—Tom. ii., Epist. 68.

Catholic bishops. The colonists acquired something of the fierceness of the tribes by whom they were surrounded. The Donatists, those Puritans of Africa, had their Anabaptists and Fifth Monarchy men in the Circumcellion. Some one has ingeniously said that yet another analogy between the Puritans and the Donatists is suggested by those extraordinary names which, as we turn over the pages of a Church History, remind us for a moment of passages at which we have smiled in Woodstock. But the love of these names belonged to African, not to Donatist, Christianity.

Among the Catholic bishops whose names are subscribed to the letter to Pope Innocent against Pelagius and Cœlestius are two Adeodatuses, and three Quodvultdeuses. How prevalent Manicheism was, no reader of the Confessions can forget. It was no unusual circumstance to find three bishops in one town, Manichean, Donatist, and Catholic. Heathenism lingered on still. Augustine speaks, with an eloquent shudder, of the hideous and effeminate wretches, who, with unguent-dripping locks and whitened faces, up to yesterday, as he says, went in the processions of the Magna Mater through the streets of Carthage. The country, and especially Carthage, was haunted by dissolute fortune-tellers and spiritualists,* the maggots who crawl from the rottenness of skepticism. Aruspices still remained and sacrificed.† Ingenious people were puzzled by impostors, *mathematici*.‡ Now an image was rashly broken by the Christians, and the population rose in fury. Now a nomad tribe had a bargain to make with its civilized neighbors and scruples of conscience arose, because the barbarians would only swear by their own gods. As is the case in India now, two phenomena were exhibited, on the one hand a fanatical revival of the old religion, on the other a philosophical rationalism, which sought to preserve a minimum of it, inculcating the moral ideas of the new faith. There, as ever in analogous circumstances, two currents of thought

* "Quos ipsi bene novimus per innumera scorta solere dissolvi."—C. Acad. lib. i., Tom. i. 417. See the curious story of the "medium" Albricerinus.—Ibid.

† One of these applied to Augustine when he was a candidate for the theatrical prize poem:—"Mandasse mihi nescio quem haruspicem, quid ei dare mercedis vellem, ut vincerem; me autem fœda illa sacramenta abominatum respondisse: nec si corona illa esset immortaliter aurea, muscam pro victoria mea necari me sinere."—Confess., iv. 2.

‡ Ibid. iv. 3.

are formed drop by drop, until at last the equilibrium is broken, the mass of the new ideas exceeds that of the old, and the old is absorbed and lost in the new. The letters of two pagans to Augustine, Longinianus the priest, and Maximus of Madaura, illustrate this truth. At Carthage, and elsewhere, the Christian Church had not yet filtered off all the dregs of paganism. Augustine admits that he knew Christians who were worshipers of pictures and sepulchers. There were riotous feasts, nominally changed into Memories of Martyrs, but in carnality and excess in no respect different from the old festivals in the temples of the idols. At Hippo itself, there were Church feasts, whose admitted extravagances were sanctioned, or palliated, by a reference to similar abuses, committed at Rome, under the eyes of its bishop. Such is a hasty and faintly drawn sketch of the varied life of populous towns* now overthrown and forgotten in the desert, or remembered only to be execrated as the nests of pirates.†

Erasmus complains bitterly that the powers of Augustus were wasted upon Africa. Such a genius would have produced still nobler fruits, had it been born or lived in Italy or Gaul. The rudeness, the voluptuousness, the small and restless curiosity of Africa, was hostile to literary excellence and philo-

* Of one of these Roman-African towns, a correspondent of the *Times* wrote, a few years ago:—"Under the shadow of the forest hill at Batna, upon which the lion, the panther and the wild boar range, a Roman City, which once held 50,000 inhabitants, and where ninety bishop assembled in council, lies a ruin." For this citation I am indebted to a passage in Archdeacon Lee's lectures, where he draws with solemn eloquence the moral of Donatism—"Lectures on Ecclesiastical History," p. 96, *sqq.*

† Of Hippo, now Bona, an eloquent description has been given by the Abbé Sibour. "The chapel of Bona is an old and miserable mosque, which the Moors themselves have abandoned. . . . . Beneath the shadow of aged olive trees, which extend their boughs over the tomb of Hippo, I was able to call up the phantom of the buried city. Nothing was changed—the same rounded coasts, the same waves which bathed them, the same bluish mountains on the side of Carthage, and near us the chain of the Edough, rising up with its sombre gorges and wild aspect. The Seybouse rolled its slow waters . . . . . We walked along a road hemmed in by two living hedges of cactus and aloes. The Arabs have given Bona the name Uneba. Sometimes from the thick hills of thorny shrubs we saw the scanthus raise its great elegantly-cut leaves. We were, in fact, on the ruins of Hippo. The town covered with its buildings the two slopes which we had ascended, and which, by a gradual fall, descend to the banks of the Seybouse near the sea. Some stones were all that remained of the city of Augustine. . . . . On that one of the two hills of Hippo which is nearest to the Abougemma, on the side of th

sophical ripeness.* This may be partly true. It seems, indeed, that the scanty hours left to the Bishop, after the toils of controversy, the care of his flock, and the superintendence of his clergy were broken in upon by a noisy throng of babbling visitors, fond of hearing their own tongues, and utterly incapable of solid discussion. But the discordant elements into which he was thrown have gained for us one useful lesson. It is instructive to see how thoroughly Augustine had mastered the thoughts and the wants of his own age; what an extensive toleration he possessed, in spite of the occasional severity and dogmatism which grate upon a modern ear. He answers the strange letter of Volutianus with an exemplary patience which astonishes Erasmus; of the Manicheans he speaks generally in the tone of one who knew the difficulty of finding truths. Perhaps something like a parallel may be found in Newman—the same long uncertainty lulled in dogmatism, only awakening from time to time to tremble with excitement and sympathy for the fortune of others. But the parallel must be drawn with due allowance for the difference between the manly submission to the Catholic Christianity of the fourth century, and the suicide of reason involved in the acceptance of Ultramontanism in the nineteenth century.

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sea, you meet as you ascend the remains of a vast edifice. All around old olive trees, thick cactuses garnished with points, grow wild from the energy of a soil of which all proves the luxuriant fertility. The character of these ruins, the extent of the building to which they belong, the solidity of the walls and vaults, the situation, make one believe at first that these are the remains of a church—perhaps the crypt of that *Basilica Pacis* where the voice of Augustine was so often raised, and where his tomb was placed. But other indications, especially the remains of aqueducts, appear to give the building another designation. The ruins have probably nothing sacred, and belong to the old cisterns of Hippo—vast reservoirs, fed at a great expense from the sources of the Edough. . . . . The Arabs and Kabyles of the mountains perform some curious ceremonies on a portion of the wall, in an angle of the edifice, upon a great stone. Upon asking their reason, they reply that a great Roumi lived here, that his history was written upon the stone, but that the stone was broken." M. Sibour argues that this great Roumi is Augustine; that the stone was transferred from its place in the ruins of the Basilica Pacis, where it covered the body of Augustine together with the remains of the great bishop, lest the tomb should be profaned by the Arian Vandals on the taking of Hippo.—Translation de la Relique de S. Augustine, par M. l'Abbé Sibour—in Poujoulat's Histoire de S. Augustine, ii. 445–450.

* "Rudis erat Africa, voluptatum avida, studiorum inimica, curiosarum rerum appetens." August. Opp. Tom. ii. 1. "Eorum irruentem presentiam qui plerumque non sunt apti tali negotio, magisque linguæ certaminibus quam scientiæ luminibus delectantur."—Volusianus Augustino.

III.

It only remains to notice briefly the milestones on the roadside of Augustine's intellectual career. We may term it, with equal truth, his spiritual career, for with him the intellectual and the spiritual are so interfused that we cannot discriminate one from the other. With many men, conversion is the abdication, with him it is the consummation of reason.

While yet divided between passion and vanity, his soul is reached by the Hortensius of Cicero. The first ring was touched, and the chain never ceased to vibrate. The great problem of the origin of evil first occupied his thoughts, and led to his long subjugation to Manicheism. To this, without ever being fully converted himself, he made several converts, as has happened more than once with converts to Rome in our own day. During nine years of Manicheism he was never thoroughly satisfied with it. Perhaps his mother was led to her dream by the prophetic penetration of maternal love.* He seems to have held, first, a kind of Dualism, then, the theory of an extended God; or, as he himself says, an extended nothing. He made various efforts to escape from these unsatisfactory speculations. Epicureanism might have tempted him for a moment, but the instinct of immortality, strong in such natures as his, preserved him. Subtler theories won him for a while. In despair of attaining to truth, he tended for a little to Academic skepticism, the probabilism of the New Academy. At other times he inclined to Pantheism, the perpetual temptation of the speculative spirit; he uses a very curious similitude to explain the form in which it presented itself to him for a while.†

Such are the bare outlines of this restless career, from Manicheism to skepticism, from skepticism to Pantheism. The true cause of the long uncertainty was, as he tells us, want of spirituality.‡ He had had some acquaintance with the Scripture from an early period of his life; he had never lived quite outside a

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* Confess., iii., 11.

† "Te autem, Domine, ex omni parte ambientem et penetrantem eam, sed usquequaque infinitum. Tamquam si mare esset ubique, et ubique per immensa infinitum solum mare, et haberet intra se spongiam quamlibet magnam, sed finitam tamen; plena esset utique spongia illa ex omni sua parte ex immenso mari; sic creaturam tuam finitam te infinito plenam putabam."—Confess., vii. 5.

‡ Conabar cogitare Te homo, et talis homo, summum et solum et verum Deum!" —Ibid. vii. 1.

current of Christian thought. The ineffable sweetness of the name of Jesus had breathed upon his soul. It is right, and, if properly understood, may be most profitable for the Christian to remember, that he who among all Christian teachers has been pronounced to have had the greatest influence next to St. Paul, derived his first great religious lessons, not directly from Scripture, but from Platonism. He can be thankful to God in later life that he had mastered some high truths of this philosophy before he really studied the Bible. But he is careful to proclaim that with all its efficacy as an awakener, Platonism is absolutely insufficient as a guide. We cannot discover in it that which alone can act upon the will, the humility of Jesus: "I did not humbly cling to my humbled Lord Jesus: nor know how masterful that infirmity was, the strength of that weakness." The most superficial reading of the Confessions will show with what entire and loving devotion he rested upon the Holy Scriptures, his chaste delight, honeyed with heaven's manna, and luminous with its light.

As specimens of Augustine's philosophy, I shall only refer to his discussion upon Time and Memory.

He is led to a theory of time in the eleventh book by his examination of the first verses of Genesis. He meets those who asked, as an objection to creation, what God was doing before He made heaven and earth, and how it came into His mind to make what he had not before made—this renders it necessary for him to examine the notion of Time.

The substance of his doctrine is this. What is Time? It is in the consciousness, and by the aid of memory that we find the first notion of duration. The mind itself is the type and measure of it. It is not from exterior sources that we acquire the notion of time, but by the inner sense; and it is the mind, the *ego*, which is the original model of that which endures. The present is an ideal point. The past and future have no existence but in the conception of the mind. We do not measure time by motion, but motion by time.

"In thee, my soul, I measure time: in thee I say I measure it. The impression which things as they pass make in thee, and which abides when they have passed away, that impression which is present I measure, not things which have passed away that it might remain. It I measure when I measure time. Therefore, either this impression is time, or I do not measure time." *

In the treatise on Memory, modern psychology has solved Augustine's great difficulty—our memory of having forgotten something—by the distinction between memory and reminiscence. Memory is spontaneous, reminiscence is memory with effort. When we will to remember a thing which does not come spontaneously to us, we remember something relative to it, which gives us a relative conception of it. We may have no conception what the thing is, only what relation it bears to something else. That relation affords an "abscissio infinitæ investigationis," and suggests another relation or relations, until we remember the whole thing.*

I shall be amply rewarded if these pages should induce any younger reader to study the Confessions for himself. We honor this great teacher, not by heaping upon him extravagant titles of traditional honor, not as they did who carried his assumed relics from Pavia to Bona, but by being made partakers of his spirit. Better than any positive result of his psychological speculations is that fresh admiration for the glories and depth of man's nature. "And they go to admire the heights of the mountains, and the billows of the sea, and the starry heavens, and *leave themselves.*" Better even than all the great pages in which he has left us the everlasting lines of our faith, his conviction that Christianity is inexhaustible by man's wit or thought. Let us read him as he himself would be read, not with the prostrate spirit of slaves, not superstitiously splintering off single texts as if infallible, but, with the reverent liberty of Christian freemen. Let us admire and imitate, as far as may be, the mingled depth and tenderness of a great heart and a great intellect; the saving common-sense which so often rescued him from the errors into which mere logic would have precipitated him; the consideration for the weak; the determination to understand an adversary's position thoroughly; the manly faith in human reason; the intense reverence for Scripture; the humble penitence and gentle trust in Christ.

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* Confess., vi. 27. Saisset's "Cite de Dieu," Introduction, lxxxix., *sqq.* "Here is Augustine's thought, which has not been well understood. The sure proof that the mind is the measure of time, or measures time, is that it measures silence. And as silence is not anything real, but simply a privation, and as no privation can be measured, the mind always measures silence by its own duration and intervals, which form part of time."—Notes of D. Martin's Traduction des Confessions, Tom. ii. 219.

VI.—THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN ITALY.*

BY REV. C. M. BUTLER, D. D.

We cannot properly speak of a Reformation, but only of a reform movement in Italy. It has not yet reached a distinctively Protestant position. It has enlisted none of the Bishops nor of the high Ecclesiastics. Although protected by the Government of Victor Emanuel, it is yet subject to priestly proscription. Embracing a very large number of the educated and business classes of Italy, together with many of the purest and most enlightened Patriots, Professors and Priests, it has arrayed against it the whole power of the Papacy and of the Prelacy, combined with most of the *contadini* and the lowest laboring classes.

But the movement is one which should enlist the warm interest and sympathy of all the friends of Christ and of his truth. On its development and success or upon its defeat, depend, humanly speaking, the fortunes of the Papacy in Europe and in the World.

We propose therefore to show whereunto the Italian Reformers have attained. To do this we shall translate a few papers from their principal organ, the "*Esaminatore*," published at Florence, which will exhibit alike their spirit, and their present doctrinal position. It will suffice as an introduction to these translations to state, that there are two schools of Reformers whose headquarters are respectively at Florence and at Naples. That at Naples is the more advanced. A society called "*La Societa Nazionale Emancipatrici* and *di mutuo succorso del Sacerdozio Italiano* numbers nearly a thousand members, who are openly enrolled in opposition to the Papacy. They are warm partizans of the Italian Government, and bitter enemies of the Pope's temporal power. They throw themselves eagerly into those political questions in which the interests of the Church are involved; and complain at this time, not without seeming cause, that the Government has not protected them as it should against the disabilities and persecutions to which they are exposed from the higher

* Chiefly translated from the *Esaminatore* by Rev. C. M. Butler, D.D., West Philadelphia, Pa.

clergy. Their organ the *Emancipatore Cattolico* is a popular *weekly* Journal, which combines politics and news with religion and reform; and is conducted with great vigor by the president of the society. The *Esaminatore*, a semi-monthly Journal, published at Florence, is of a higher character. Its discussions are learned, temperate and elaborate. A beautiful spirit of Christian courtesy and moderation, pervades all its articles. It is a warm friend of the Italian Government and of United Italy; but it does not give itself habitually to political discussions. Its Editor and most of its contributors, are *under the veil;* as its policy has been to elicit full discussion, without subjecting those who write, to Episcopal or Papal wrath. It has many friends and co-laborers and contributors among the most distinguished patriots and the most learned Ecclesiastics of Italy. Those who are represented by the *Esaminatore* are also combined into an association, which has adopted seven principal points as the basis of its proposed reformation. They are thus introduced and stated and explained by the Editor:—

"The object of our periodical is always *to examine* the actual state of the Church, to propose the remedies needful to heal its wounds, and to reconcile religion with the State; hence we desire to submit this summary of our views to the judgment, and to careful examination of all those who direct their attention to these vital questions. From examinations and discussions we hope for light; and with light will come a remedy.

The fundamental idea of our movement is, the restitution to every order of the faithful—the laity no less than the clergy—of all their ancient Catholic rights and duties. Hence,

1. Restitution to the laity of the right to elect the parochial clergy, and to administer the temporal affairs of the Church.

2. The election of Bishops by the Clergy and people, with the reservation of the rights of the Crown.

3. The reinvestment, in their ancient Diocesan and provincial rights of Bishops and Metropolitans; and hence the cessation of their present servile dependence upon Rome and the abolition of every oath of vassalage to her.

4. The celibacy of the Clergy not to be enforced.

5. The circulation of the Holy Scriptures among the clergy and laity to be free.

6. The Liturgy to be performed in the national tongue, understood by the people.

7. Confession to be no longer obligatory but voluntary; and the communion to be administered in both kinds.

So soon as, upon this basis, we shall begin a truly Catholic Reformation of the Church, we shall see the Papal despotism fall, and the primitive constitution of the Church re-established; and then concord between the priests and the laity, between religion and the state, will be no longer an aspiration and a dream. Without such concord we may indeed truly say that Italy is constituted; but no thoughtful man will dare to add that it is permanently established.

No programme, however splendid it may be, has true value, unless it can be carried out. Our scheme may be realized, if all those in Italy who are persuaded of the evils which we lament, and approve of the remedies which we propose, unite in a National association all the members of which, in the promotion of their sacred object, shall be pledged to use the following means:—

1. *To speak*—with tongue and pen, each member in his sphere, as much and as effectively as he can.

2. *To print*—The *Esaminatore* gives itself unreservedly to this work; and if we may judge from the indications of sympathy which our Journal has thus far received from the Italian press, there will not be wanting co-laborers in this great cause.

3. *To preach*—The example of one earnest Ecclesiastic* will not be, we may hope, without imitation."

This association has acted upon this programme for the last two years. There has been a perceptible advance during this period in the spirit of reform, and in dissatisfaction with the Papal dogmas, and the Papal Government. A question upon which there has been much discussion in that of continuing to act under the veil of anonymous authorship and secret association. The bolder and more pronounced friends of reform, denounce this policy as disingenuous and unworthy. The conductor of the *Esaminatore* still advocate it, but with less and less confidence, and with a more distinct assurance that it must, ere long, be abandoned. Many of the best contributors of the Journal write over their own names. Among the most prominent of these is a highly venerated and pious parish priest of Piedmont,

* Petro Mongini.

Pietro Mongini. He openly advocates in the pulpit and press the most advanced views of the Reforming party; he is a model of parochial fidelity and zeal; his parishoners sustain him with enthusiastic affection. He has been able to brave the Pope's excommunication; and has thus demonstrated that the policy of open and manly confession is safe as well as honorable and righteous. Mongini is impatient of the inaction of the friends of Reformation. Hitherto they have confined themselves to discussion and to the propagation of their programme of reform. There has been no attempt to organize and associate parishes conducted upon the avowed principles of the association. Mongini contends that the time for putting their principles in practice has arrived. In a recent work entitled "*Le due Politiche*" he advocates immediate action and organization. He does not propose a separation from the Church, although he is well aware that the measures which he proposes will be regarded as a schism by the Pope, but only such measures within the Church, as shall lead to its purification. He even dreams of a General Council which, under the inspiration of the spirit of Reform, shall purify the Church "in its head and its members." But he hopes for this result only through the progress of a Reform which should be at once practically and energetically inaugurated.

As this work of Mongini presents the most recent phase of the Reform movement; and as this excellent and practical man appears to be the popular religious leader of the Reform party, we present to our readers a subsequent communication from him to the *Esaminatore* of June 15, in which he meets distinctly the demand for a practical programme of action. It is thus introduced by the Editor:—

"The Question of Practical Reform."—We rejoice to give the post of honor in our present issue, to the noble words of our old and venerated friend Mongini. We adopt them in substance as our own. No one who has hitherto followed our course needs to be informed of our slight differences of opinion. Assuredly *in necessariis* the unity of sentiment on the part of the *Esaminatore* and this valuable article is perfect. And we, although preachers of prudence, fully sympathize with the boldness, which is by no means empty braggadocio, but which draws its inspiration,

if we may believe a thousand unimpeachable testimonies, not less from the sanctity of his cause, and from the consciousness of an irreproachable life, than from thorough knowledge, and an ardent love of country, and a profound consecration to truth, and a felt obligation to proclaim it at every cost.

TURIN, JUNE, 1857.

"I feel myself called upon, Dear Signor *Esaminatore*, to thank you warmly for your examination of my little work *Le due Politiche;* and no less for the very courteous manner in which you have presented it to your readers, conveying in a few words the design and argument of the treatise, and speaking of it as conducted under the form of an inexorable syllogism.

But the author of syllogisms finds himself under the necessity of accounting for everything connected with them;—the syllogisms themselves, their consequences, and all that group of corollaries which follow both.

Now this is my present position. The consequence of my syllogism is the summons which you properly make to me, to treat, in another article, of the practical possibility of assembling, in our day, an Œcumenical Council which shall accomplish a true Reformation of the Church. And here you say truly that we come upon one of those practical questions, which it is necessary to confront and to resolve, if we wish that our studies and discussions should issue in any practical result.

Your summons places me in the embarrassing position, either of confronting and resolving the question, or of seeing my syllogism fall like a dead body to the ground notwithstanding all its inexorableness. To do what you demand would be nothing less than to demonstrate the practical and precise means of reaching an actual result of reformation. And inasmuch as I have already indicated in my treatise, the practical and precise means, and have summed them all up in one, viz: the determined will of the Bishops themselves that there shall be a reformation; and inasmuch as you have no faith in the realization of the result by this agency, you demand that I shall resolve the question in some other way.

But how shall I proceed? If I could act with the Bishops the practical question would be, I am persuaded, resolved. But

without them, and against their will, how can it be possible, without inflicting a wound upon the Catholic conscience?

Our foremost men have treated of reform. I place at the head of the modern writers, Gioberti, Rosmini, Ventura. The first has treated of Catholic reform and of civil renovation, not more philosophically than practically. The second has disclosed, with a master hand, the wounds of the Church; but he has not opened all of them, and having drawn a veil over the principal one—the temporal sovereignty of the Pope—he has not been able to indicate any practicable method of reform. The third has done the least of all. He has written a work upon "*the public Christian right*," but as to the practical question, he has entirely shirked it, having well known from personal experience, that in opposition to the theoretical public Christian right, stands the all powerful existing anti-christian right of the Jesuits. How then shall I, a feeble dwarf, confront the question which these giants have not touched, and scarcely have approached?

Nevertheless I am not willing wholly to withdraw from the field. If it be not presumptuous I would say: Giants treat questions in the large, and sometimes it happens that an obscure laborer discovers an unobserved *leverage*, which is sufficient to lift the obelisk and fix it on its pedestal.* I will therefore attempt an answer. In any event it is only my opinion which will be expressed. This is the age of great truths, and new suggestions. The latter have at least the merit of shedding additional luster upon the former.

I begin therefore with the frank acknowledgment that you and I perfectly agree in the opinion that the Bishops will do nothing. So true is this, that I close my little work with the expression of that sad presentiment. This being premised, I proceed to the development of my views.

I admit as demonstrated,

1. That many Anti-Catholic sectarian principles predominate in the church.

2. That the present Papacy ought therefore to be transformed, in so far as it is disfigured by these principles.

* An allusion to the famous story of the workman, who, when the obelisk of the Vatican, having been lifted to the utmost height which the machinery would permit, was still too low to be swung upon the pedestal, cried out "*wet the ropes!*" which being done brought the obelisk to the desired elevation.

3. That this transformation can be wrought only by means of a thorough reform.

4. That this reform is not desired, but is abhorred, and in a thousand ways counteracted, by Rome and by the Episcopate.

5. That the inferior clergy cannot, if it would, perform this work.

6. That the Papacy and the Episcopate have been entreated and counselled in a thousand ways, to inaugurate a Reformation, but always in vain; and that thus all the efforts demanded by Christian charity, towards our superiors, have been exhausted.

7. That the laity, with very few exceptions, are wrapped in the deep sleep of indifference.

Admitting I say, all these stern facts, which no one can possibly deny, I can discover no other mode of rendering a reform possible than the following:

Let all the more courageous of the clergy and laity, however small may be their number, unite together, and make a distinct issue with the Papacy, so that the fact of its existence may be met by the fact of an actual and organized opposition. Unless we adopt this energetic measure, it is my opinion that the practical question of reform will be long postponed.

But this proposition needs explanation, in order that there may be no misunderstanding. I shall speak, as is my wont, without the least equivocation.

What then do I mean by *the courageous?* I mean that select part of the clergy and laity, who unite a sacred love to the Church with a warm devotion to the country. Hence by the *courageous* I mean neither the immoral nor the fanatical, nor braggarts in the guise of Reformers, but honest men who can boldly confront the Pope himself, men of tried character, firm in their principles, and having but one supreme aim, that of desiring, with St. Bernard, to see the church in her pristine beauty.

What do I mean by putting ourselves *on the field of facts?* I mean that it is now time to do rather than to speak; that we should waste no more time in theories, but should seek their realization. I mean that having designed the structure, we should now quarry the stones from the mountain, and hew them into shape for use.

What do I mean by opposing facts to facts? I mean that inasmuch as Rome *acts*, and acts always, and acts as the enemy

of modern civilization, we too should act, not indeed as an enemy of any one, but solely from love to the Church of God.* We should act *negatively* by not heeding or caring for what is done at Rome—neither for its dogmas, nor its Anti-Catholic and sectarian enactments—and we should act *positively* by a contrary cause of proceeding, always indeed in consistency with that which is lawful and honest, and in conformity to the laws under which we live.

This explicit language may greatly disturb the scruples of some of your readers. I seem already to hear these demands. "Is it lawful then for a Catholic priest or layman, to act thus on the convictions of his own mind? Would not this be to introduce schism? Would not this be to rebel openly against Ecclesiastical authority?

These three scruples must be banished before united action can be possible. Hence I answer distinctly to the first—

Yes—in certain supreme circumstances it is lawful, nay a duty, to act independently of the law. I demand therefore of the scrupulous conscience which propounds the question—

Is it lawful to care for the wounded man who lies in the highway weltering in his blood, when the Levite, whose official duty it is to attend to him and cure him, passes him carelessly on his steed?

Is it lawful for the inmates of a house to prop it up and repair it when it is crumbling into ruin, and when the father of the family, though warned of the fact many times, pays no heed to the warning?

Is it lawful for a man to cultivate a field possessed by him in common with others, when the appointed cultivator has left it desolate, and when his family would else be destitute of food?

Is it lawful to drive away wolves from a common sheep-fold when the shepherds sleep, and appear to have made a compact with the wolves?

Yes it is lawful, and not lawful only, but a duty. No theolo-

* A truly Christian sentiment! It recalls to my mind the saying of Parini, when in the theater a loud cry was raised—"*Viva liberty and death to the aristocrats!*" "*Viva.*" said the venerable old man, amidst the profound silence which prevailed when he rose—"*Viva liberty and death to no one!*" We commend the noble sentiment to those malignant wretches who demand for themselves only benevolence, while they pursue others with hatred and revenge.—EDITOR.

gian in the world can deny it, because there is no theologian who does not know that there is a law which is above all human laws, and all human lawgivers, a natural and eternal law, which in these extraordinary cases appeals authoritatively to every conscience. Then it is lawful for us, and a duty also, in the circumstances in which we are placed, to *act.* In order to disprove this conclusion it would be necessary to set aside as false the seven facts which we have enumerated above.

But this it is impossible to do. It must be confessed that the fine gold has become dim and needs to be burnished; it must be confessed that the holy mountain is desolate, and has become a habitation of wolves, and that its guardians have slept while the wolves have ravened in the folds.

To the second scruple we reply—that to do what we propose is not to will a schism. It is in fact to will to avoid schism. The schism already exists—and a frightful one it is! It is in part latent and in part open. It is latent in the sullen universal murmur of the Christian world, which complains of Rome, even when it does not differ from her in fundamental principles; in the universal indifference, which is a silent schism, more fatal than any other; in the abandonment on the part of the most enlightened classes of many religious observances; in the religious dissensions, under the same domestic roof, between husband and wife, between father and children, between brother and brother, and even between priests and priests, and between priests and Bishops—differences over which shame draws a veil. Its existence is apparent in the issues of the press—in philosophical books, in which a thousand different systems are proposed, in political productions where the Catholics, already discordant among themselves, find that they are still more at variance with the Jesuits; in theological treatises, where the Jesuits themselves are in open issue with each other in regard to the theoretical principles upon which Papal Rome should be conducted. This schism is open also in the practical attitude assumed respectively by the different civil Governments and the court of Rome; both making laws and decrees, and each disapproving of those made by the other; a difference which constitutes an actual religious and political schism. In short, schism exists already, and he must have the eyes of a mole who does not see it. How then can our effort for Reformation be called a wish to commence a schism? This

would be to wish for a tempest, when it was already beating on our head.

What we do *not* wish to do sufficiently appears from the scheme of reform which we propose. We propose the destruction of all schismatical and sectarian principles with which the clerical press, official and unofficial, is replete. We propose the abolition of all those matters and modes of discipline which are not conformed to our age, and which St. Augustine declares should be changed according to the exigencies of the times. We propose in short to refit the Church, by rendering it *one, holy and Apostolic*, as in former times, in which it was the friend of the people, the benefactor of humanity, the mighty tree whose fruit was every species of civilization. This is what our Reform proposes; and this—is it to desire schism, or to desire its extinction?

But it is said—"Inasmuch as schism exists, this will surely increase it, and make it worse, because the question of reform always starts up powerful parties."

Beyond a doubt I admit it; the raising of these existing imporant issues between true Catholics and Sectarists, is a serious matter. But this is the case, history advises us, in all great epochs of reform. But it is also as certain that harmony will result from this collision, as that to the tempest and hurricane will succeed the calm. Moreover, these disorders are the necessary and fatal result of causes whose origin is Rome. The disorders are not to be charged to the Reformation, but to the evils which have made it inevitable. Their authors are—the partizans and sectaries who teach from the professional chair, from the pulpit, from the confessionals, through the press, and in the social circle. They are the court officials, whose position is one of dependence on a bad government, the courtiers who fumigate the Pope, and aquiesce, without a word, in all the measures of the governing clique. They are the authors of the syllabus, and the encyclical letters, and diplomatic notes, in which they defend and aggrandize that which is the real cause of all our difficulties—the temporal power. Hence it follows that schism is not to be charged upon us, but upon Rome and its champions. The ravages of the wolves are not to be imputed to their victims, the lambs. If therefore disorders of another kind than those of mere differences of opinion should ensue, it is Rome who will be responsible for them; it is she who will be the sole schismatic, and the original

cause of all our difficulties. We should always bear in mind the famous saying: *Qui est causa causae, est causa causati.*

And now we reply to the third scruple. Certainly the cause which we propose would not be a rebellion against ecclesiastical authority. I lift my cap reverently to the mere word *authority*, especially if it be ecclesiastical. Why? Because authority is everything to me. It is in a certain sense God himself, who is essential authority, for he is the Alpha and Omega of all authority. For me this word is as venerable as that of law, for it conveys to me the idea of sanctity and justice. But I cannot say the same thing always of the person invested with authority. I make a most important distinction between authority, and the person invested with authority. If the person invested with authority evidently abuses it, then this person is to me, not authority, but its negative, its violation. And if this person says—as certain mitred pretenders do say—"I am the embodied authority and you must respect the authority in me,"—I reply—"Authority makes its demand on you, and hence you must yourself respect the authority which you wield, by using it only for the purpose for which it was confided to you." Opposition therefore to the person who abuses his authority is not rebellion against authority itself, but only resistance to its violation and to injustice, and thence it is in fact homage to authority, loyalty to authority, which is all the more real because it is the defense of authority itself against its worst violation.

In our case the authority is ecclesiastical. The person invested with it is a priest. If this priest, whatever may be his grade, is a sectarist, and partizan, and uses his ecclesiastical authority to promote his sectarian principles, he then abuses his authority, and hence it is not only lawful but a duty to oppose him. We have on this point the united testimony of all the philosophers and theologians in the world; and without being theologians or philosophers we are taught the same thing by common sense. I shall never cease to reiterate to the over-scrupulous and timid, the grand saying of Bellarmine, "that it is lawful to resist the Pope when he assaults the souls of the faithful, and introduces commotions in the Church." (*De Rom. Pont.* Lib. 2. chap. 29). Gioberti says, and truly, that "in such a case it is piety and wisdom to disobey, inasmuch as it is a duty to save religion even from its own ministers." Rinn. Lon. 2 p. 9, 141.

If we resort to history to find practical examples of such resistance, and positive disobedience we shall have a *mare magnum* of them, from the time of St. Paul himself in his withstanding of St. Peter to the face. We shall find them in all nations and in all courts; for everywhere this opposition to the Papal pretensions has been at some time manifested. Let the doubting and the overscrupulous read the story of the councils; and they will be amazed to discover the energetic protests made against Rome. But examples are not needful for men who reason from principles. And it is a principle that authority is a thing as sacred as God himself. It is a principle that to oppose him who abuses it is virtue and duty.

It is a principle that the loftier is the position of him who abuses his authority, the more shameful is such abuse; and consequently that the obligation to resist him is greater in proportion to his guilt, and to the evils which it produces.

Let then the timid be assured, and not apprehend that in betaking themselves to action, they will be found in rebellion against Ecclesiastical authority. It might be rebellion to oppose the Church *as the Church*, and the Pope *as its lawful head*, and Bishops *as Bishops;* but it certainly is not rebellion to oppose a sect which calls itself the Church, and sectarists who call themselves Bishops. In our case we contend that the *words Church*, *Pontiff*, *Bishop*, are not truly aud properly applied. We contend for these realities, when we oppose the counterfeits which go under their name.

Now I flatter myself that the moral question is solved. If it is not, I beg the readers of the *Esaminatore* to favor me by pointing out the fallacy of this reasoning; and in such case I will promptly retract it.

Let us then, with united minds and hearts, prepare for action. Let us work with dignity and frankness, without ostentation and without assumption, and with deference to all legitimate authority and law. But let our labor be open as the day. Let us not imitate the sectarists who operate in the dark. Let us proceed deliberately and gradually. Let us not be precipitate, and seek to-day what cannot possibly be obtained until to-morrow; nor attempt this year that which cannot be accomplished until the next year, or the year succeeding; and may with ease be accomplished then. Let us imitate our great civil Reformers who pre-

pare the way, before they make their advance, and progress slowly and wisely towards their end. This mode of proceeding will propitiate the whole Nation, and the Government, which will then comprehend the necessity of a religious, no less than of a civil Reformation and reorganization. This policy will beget confidence, because it will be seen to give rise to no perturbations. It is true that in our times such excesses are no longer possible as were excited in the days of the Arnaldists, the Albigenses, the Waldenses and the Huguenots. But it is nevertheless true that through the agency of the Papal sectarists, disorders might arise, and that hence the Government might have cause to be offended, and perhaps to provide for the maintenance of public order. This might arrest in some measure the movement for Reform. On the other hand if we, availing ourselves of the liberal franchises, under the ægis of which all Italian citizens can now labor, proceed with prudence, we shall receive not condemnation, but aid and approbation.

Rome indeed will exclaim against us. But we, respecting the Church and its lawful authorities, will proceed intrepidly and with dignified silence, reserving our answer to a future time. In the meantime we will reply to Rome with the argument of continued action. On the one hand it is an old story that Rome will cry out at every movement of reform, as if it were not lawful without her permission to do well; and as if, without her leave, virtue itself were sin. But it is also becoming an old story that the World allows her still to cry out, while it pursues its own path. This history began with Hildebrand and continues with Pius IX. All accomplished facts take their place in the World, in spite of Rome. If Catholic Europe, ancient and modern, had yielded to the fear of Rome, its civilization would never reached its present stage. The Pope would have been Lord of the World, and the World would have been a convent of friars.

But now the important practical demand is made of me—"By what action can a useful result be reached?" At this demand I confess, dear Signor *Esaminatore*, that I feel the thorns beneath my feet. But since I have placed myself upon this path, how can I retreat? As this is impossible, I am constrained to express my opinion.

I have said that our first proceedings should be in the way of preparation, like those who quarry a mountain, and shape the

stones for building. Now these preparations I divide into two kinds; those which should be undertaken by the priests, and those which the priests and laity should undertake together. I commence with the former,

The first proceeding I think should be this: *The veil should be removed from all whom it covers.* Those few priests of Italy of right mind, of noble heart, of firm character, true lovers of the Church and of reform, should make themselves known by their name, their surname and their quality. When this is done, one noble stone for our edifice will have been separated and shaped. Moreover it will redound to their great honor with God and man; it will be a vigorous blow to the spirit of anti-Christian sectarianism. Let it be understood that Rome fears, as indeed she does, a hundred courageous priests more than she does a hundred thousand Zouaves. I have observed in another place, and I repeat it, that Rome is like that vile crew of which Dante speaks, which rises like a dragon against those who flee, but is meek as a lamb in the presence of those who show their teeth. And this is the time in which it is necessary, so to speak, to show the teeth. It may be that there are but few sufficiently courageous—but no matter! There were but twelve Apostles. God is always the same. Whoever has a bad cause to defend, fears the twelve as if it were a thousand; because the twelve may multiply to that number, as they do already multiply.

I do not wish to dictate to those who are still under the veil; for indeed I know well their high intelligence. Yet I cannot refrain from saying that this policy might be very proper in ordinary times, when the World was indisposed to Reformation; and when it would be necessary, not only to oppose Rome, but also the powerful governments by which it was sustained. But in these extraordinary times of general regeneration, times in which all the World is calling for Reform in all departments; in which the priests, with shame, see the triumphs of civil reformation passing by them, with no improvements in the sad condition of the Church; in which the priests find arrayed against them the public opinion and the press; in which they are stigmatized as retrograde, *sanfedisti*, sycophants, and friends of darkness; in which they are exhibited in caricatures for the amusement of the triflers of the *Café* and the *piazza*.—Oh believe me, dear *Esaminatore*, these things rend my heart! Hence I say distinctly—

once let this veil be removed, and we shall feel the true dignity of our position. The plea of modestly withholding our names, on the ground of prudence, is in itself plausible; but it should not avail against the dignity of the priesthood and the decorum of the sanctuary, which we are not at liberty to abdicate. And I am the more distressed at this disguise, when I see that the sycophantic priests, advocates of the temporal power, preach, speak and write openly with an audacity which amounts to impudence; while the good, the wise, the true liberal priests hide themselves under the veil, like snails beneath their shell. Still more do I feel it when I think of Rome. She is well pleased with this reserve. If she does not consider the veiled as her allies, at least she congratulates herself upon regarding them as time-servers and cowards. And as she has educated the clergy to this temper of mind, she has at least the comfort of perceiving that the result of this her training, is to allow her to remain undisturbed behind her fortifications. Oh, woe to her if the clergy should courageously arise and cast all their veils to Satan! She would then be ruined forever!

I always remember a remark of Massimo de Azeglio in one of his letters which he wrote to me the 18th of Sept., 1858. He was discussing my project of society for mutual support of the priests, with a view to elevate their moral tone to the exigencies of the times. He wrote to me thus: "Your idea is excellent; but the first condition of this moral elevation is *open opposition to the policy of Rome.*" I noticed particularly this phrase of *open* opposition, and discussing the subject with him subsequently upon the shores of Lake Maggiore, I observed to him that we poor priests were compelled to be prudent. And he, gently rebuking me, answered me—how? In these precise words—"*Alas! pity the poor Christ who for his imprudence was crucified.*" And then he cast upon me a glance which seemed to pierce me as with burning arrows. Believe me, *Signor Esaminatore*, that from that moment I made a solemn vow openly to detach myself from Rome, and to begin my war of words against her. God forbid that I should present myself as a model for imitation; but I narrate the fact in order to show that Reform will never be possible unless it be preceded by an open detachment from the policy of Rome, and it cannot be open even if it be veiled by modesty and not by fear.

I ask pardon of those who are under the veil. I have given my opinion. It is nothing more. And you, Sig. *Esaminatore*, if you are of the same opinion, will tear apart the veil as I have done, and as has been done also by Paolo Panzani, author of the *Publica Confessione.*

The second manifestation should be on the part of all the priests who are already unveiled, and who have been censured, or threatened with censures evidently unjust. They should continue firm and constant in the exercise of their ministry, and scarcely allow themselves to know that they have been struck or threatened. This attitude puts Rome and its partizans in the utmost perplexity. If all those who have signed memorials to Rome, had preserved this attitude, and had not through cowardice, refused to take their stand with the cause of Italy and civilization, Reform would already have made good progress. Gioberti says that firmness alone answers in dealing with Rome; for that mildness and obsequiousness, and condescension do not propitiate, but only make it swell with new arrogance and pride. This is the reason why I praise, and all Italy praises with me, those priests who give a practical demonstration of their firmness. They demonstrate that they love the Church not in word, and in tongue, but in deed and in truth. May God bless them, and may he make the number of these champions of the Church to be greatly multiplied!

The third measure demanded in the interest of Reform is, that those courageous priests who are its friends, should inaugurate in their respective neighborhoods, a species of propagandism, and infuse into other priests, a little lukewarm, a portion of their holy warmth and enlighten them still more, and persuade them of the duty of open action, in order that they may put an end to the scandal which Rome imposes upon religion and upon the country; and in order that the faithful priests at Rome itself may become ultimately enlisted in this holy cause. We may count these half persuaded priests by the hundreds and the thousands. They are the poor dupes of the subtle modern pharisees. They claim our sympathy. They need to know the sophisms, the intrigues, the infamies to which the partizans of sectarian Rome resort. Hence it is necessary that they should be brought under the influence of *conversazioni*, of conferences, and of salutary literature. This is the noble mission of our band of intrepid

priests—to recover those candid souls, which give themselves up, in good faith, to the wolves which raven on the hill of Zion.

And we are to gain them always by reasoning, by charity, and by respecting the rights and liberty of opinion. This is the true method of winning hearts, even where minds are not gained. This is in itself a great gain, and may open the way to mental conviction, as it did in the triumph of St. Ambrose over Augustine.

The fourth measure which we recommend is, that we should commence, from this time, to pay as little heed as is possible, in connection with full conformity to the civil law, to those laws and decrees, and taxes of every name, and to those usages imposed by the Papal *curia*, which belong to an extinct feudalism, and which it is the first work of reform to rectify or abolish. To disregard these old obsolete impositions, the fruit of the lust of domination, of superstition and of ignorance, would be in itself a substantial reform; and Rome, which cannot now enforce their observance with *Gens d'Armes* would be constrained to make a virtue of necessity, and to see her mediæval treasures cast as rubbish into the mire.

I have a hundred other things to say, but I omit them for the sake of brevity, and reserve them for another article. I now pass to the point of combined action of the clergy and the laity.

Their first measure should be to unite and organize a congress in some central place in Italy; and in this congress, which should be henceforth periodical, the practical question should be discussed as to the best method of actualizing reform in view of the present condition of things in Italy and in the World. We know very well that the Reform of the Church is implicated in many respects, with that of the State; and that consequently there may be a necessity for other and more arrangements and regulations than might at first be supposed.

Hence among the first labors of this congress I propose the following, as those which appear to me the most conformed to the rules of practical prudence.

1. A dignified address to the Pope and the Episcopate in which, the evils of the Church being fully described, they shall be once more and finally exhorted to inaugurate Reforms, and to put the Papacy in harmonious relation to Italy, and to all the civilized nations of the earth.

2. A similar address to the Government, informing it of our reform movement, and of the points upon which reformation is proposed, should be addressed to the Government, to the end that every thing may be devised in view of the *Regalia* and the ordinances of the State, and thus may secure for Reform all the moral support possible.

3. A similar address to the clergy and to the Italian people, inviting them to concur in this great work, which will enure to the religious and civil welfare of all classes.

4. A similar address to all the secular press, with a view to enlist its aid in promoting the movement for Reform, this being a matter eminently of social and civil, as well as of religious interest.

This should be, in my opinion our first united movement. The second should be, that some learned man should, from this time, hold public conferences on given days, to which every class of persons should have gratuitous admission.*

A third movement should be the organization of evening and day schools which will afford an opportunity to enlighten children and youth, who have been dreadfully demoralized by the schools of the priests who are slaves of Rome.

A fourth important measure is the composition of popular catechisms upon Reform, the expense of which should be divided among the enlightened and liberal friends of the movement, clerical and lay, who should disseminate them by every practicable method, among the rural and the mountain population.

I add no more at present. But here you have my poor opinion upon the practical question which, you dear Sig. *Esaminatore*, have called upon me to confront. I am persuaded that by these methods of proceeding, commenced with courage and continued with perseverance, the matter would wear a very serious aspect to the eyes of Rome. It might drive her to the wall, and compel her either to institute a Reformation, or to see one established in her despite. And a humiliation indeed it will be to hear it said, "Once it was the Church that reformed the World; now it is the World which reforms the Church. The Sun has become a satellite of the Moon."

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* This arrangement will be made shortly in Florence, by our esteemed friend Professor Reali.

This surely is bold, out-spoken and definite. Although Mongini disavows any purpose to leave the Church, and to institute a schism, although he claims that Rome herself is sectarian and schismatic in spirit, yet it must be evident to him that such an organized movement as he proposes would be regarded by Rome as an open schism. The movement is very significant. It would scarcely have been recommended by Mongini, except upon consultation with his friends. It is seen to be accepted by the cautious editor of the *Esaminatore*. We shall expect to see it soon in operation. And we may well anticipate that when any considerable portion of the clergy and laity shall be able to emancipate themselves from their superstitious dependence upon Rome, sufficiently to act in any open independent organization, they will not find their limit of reform in the seven points of difference from the Papal dogmas, which they have already reached. They will no doubt be carried farther forward. Already their spirit of Reform and their spirituality of apprehension, appears to us to be in advance of their doctrinal position. This will lead inevitably to the purification of their doctrinal standard. The practical evils which most retard Reformation are the celibacy of the clergy, the absence of preaching, and the denial of the Bible to the people. We subjoin extracts on preaching from the same publication, in order to show that the spirit which animates those who are engaged in the work of Reforming the Church will not be likely to content itself with cleaning out the rubbish from the *atrium*, and cleansing the *Nave* and the *Choir*, but will be carried on to the purification of the *sanctuary* itself. We have good reason to hope that when they shall have removed practical abuses and superstitions, they will then rid themselves of that doctrinal system of merits and of works in which such abuses take their rise, and enter into the glorious liberty of that law of love, which comes from the great truth of a free justification, and full sanctifying grace, by faith in Christ Jesus. It will be seen that already, the article of which we give a part, on *preaching*, attributes a far higher and more important function to this great instrument for the conversion and sanctification of the souls of men, than is assigned to it by the Anglo-Catholics of the Pusey school in England.

PREACHING.

"The word of God is the truth which he has deigned to reveal by the mouth of his prophets, and in the fullness of time by that of his only begotten Son. When Christian preachers mount the pulpit, they unfold revealed truths; but it is only in an accommodated sense that their words can be called the word of God. The true and only fountain from which the people derive the holy word is the book in which it is written. One of the most sacred rights, and one of the most legitimate aspirations of a Christian man is to read, and to hear announced the word of God, which God has himself revealed. Now this right, which we acquired in baptism, has been violated, this instinct, which was implanted in our hearts at the moment of our regeneration, was weakened when, little by little, the word of man came to be substituted for the word of God, or when the holy scriptures were taken out of the hands of the faithful, and their place supplied by other books, which even if they do not corrupt the divine word, modify it and attenuate it, and rob it of that supernatural power which renders it "quick and powerful, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart;" (Eph. i. 12) that word, which issuing from the mouth of God, "does not return to him void." (Is. v. 2).

I do not wish to insinuate that Christian nurture and education can be complete by merely *reading* the sacred scriptures. Jesus Christ commanded his Apostles to *preach* the good news to all nations. St. Paul teaches that faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ (Rom. x. 17).

Let Apostolic men then preach the word of Christ—the word of Christ alone, without mutilation or addition. Christian preachers should keep their eyes fixed upon the author of our faith, as the model and the guide of all those who announce the words of life. Let them always remember that to teach Christian doctrine and duty, in the very words of scripture, is the sublimest of all their functions; that simplicity, and gravity ought to be the basis of their eloquence; that their style should be nourished with scriptural phraseology, and strengthened with evangelical earnestness; that their preaching should glow and flash with

the splendors of divine love. Derived from this holy fountain, it should exhibit its purity, and with its penetrating efficacy reach the wounds of the heart, and speak to us with that prevailing tenderness which we call unction, which distinguishes the sacred word from all other compositions. The Holy Scriptures and the divine love are sources of inspiration to which neither the forensic nor the political orator can attain. The Holy Scriptures announce that he who loves God possesses a secret virtue which produces conviction, when he does not attempt it, and makes him unconsciously skillful; so that his believing hearer seems to recognize a heavenly voice in his heart which says: "It is God himself who speaks to thee!"

The Holy Fathers of the Church, and especially those who flourished in the first Christian centuries, when they addressed the people by homolies or by catechetical instruction, did nothing else but expound and comment upon the sacred scriptures, and lead their hearers to comprehend its true meaning. St. Jno. Chrysostom exhorted the faithful to read, before resorting to the Church, those portions of the scripture which would be publicly read and expounded upon the Lord's Day. And the Fathers always rely upon the text of the Bible for the foundation of their doctrine; and because of this they present themselves with the dignity of a prophet or an Apostle, and with that conviction of giving forth inspired truth which comes from the profound study of the inspired scriptures. Their words are weighty, and suited to their theme. Hence their argument flows on with a pleasing movement, and the scriptural texts are unfolded with simple dignity, and made intelligible with a grace and naturalness appropriate to truth.

Yet the words of the fathers are by no means always the word of God. They exhibit the errors of their age, and sometimes confound the teachings of human philosophy with those of revealed religion. Sometimes they are too argumentative, sometimes too ornate, sometimes candid and severe, but rough; and then again, abandoning their rich simplicity, they become ingenious rather than true, and involve themselves in mystical expositions, and present the accommodated, rather than the actual, sense of scripture. But they all concurred in the instruction of the people from the scriptures themselves, in expounding them,

verse by verse, or in collecting separate passages in proof of the doctrines which they proclaimed. They regarded it as their single function, except in controversies with the heathens and heretics, to break to their flocks the bread of life."

May the spirit of St. Paul, which pervades this article, enter into and revive that Church of Rome, which has so long been given over to all practical superstition and doctrinal corruption under the sacred name of St. Peter! C. M. B.

VII.—CONDITION AND IMPORTANCE OF APOLOGETICS AT THE PRESENT DAY.*

BY DR. O. ZÖCKLER, PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN GREIFSWALD.

Since the end of the last century, Ultramontanism has received no wounds so deep and fatal as those inflicted by the political events of the past year. Of the two great powers which have hitherto supported the papacy and the whole system of Ultramontane interests and efforts, one has been shaken to its deepest foundation, and well-nigh dragged from its former position. The other, already shaking for some time, has voluntarily withdrawn, and shown more decided signs than ever before of abandoning its protegé, in despair, to the anti-priestly movement of young Italy. In the face of these facts, the more simple devotees of the Romish Church have sighed in vain for new miracles by the Mother of God and by the saints. Others have fruitlessly prophesied that the abrogation of the temporal power of the Pope would contribute immensely toward strengthening Romanism. Others again have cast a despairing look toward Spain, a land which is also in a perilous crisis and in need of foreign intervention, and to which there remains barely a shadow of its former greatness.

But with the downfall of the papacy as a political power, the most prominent props, both practical and theoretical, of the Ultramontane system, would undoubtedly fall. Such a catastrophe must certainly be followed in a short time by thorough changes of the whole Romish ecclesiastical system. The sad and multiform degeneracy of doctrine, worship, and pastoral practice, corroborate but too truly the celebrated declaration of Dr. Pusey, that the Catholic Church of the present day is "no longer a church of Christ, but the Church of Mary." The climax of the degeneracy may soon, perhaps, be succeeded by improvement; but in any event, the approach of such a crisis will necessitate a

* Translated from the *Beweis des Glaubens: Monatschrift zur Begründung und Vertheidigung der christlichen Wahrheit*, Jan., 1867, by Rev. J. F. Hurst, D. D. Bremen, Germany.

very different course of action on the part of the Protestant opponents of Rome, both in their own attacks and in their resistance of Romish attacks. Since the question is the defense of evangelical truth against an enemy thrown to the ground by the weight of the late grand historical revolutions and judgments, anti-Romish polemics must necessarily be different, and other arms must be used than those employed when this enemy stood boldly arrayed against evangelical truth, in long, unbroken columns. Instead of the stringency and sharpness which were formerly in place, we must adopt a more attractive mildness and kindly gentleness which, in reliance on the inner power of the known truth, simply seeks to convince those of our opponents who desire an improvement of their religious condition, but does not hesitate to leave those who will never be improved to themselves and their fate.

Apologetics, the more important department of labor which we design to promote by this journal, will be influenced to some extent like polemics by the great political changes of recent occurrence. The brilliant victory which the cause of Protestantism has won in the past year on the political and military field, involves many great dangers in the way of the successful development of the inner life of evangelical Christianity; which dangers threaten more or less the work of defending evangelical faith against unbelief. We here have in mind the haughty arrogance and destructive radicalism of those merely negative Protestants who would like to see the speedy overthrow of everything positive connected with the Church follow the fall of Rome, and who, with this design, redouble their efforts by means of criticism to undermine and demolish the historical foundations of Christianity. Hence, as a consequence of the most recent events, arises not only the necessity of a more zealous battle for revealed truth, but also the duty of a stricter watch, in order to guard, as far as we can, against the entrance of subtle contagion from the enemy's camp into our own. For just in proportion as the Romish pressure diminishes, and the death of the papacy becomes a patent historical fact, the danger on the Protestant side of sinking into false and worldly security, and of plunging into aimless and untenable ultra-Protestantism, is increased. And yet the grandest fruits of the Church and theology of the Reformation grow only when along with its evangelical character it preserves also its

true catholicity. The restoration of the Church to its original purity and apostolical form, — the highest task of all sound Christian life and effort,—will remain an impossibility as long as it is not conducted in harmony with the whole truth of the Scriptures, and according to the eternal and inalienable contents of the doctrines of the Church.

The lesson, therefore, we are to learn in evangelical apologetics from the most recent historical progress is not the necessity of increased concessions to modern unbelief. We must, on the contrary, keep in view the seizure and defense of as strong a position as possible on the eternal ground of the truth of God's Word; yea, even the courageous holding of all the essential outer works of this fortification, around which the battle now rages far more than ever. We can best perceive what special duties in this respect devolve at the present time upon apologetic science, what changes in our former methods must be undertaken, what neglects must be repaired, and what cavities filled up, by giving a survey of the *condition and importance of Apologetics at the present time*, at the same time considering the important work that has been accomplished in this department as well as the most prominent obligations resting upon Apologetics for the future. We hope thereby to render a special service to those of our readers who, not being strictly theologians, need more thorough information on the position of Apologetics in Christian science, and who have been able to learn from the two surveys of the literature of the subject, published in this periodical,* much, but not all, that pertains to a proper comprehension of the developing progress of Apologetics down to this time.

Apologetics is the science which teaches a knowledge of the leading principles for the defense of Christianity by philosophical and historical means. It is related to apology, the accomplished attempt of such a historical and philosophical defense of Christian truth, as theory is to practice; or, as an orderly, regular system is to its practical application in life. The relation of apologetics to the individual apology for Christianity is a perfectly similar one, and also just as intimate and necessary as that of homiletics

* See Vol. I, (1865), p. 179 ff.; and Vol. II, (1866), p. 218 ff.—The survey of the Apologetical literature of the second half of the year 1866, designed for the December No. of Vol. II, is given in this article, at the conclusion of which the most noteworthy works of the most recent date are cursorily enumerated and discussed.

to the individual homily, or of the theory of pulpit eloquence to the sermon, as the actual exercise and application of its rules. Yet this analogy does not justify us in placing Apologetics in general on the same platform with homiletics, catechetics, and kindred practical, theological sciences; and thereby in thrusting it from its peculiarly proper place at the head of systematic theology into the department of practical theology.* Since the apology for Christianity,—quite unlike the sermon, catechising, etc.,—is essentially a scientific work, a process conducted by scientific means, and designed to win men of scientific culture, the theory lying at its root can occupy a place nowhere else than in the immediate neighborhood of dogmatics and ethics, the systematic, theological sciences in the strict sense of the term. Now Apologetics must precede these sciences, especially that of dogmatics, as their philosophical and fundamental substructure and direct preparation, so far as its task is to justify before the religious consciousness, by speculative and historical reasoning, the truth of Christian faith assumed by dogmatics. The remaining branches of theological knowledge,—namely, exegesis of the Old and New Testaments, together with biblical theology and church history,—are assumed by it; because it is employed either in a learned or popular way, in establishing the principal results of these sciences so far as they serve as material for the doctrines of faith. Schleiermacher's transferal of apologetics and polemics to the head of the whole organism of theological sciences has against it just this relation of apologetics to biblical and historical theology as its indispensable mine and arsenal.† But it is also proved to be impracticable so far as both apologetics and homiletics, from their very conception, are connected most intimately with dogmatics, and at the same time constitute its indispensable organs for opposing the outward and inward foes of the truth of Christian faith. But apologetics is distinguished from polemics in that it, as the doctrinal teaching of principles or propædeutics (and so *theologia fundamentalis*, according to a favorite expression of Catholic theology), must precede the doctrines of faith, while its twin-sister, polemics, can take its necessary and natural position only after dogmatics.

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* Kienlen, for example, has endeavored to give apologetics and polemics this position in theological Encyclopædia. (*Studien und Kritiken*, 1846, IV. p. 893 ff.)

† Schleiermacher, *Darstellung des theologischen Studiums*, § 32 ff.)

Thus much on the conception of Apologetics and its relation to the remaining theological sciences. There arises, accordingly, as its principal import, the philosophical and historical demonstration of the truth and divinity of Christianity; or, more accurately expressed, the laying down of scientific rules and principles for the defense of Christian truth in the departments of religious speculation and experience on the one hand, and of the tradition of religion and universal history on the other.

Christianity is philosophically or speculatively defended as a religion when it is inwardly proved, before the judgment-seat of reason and conscience, to be the true religion, the true source of comfort and peace of heart, and the restoration of a real communion of man with God. The highest completion of this inward demonstration belongs, indeed, to the department of the immediate religious experience of life, and therefore falls beyond the limits of a strictly scientific statement. But though the mystery of redemption by Christ, and communion with the ascended Redeemer through the Holy Spirit, cannot be demonstrated or proved by the usual logical means of proof; and though the apologist here remains limited in substance to the "come and see" of the Holy Scriptures, and to the admonition to become more experimentally acquainted with salvation in Christ, yet for an exact *religious* and philosophical description of the different conditions and antecedents of the inward, experimental Christian life, as well as for instructive comparisons of these conditions with those religions which are not Christian, there will be constantly a wide scope afforded, the careful and faithful use of which will be able in many cases, if not to convince, yet to operate persuasively and very powerfully upon the hearts of hearers or readers.

The department of historical demonstration is more comprehensive than this purely speculative argumentation in favor of Christian truth, whose business properly consists only in showing that Christianity corresponds on all sides to the essence of religion, or that it really effects the essential, religious communion of man with God. It subjoins to that statement of the really and essentially religious character of Christianity the proof of its absolute unity and incomparableness as a religion; to the inward proof of its divine truth it joins the outward one; it erects out

of the "demonstration of the Spirit" the "demonstration of power" (comp. 1 Cor. ii, 4). For it shows how Christianity has been always and everywhere authenticated as the divinely revealed religion of incomparable beauty, force of conviction, and fullness of consolation,—in short, as "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth." It proves that Christianity is the really saving, rejuvenating, and glorifying power in the later history of humanity. From the miracles of Christ and his Apostles down to the latest triumphs of the Gospel over the heathen powers of darkness, and over those powers within the pale of Christendom, it presents to us that unbroken succession of brilliant witnesses which proves that all the kingdoms of this world must finally become subject to Christ, and that the movement which went out from Palestine eighteen hundred years ago cannot stand still until the knees of all who are on the earth shall have bowed at the name of Jesus. Yea, it casts its light backward on the beginning of Christianity, since it enables us to estimate and comprehend the phenomena that paved the way to its historical entrance from the creation and paradise down to the last prophetical precursors of our Lord, as the necessary expressions of the divine activity of revelation which reached its conclusion in Christ. Here belongs the whole department of Old Testament apologetics, which, in its final foundation, passes over into the department of physico-theological apologetics,—that is, the justification of the fundamental principles of revelation in contradistinction from natural philosophy. For the original beginning of the divine revelation in the Old Testament coincides, according to the first chapters of Genesis, with the original beginning of the creation of nature and man. And the necessity of securing to this most general foundation of the history of salvation its concrete, monotheistic character in antagonism to every pantheistic, materialistic, or abstractly deistic view of the world, occasions the relation of apologetic operation to nearly all the principal departments of the natural sciences, from comparative philology, ethnology, anatomy and paleontology to the most remote mysteries of the chemico-physical and astronomical departments. The effort to trace on each of these fields the evidence of creative work and the reflection of the infinite glory of God leads back finally to the point of departure of all apologetic consideration, or to the fundamental, religious and philosophical discussions on the

existence and revelation of Deity. The refutation of materialistic atheism, with its theses,—which are designed for the denial of the divine as well as the human spirit,—constitutes the initial point, as well as the aim, of the whole mental process of apologetics.

It is accordingly a very comprehensive material which the scientific apologist for Christianity has to work upon and join together into an organic whole; and it cannot seem strange that many of the early and later attempts at this organization have been incomplete or not equally thorough, in the treatment of single parts. The most of the works in this department that were produced by the early church, by the Middle Ages, and by recent times, have not been so much complete and systematically arranged apologetical productions as mere apologies, which aimed, with a more special interest, to establish the proof of the truth and glory of the Christian religion now in one and now in another direction; but they seldom discussed all the departments under consideration with equal care and in good scientific order. This remark applies prominently to the defensive works of the Church Fathers against heathenism or Judaism (Athenagoras, Theophilus, Clement, Origen, Tertullian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustine, Cyril, etc.), concerning whose contents, method and importance, one of our respected co-laborers has given extended and instructive information in this magazine. But the remark does not less apply to the writings of many scholastics which arose from the same interests and were composed according to a similar plan (as Abelard's *Dialogus inter Philosophum Judæum et Christianum;* Alanus of Ryssell's *Ars Catholicæ Fidei;* Thomas Aquinas' *Summa de veritate fidei Catholicæ contra Gentiles*, etc.); and also to the later Middle Age writers (for example, Marcilius Ficinus' *De Christiana religione et fidei pietate;* and Savonarola's *Triumphus crucis seu de veritate religionis Christianæ*, C. iv.)

In the post-Reformation period, the celebrated Dutch jurist and theologian, Hugo Grotius, in his work on the *Truth of the Christian Religion*, (*De Veritate religionis Christianæ*, etc., iv, Amst. 1627), written principally for the sailors and sea-travelers of his country, but in truth hardly adapted to any but learned readers, attempts to lay down as completely as possible the principal grounds which can secure Christians against apostacy to

heathenism and Islamism, but yet treats only the religious and philosophical side of the demonstration in a really thorough manner, while he has carried out only those historical proofs which, in reality, properly consist only in the authenticity and credibility of the Holy Scriptures. There likewise appears the relation between the historical and philosophical elements of demonstration in nearly all the later apologies which appeared under the same title; for example, in the Arminian Philip Limborch's *Conversation with a Jew on the Truth of the Christian Religion* (Gouda, 1687), and in the work of the Genevan orthodox theologian, G. A. Turretin, *Traité de la Verité de la religion Chrétienne* (3 vols. Geneva, 1735 ff.), etc.

The most of the apologists of the English Church of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who sought to defend Christianity against the attacks of the so-called Free Thinkers or Deists,—for example, Clarke, Dodwell, Stackhouse, Lardner, Foster, and Warburton,—likewise set forth, besides more general religious and philosophical observations, for the most part nothing more than the customary arguments for the authenticity and credibility of the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Though some of them, as Butler, or the highly praised Paley, whose labors extend into our own century, added to their biblical and isagogic reasoning very acute physico-theological observations,—namely, statements on the wise institution and adaptation of natural life in the class and in the individual member,—the whole mass of apologetic material was therein far from being exhausted; and by no means had the question of a systematically arranged grouping of all the single main elements of demonstration into a complete whole, arisen.

Also on German soil, the latest history of the development of apologetic science presents a far greater number of apologies or monographical examinations of individual materials of the science than of exhaustive, complete and systematic representations. Of works of the latter class, strictly speaking, we have only K. H. Sack's *Christliche Apologetik* (Hamburg, 1829; 2nd Ed. 1841), an attempt at the development of a complete apologetic theory according to Schleiermacher's principles; and the Catholic S. Von Drey's *Apologetik als wissenschaftliche Nachweisung der Göttlichkeit des Christenthums in seiner Erscheinung* (3 vols., Mayence, 1838–47). This latter work has lately been imitated

by learned men of the same Church; for example, by Reinerding (*Theologia fundamentalis*, Münster (1864); by Vozen (*das Christenthum und die Einsprüche seiner Gegner*, Freiberg, 1864); and especially by Hettinger, in a work which, though its title is only *Apologie des Christenthums*, presents in reality an almost complete apologetical system, and is a work of exquisite beauty and worth, though of a distinctly Romish character (2nd Ed. Freiburg, 1865 ff.). The apologetic labors of some evangelical theologians of the past century,—for example, Kleuker's *Neue Prüfung der vorzüglichsten Beweise fur die Wahrheit und den göttlichen Ursprung des Christenthums* (Riga, 1787 ff., 4 vols.), Lilienthal's *Gute Sache der Offenbarung* (Königsberg, 1750–1778; 16 vols.), and Jerusalem's *Betrachtungen über die vornehmsten Wahrheiten der Religion* (Brunswick 1773 ff., 4 vols.),—are rather abundant compilations of isolated apologetic inquiries without strictly scientific harmony and arrangement. And that which has been accomplished in this department by the theologians of the so-called elder Tübingen School, as the highly respectable supernaturalists Storr, Flatt, Süskind, C. G. Bengel and Steudel, is confined, even when a certain degree of systematic harmony is aimed at,—as in Steudel's *Grundzügen einer Apologetik* (Tübingen, 1830),—almost exclusively to some cold, demonstrative, legislative inquiries on the credibility of the biblical writers, and on the necessity of the divine revelation to meet the requirements of the human mind and heart. We should have had a tolerably complete, well planned and systematically arranged treatment of the whole apologetical field by the late Dr. Auberlen of Basle, if he had been spared to complete his excellent master-work, *Die göttliche Offenbarung* (Basle, 1861–1865); for the plan of the whole work, which is published at the beginning of the last issued but yet incomplete volume, announces the purpose of treating apologetically the doctrines of man, of God, and of the idea and nature of God's revelation to humanity; while that part of the work which is really finished reaches only to the middle of the doctrine of man. We find the whole territory of apologetic science treated in the *Christliche Apologetik* (or, *die Christliche Glaubenslehre*, First Part, or Entrance), published by the Calwer Publishing Union, in 1855,—a complete work, but being designed rather for the laity, it is devoid of scientific and systematic harmony. This is an interesting and instructive little book, but is

complete only when taken together with the *Glaubenslehre* proper, which was published somewhat later (1856–58).

The apologetical contributions of the very latest date, consist altogether of only monographic contributions for the cultivation and promotion of special branches of this science.

The most nearly complete exhibition of the whole field has been attempted by Dr. Theodore Christlieb, (formerly a German pastor in London, but now pastor at Fredrichshafen, on Lake Constance), in his lectures delivered at the beginning of 1866, in St. Gall, and published under the title of *Bildung und Christenthum, Vernunft und Offenbarung, neuere nichtbiblische Gottesbegriffe*, etc. This is an instructive and concise series of apologetical treatises which originally were published in separate tracts for the use of the St. Gall Evangelical Society. They are now united into a larger work, and are to be issued by R. Besser of Gotha, under the title of *Moderne Zweifel am christlichen Glauben.* With this exception, we have to notice here only separate contributions to biblical apologetics. To the department of Old Testament theology belong: Wangemann, (Missionary Director in Berlin), *das Opfer nach Lehre der hl. Schrift A. und N. Testaments, eine apologet. Darstellung des biblisch-kirchlichen Opferbegriffs*, (Berlin, 1866, 2 vols.), and H. G. Hoelemann, (Professor of Theology at Leipzig), *Neue Bibelstudien*, (Leipzig, 1866). Both of these works are very thorough and abundant in profound inquiries, but they have not altogether escaped the danger of making untenable assertions here and there, in consequence of the partial difficulty and obscurity of the subjects discussed.

Of the apologetical works on the Old Testament which have appeared outside of Germany, we may mention J. H. Kurtz, *Zur Theologie der Psalmen*, (Dorpat, 1865; re printed from the Dorpat *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, and especially valuable on account of its instructive observations on the Messianic character of the Psalms, and on the meaning of the imprecatory Psalms); C. Arnaud, *Le Pentateuque Mosaique défendu contre les attaques de la critique négative*, (Paris, 1865); and A. Rutger's *De echtheid van het tweede gedeelte van Jesaja*, (Leyden, 1866). The two works last mentioned do not occupy a place quite on the height of German science, and must therefore stand in the shade when compared with the latest productions of German theological literature that treat the same subjects; for example, Hoel-

emann's *Bibelstudien* (Sections 1, 2, and 3), and Delitzsch's *Commentar zu Jesaja*, Leipzig, 1866), etc.

The most recent literature of the French Reformed Church presents two works of important apologetic and scientific character, in the department of New Testament theology. We mean Bonifas' *Essai sur l'unité de l'enseignement apostolique*, (Paris, 1866), and F. Godet's (Pastor in Neufchatel), *Prüfung der wichtigsten kritischen Streitfragen unsrer Tage über das vierte Evangelium*, (taken from the author's *Commentaire sur l'evangile de S. Jean*, and translated by Pastor Wirz, Zurich, 1866). Both of these works combine popular adaptation and a pleasing facility of style with a truly evangelical spirit, and belong strictly to those liberal and acute replies which the critical and destructive attempts of the French imitators of our Strauss and Baur have called forth in these last days. Another apologetic writer of the Reformed Church of France—the anonymous author of the valuable pamphlets entitled *La religion pure et sans tache*, and *Etude sur la religion de la Bible*, etc., has exhibited his power to examine apologetically the fundamental principles of the Christian religion in a plain, intelligible, yet profound and edifying manner, in his little work directed against the atheistic and materialistic skeptical philosophy of the Positivists, entitled *L'évangile et la positivism*, (the German translation is entitled *Das Christenthum und der Postivismus*, Hamburg, 1866). Of German theological works on the New Testament that have at least a partially apologetic character, we may mention the *Neutestamentliche Studien*, by Dr. J. C. M. Laurent, (Gotha, 1866), as well as a Latin treatise by A. Klostermann, tutor in Göttingen, bearing the title of *Vindiciæ Lucanæ, seu de itinerarii in libro Actorum asservati auctore.* The former of these works furnishes contributions to the science of introduction to the New Testament, among which is much that is of apologetic value; the purpose of the latter is to prove that Luke is the writer of the Acts of the Apostles, and therefore that this biblical book is authentic and credible. Weber's *Kurzgefasste Einleitung in die heiligen Schriften Alten und Neuen Testaments*, which serves chiefly a practical and edifying purpose, but, indirectly, takes into account an apologetic point of view, has lately appeared in a second, enlarged, and greatly improved edition (Nordlingen, 1867). The author is a Bavarian pastor.

If at the conclusion of this survey we should indicate what are the principal remaining duties required of apologetic authors of the immediate future, we would say first of all, that we need a truly complete work, embracing the entire field of apologetics, in a systematic form, and carried out on a plan like that of Auberlen's *Offenbarung*. Not one of the theoretical and scientific apologetical works mentioned above, meets, in this respect, the demands pressing upon us. Nearly all of them are totally deficient in that strict and correct incorporation of apologetics into scientific theology, on which the soundness and satisfactoriness of the foundation and construction of the former so essentially depend. Next, we must affirm that there is a necessity for increased industry and zeal in improving many of the special departments or provinces of apologetics which have heretofore not been sufficiently cultivated. That some principal branches of *Biblical* apologetics have not been so industriously cultivated as the most recent rationalistic assaults would have seemed to require, causes us only a passing regret, in view of the solid character of the earlier productions of theologians of the first rank in defense of these departments. This remark applies to what might perhaps have been said on the orthodox side in reply to Renan's *Apostles*, lately issued, which surpasses, if possible, in shallow, unscientific character, the same author's *Life of Jesus*. On the other hand, it is all the more necessary that the apologists of the present time and of the immediate future should unite in the most earnest efforts in the direction of *natural science*, against the attacks on the foundations of revealed faith. For the injury which these machinations of modern unbelief inflict upon the decisions and opinions of the great multitude, is one of special destructiveness, and the work of a scientific refutation and exhaustion of these skeptical assumptions, requires a very profound and attentive study, and a very watchful eye, in order to follow up all the principal results of the latest researches that come under consideration. If working with combined strength and by mutual assistance is necessary anywhere, it is in this very department of physico-theological apologetics, whether the departments to be maintained belong to the general historical principles of revealed truth, and thus necessitate a careful examination of the fruits of the investigations of modern geology, palæontology, comparative ethnology, physical geography, etc.; or whether

they come in contact with the essential and fundamental questions of dogmatics and ethics, and accordingly summon us to anti-materialistic polemics in the strict sense, but at the same time to the representation of the general relation of nature and revelation. But intimately connected with this last mentioned positive side of apologetics in the sphere of natural theology is the proof of the irresistible, victorious power which the Gospel of Christ continually presents in the sphere of social life, by the alleviation and removal of the sore necessities of humanity, sunk in the wretchedness of sin and death, and by furnishing the only reliable guarantees for the preservation or rejuvenation of aged nations. Likewise the social-philosophical examination of the influences, effects, and triumph of Christianity in the most recent past and present, together with the connected problems and results of Christian, social, educational, and humanitarian unions,—in short, all that can be expressed by the one term of *Missionary Apologetics*, is a department of prominent importance, but one to which by no means the desired care and culture on the part of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, have been devoted. A great abundance of the most remunerative and most deeply serious themes is presented just here to apologists. The attentive inquirer for arguments in favor of the imperishable glory and vital energy of the gospel, will be able to gather, in this field particularly, a harvest of the ripest and most nutritious fruit. May the many excellent men of scientific culture who have tasted somewhat of the sweetness of God's grace in Christ Jesus, feel themselves impelled to dedicate their still youthful strength wholly to the service of these themes, which can produce truly abundant fruit only when they are comprehended and handled as essentially vital questions.

VIII.—GUIZOT ON THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.*

BY DR. HERZOG, PROFESSOR IN ERLANGEN.

After a long and (whatever judgment may be formed of this or that particular of it), meritorious career as a distinguished academical instructor and writer in the department of universal history and of politics, as an influential statesman and a political speaker, Guizot has for some years devoted all his strength to the defense and furtherance of the cause of Christianity in general, and of his own church in particular. We do not mean that he had been a stranger to religious and ecclesiastical questions and interests until this recent period, but that these have now come into the foreground of his active efforts and his literary labors. It is truly an elevating spectacle, to perceive how the venerable man, as he approaches the term of human existence, gathers more and more the experiences treasured up in his rich and eventful life, and his abundant and extensive learning, into the focus of Christianity, and does not disdain to engage himself practically in active church operations. We have therefore not to do with a man, who, worn out and despondent, throws himself into the arms of religion, but with one who, standing in the full maturity of his mental powers, feels himself irresistibly impelled by an inward call as well as by the present state of Christendom, to labor more immediately and directly in that field which embraces his hopes for eternity, in which the springs of life for his people flow, —a field in which, as his labors in relation to it show, he is always at home.

The meditations which form the contents of the volume before us, are one member of a series of reflections which the author began to publish some time since. The first were the Meditations on the Essence of the Christian Religion, which appeared in the year 1864, and in which the author discusses the problems yielded

* A review of *Meditations sur l'état actuelle la religion chrétienne*, par M. Guizot: translated from the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, April, 1867, by Rev. Wm. H. Green, D. D., Professor in Princeton Theological Seminary.

by the moral and religious nature of man, then the fundamental doctrines whereby Christianity solved them, and finally the supernatural facts upon which these doctrines are based. This treatise, which well deserves a careful examination, and extracts from which were given in the German journals, is distinguished by an exhibition which is a model for clearness and condensation, of whatever is most important in the revelation of Scripture so far as it is related to the religious and moral necessities of human nature. By his sure insight the author is able to discover the essential and eternal in every part of Revelation, and to sunder it from its accessories. In the preface the author announced a second series of meditations in which he would undertake the historical justification of Christianity. A third series was to be devoted to the consideration of the present condition; and for a fourth and concluding series of meditations he reserved the task of indicating the future of the Christian religion, and of showing in what ways it is called to the completed conquest and the moral control of that part of the universe which we call our earth; or in truth a grandly sketched plan and a *dignus vindice nodus.*

The author has now so far changed the order of succession just stated, as to have advanced into the second place what was originally to have stood in the third. The meditations before us are occupied with the religious awakening in France in the nineteenth century and with the opponents of Christianity—with Spiritualism, Rationalism, Positivism, Pantheism, Materialism, Skepticism, and in a concluding meditation, with Godlessness, Indifference, and Perplexity (perplexité). We hasten to add that the view of the author is throughout directed exclusively to France. If to this extent the execution does not answer precisely to the title, this defect is an advantage, inasmuch as the author is best qualified to speak about French matters, and he can go into more detail in proportion as he limits himself to them.

It may indeed seem surprising to us Germans to find so many, such lofty, and such comprehensive subjects embraced within the limits of what is after all so small a treatise. And in fact we cannot say that it accords with the demands of a scientific demonstration or refutation, as the case may be, as we are accustomed to rate them. But it would be a mistake to place a low estimate upon it on this account. The author deals indeed little

in the development of ideas, but gives, instead, results of his knowledge of the world and of men, of his observations, of his reading: with a master hand he singles out the main and characteristic features of the various phenomena which he adduces. He was personally acquainted with very many of the men who form the theme of his meditations, and he knows how to throw light upon their spiritual products by a description of their personality. The whole is interwoven with striking and sententious judgments, which profitably stimulate thought. This publication may consequently serve as a pole-star to many of the author's countrymen, who in the ferment and confusion of the times know not whither to direct their steps, or how to find their way out of these mutually contradictory views and systems.

The first meditation, entitled the Christian Awakening in France in the Nineteenth Century, occupies more than half of the entire volume, and is the main portion of it in every respect. The peculiarity of the author's mode of looking at his subject consists in his considering the state of things in France from the point of view of a religious awakening, and applying this point of view in equal measure to the Catholic as to the Protestant Church of France. In fact, this point of view is perfectly justified, if only the elements and forces hostile to Christianity are not left out of the account; and of these the author speaks already in this first meditation, but chiefly in those that follow.

He first directs attention to the Catholic church, and it is a source of great pleasure to review the various phenomena which it presents under the guidance of so safe a leader. He begins naturally with the Concordat of Napoleon in the year 1802, and with Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*. He does not of course ignore the great imperfections of them both. But he finds that the Concordat, whatever may be said against it, was a wholesome and necessary measure, considering the state of things and the sentiments prevalent at the time. It gave at one blow a sanction and an impulse to the Christian awakening which followed the orgies of the revolution, such as it could have obtained from no other measures, least of all, in Guizot's opinion, from the separation of Church and State, wherein he declares himself in opposition to the view taken by Edm. de Pressensé in his *L'Eglise et la Revolution Françoise*, 1864. He calls Chateaubriand's *Genius of Christianity*, notwithstanding its religious and literary defects,

which he plainly enough acknowledges, a brilliant and powerful work, which made a lively impression on men's souls, and procured again for Christian traditions and convictions that place which was their due. Guizot likewise gives prominence to the fact that neither the Concordat nor Chateaubriand's treatise was a blind and fruitless return to the past, since both Napoleon and Chateaubriand were bold innovators. Napoleon maintained the freedom of worship intact, and Chateaubriand set forth the beauties of Christian literature in such new and oriental images and forms that some of the strict guardians of the French language charged him with giving offence and being guilty of barbarisms. Then after treating briefly of Bonald and Joseph de Maistre, of whom it is said that they joined God and Cæsar (Mat. xxii: 21) too closely together, and thought too much of Cæsar when defending the cause of God, thereby changing and compromising the Christian awakening after they had materially promoted it, Guizot passes to the notorious Lamennais, who, like both the foregoing, founded faith and human society solely upon authority: but he based this authority on the universal reason. "But as this apostle of the universal reason was likewise the proudest adorer of his own reason, a change took place in him in consequence of external circumstances and a violent controversy. As the supreme ecclesiastical authority rejected his principle, the spirit of rebellion was unfettered within him. The "Words of a Believer" are the eloquent expression for this explosion of the tumult of his soul. Sunk in the chaos of the most contradictory feelings, though professing to be always consistent with himself, the champion of authority became the wildest democrat in the State and the haughtiest rebel in the Church. Yet one merit remains to the Abbé Lamennais: he vigorously denounced the gross and vulgar forgetfulness of the moral interests of mankind. His Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion dealt sturdy blows to this error of the times, and called the souls of men to higher things. To this extent he promoted the Christian awakening, although he abandoned it."

Arrived at the Jesuits and their movements and proceedings in France, he repeats the axiom, which he had already uttered several times before, that in religious as in civil society, two great moral forces, authority and freedom, rule alternately, and alternately have their heroes as well as their martyrs. The Jesuits

set themselves as a dam against freedom, which in the Reformation, in connection with faith, broke open a passage for itself and shook the authority of the church. Ecclesiastical authority concluded a league with political absolutism, and supported it in its resistance to political freedom. Out of this struggle and for this struggle, the order of the Jesuits arose as the *elite* of the army appointed to defend in the name of faith the principle of authority in Church and State. Guizot shows right well why, nevertheless, Napoleon and the Jesuits could not agree. If on the one hand, Napoleon inspired them with sympathy by his restoration of the Catholic Church and of political absolutism, on the other hand they could not do otherwise than mistrust him, because he upheld some of the maxims of the revolution, particularly religious freedom, and moreover claimed to rule in Rome as well as in Paris. He was neither an earnest believer nor an honest friend of the Papacy. The mistrust which the Jesuits cherished toward him on this account was mutual. The Jesuits were much too independent Catholics for Napoleon,—too jealously devoted to their Church and its head. For this reason, as early as 1804, he directed their houses, which were disguised under various names, to be closed, and created the French University, on which he conferred the exclusive privilege of public instruction. In the period of the restoration, the Jesuits had in the first instance a favorable position. They were very readily admitted at the place of highest authority, and could likewise appeal on their own behalf to the liberal principles in favor with the public and get the full benefit of them. Had they restricted themselves to their religious mission, had they kept aloof from the strife of political parties, they might have had secular influence in addition to and in consequence of their confirmed spiritual influence. The author adduces here the example of Father Ravignan, as showing how a man who is solely occupied with promoting piety, can openly declare himself a Jesuit without exciting suspicion. He is moreover not willing to decide how far and how deeply the Jesuits were then implicated in the movements of the retrograde party. He finds probably not incorectly that France then feared this party too much, as on the other hand the kingdom was too much afraid of the revolutionary party, whereupon he profoundly remarks, "Nations and governments cannot easily commit a graver fault than to have more fear than they really incur peril."

In regard to the clergy in general, he in nowise ignores the faults committed by them during the period of the restoration. Their prime mistake he finds in their cherishing the expectation of being able to regain at least a portion of the influential position and authority which they had prior to 1789. For nothing, says he, is more destructive of religious influence in the France of the present day than the attempt or even the semblance of ghostly domination. This was in the restoration the canker of the Catholic religion and the clergy. This was, in the opinion of Guizot, the more to be regretted as the evil was not very serious nor formidable. He believes, for instance, that the clergy aspired far less after dominion than they had the appearance of doing, and that it was principally the blindly fanatical party at the court of Charles X. that drew the clergy along with them, and used them as an instrument of extending their party influence. He adduces several instances in which the clergy conducted themselves well in this respect, and did not suffer themselves to be dragged along. His opinion is, that the French clergy as a body adapted themselves better to the new political relations than king Charles X. and his intimate friends, and that the false ideas and preposterous claims of the king and the coterie which constituted his court, were the source of the great errors of the restoration much more than the religious frenzy of the clergy. He considers the Abbé Frayssinous a faithful representative of the measure of religious and political wisdom which may be imputed to the clergy.

What the author says of the liberal Catholics under the July government is of special interest. As he sees the great progress which was made under this government from 1830 to 1848 to consist in the fact that the political standard was taken from the Church, and the standard of faith and of religious freedom was alone left to it, he finds the same characteristic in the exertions of the most distinguised champions of the church, Montalembert, Lacordaire, Lenormant, Ozanam, and their friends. Their attempt was extraordinarily bold and difficult, for they aimed at extricating the French nation from unbelief and indifference, and likewise turning Catholicism off from its alliance with absolutism. They proclaimed at the same time Christian faith in the spiritual domain and liberalism in the secular domain. This required, as Guizot correctly assumes, an elevation of soul and an

energy of conviction, of which few persons are capable. He shows now the experience of those men soon proved, that they had flattered themselves with the hope of a much too easy success, that they were violently assailed by unbelievers as well as by zealous Catholics, and that the assaults of the latter were particularly grievous to them.

To this succeed some excellent fragments respecting Veuillot, who rendered any reconciliation between Catholicism and modern human society impossible, and became one of the most damaging though most devoted defenders of his Church. Thereupon he adduces as witnesses of the Christian awakening in the realm of science the prelections of Ozanam at the Sorbonne as well as the theological prelections of Maret, Frére, Dupanloup, Gerbet, and the establishment of the Université Catholique, a widely read journal. This is followed by a review of Christian enterprises of the century, under which Guizot enumerates from the period between 1820 and 1848, one hundred and seven institutions or unions of every sort which were called into life or maintained by Christian zeal.

In the times since the revolution of 1848 he first takes note of what Falloux, raised to be Minister of Public Instruction and Worship in 1848, did for the thorough and legalized establishment of freedom of instruction. The law upon this subject adopted by the National Assembly was based upon a regard for the rights of all concerned, and the free concurrence of the State, the Church, and individual agency, in matters of public instruction. Here he emphasizes the vigorous concurrence of the various educational institutions, effected by the freedom introduced fifteen years ago. He commends the schools of the Jesuits as well as the large school for higher theological studies, founded by the Archbishop of Paris in the old Carmelite cloister. He remarks also upon the demand, which the Abbé Gaume impelled by his blind zeal set up, that since the high position which the studies of classical antiquity take in instruction is the worm gnawing at the heart of modern States, the Christian classics, *i. e.* the Fathers of the Church should be substituted in the schools for the old Greek and Latin classics. Guizot shows that this demand, though very readily taken up by a portion of the clergy and zealously defended by Veuillot, had nevertheless been quite as zealously contested by Catholic clergymen. Here he adduces

the former Abbé Dupanloup, since Bishop of Orleans, and does not omit to mention that the Jesuits too have entered the lists in favor of classical studies. On the whole he finds that a portion of the clergy comprehends the great problem of the times, *i. e.* the reconciliation between liberal progress and Christian awakening, and is endeavoring its solution; and as a principal proof, he adduces again the Bishop of Orleans in his essay on Religious Pacification.

The entire exhibition of the state of the Catholic Church breathes a spirit of moderation which deserves every acknowledgment, and falls in with the stand-point of the author, the former minister of worship and instruction, a stand-point which rises above denominational limits. A cultivated, enlightened Catholic, understanding this word in a good sense, would have spoken in very much the same way. But we will not deny that this high moderation gives, after all, a merely conditional value to the whole representation. We feel the want sometimes of a greater sharpness of judgment, such as a strict maintenance of the evangelical Christian stand-point would require. The author also omits to call attention to the undeveloped condition of French Catholic theology. As a proof of this want of development, we adduce only this one fact, that it was repeatedly said of the article published by Pressensé in his Revue Chrétienne against the recent book of Renan,* and which is a very good though by no means exhaustive work, that it was the only thing that was tenable and important which had up to that time been brought out in all France by believers in Christ! When further Guizot unceremoniously puts Renan's attempt to dethrone Christ and the various attempts to deny everything supernatural along with the attempts to dethrone the Pope as a temporal ruler, he certainly gives utterance to things which closely cohere in the minds of many Catholics, but which, fundamentally considered, are very far asunder. Also the censure which he expresses of the Papal encyclical of December 8th, 1864, appears to us not severe enough. Guizot has a degree of shyness about touching that side of Catholicism which sets itself too manifestly in opposition to Christianity; this may also be the reason why he does not once mention the new dogma of the immaculate conception, nor the very slight resist-

* A translation of this article of Pressensé will be found in the THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC, Vol. I, pp. 199–244.

ance which it encountered in France. If we consider how few Catholics believe in it, the deathlike stillness observed in regard to it in the Catholic Church is really a gloomy sign of the times. Therefore when the author concludes his representation by saying that French Catholicism has made advances which though incomplete and unsatisfactory, are yet symptoms of a vigorous living force, with rich promise for the future, it must not be forgotten that this living force, which we by no means ignore, is ever afresh checked in its development by the blindness of the highest leaders of the Church, the devout Pius IX and the group of ninnies who surround him, and who are on very bad terms with a Döllinger, Haneberg, and other enlightened Catholics. The German Catholic Church is also in very much the same hampered condition.

The faults in this representation which have been named, find their explanation in the fact, that this volume is intended for the instruction of Catholics as well as for that of Protestants. This is very plainly shown in the way in which the author passes over to the representation of the state of things among the Protestants. "I need," he says, "make no transition, for I am not going out of the Christian Church. In matters of Christianity the Protestant nations have given proofs of what they can do. Taken as a whole, they have for four centuries labored effectively at the Christian solution of the great problem of modern society, the moral and material progress of all, and the political guaranty of the rights and freedom of all. And in regard to the Christian faith itself, although it is assailed in Protestant lands as well as elsewhere, it is nevertheless ably defended in them, and maintained and practised in the life. I will institute no injurious comparisons. Protestantism is not the last and sole bulwark of Christianity in the Christian world, but it has none stronger, none which offers fewer assailable points to its foes, none which is provided with truer and more skillful defenders."

The position of the French Protestants after the times of the suppression and the storms of the revolution, are sketched very well though briefly, and the two men, Vincent and Encontre, who exerted a preponderating influence in the first decades of the century, are accurately characterized. Encontre is the representative of the religious spirit of French Protestantism, being the son of a preacher of the "Desert" and having received his consecration to the spiritual office in an assembly of the Desert.

Vincent introduced German science and criticism into the French Protestant Church. He corresponds to the new and latitudinarian tendencies of a foreign philosophy and condition, while Encontre breathes more of the pious spirit of Old Reformed France. But both men lacked, what Guizot does not remark upon, a thorough theological training. The very circumstance that they, and especially Vincent, possessed so much other secular knowledge, stood in the way of their complete theological culture. Accordingly we find in one traditional orthodoxy, but without the harshness which condemns those who have not yet attained to the full knowledge of all that is comprehended in the Christian faith; in the other a tendency which subjected the essentials of Protestantism to a free investigation. Then, too, what Vincent did for the introduction of German science is, upon closer examination, limited to but little. Both of them are, as Guizot says, the first symptoms of the religious crisis in the bosom of French Protestantism, which was to issue in an open contest between the progress of rationalism and the Christian awakening.

This awakening, its origin which takes us back to Geneva, the energy which it manifested and which became a real "passion for the salvation of souls" (an apt expression), the activity which was thereby called forth, the dark sides which it revealed, the men who stood at the head of the movement and promoted it,—all this is summarily set forth in what follows with equal warmth and caution. What the author says of Vinet and A. Monod deserves especial notice, although he does not approve the unqualified demand of the absolute separation of Church and State, which the former advanced, and in this respect feels himself more drawn to A. Monod. He sums up his account with the words: "Notwithstanding the differences and the various forms of French Protestantism, there is in its bosom progress of faith, progress of Christian works, progress of Christian science, progress of Christian influence. I repeat here the same expressions, which I used when speaking of the Catholic Church, because I find myself confronted by similar facts." The narrative cannot do otherwise than make a very good impression on unprejudiced Catholics, who have any comprehension of a Christian life developing itself outside of their church, and contribute on their part to a mutual recognition and to peaceful relations between the religious bodies.

We must only allow ourselves here one critical remark. The

author pays too little regard to the want of theology, under which French Protestantism suffers. How isolated are the really able labors of Pressensé in Reformed France! In the department of exegesis we must, apart from the labors of Lutteroth, go to French Switzerland to find anything of reputation and value. In the department of history, especially the history of the French Reformed Church, the most activity prevails. But it is manifest that this does not suffice to offer adequate resistance to attacks. Such considerations to be sure would not present themselves so readily to a non-theologian, and they had less to do with the aim of the narrative, which is directed rather to giving the Catholics of France a favorable idea of Protestantism than to teaching the Protestants themselves anything new.

After the progress of Christianity made on both sides has been exhibited, the author passes to the adversaries in both camps. He justly gives prominence to the fact, that as far as the Catholic Church is concerned they do not restrict themselves to contesting the rights which are due her, nor as regards the Protestant Church to denying that she must maintain a common faith and order. "Above these special questions rises the general question, which grows out of the common position of both confessions: the strife which has begun concerns Christianity itself: the Christian awakening is engaged hand to hand with anti-Christian efforts." With the same propriety the author inculcates it upon his readers, that they should not yield to any self-deception in reference to the character and the strength of these anti-Christian efforts and the dangers connected with them. "They are not the product of a mere attack of fever, a mere revolutionary crisis. Precisely the most eminent among the opposers of Christianity at the present day esteem themselves to be expounders and apologists of truth, some of philosophical truth, others of historical truth, others still of truth with reference to the facts and laws of the physical world. They also assert that they bear the standard of a great and noble cause, the cause of freedom. From this results the greatest danger which Christianity has to encounter in our days. Estimate the force of the two factors, the love of science and the love of freedom, the degeneracies and distortions which both experience, the false ideas and fantastic hopes, whose spring they can be, the immoral and anarchical passions for which they can serve as a pretext and occasion, and you will obtain a conception of the host

of foes which are inexorably making war upon Christianity, and which it is its task to subdue." "Christianity,"—this is Guizot's inward conviction,—"will finally gain the victory in this conflict, but it must in carrying it on satisfy the claims of truth and the conditions of freedom. It has nothing to fear from these claims and conditions, if it only accepts them without reserve and prescribes them in all earnestness to its adversaries. That human science, its labors and systems, are to be subjected to the same examination and treated with the same freedom with the fundamental facts and doctrines of the Christian religion, this is all that Christians are authorized to or need demand."

Guizot now goes through and reviews the ranks of the enemies of Christianity. In the first line he adduces spiritualism, whose coryphæi are Royer-Collard, Cousin, Jouffroy, followed by de Rémusat, Damiron, Garnier, Saisset, Janet, and others. It creates surprise to find this school enumerated with the adversaries of Christianity. Guizot gives it the credit of having arisen out of a reaction against the Sensualism of the eighteenth century. It has created psychology, has set in a clear light the true fundamental principle of morals, as well as the law of obligation, and the distinction of good and evil, and human freedom, and apprehended this as the basis of political freedom. But it did not advance to the idea of revelation and its necessity, by which the development of the religious and moral faculties of human nature is first rendered possible; it restricted itself to its own particular theme, psychology, the study of the human soul. Spiritualism in this way led to Rationalism, to which Guizot particularly objects that it dismembers man, regards and treats the thinking faculty as the fundamental characteristic of the man, so that the human entity itself in its personal, free and living unity vanishes. He likewise adduces from the mouth of two distinguished Rationalists, the English Lecky and the French Scherer, remarkable confessions, from which it appears that they themselves felt an uneasiness and some degree of horror at the results of Rationalism. "Nothing affects me more," he adds, "and nothing is more instructive to me than these involuntary and invincible misgivings, which thoroughly convinced minds cherish in respect to the deficiencies and inconsistencies of their own conviction."

A particular and inferior species of Rationalism appears in

Positivism, which he arranges immediately after the preceding, and which limits human knowledge to an acquaintance with the properties of matter, whence all that belongs to religion appears only as weakness and a confession of spiritual impotency. It is very interesting to read what he communicates respecting the coryphæus of Positivism, August Comte, his person, his fortunes, his fancies, his fantastic plans and expectations. It is especially piquant that Comte, who had begun with throwing all and every religion overboard, at last seeks yet again to give currency to a sort of religion, the religion which has for its object Humanity "le grand Etre, l'Etre réel," the Supreme being alone worthy of adoration, whose high priest is Comte himself.

Passing thence to Pantheism, which he conceives of in the first instance as the abrupt opposite of Positivism, that is to say idealistic as distinguished from materialistic Pantheism, he shows in some brief but striking sentences all the perversions of which it is guilty, and how Pantheism, after it has taken away the freedom and the morality of man, nevertheless makes man God. Guizot moreover will know nothing of a materialistic Pantheism,—he thinks the true name of it is simply Materialism. He correctly finds in it greater consistency of thought than in Pantheism: at the same time he quite as correctly insists that Materialism too is a bare hypothesis, which not only misunderstands and suppresses the facts which it undertakes to explain, but which also sets itself in open contradiction to the recognised and established facts of psychology. After some sensible remarks about skepticism, which may be very salutary for many Frenchmen, the author passes to his last Meditation, and in it scourges not only the wide-spread godlessness, but above all indifferentism, which he holds to be far more dangerous, and regards as the greatest impediment, with which the friends of Christianity can meet. "Religious indifferentism (l'insouciance religieuse)," he says, "is a wide dead sea in which nothing lives, a vast desert where not a seed germinates. It is, if not the most offensive, nevertheless the most fatal evil of our times. Against this evil, Christians should mainly direct their exertions; the subjugation of whole nations depends upon it." Excellent words for those Frenchmen who will hear!

IX.—ON PREACHING.*

The question of the preaching proper to do the work of the present age, is one which presses upon us with painful force. In opposition to Gospel truth, to the power and spread of free and living Christianity, there are two malign powers of growing strength, infidelity and ritualism, which, while in one sense antagonistic to each other, yet often react the one in favor of the other. Both are alike contrary to a free and spiritual Christian faith, and against them both, pure and true Christianity has but one arm to use, the arm of preaching. It is true, indeed, and it never was so important as it now is to remember this truth, that the actual contact of Christianity with the convictions and hearts of men is much more generally around the circumference of free and miscellaneous fellowship and intercourse in society, or through the humble labors of those who bear their testimony from house to house, or in the class-room of the Sunday-school, than by direct propagation from the preaching center. But it is not the less true that the pulpit is the center from which the circumference of influence is defined and sustained, and from which all the forces which diffuse themselves by many Christian agencies through society, derive their energy and direction. By the teaching and vital power of the pulpit, by the addresses of the pastors and teachers in church meetings, which must answer in character to the style and quality of the preaching power, by the influence of mutual fellowship which radiates from each to all, and from all to those without, but which itself must correspond in character with the doctrine continually taught from the pulpit, by these things must be inspired and determined the outgoings of the Church life upon and amid the society in the midst of which it works. We do not now speak of pulpit or pastor, as if we meant that each Church was to be guided by one man, or as if only an ordained and separated order were to teach and preach. We speak of teaching and the pulpit as representing all the recognized and ordinary expository or hortatory activities of the Church. And, in this sense, it cannot well be questioned that,

* Abridged from the *London Quarterly Review*, (Methodist), July, 1867.

as we have said, the one central force and energy of the Church, the motive power by which alone its operations can be sustained, is the power of the pulpit. The power of the pulpit, accordingly, we must repeat, is the one arm which pure and true Christianity has to wield against the two opposite yet correlative powers, infidelity and ritualism, which combine to encumber the advance and becloud the prospect of true religion in the present age.

It is but a small minority in any age or of any people who can be hard and callous enough, or reckless enough, to accept as their all-sufficing conclusion a blank and empty unbelief. Most men must have some faith and some religion. Nothing so provokes men of any free intelligence to infidelity as an unreasoning, unreasonable, and at the same time tyrannical and merciless, established religion. And yet even Popery, which might have been expected to drive all but the weak and superstitious into a dreary skepticism, has only prevailed to make infidels of a minority—it is to be feared often a large minority—of the people, even in ages and nations of active intelligence. Practically, therefore, as regards much the larger proportion of the English nation, the question lies between their being held in allegiance by preaching or captivated by ritualism. As regards people of strong intelligence, the question is between luminous and powerful preaching on the one hand, and skepticism on the other.

Men go honestly and earnestly to public worship, either as superstitious devotees or as intelligent believers in Divine truth. Either they count on a blessing through the mere "performance" of rite, ceremony, or service, whether by the priest or by themselves, or conjointly by both; or else they expect, by the apprehension of Divine truth, and through the spiritual worship which is thereby sustained, to be made wiser and better men. Those who are influenced by neither of these motives, go to public worship merely from custom, or for appearance sake.

It is plain, accordingly, that the two powers in connection with public worship which alone can exercise any honest and genuine sway over the convictions and feelings of those that attend, are, on the one hand, ritualism as such, and on the other, earnest and devotional exposition of Divine truth. Ritualism, pure and simple, is a mighty power, and in the "ages of faith," so called, held all men spell-bound. There could then be no complaint of indifference to public worship, whether on the part of lord or

serf, of knight-at-arms or the simple free-holder. The power of preaching, when combined with devotional exercises and animated by a spirit of soaring desire or fervent faith, has ever been a great power; great in combination with ritualism, as in the case of such preachers as Massillon and Bourdaloue; greater far in its real power upon the whole manhood of the hearers when separated from it, as in the case of Luther, of Baxter, of Wesley and Whitfield, of Chalmers and Spurgeon. But where the worship is neither potent with the spells and superstition which belong to ritualism, nor full of the genuine majesty and the vivid, all-renewing life which belong to the doctrines of the Gospel spiritually preached and received, what can it be but a dead formalism, the very drudgery of worship?

Ritualism may again become a mighty power in this country. It has in it capacities for enthralling the ignorant masses, as well as for fascinating the indolent, the luxurious, and the superficial, who desire a religion which shall gratify the "lust of the eye," and pamper the "pride of life," without taxing the intellect or really grappling with the conscience. A form of worship which combines the sensuous splendor and the imposing claims and pretensions of Popery, with as little as possible of its confessional inquisitions, and penitential impositions, has many advantages in a country and an age like our own. But churches or chapels which neither, on the one hand, affect to claim ritualistic efficacy and necessary sacramental virtues and outgoings, nor yet, on the other, possess any commanding pulpit power in the exposition and application of divine truth, are no better than "wells without water."

To the pulpit, then, we must look if the present controversy is, in our time, to be determined on behalf of Christian truth. If preachers fail in their power, the people must speedily be divided into two camps. There will be the infidels, the "advanced critics," who go nowhere to worship. There will be the droves of servile devotees, who flock to Ritualist or Romanish churches. The world will be divided once again between the philosophers and the heathenishly superstitious. The preaching, moreover, which is to deliver the age, must in flexibility, simplicity, depth, variety, thorough culture, flame-like inward fervor, contagious earnestness, be such as the world has hardly yet known, at least since the days of Paul.

When, some weeks ago, the religious journals were occupied with the inquiry why the working classes are, to so large an extent, non-attendants at public worship, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, in one of those daring articles which have conspired with its honest and conspicuous merits to give it vogue and influence, suggested that the matter for wonder was not so much why working men did not go to church as why people of other classes did. It then went on to analyze, with caustic and contemptuous severity, the prevalent style and character of the preaching and the religious services on which the "respectable" classes attend, and the various motives which operate to ensure such an amount and regularity of attendance on the part of those classes as actually obtains. The inference more than hinted at was, that, but for certain interested motives, most of the better-to-do classes would follow the example of those below them, on whom the same motives have little or no force, and would stay away from services which offer scarcely anything to instruct or stimulate those who attend them.

The article might have been that of an unbeliever. Its tone was painfully flippant and irreverent. Nevertheless there was searching truth in it, and lessons eminently needful for the day may be learned from it. The responsibility attached to the work of preaching at the present day is great and perilous. The grand controversy of the times, between Christ and Antichrist, between God and Atheism, rests, to a great extent, with the preachers. Nay, whether the press, that enormous power, shall be allied or hostile in this controversy, depends very much on the preachers and preaching of the coming age.

There can be no more serious question, accordingly, than what the preaching ought to be, and how ministers are to be prepared, how to prepare themselves, for the work of preaching. What ought to be the aim or scope of sermons? Ought they to be read from the manuscript, or to be spoken? If the sermon ought to be spoken, what is the best method of preparing for its delivery? Should the sermon be written and learnt, or should it be premeditated and afterwards delivered as the thoughts rise and the words are freshly suggested? or may a sermon be delivered in part from memory, in part only from premeditation? or may different persons use either of these plans, or the same person use either, according to circumstances? These are the questions which, with the utmost brevity, we will now try to answer.

A sermon may be apologetic, dealing with the evidences of religion, or it may be expository, aiming to bring out the full sense and harmony of the Scripture text and teaching; or it may be hortatory. It may be either of these mainly, or even only; or it may combine the three varieties in various proportions. A discourse, moreover, may be intended for an audience consisting exclusively of thoughtful and educated, of student-like persons, or it may be designed for a congregation including many persons who have never been trained closely and consecutively to follow a train of argument or criticism. An apologetic or a closely and elaborated expository discourse might be intended for an audience of the former class; but would be quite unsuitable for the latter. A merely hortatory sermon would be proper for the latter class, but hardly for the former.

With these discriminations in our mind we shall be prepared easily to define the only cases in which a read discourse, a sermon which assumes the character of a prelection or a lecture, may be fairly allowed. An apologetic argument in favor of the Christian religion, or an elaborate and minute exposition of Scripture, addressed to a select audience,—an audience trained closely to follow a sustained argument or discussion,—may not improperly be read, especially if such discourses are understood to be prepared with a view to publication. But, if the congregation includes persons of common-place intelligence and character, and especially if it includes those who need to be instructed in the first principles of theology and the general outline of Scriptural knowledge, it is certain that read discourses are altogether unfit for these. They need the glance, the pause, the challenge, the gush—the hesitation that piques interest, the sudden impulse and outpouring that takes captive the hearer's sympathy—all that belongs to the vivid play of living speech, in order to secure the conveyance to them of the speaker's full meaning, and to hold their attention to the sequence and relations of his thoughts. Reading is incompatible with the full play of passion and appeal; the impassioned reader is but an orator in chains. Reading is incompatible with action, with all that belongs to the dramatic play of eye, hand and voice, without which there can be no true oratory. Where the composition rises to real eloquence, such eloquence as belongs to the speech of man to men, reading is unnatural, obstructive, contradictory. Where the intellect alone

is directly and in the first instance appealed to, where the one thing sought is to convey certain truths to the attentive understanding through the listening ear, reading is proper. That is to say, it befits elaborate argument and minute exposition addressed to the exact thinker, the cultured and disciplined hearer. Such persons, however, as a rule, we venture to think, would do better to buy books and read privately, than to listen in public to what might best be printed for the study of those interested in the subject. One exception, indeed, we would be forward to allow—in the case of lectures read to the leaders of thought, intended to command attention from the first at the very center, with a view to their necessary publication afterwards.

Viewed abstractly, we apprehend few could be found to deny the conclusion we have stated. Great names, however, in lieu of argument, are quoted against us. Dr. Harris and Dr. Chalmers read their sermons. They did, we reply, and their examples confirm our conclusions. Never was there a better reader, more graceful, more effective, than Dr. Harris; and yet no one could have listened even to his reading without feeling that the down-turned eye—although often for many lines together Dr. Harris did not turn down his eye, but, in fact, spoke his sermon—yet that, on the whole, the down-turned eye, the evident manuscript, the tether within which he was obliged to limit his movements, the want of the due, full action, often suggested by the graceful gestures of the reader, but never carried out because of the tether, the want of the full, prolonged gaze of the flashing eye, of the sudden arrest, of the commanding challenge, of the two handed, concentrated appeal—in a word, of the grand abandonment of the true orator at the climax of his wrestlings with the souls of his congregation—left a certain sense of incompleteness, of inconsistency, of disappointment, with those who had listened to his otherwise all but matchless discourses. The hearers wished that Dr. Harris had been altogether such a one as he stood there before them "except that chain," and as to Dr. Chalmers, his reading was throughout a hindrance and a contradiction. Most vehemently did his soul, in his rage and passion of uncontrollable earnestness, rebel against the trammels and bondage of the reading. Hence his uncouth gestures, his savage eccentricity, his violence of emphasis, his one-sided action in the delivery of his splendid sermons. Moreover, we have it on record in his life

that his extempore outpourings in cottages far surpassed in splendor and overwhelming effect even his great sermons in Edinburgh.

In a word, reading is not preaching, and cannot but be inconsistent with it. There is no power of propagandism in reading. No great point is likely to be won; no great work of conviction or moral impression to be done; no sweep of conquest ever to be gained for Christ, if ministers are to read their sermons. We can understand that it might be contended that the read lecture might be combined with the sermon, as in one of the best known churches of Edinburgh, the morning congregation was accustomed to listen to an exposition read by one pastor, while in the afternoon a much larger congregation listened to a real sermon preached by his colleague; and as we have heard a very gifted minister read one discourse almost throughout,—a close doctrinal discussion,—preach another with the assistance of notes, and preach a third,—a most masterly sermon,—quite extemporaneously, in the open air, and under a very evident present inspiration from the subject, the scene, and the audience,—all in one day. But that any one should defend reading as in itself and for ordinary occasions the best mode of addressing a congregation, that any one should regard it for ordinary congregations and occasions as even a tolerable mode, is to us, we confess, altogether surprising.

The Rev. Daniel Moore, so well known as one of the ablest preachers among the London clergy, in his valuable work entitled "*Thoughts on Preaching*," contends for the combination, for certain congregations, of the read with the spoken sermon. He is careful, however, to limit his approval of reading to one discourse in the day, and that only in the case of "our more educated and intellectual congregations." As to the general question of reading *versus* speaking without book, his summing up seems to be very decisive in favor of the latter method, very strong and conclusive against the former. We quote from a passage given at length in the appendix to "Kidder's Homiletics:"

"The question in what sections of the professing Church does the practice of reading sermons prevail? may be answered easily. Bishop Burnet gave the answer to it up to his own time; and his dictum will not be far wrong if allowed to be extended to our own. 'Reading,' he says, 'is peculiar to this nation, and is en-

dured in no other.' And we see the proof of this in all countries and in all churches. In France we never hear of such a practice. Even among Irish Protestants it is almost entirely laid aside. In Scotland it is abjured with an almost superstitious dread. The Wesleyans would relegate to the shop-board or the plow, a candidate for the ministry who could not do without his notes; while, by other Dissenters, the reading of a sermon is only tolerated as an infirmity which they hope the preacher will be able to overcome, and which, until he does, he must use all lawful artifice to conceal.

"Still less of countenance to this habit of reading from a manuscript can be found in other forms of popular address, of which the aim, like that of the preacher, is to gain the practical assent of the hearer. What pleader at the bar would think of addressing a jury from a written speech? How impatient is the House of Commons of eloquence, of which even a few notes only are fastened in the lining of the member's hat? And how soon would our great religious meetings dwindle down to a scattered remnant, if every speaker, as he was called upon, began to spread out a paper written, within and without, like the prophet's roll? —instances these, all tending to bear out that observation of Sir Walter Scott, 'It is conclusive against the frigid custom of ready sermons, that in any other mode of public speaking it would be held childish and absurd.'

"Thus, Gospel authority, primitive usage, the custom of the Catholic Church everywhere, and the conclusion from what is found to be effective in public speaking of every other kind, are all *against* the written sermon."

Yes, as Mr. Moore says, "reading is peculiar to this nation, and is endured in no other." It has for generations been the rule in the English Establishment. Any other mode of address has, till lately, been discouraged by many of the bishops. It has even been discountenanced in Episcopal charges. To preach extempore has been counted a sign of clerical unsoundness, as to pray extempore is still esteemed a very suspicious and indeed reprehensible besetment. And to what a level of tame emptiness read sermons have helped to bring down the staple and average preaching of the establishment, cannot be better described than in the words of that eloquent French preacher, Athanase Coquerel:

"This system has for a long time been that of the Anglican Church, it reigns there still, although it has begun to pass away, and we know into what a decay it has brought it. The Anglican bishop or minister, comfortably leaning upon a cushion of velvet large enough to receive his manuscript, read with the most

trusting placidity, without hazarding any other gesture than the movement of turning the pages, and scarcely did he permit himself at wide intervals what was called the waving of the hand; that is to say, the effort of raising the hand in order to let it speedily fall upon the side of the pulpit. This was a systematic and permanent denial given to the old principle that action is the essence of oratoric art, this principle so recommended by Demosthenes, of whom Cicero, supporting it in turn in the strongest terms, recalls the famous saying that the three first qualities of the orator are—1st, action; 2d, action; 3rd, action. The peaceful delivery of the Anglican Church interdicted recitation and much more extemporization; they were bound to read. During this time the orators of the Dissenting churches took care to become truly orators; they have thus made an approach to the Episcopal Church, from which it is far from having removed itself. The members of its clergy who have acquired a real ascendency over the masses, have more or less renounced this inertness of elocution, and have walked in the steps of Irving and of Spurgeon."

From the reports of the proceedings of the Wesleyan Conference during the last year or two, it appears that, oddly enough, a few Methodist ministers have lately taken, more or less, to reading their sermons. Just when the Church of England is waking up to a sense of what she has lost through the practice of sermon-reading, when her most renowned bishops set the example of extempore preaching, and are some of them masters of the art, it is curious indeed to find Methodist preachers, of all people, take to reading. Methodist congregations must be marvellously changed, if they learn to tolerate it. And yet the same practice, some years earlier, was threatening to find a lodgment in the American Methodist churches. The words which Dr. Stevens, in his effective volume on the "Preaching Required by the Times," employs in regard to this subject, must, under similar circumstances, possess interest and force for the Wesleyans of England:

"Our fathers expected to see men awakened and converted under their sermons, and the expectations led to an adaptation of their discourses to this end. A sermon that had not some visible effect was never satisfactory, whatever might be the hope of its future results. It was usual with them to end the discourse with a home-directed and overwhelming application, and often to follow it immediately with exercises of prayer, that they might gather up the shaken fruit on the spot. Hence revivals flamed along their extensive circuits. They were *workmen*, and workmen that needed not to be ashamed.

"Extemporaneous preaching was, until lately, the universal usage of our ministry. It was more than this: it was, as we have intimated, a *necessary* characteristic of the kind of preaching we have attributed to them. We cannot, indeed, *conceive* of the preaching we have described as other than extemporaneous. Reading could never be preaching, in this sense, any more than the letters of the one word spell the other. How these heroic men could have gone thundering through the land, prostrating multitudes to the earth, or melting them to tears by the reading of manuscripts, is a problem which certainly no experiment ever solved and no logic can show. They would have been an entirely different class of men, and Methodism a quite different affair, if they had been readers instead of what they preëminently were—preachers."

But, it is argued, if sermons are not to be read, then they ought not to be recited, for recitation is but reading from the page of memory. We do not ourselves think recitation the best method of delivery, at least as a general rule; but yet we are not prepared to admit this. The reciter looks his congregation in the face, at least ordinarily; moreover, difficult as it may be to recite thoroughly well, with a present sense of the full force of the words uttered, and in living relation and true sympathy with the people addressed, it is yet a more difficult thing to read at once naturally and effectively. Tame, mumbling, obscure, and hurried reading, reading utterly unimpressive, if not absolutely unintelligible to many, is much more common than recitation of an equally ineffective quality. We have often heard a preacher in the same service read badly and yet recite tolerably well. Moreover, unless the reciter be an absolute slave to his manuscript and his memorizing, he has at least some liberty and power to take advantage of opportunity and circumstance, and more or less to supplement what he has prepared by sentences, by passages, thrown in or appended. And again, what is perhaps a consideration of more importance than any or all of those we have now adduced, the habit of always reading in the pulpit what has been written in the study prevents the preacher from getting to feel, as by an instinct, how he ought to express his thoughts so as to gain the ear and the soul of his audience. The style which is to arrest the attention of a promiscuous congregation and to hold it fast until the points of the sermon are fully apprehended by the hearers, and sent thoroughly home to their hearts, is quite a different one from that which it is proper to use in conveying the

self-same lessons and impressions to the still and secluded reader. And unless the sermon-writer has a certain power of dramatic realization, by which, as he writes, his congregation is present to him, and he feels as if he were speaking to them, he is sure to fall into a bookish style, lacking the half-colloquial freedom, the short sentences, the piecemeal forth-puttings of a law, of a deep, far-reaching thought, of a principle, until its full meaning is taken in, the necessary repetitions, as well as, from time to time, when the way is cleared, the rapid, copious rush which belong to the pulpit oratory of the truly popular preacher. In the process of "getting up" his sermon for delivery, however, especially in the rehearsals which must precede an effective recitation, the sermon-reciter is brought into what we may describe as a dramatic state of feeling, a dramatic attitude of mind, and in trying his sermon, in speaking it to himself and to his ideal congregation, he becomes aware of the incongruities and the ineffectiveness of his bookish style, his essay-like composition, and is enabled, more or less perfectly, to transform his essay into an address, and by degrees to acquire the style which befits delivery and is most likely to interest and impress his audience. Nor is this all. The sermon-reciter presently finds out that the style which best arrests and holds the attention of his audience is precisely the style which it is easiest for him to remember and to elocutionize; that the bookish style, with its closely interwoven texture and unbroken consecutiveness, is beyond all prose styles, that which it is hardest to retain with accuracy and to reproduce with ease and self-possession. So that, on the whole, we must conclude, not only that recitation is in itself much more effective than reading, but that the reciter is very much more likely to compose effective discourses than the reader. Nevertheless, as we have said, we do not regard recitation as ordinarily the best method of delivery. There are only some men who, in our judgment, can use it to real advantage, and these, we venture to think, should never rely exclusively upon it, should only, indeed, employ it for certain subjects, and should always be able to adapt or supplement what they have prepared for recitation by their command of the power of extemporaneous speech.

The *mere* reciter, although he may be a brilliant rhetorician, can never be a true orator. He cannot sway a multitude as from a throne, by a potent and present inspiration, and with the true

electric sympathy which should perfectly identify the speaker and his audience—he can never move and animate at will those who are hanging on his lips, whose temper he sees and measures, whose individuality he vanquishes and binds in one passion and purpose, whose prejudices he conciliates and overpowers, whose enthusiasm he first kindles, and then, mounting upon it as a chariot of fire, is rapt by it into regions higher than by his own individual passion and enthusiasm he could ever have reached, guiding his flight the while under the highest energy of his blended and impassioned faculties, as carried far out of self-consciousness and yet completely self-possessed. This is true oratory, this is genuine power of speaking. The highest results of this kind should be gained under the influence of the highest themes and the Divine Spirit. Such results did mark the preaching of Whitfield and John Wesley, when Wesley was in his prime; under the ministry of Bradburn, Clarke and Bunting, men knew something of what these things mean. Robert Hall's sermons not seldom realized that which we have attempted to describe. If we have comparatively little of it now, may not the undue prevalence of the habit of recitation be one reason of this?

A Christian preacher who is compelled to reproduce the very words which he has prepared for recitation, even although he finds himself, when he stands up to speak, in altogether unexpected and incongruous circumstances, or who finds himself quite helpless and incapable of taking advantage of some unexpected incident or relation, is certainly in a most humiliating position. Yet such must often be the position of the mere reciter. And when work is to be done for Christ, for souls, for eternity,—not the work of mere intellectual stimulation, not the mere delivery of an exercitation, or an oration,—but the work of honest and earnest remonstrance, of warning, of persuasion, of the exhibition of Christ to a congregation of living men and women, and not some ideal congregation, as their Saviour from the bondage and guilt of sin, how sad and unevangelical a thing it is for a minister to stand before them, lame and helpless, dumb and powerless, in presence of the very facts which discriminate and individualize his audience, of the very circumstances which indicate who they are, what their condition, and what their need.

Further still, the mere reciter of speeches and sermons finds, after a while, as his time comes to be divided among many responsibilities, and as the wear of thought and the pressure of cares

impair the freshness and tension of his memory, that the burden and bondage of *memoriter* preparation, superadded to that of writing *in extenso*, become more than he can bear. Some take to repeating evermore, in due rotation, without the least variation, the same sermons, than which practice a more wretched travesty of what is due from the Christian preacher cannot be conceived; some take to reading their sermons, from sheer inability to drag any farther their ever-lengthening chain; while some break down prematurely beneath their load. Noble and useful preachers might be named who have in this way been prematurely disabled and brought to a too early grave.

The sermon-reciter, if he is a good and fresh preacher, is almost invariably a poor pastor. He cannot well be otherwise, from real want of time. Very often, also, he finds very little time left him for large and comprehensive mental culture. His staple reading is to pick up for his sermons. Scott, the commentator, was an excellent preacher and an assiduous pastor, notwithstanding his voluminous reading and writing. But then his plan was to rise early on the Sabbath, and selecting out of his abundant stores of biblical knowledge texts suitable for the day and for the present circumstances of his congregation, to meditate upon them, mold his thoughts and illustrations into order, fix them distinctly and fully before his mind, and then go and discourse freely and fervently on the matters which lived within his heart and stood clear within his view. How different this sort of work is from that done and contemplated as proper to be done by the intellectual and rationalistic reciter, Coquerel. He lays it down, that to prepare one sermon for the Sunday is a good week's work. And his translator, Mr. Bertram, agrees with him. Such an ideal of preaching would make it a luxury for the intellectual few.

We do not say that memoriter preachers cannot be really earnest or very useful preachers. Such an assertion would be contrary to notorious fact. The preacher may have his people before him while he writes; and every page may have been conceived under the influence of the most devotional feeling, the most evangelical earnestness. The whole may have been steeped in the spirit of prayer before delivery, and may be delivered, with full, clear consciousness of the present utterance, under the most urgent spirit of prayerful and holy passion. The name of David Stoner is of itself enough to indicate all we would say on

this point. Still, the reasons which we have assigned appear to us conclusive against relying only or even customarily on recitation.

Coquerel, indeed, as we have noted, recommends recitation; and this has always been the method which has prevailed in France. But this does not tend to reconcile us to it. Such a custom we should have expected to prevail in France. Preaching in France has been an intellectual entertainment. Now if, beyond all things, it be necessary to avoid a flaw in composition, to secure refinement, antithesis and finish, preachers, if they do not read, must needs recite. But, if the object of the sermon is profoundly to convince, and morally to impress, to gain the allegiance of the whole man, but especially of the heart, of the conscience, then form of phrase, finish of sentences, balance of antithesis, splendor of periods, are not essential to the sermon,—may even be hindrances to its effect, if they draw away attention from the substance to the style, from the matter to the mode of the preacher's utterance. What is wanted is a firm intellectual grasp of the whole subject, clear, consecutive ideas, substantially apt and really serviceable illustrations, all present to the mind's eye of the speaker, and above all, a heart and soul deeply concerned for those addressed, and determined to secure their attention to the speaker's theme.

There are, doubtless, some subjects in regard to which exactitude of phrase is important, and which are best exhibited by a simple, modest, masterly style, to secure which may demand the finish of the study. The same subjects in regard to which it might be allowable to read discourses, on certain occasions, and before select audiences, might justify, and sometimes even seem to require, that, if the sermon be not read, it be, for the most part, at least verbally committed to memory. But such sermons as these, although they may be among the greatest and noblest of sermons, can never form, and ought not to form, the staple of any man's ministry.

For the common staple of the evangelical preacher's ministrations, recitation, we cannot but conclude, is altogether unsuitable. Nor will the want of finish,—the occasional anacoluthon,—of the earnest, thoughtful preacher, who, as all see, is bent on one thing only, on getting his idea and his conviction, for its own sake, not because of its verbal investiture, into the minds of his hearers, and grappling with their conscience and heart,—in the least degree impair the effect of his preaching. His hearers have

not come for phrases, but for truth and heart; and therefore the want of the phrases does not disappoint them.

On such a point as this there will be readers who will care much more for the authority of a man like Ruskin than for all that we can say. The following extract from that great master of diction and of word-painting may perhaps surprise some that read it:—

"There are two ways of regarding a sermon, either as a human composition or a Divine message. If we look upon it entirely as the first, and require our clergymen to finish it with their utmost care and learning, for our better delight, whether of ear or intellect, we shall necessarily be led to expect much formality and stateliness in its delivery, and to think that all is not well if the pulpit have not a golden fringe round it, and a goodly cushion in front of it, and if the sermon be not fairly written in a black book, to be smoothed upon the cushion in a majestic manner before beginning, all this we shall duly come to expect; but we shall at the same time consider the treatise thus prepared as something to which it is our duty to listen, without restlessness, for half an hour or three-quarters, but which, when that duty has been decorously performed, we may dismiss from our minds in happy confidence of being provided with another when next it shall be necessary. But if once we begin to regard the preacher, whatever his faults, as a man sent with a message to us, which it is a matter of life or death whether we hear or refuse; if we look upon him as set in charge over many spirits in danger of ruin, and having allowed to him but an hour or two in the seven days to speak to them; if we make some endeavor to conceive how precious these hours ought to be to him; a small vantage on the side of God after his flock have been exposed for six days together to the full weight of the world's temptation, and he has been forced to watch the thorn and the thistle springing in their hearts, and to see what wheat had been scattered there, snatched from the way-side by this wild bird and the other, and at last, when breathless and weary with the week's labor, they give him this interval of imperfect and languid hearing, he has but thirty minutes to get at the separate hearts of a thousand men, to convince them of all their weaknesses, to shame them for all their sins, to warn them of all their dangers, to try by this way and that to stir the hard fastenings of those doors where the Master Himself has stood and knocked and yet none opened, and to call at the openings of those dark streets where Wisdom hath stretched forth her hands and no one regarded,—thirty minutes to raise the dead in,—let us but once understand and feel this, and we shall look with changed eyes upon that frippery of gay furniture about the place from which the message of judgment must be delivered, which

either breathes upon dry bones that they may live, or, if ineffectual, remains recorded in condemnation, perhaps against the utterer and listener alike, but assuredly against one of them. We shall not so easily bear with the silk and gold upon the seat of judgment, nor with ornament of oratory in the mouth of the messenger: we should wish that his words may be simple, even when they are sweetest, and the place from which he speaks like a marble rock in the desert, about which the people have gathered in their thirst."—"*Stones of Venice*," vol. ii, pp. 23, 24.

We do not admit, however, that because he does not write and learn his sermon, the extemporaneous preacher must be expected to use a slip-shod style. On the contrary, provided that he properly improves and disciplines his mind, we cannot doubt that, on the whole, the style of the extemporaneous sermon will be better than that of the recited. There may be some unfinished sentences,—a matter in itself of small consequence; but there need not be many. Often the highest finish as well as power of language is suggested in the moment of delivery. The inspired felicity of the occasion will go far beyond the *curiosa felicitas* of the study. We assume that the speaker is also a writer; that in the study he is habitually careful and exact, if not fastidious, in the style of all that he writes; that he is also inured to habits of reflection, to the logical arrangement of his subject in his mind before speaking; to the provision and use of illustrations, to all that belongs to complete premeditation. Such a speaker will often far excel in his extemporaneous utterances anything he could have prepared on the subject at his desk. In fact, the habit of speaking contributes to the production of the noblest and completest style even for what is intended only to be read, as every man must know who has habitually practised at the same time writing for the press and speaking to the multitude.

The noblest pulpit oratory has been the result of such premeditation as we have described, coupled with hard reading and continuous self-culture, with a complete mastery of style in writing, and with all that belongs to mental discipline. Let the young minister read the accounts given by their respective biographers of the manner in which Robert Hall, Richard Watson, when stationed at Hull and in his best days, and William Jay, prepared for their preaching, and he may learn a good lesson for himself. All these men premeditated. Whether they wrote more or less, and Hall often wrote not at all, Watson scarcely at all, there was

no servile adherence to the letter of their written preparation. By premeditation they made their theme and all its bearings completely their own, and then they went to preach about it. Jay dug in his garden; Watson paced his study, his eloquent countenance changing with the changes of his thought; Hall lay in pain on the sofa or on the floor, but all were wrapt up in their subject, and were making it a part of themselves by pure and true mental assimilation, not by mere verbal memory. It is remarkable, too, that in *Felix Holt*, the gifted writer, having to portray a genuine and potent preacher, with that true perception of what such a preacher should be, which is characteristic of the genius of "George Elliot," makes the non-conformist preacher, Mr. Lyon, premeditate his sermons, and admirably describes the manner in which a preacher of so noble a type might have been expected to prepare for his work. On such a point the author of *Scenes of Clerical Life*, of *Adam Bede*, and of *Felix Holt*, is no mean authority.

There are men, indeed, with memories of so rare an order, that provided the outline and method of the sermon be clear and right, and the words used true and fit—the best and fewest possible for the meaning to be conveyed, for the work to be done,—they need but to read the sermon over a very few times, and the whole becomes mirrored before their minds, and reflected without effort or sense of merely verbal recollection in their faithful memory. Such men certainly ought not to be prevented from using in their ministry so royal a gift of memory as this. In their delivery there will be no bondage, no effort. With perfect freedom and mastery they will repeat that which has become so absolutely a fixed part of themselves. There will be, in such a case, no hurrying from sentence to sentence, no mental vision of the written page, no trace of school-boy recitation, neither fear, nor haste, nor sing-song. And such men cannot but be able, if they desire, standing in perfect confidence on the back-ground of preparation, to strike fresh chords under the present inspiration; to supplement or to modify what they have prepared.

But what, in all cases, we should insist upon, as the basis of all pulpit power, is the power of extempore speech. There are many good and wise passages in Coquerel's *Preacher's Counsellor;* but, as might be expected from such a preacher, belonging to such a school, there are many serious errors. Perhaps the most

serious of all is his assertion that if the preacher "begins with extemporization, all is lost." It would be very much nearer the truth to say, that if the preacher does *not* begin with extemporization, all is lost. M. Coquerel himself began with recitation, and practised this method alone for many years, until an extreme emergency seemed to compel him, on a certain occasion, to throw away his memorized preparations and extemporize. To his surprise and relief, he found himself perfectly well able to extemporize. Hence he infers that the safe way, the only safe way, is first to memorize, and afterwards to acquire the power to extemporize.

But suppose M. Coquerel's emergency had happened many years earlier, at the beginning of his course: what then? We may assume, indeed, that many occasions must have occurred when it would have been eminently convenient and effective if he could have done earlier what he did so late—laid aside his memorized manuscript, and adapted his discoursing to some unexpected and important event, some change which had come suddenly on all. If M. Coquerel had earlier taken to extemporaneous speaking, no doubt it would have been a very great advantage to him and his congregation.

But if M. Coquerel succeeded, at a late stage in his course, in turning at once from memorization to extemporization, it by no means follows that other men, under similar circumstances, would find the like success. M. Coquerel had for many years been very much in the best and most intellectual French society, in which the art of conversation has for ages been cultivated with the utmost success. There, doubtless, he often improvised paragraphs and passages, and was continually cultivating the power of brilliant extempore conversation. Hence his success when he took unexpectedly to public extemporizing.

With most people, the case is far otherwise. Trusting more and more habitually and absolutely to the memorized manuscript, they have absolutely no experience of extempore speech. They have not the conversational culture of the French salons, in which what may almost be called dissertations, full of point and brilliance, are continually improvised. Hence any attempt at extempore preaching often bewilders and unmans them. The habit of memorizing calls into operation a perfectly different set of powers from that of extemporaneous speaking. The laws of

suggestion in the one case are altogether different from those in the other. It is easy for a man who has first learnt to speak extempore with complete ease and self-possession, to join to this the power of recitation from memory, which is but a continuation of his old scholastic discipline. But it is quite another thing for the memorizer, who has never practiced extempore speaking, to begin, at a late period of his life—when his faculties are already drilled, when his intellectual gymnastics has long been determined and finished, and at the same time, when being in the maturity of his course, and having a character and position to forfeit, he is not at liberty to go to school again,—to falter and fail, and try again, and go through the discipline of youth.

Among the Greek *facetiæ*, with which we contracted some familiarity at school, there is one which represents a man who, in bathing, had narrowly escaped drowning, as saying that his danger had taught him a lesson; and that he should take good care never again to go into the water until he had learnt to swim. Now, to tell a preacher that he must never attempt to extemporize until he has attained maturity as a preacher, so that when he does begin he may extemporize with ease, appears to us to be very much on a par for wisdom with the sapient resolution of the half-drowned Greek. The only way for a man to be master of the art of extempore speech is to practice it from the beginning—first short flights and then longer—until he can sustain himself so long as his strength holds out; by conversational practice; by frequent brief exhortations, especially to plain, uncritical audiences; by assiduous practice in discussion societies; and by all other means adapted to give self-possession and early command of words. Lord Brougham's advice to his friend Macaulay in regard to the training of his son (Lord Macaulay) to speak is, we are persuaded, the best possible: "Let him first of all learn to speak easily and fluently, as well and as sensibly as he can, no doubt; but, at any rate, let him learn to speak. This is to eloquence or good public speaking what the being able to talk in a child is to correct grammatical speech. It is the requisite foundation, and on it you must build. Moreover, it can only be acquired young. Then let it, by all means and at any sacrifice, be gotten hold of forthwith."

A public speaker who can only recite from memory, is like the man who has only learnt to swim with bladders or floats: take

away these artificial supports and he sinks. The speaker who possesses as the basis of his power the faculty of speaking extempore, is like the man who is master of the real art of swimming: he can use the floats as helps or rests, if he choose; but, whether with them or without, he feels himself when in the water, to be in his element and at perfect ease. He is master of the situation; he is in no danger of sinking.

A writer quoted by Dr. Kidder says: "Why should not a young man be trained to think at his tongue's end as well as at his finger's end?" Why not, indeed? Men go into the study. Having duly laid out their subject in their minds, they sit down, and easily, almost without break, write out the sermon which they had before thought out. Do not the words flow readily? Is not the style of the practised writer often correct as it flows out under the pen? Why, then, with all the faculties under the higher stimulus, the more perfect concentration, the more steadfast and absolute mastery, which belongs to speaking in the presence of a congregation when a man has been trained to speak, should not the speaker's ideas flow more freely, find expression for themselves in words more apt and powerful, and be not materially less correct than as they are indited in the study?

How admirably men may be self-trained to speak, whose only training has been in extempore speech, who have had little or no practice in written composition; who, whilst masterly speakers, would probably find correct written composition a serious difficulty, and would find it impossible to indite on paper any expression of their thoughts and feelings comparable to that which they speak off without any difficulty whatever;—may be known any year at the annual gatherings of the laymen of Methodism at the Conference committees of review. Nothing can be more wonderful than the speeches delivered by the lay-gentlemen of Methodism, at a quarter of an hour's notice, on all sorts of subjects connected with the economy and prosperity of their denomination. But then Methodism is one vast training school for extempore speakers. The class-meeting, the prayer-meeting, the love-feast and fellowship-meeting, the tea-meeting, the circuit quarterly meeting, the whole institution of lay-preaching, by which tens of thousands of extempore speakers are kept continually in practice; the district meetings, the conference committees, the missionary platform, furnish altogether an unequalled discipline, the

effect of which has been to develop an amount and quality of speaking power, the like of which, within similar limits, has never been known.

The less excuse is there for the young Methodist preacher who addicts himself to servile recitation. No candidate, we venture to think, should be sent to a theological college, who has not, before his going, acquired the power of extempore preaching. And after he has gone to college, if he is suffered to lose this power, all else that he gains there can hardly counterbalance this loss. For this reason, cottage exhortation should be most diligently kept up by the students as a part of their discipline at college. Moreover, the large practice of earnest conversation on the noblest themes, and discussion societies managed under due regulation, are almost essential to the complete efficiency of the college instruction.

We can hardly finish this paper without saying a few words as to that intermediate practice, the use of notes in the pulpit. If notes are very brief, mere heads, why cannot they be dispensed with? Surely the preacher can master his own outline, if its order and its articulation be logical and natural. If, on the other hand the notes are extensive, they bring the eye down too much to the desk, and they are apt to trammel and embarrass. "I once used notes," observed a distinguished preacher, "but found *my memory, upon trial*, serve me best. The subject is laid nearer my heart; I think I feel more dependence on the Spirit; my own heart enjoys more; I am more unconfined; and any part of the subject more readily recurs *at another time*, when I need it. It requires a little more pains to fix it in the memory; but amply, very amply, does it repay for diligence."

It will, of course, be understood, that in all thoroughly worked out sermons, however freely extemporaneous, the outlines, the sentences of nice definition, and the quotations from Scripture, will need to be strictly committed to memory; and that the logical memory, and that memory which depends on substantial analogies, and reproduces true and substantial illustrations, will be continually in requisition. But memory so far used as this prepares the way for extempore power, and leaves the mind perfectly open to the operation of the natural laws of suggestion in free speech, by which first the subject and then its parts and proportions, with the thoughts and the illustrations, in due order,

which belong to it, are suggested to the mind; and then, just as in conversation and impromptu address, the words and sentences, without any effort at recollection, without any disturbance of the mind's unity and concentration, without any distraction of the mind's energy and serenity, and through a two-fold operation a divided attention and effort, rise up spontaneously to the lip, and are uttered in speech. Such a use of memory as we suppose, must have gone even with apostolical inspiration and preaching; such as we would discountenance would have been fatal to the apostolic character.

The May No. of the *Beweis des Glaubens*, mentions "the Lake Dwellings and their Inhabitants," by *Reinhold Pallmann*, a German archælogist and historian, (Greifswald, 1866, ff. 218), as possessing special interest for the Christian apologist. He maintains the Swiss and Danish Lake Dwellings to be stations or forts of Celtic, Greek, or Roman traders, shortly before the Christian era, who brought the articles of stone and bronze which have been discovered, as means of exchange with the natives for skins, tin, amber, etc. The Swedish savant, *Nilsson*, one of the most eminent antiquarians of the age, has pronounced these remains to be of Phœnician origin, and not to extend much beyond 1000 B. C. The exaggerated estimates in respect to the age of these remains appear, under careful investigation, to be gradually yielding to the decisions of a sound and sober judgment.

X.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MIRACLES IN CHRISTIANITY.*

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By miracles we understand certain phenomena, which cannot be explained by the natural sequence and course of events, which declare accordingly the special, immediate intervention and operation of God in the order of the universe. These miracles are scattered along the sacred history of the Old and New Testament, as the heaven is sown with stars; yea, this sacred history itself, regarded in its peculiar contents, is one great miracle, culminating in the person of Jesus Christ; for, thus regarded, it sets forth before us a supernatural relation between heaven and earth, established and sustained by the special and direct agency of God, which finds its final expression in the personal entrance of the Godhead into humanity.

But there is scarcely one feature of Christianity against which the modern consciousness, so-called, has pronounced more decisively than against miracles. "For science there is no miracle:" such in its more moderate form is the protest delivered against the Bible representation of nature. Almost without exception, physical and historical inquiries alike make this proposition their starting-point: *this* conclusion is assumed as a certainty prior to all special investigation. The same dogma of unbelief is strenuously thrust even on theology, the natural warden of miracles. The impossibility of miracles was the pre-supposition, assumed to be self-evident, from which a quarter of a century ago Strauss advanced in his attempts to destroy the credibility of the life of Jesus. Since that time a celebrated theological school, proceeding on the same assumption, has sought elaborately to unfold

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[This address was delivered before the Evangelical Union at Berlin, March 31, 1862. One or two passages have been omitted in the translation in which Dr. B. makes concessions to a rationalistic criticism in regard to a few of the Old Testament miracles, to which we are unwilling to give our sanction, and which, as they do not in anywise affect the argument, can be omitted without any injustice to the essay, or to the author.—*Tr.*]

the historical origin of Christianity, wherein it much more readily discovers the traces of moral imperfection than of a supernatural agency; and the method of this school has been extolled in literary circles as the only scientific, the only historical method. Is it the fact, then, that we must inevitably succumb to this negative spirit of the age? Is our belief in miracles like the melting snow, destined to dissolve before the nineteenth century's sun of science? Or have we still in miracles an inalienable inheritance, something which we cannot surrender without abandoning what we hold most sacred? Notwithstanding all the arrogant assumptions which are put forth, have we still good ground not only for our religious belief in general, but for our belief in miracles in particular? This is the question which is now briefly to engage our consideration.

As is well known, the point of view from which the opposition to miracles proceeds in our day, is that of natural science; and for this very reason it is so widely spread and so full of assurance, for the science of nature is queen of our age. Who but is constrained to acknowledge the mighty progress which it is making? Not only has it made man more truly than ever the lord of creation by the thousand instrumentalities which it provides for the progressive subjugation of nature, it also charms the spirit in its researches after wisdom and knowledge, by giving it such a view of the structure of the universe in its totality as immeasurably surpasses, in vividness and completeness, all the representations of the past. Intoxicated with the view, the child of our age stands before nature as the great Kosmos, a most perfectly planned system of order and harmony resting on immanent laws and interpenetrative necessities; and so firmly bound together, so exquisitely adapted in all its parts, does this beauteous structure appear to him, that it seems as though the hand of no spirit, not even the hand of God, could disturb any one of its links without detriment and derangement to the whole. Such, indeed, is the well-known, oft-repeated objection to miracles: a miracle, it is said, would be the violation of the laws of nature, and a violation of the laws of nature is impossible; raised at a single point off its hinges, the entire Kosmos would plunge at once into chaos. Thousands listen to this dogmatic dictum with such blind credulity that to make way for it they strike out of their creed the declaration that "with God all things are possible." Those who are

more thoughtful indeed will ask: how *can* nature be an order so rigidly shut up in itself, so inaccessible to all influence, seeing that it exists not for itself, but for the personal spirit, that it is the theatre on which the development of spirit accomplishes itself, that spirit attaches itself to it by a thousand ramifications? And if now the development of spirit is by God most intimately associated with that of nature, at the same time that it is placed under quite another law, under the law not of natural necessity, but of moral freedom, does it not follow that between the development of nature and that of spirit a reciprocity of action is possible, which in a thousand ways violates mere natural law? Above all must it not be true that God, who reigns in nature and history with divine liberty, has power to interpose and to exert His energy not only in respect to the human web of the world's history, but also in respect to its natural elements? For are not those laws of nature, on the inviolability of which so great stress is laid, *God's* laws? However rigid and inflexible therefore, they may be in their relation to us, must they not be plastic and elastic in the hand of Him who instituted them? Or shall the Lord God be the only one who is not master in His own house, who is without authority to suspend on the festal days of His government the ordinances and laws which He established for the every-day administration of affairs?

These questions will admit of but one answer from those who believe in the existence of spirit as independent of nature, who believe in a Father of spirits, in a living God. But to the infatuated scientific naturalism of the day, even the great realities of a personal spirit and of a personal God present no difficulty: just because they are a miracle to it, which cannot be mastered by the processes of mere *natural* research, they must fall. For so great is that infatuation, which is to be ascribed indeed only to the weakness of those minds which have devoted themselves to the science of nature, not to that glorious science itself, that the investigation of nature is regarded as the very science of all sciences, and all which *she* cannot discover by means of *her* instrumentalities, is set down as not to be known, as not existing. It is assumed at the outset that these can be only the natural, and from thence it is boldly inferred that the supernatural does not exist. A conclusion indeed so ridiculous that any child can refute it, and yet it is daily advanced with the utmost seriousness

in the name of the natural sciences: and not that only, but even the sciences of spiritual phenomena have been driven by this humiliating pretense to make a disgraceful surrender of their independent and self-conscious basis, commending such a surrender to us, forsooth, as preëminently the liberty of the spirit! But what then are we to do with spirit, whether created or uncreated? It is treated as simply a natural force of a higher order. The soul is only the vital principle of the bodily organism, produced together with it, and perishing together with it. And the same position which the soul sustains in regard to the body is ascribed to God in regard to the world; He has no independent existence above the world, no personal consciousness, no personal will; He is merely the immanent impelling Force of nature and of history, a force which in nature assumes the form of a blind necessity, which in the human soul and the history of the world takes that of consciousness and freedom. In a word there is no independent realm of spirit above this visible world, no heaven, no hereafter as the eternal home of the divinely begotten soul, no kingdom of completeness beyond this lower realm of struggling development; all this is the mere dreaming of a humanity which has not yet fully come to itself. In this way, indeed, an end is made once and for all of miracles, but only in this way; for as Strauss has often expressed it, the Hereafter is the last enemy which modern science must fight, and if possible, vanquish. For so long as a supernatural order of things is assumed to exist, so long, certainly, will it be expected and required that this higher order should invade and illuminate the lower, and that consequently miracles should occur. Only when you have swept away the strong hold of miracles, the supra-mundane kingdom of the supra-mundane God, that kingdom in regard to which Christ has taught us to pray, "Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven," only then will you be done with miracles.

Let us reflect for a moment what such an annihilation of miracles would signify to the personal life of each one individually for there are many who think that the controversy concerning miracles is like a war in some distant land, something which is no concern of theirs; but the fact is quite otherwise. You believe that here and there in your life you can discern the guiding and preserving hand of your God, and memory reverts

gratefully to many a critical point in your history where its interposition in your behalf was manifest. A mere illusion!—if the spirit of the age be right; it was purely a natural sequence by virtue of which things happened so and not otherwise; a natural sequence which knows nothing of you, which asks nothing about you; an iron necessity which not even the hand of God breaks through: and truly, if He could not with uplifted arm lead Israel out of Egypt and through the wilderness, how can He take and guide you by the hand? You are sitting by the sick bed of your child, knowing not whether the scales will turn in favor of life or of death; you feel yourself seized by the strong hand of God; you sink down upon your knees before Him, and pray that He would not extinguish the glimmering spark of life, but that He would cause it to kindle again to a bright and joyous flame. Useless trouble!—if our modern wisdom be relied on, if pure, natural law obtains, which cannot be disturbed. Your panting heart must await its fate from the blind, deaf processes of nature: for—can you deny it?—if the prayers and groans of Christ could not ascend through the clouds and bring down healing, how can yours do it? You are standing by the coffin of a father, of a mother: the deepest, holiest feeling of your heart clings to the assurance that such bands, which God himself has framed, cannot be forever severed; that you must once again be mirrored in those eyes; that again you must hear your name from those lips. Childish dreams! exclaims to you the modern consciousness: the whole course of nature testifies against the resurrection of the dead; and in fact, as Christ had no power to raise up the young man at Nain, or Lazarus, as He had no power to raise up Himself again in a glorified body, the laws of nature forbidding it, so also for you an awakening of the dead, a reunion in the hereafter, is a chimera. Nay! all this is but the least part of the loss which we must sustain, if the possibility of miracles be denied. Through your inner life runs the discord between the good which you would do, but can not, and the evil which you hate but which still holds you in captivity: you sigh for Divine assistance, for the victory of the spirit over the flesh; you pray, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." All in vain, if there be no miracle; even the divine supply of life which is to flow into your heart that it may be within you a power for good such as you find not in yourself

by nature, even the new birth would be a violation of your natural sinful development, would be a direct interference of God with a natural process. And now if any should come forward and say that they have nevertheless actually experienced this miracle, the answer is that they are the victims of self-deception, of a confusion of the objective and the subjective. It was Paul himself who on the way to Damascus produced that manifestation of Christ which transformed him into a new man, that being nothing more than a vision generated out of his hungering and thirsting after righteousness, in accordance, it is to be presumed, with that most obvious law of nature, that violent hunger will in the end produce the bread which is to satisfy it.

In the midst of the world's history there stands one sacred, incomparable form before whom the knee involuntarily bows: is not *He* the incarnation of that eternal grace and righteousness after which your soul hungers and thirsts? Do you not find yourself constrained to say: through receiving Him into my heart I have become reconciled with God, and have within me even here below the beginning of eternal life, and in this beginning the pledge of its blessed perfection hereafter? Most true! is the testimony of the Gospel ministry from the beginning until now; but the preaching of this truth, and the faith which comes from that preaching are both in vain, if there be no miracle: for then Christ is not risen to a glorified life; His life ended forever eighteen hundred years ago, in the grave of Joseph of Arimathea. How then can there be any communion between Him and you, between the vine and the branch? How can you say, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me?" If miracles be an impossibility, Christ is not the being He seems to be; He is not the Christ who is preached; He is not the new scion engrafted on the wild stock of humanity to regenerate it, but He originates from beneath, as you do; He is tainted, like you, with the earthly defects of human nature; He is a sinner, like you; in Him as in you, although more highly refined, the spirit of the world reigns. And how can He be from above, from God, how can He raise you to God, if there is no above, no heaven from whence He could have descended for your sake, and to which you can ascend through Him, if this material world be everything, this immense nature which brought you forth, and which, when your hour comes, will again swallow you up in itself? Presumptuous man,

to dream of becoming perfect like your Father in heaven, of a glory destined for you before the world was! Why would you be anything better than the rest of the world? why would you be holy and blessed? "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

Such is the denial of miracles in its strict logical results. I know well that all the opponents of miracles do not advance to these extreme consequences, and I find the many incomplete half-way positions at which so many halt by the way deserving of the highest honor. But he who fully recognizes the principles on which a theory of the world rests, will not fail of deducing its legitimate conclusions; and the conclusions of this modern theory of the world which deifies nature, have already been deduced not by us, but by its own supporters. Again the world is experiencing that which of old gave being to the ancient heathenism, the irresistible charm which nature can exert over the hearts which bury themselves in her glories without carrying with them into her depths the living God. But the new heathenism is immeasurably more godless, more radical than the old; for while that in its simplicity confounded the Creator and the creation, it was not like this a conscious denial of the Father revealed in Christ. The grave wherein this new heathenism would bury miracles, engulfs everything which gives to human existence its ideal character, its real worth, the soul as the express image of God, faith and prayer, the holy person of the Redeemer, the future world, the living God. He who would save these precious realities must purge his eyes of the glamoor of naturalism, and begin again with the faith which is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, with faith therefore in the supernatural, in miracles.

How then—it may be asked—if in order to save all our invisible and future treasures, we profess our faith in miracles, do we not establish together with miracles the reign of a divine arbitrariness? do we not weave into nature and history a thread, composed of that which contradicts nature and reason? do we not open the door to all superstition? do we not concede so much to the omnipotence of God, as imperils His wisdom, and with His wisdom all science, which consists in the conformity of our thoughts to those of the Divine wisdom? Not in the least: we but establish a real distinction and a real communion between

spirit and nature, between God and the world, between reve lation and history.

That the spirit of man is not merely the soul of his corporeity, not merely the vital principle of this natural organism, as modern Pantheism asserts, appears incontrovertibly from the fact that man bears in himself a law of life which has throughout nothing in common with nature, the moral law of conscience. Nature knows nothing of good and evil; man has this knowledge: he knows himself to be obligated to the good not only when it is in harmony with natural impulse but also when it is opposed to impulse; yea, if need be, at the cost of nature's ruin, at the cost of body and of life. It is no "Mother nature" who could have imparted such a law to man; it is only a supernatural Creator, a Father of spirits of whose light and fire the human soul is a spark, who from everlasting to everlasting *is* in infinite perfection, that which man has to *become*, a moral personality. Now this spirit formed in the Divine image, this supernatural germ, God has implanted in the body, in nature, in order that it might therein attain a moral development. There is then not only a possibility that the natural should encroach upon the spiritual, that the flesh should become lord over the spirit, but this, alas! is the actual condition of things, a condition which is become a second nature, and which is regarded by the Scriptures as the natural ground of all sin, so that it seems as though our spiritual being were only the motive-power of our natural being. But the other possibility, that the higher spiritual life should invade the lower natural life, is also an event which comes to pass, and that too occasionally where no regeneration has taken place to restore each to its divinely appointed relation. For does not the inward beauty of a virtuous, noble soul stream through, illuminating even the ill-favored features of the countenance? Yea, does not the life of the spirit in its moments of highest moral tension overpower the antagonistic conditions of nature in a manner which seems even to the world all but miraculous? In the rapture of inspiration the stammerer becomes eloquent; in behalf of her child the trembling woman becomes a heroine; one who is already dying, whose natural life is at its lowest ebb, presents in his soul a scene of triumph in the midst of the body's dissolution. In these instances do we not see clearly the law of nature overruled by the higher law of spirit? And that which a created

spirit can do in its microcosm is it not possible to the Eternal Spirit in his macrocosm?

As the spirit of man is in respect to its essence elevated above the body, at the same time that it is intimately bound to the body as its soul, so also, we might say, is God, the Eternal Spirit, elevated above the world, of which he is at the same time the living soul, for He has of his own free love entered it, and become immanent in it. He did not finish it and wind it up like the machinery of a clock, so that it would run on without him, making it necessary for him, whenever he would accomplish any special result, to interfere from without, and by such interference to suspend or to divert its course; the rather is it true that He

> "All nature's movements from within disposeth,
> Himself in it, it in Himself incloseth;"

as Jesus told the Jews, who thought that the Sabbath-rest of God implied the cessation of all creative activity, "My Father worketh hitherto." It is entirely consistent with this to say that in point of fact the life of nature is in a certain sense self-sustaining, that it develops itself by its own spontaneous movement, in accordance with laws immanent in itself. So does the rose by its own spontaneous impulse, unfold itself from within; but can it therefore dispense with the sunbeam, which stirs up within it this process of unfolding, which vitalizes the law immanent in itself! In like manner the entire Kosmos is susceptible of continuous self-development only because the sunlight of Creative Love streams in continually at every pore. In all development, in every process of becoming, while on the one side it bears the characteristics of the natural, there breathes on the other side the power of the supernatural, in so far as it reminds us in any way of the hand of the Creator immediately operative in it. Most unmistakably is this power manifest in every new man who enters the world, who, although on the one side the product of natural factors, is on the other side impressed with that which testifies neither of his parentage nor of his nationality, nor of his age, to wit: his individuality, his peculiar personal characteristic, that which distinguishes him from all his fellows, which, for that very reason, can be no natural product, but must be the immediate gift of the Creator. And now, God being thus creatively present at every point of the universe he disturbs nothing and he destroys nothing,

when at any one point he produces anything new and extraordinary, which a higher relation may demand.

This higher relation is that which he sustains to man, whom he has created to be the lord of nature and to be his own child. The human soul he designed to be a new and higher laboratory for his miracles, the organ of his supernatural revelation; and how could it be otherwise? If at every point in the sequences of nature he left open an entrance for himself, how much more in the human heart, which is of divine lineage! If he makes the human heart to be the organ of his especial revelations, if at last he causes the entire fullness of his Godhead to dwell in the heart of a man in order that his Spirit might flow thence into the hearts of all men, what is this but that for which he has prepared the heart of man from the beginning? Nay verily, *not* to introduce himself into this human heart, which was formed to be the habitation of God in the Spirit, *not* to enter it and to make his abode in it, *that* would be unnatural, *that* would be in the truest sense of the word the disruption of a natural connection. Furthermore, he has to do with the soul of man not in a state of individual isolation, but he deals with it after a purely natural manner, as one of the constituent members of a vast, consecutive development; he weaves his revelation into the development of humanity, into the history of the world. And as he has from the beginning grounded the history of the world on the law of liberty, so he at all times honors this law, even when it is abused; and thus he never obtrudes, or forces his revelation on man, but everywhere adapts and attaches it to human susceptibility, as though, anticipating the objection of its contradicting nature, of its being the destruction of natural development, he would at the outset take away its force.

On the other hand this law of liberty, by which the history of mankind is distinguished from the mere processes of nature, is precisely that which causes the miracles of God as special acts of God, projecting themselves into the sequences of nature's development. For how can we conceive of a Divine Sovereignty as correlative to human freedom, unless we reserve to God the liberty of inserting his own will into the complicated texture wrought out by the freedom of the will and natural necessity, into the historical development of the world? We recognize a free act of divine sovereignty, and divine intervention in nature and history every time there enters into the world a man of his-

torical significance, of mighty influence, who in his determinate inexplicable individuality, is formed and sent forth by the hand of the Creator to occupy that very place in the history of the world which God would have him fill: or are we to say, forsooth, that the birth of a Charlemagne, or of a Martin Luther at the very time when the Kaiser or the Reformer is needed, can be accounted for from the blind laws of nature? Thus, it is that the direct interpositions, and consequently the *miracles* of God pervade the whole of the world's history; and furthermore, in consequence of this same relation of human freedom and divine sovereignty, there is inside of this sphere of general history a special divine domain of miracles, the sacred history, the history of redemption. For while the course of humanity's development has been characterized from the beginning by freedom, it had the power in the perverted exercise of that freedom to take an erroneous direction, one that was abnormal, sinful, involving therefore a departure from nature into a state of corruption, and not only admitting of a saving and healing interposition of God, but requiring it as an act of mercy. And if now Divine Love, in its infinite wisdom on the one hand permits this perversion of freedom to take its course, to work out its own self-condemnation, in order that the yearning after help and salvation may be awakened to its profoundest depths, while on the other it silently prepares this help and this salvation, at the right hour brings it forth, and through the free impartation of the same, causes it to penetrate humanity as a whole, is *that* to be regarded as something unnatural, as a violent interference with the process of natural development? Just as properly might the gardener be charged with contradicting nature, when by inserting at the right hour a graft of better quality, he interrupts the original development of the wild tree; just as properly might the physician be accused of violent interference with a natural development when at the right hour he infuses into the diseased organism a remedial agent which converts a development in the direction of death into a development in the direction of life.

But perhaps the attempt will be made to disprove the necessity for a supernatural redemption and the reality of the miracles of revelation, by eulogizing the natural course of humanity's development as being a healthy, normal development. But does not this theory directly contradict every unprejudiced view of

history? Is it indeed the result of a normal development that we see to-day in Judea, in China, everywhere on the wide earth where the revelation of the Bible has not become the renovating principle of the popular life? Even those distinguished nations of classical antiquity to whom it was allotted fully to unfold and exhibit in jurisprudence and morals, in art and science, the glory of our native relationship to God, were they able, after all, to bring forth any thing better as the final result of their own power than the empire of a Caligula and a Nero? On the other hand can the history even of the Old Testament, be characterized as nothing more than the fruit of a like natural development, as that which has obtained in the fate of India or of Greece? All the nations of the old world stand under the curse of the deification of nature: this nation alone looks to a God who is above the world, and this it does although it trembles before that God's commands. All the nations of antiquity look back disconsolately to a lost golden age, for which they long in vain, and forward to a future of increasing degeneracy; this nation alone looks forward, full of hope, to a golden age in the future, a hope which soars the higher the more hopeless the reality seems to be. Can this religion be regarded as the natural product of the Hebrew national spirit, a spirit which for a thousand years struggled against it, and which was persuaded only by the severest chastisements to give up the grossest heathenism, and which, even after it rendered to this religion its final submission, showed but too clearly that it had appropriated the shell, not the kernel? And yet, all this wonder-working of God among the Jews is but the prelude to the history of Him who could say, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," to that divine human life, which, if it be denied as a miracle must be stamped as a legend, but which never could have been invented, for the reason that the very invention of it would have demanded a heart no less comprehensive, no less divine than His own!

On the other side, be it observed how carefully God everywhere connects this historical revelation with the natural conditions of historical development, how on each lower grade he educates human susceptibilities toward a higher, how the decisive agencies employed by him are always at the last of a spiritual and moral character; so that this sacred history, far from being a violent irruption upon the development of humanity, is itself

become in all its supernaturalness a truly historical development of a higher order. At the time of the dispersion of nationalities, when heathenism everywhere changes into darkness the light of an original consciousness of God, he kindles by his promise, in the heart of Abraham, that solitary friend of God, the glimmering spark of a genuine faith in himself, and thus preserves the residue of a living connection between himself and an apostate world, a point from which the work of restoring all the nations of the earth to communion with himself may silently advance. The nation which inherits this faith, he subjects under Moses to a course of religious culture, educating them by types and by the law, until at length the prophets make their appearance, presenting a future in which the relation between God and humanity is exhibited in its completeness. And when finally the promise finds its fulfillment, when the miracle of miracles is accomplished, when the fullness of the Godhead becomes incarnate in humanity, that it may receive a human and moral development, and that it may pour forth the Holy Spirit as a new life upon all nations and hearts,—how is it possible that the glory of God should exhibit greater condescension in entering human nature and history than it has done in the life and death of Jesus Christ?

If now this supernatural development, extending from Abraham through Moses and the prophets down to Christ, is at every step attended by miracles which appeal to the senses, what are these but the *reflections in nature* of that *one* great historical spiritual miracle, as such corresponding perfectly to it, and grounded in the connection between nature and spirit? These natural reflections have necessarily an educational purpose, that of bringing the spiritual revelation of salvation near to men; for the natural man, that is to say sinful man, is predominently sensuous, and the world of sense must therefore form the bridge by which the Spirit of God must find a way to approach him. I at least know not how God could otherwise have revealed Himself to Abraham than by condescending to his childlike conceptions, and in entering his tent in visible form like a man; how Moses could for forty years have led and ruled that carnal Jewish nation in the name of God; or how Elijah could have convinced an idolatrous people, who bowed the knee before Baal, that power and truth belong only to Jehovah, without the testimony of physical

miracles. And when now the Saviour entered a race which while it is diseased above all in the inward man is nevertheless and indeed for that very reason, more conscious of its outward than of its inward misery, is it possible for Him to open human hearts to the love and grace of God without causing the rays of those attributes to beam visibly and sensibly on all earthly need, disease and sickness? But that coronet of physical miracles which adorns His brow has yet another significance, deeper and more immediately concerning us. Like the rays of the dawn they prophesy the day of final perfection, when the same Saviour will crown the completed redemption of the soul with the redemption of the body. For there must be a redemption of the body as well as of the soul, if body and soul really belong together, if corporeity, if nature be in truth an imperishable thought of God's, and thus a part of His everlasting kingdom. Can it be that the kingdom of spirit here below is imperfect, in course of development while that of nature is ideal, perfect? It is not true when natural science affirms that the present natural order is the highest conceivable, is absolutely perfect, this order, where all life is conditioned by death, where creation is at war with itself, and the elements hate the workmanship of men's hands, where, in a thousand instances, the bud must wither, the child must perish, before the innate law of its development has asserted itself; this order in which discord, disease, evil, death reign. Whatever science may say here, the heart knows that evil is still evil, that sickness is not health, that death is something else than a smiling demon engaged in inverting torches. The heart assents to the declaration of Holy Writ, that by sin death has come into the world and passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. For the same reason it accepts the prediction of the same Scripture when it speaks of a new heaven and a new earth at the end of the days, of a regeneration of nature, following upon and corresponding to the regeneration of our physical nature, the resurrection of the body, of a system of things in which "there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away." (Rev. xxi: 4). It is true that this redemption of the body, this regeneration of nature, is the last result to be realized in God's redemptive plan. First must come the redemption of the soul, the inward regeneration of humanity by the

Spirit of God; and therefore Christ has founded His church not upon a continued series of physical miracles, as the Romish church affirms, but on a continued series of spiritual miracles, which we are to experience inwardly, on regeneration and renewal in the Holy Ghost. But God's ways issue at last in the corporeal, or visible world; and as in general it is His eternal ordinance that the inwardly perfect should in the end be made outwardly manifest, so must His kingdom which is within find some time its complete expression without; the life that is hid with Christ in God must sometime be revealed in glory. And that we might know that He who heals our souls has power also hereafter to change our vile bodies into the similitude of His glorious body, and at the end even to subdue all things, all nature to himself (Phil. iii: 21), He healed the sick even here, gave life to the dead, and, more than all, manifested himself as the conqueror of death as well as of sin, in that He rose again from the dead.

Thus do the physical miracles of the sacred history, when contemplated with the eye of faith, constitute a higher natural order; they are the first fruits of that future system of perfection in which the miracle will no longer be the exception, but the rule, as being nature itself in its highest, faultless, glorified form. Do not the miracles of the New Testament, in particular Christ's miracles of healing and love, exceptions and violations although they may be of the ordinary course of nature, exhibit themselves from this point of view as phenomena which, far from unnaturally contravening nature do much rather supernaturally contravene an unnatural order of things? In truth, that which is unnatural in the case is that there should be any blind, or any deaf and dumb; not that a Saviour should miraculously give eyes to the blind, ears to the deaf, a tongue to the dumb. That which is really unnatural is that death should rob the widow of Nain of her young and only son; not that a divine word of power and love should burst the bands of death, and restore the son to the mother. And the climax of unnaturalness is to be found in the fact that so sinful and lost is the world become, that for the only righteous One it has nothing but the cross; while on the other hand, that which is supernatural in connection with this holy, crucified One, the fact that not having deserved death He was not holden of it, but burst open the portals of the grave, and triumphantly ascended to glory, is alone truly natural.

Miracles thus regarded are exponents of the most intimate relation between God and the world—a relation in which not only the omnipotence of God but also His wisdom and His love are prominent. They exhibit a higher order of ways and means lying at the service of God than that which is witnessed in the ordinary operations of nature. They are seen to be essential moments, necessary accompaniments of the divine redemptive thoughts of wisdom and love. Each miracle is a member of that great redemptive historical organism of which Christ, the Miracle of Miracles, is the living heart, sending forth its blood and life through the Holy Spirit, and furnishing to us in our own living experience the inward evidence of Christianity's miracles. Such then being the case, all the miracles of the Sacred history, whether natural or spiritual, being but the chords of a higher harmony, which ring through the dissonances of the earthly movements of nature and history—broken chords indeed they are to our gross and fallen sense, but still the more we attend to them the more do they make intelligible to us the dominant theme of that higher, that eternal symphony in which all discords are finally resolved, —it follows that Christian thought can look down with a smile of pity on the spirit of the age, when it discourses of the harmony of the Kosmos, and of its violation by the miracles of the Bible, and that it can recall in opposition to the wisdom of that spirit those words of God spoken in olden time: "My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways: for as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."

XI.—THE PENINSULA OF SINAI.*

Most students of Scripture geography are aware that a huge desert of sand, flint and chalk—the so called desert Tih, or wilderness of the wandering of Israel—occupies the whole northern extent of the Sinaitic Peninsula from Egypt on the west, to the great valley reaching from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Akaba eastward, and from the shores of the Mediterranean and Palestine on the north, as far south as lat. 29° N., or nearly half way between the head of the gulf of Suez and Râs Mohammed, the extreme southern point of the peninsula. The southern boundary of this great plateau is formed by a line of hills, the Gebel Tih, which curves downward from the neighborhood of Suez towards the center of the peninsula, and then recurves upward in the direction of the Gulf of Akaba. South of Gebel Tih, right across the peninsula, there runs a belt of sandstone some ten or fifteen miles wide about the middle, some forty or fifty at the extremities E. & W., which forms a stepping stone from the chalk plateau to the lofty mountain region still farther south. The sandstone passed, the traveler finds himself lifted to a labyrinth of mountains, and wadis and ravines, the wilds of Serbal and Sinai,—where granite, greenstone, felspar, porphyry, and their whole genus, in varieties past all describing, hold grand and gorgeous sway, till they sink into the waters of the Red Sea at the Mohammed Point. The consequence of this physical configuration of the country is, that the traveler who makes his way from Suez to Sinai, and thence by Akaba into Palestine, repeats in the latter half of the journey his geological experiences of the former half. In going towards Sinai from Suez he mounts by a gradual slope the chalky, gritty wilderness, where the far divided waters of Ain Musa and of Wadi Gharandel—for Mara is still a mockery—serve only to make the general thirstiness of the ground appear more thirsty. Then, whether he takes the more western route of the Written and Feiran Valleys, or the more eastern by Wadi Nash and the ancient cemetery of Sarbat-el-Khadem, his course lies through a region of mottled and variegated sandstone, often carved into

* From the *London Quarterly Review*, (Methodist), July, 1867.

strangely fantastic forms by the genius of flood and weather. At the farther end of Feiran, and its sister Wadi some few miles eastward, the great granite staircase begins to rise before the pilgrim, and he mounts and still mounts, without once leaving it, till he reaches his resting place at Horeb. All this is reversed in proceeding from Sinai to Akaba downward by the desert routes into Palestine. Now the staircase of granite is descended till you come to the sandstone at Hadhera, or some part of the country to the west of it; and so by a long line of march over mingled sandstone and crystalline rocks, you pass beyond the head of the eastern arm of the Red Sea, and plunge once more into the melancholy wastes of chalk and grit, by which the green fields and pleasant terrace gardens of India are sundered from the mountain grandeur and picturesqueness of the distant south.

A frequent halting place of travelers on the way from the Wells of Moses to Wadi Gharandel is the Wadi Warden. The writer was there on the 20th of March, 1864. The general appearance of this Wadi is that of many parts of the Western Tih plateau, at least of such as are near the sea, and exhibit any signs of moisture. It is a broad, shallow depression, crossing the desert from the distant mountains eastward, and widening out as it advances to the sea. Except that it is lined and furrowed by water courses, and that mounds and ridges of sand score or dot it in certain directions, it shows nothing but a grey, stony level, where the mirage delights to juggle the sense by beautifying stunted tamarisks, broom, and other sand-loving shrubs—as it did before our eyes—into well-grown, shadowy, timber-trees, rising from islands off the sea shore. The whole surface of the Wadi is thickly strewn with pebbles and fragments of calcareous, silicious, and cherty rocks, often apparently coralline in structure. For the most part, they are extremely hard, and their colors—brown, white, blue, (sometimes richly dyed), pink, fawn, chocolate, black—give a singularly chequered aspect to the ground, when viewed under favorable lights. Many of the smoother pebbles exhibit a surface made up of curious corrugations and brain-like ridges and channels; while not unfrequently they bristle with sharp points, cusps, plates and blossoms of flint, the hardness of which would scarcely be believed, without actual observation. Phenomena of the same class present themselves over the tertiary area of Egypt and Arabia—we remarked them in the central and northeastern

parts of the Tih desert—and they form a geological puzzle, which no one, so far as we know, has hitherto been skillful enough to resolve. As elsewhere through the peninsula, the entomologist may find ample sport in the Wadi Warden. Many species of insects have their home in it, particularly beetles and grasshoppers. We stumbled upon one very remarkable creature, furnished with antennæ and the orthodox number of legs, which, when at rest, looked exactly like a common broad bean, trimmed a little into the shape of a trilobite.

Neither the geologist nor the scholar has done his work in the famous Wadis Maghara and Mukatteb, where we found ourselves on the 25th and 26th of March. The sandstone of the two Wadis resembles very closely that of the quarries of Hagar Silsilis, in Upper Egypt, the prevailing color of the rocks being brown and red, though they are often wonderfully striped and ribbed with grey, purple, yellow, &c., exceeding in this respect any English "trias" we ever met with. It is surprising how little is still known either of the ancient copper mines of this part of the Sinaitic Peninsula, or of the conditions under which Major McDonald's Arabs of Maghara and its neighborhood, in our own days, meet with their turquoises, whether the good ones which find their way into the European market, or the bad ones which the miners steep in oil to improve their complexion, and so palm upon the unsophisticated curiosity of casual travelers. Yet, after our personal experiences in visiting the Egyptian sculptures of the Wadi, we were prepared to be patient, though wisdom did spring slowly from the soil of the desert. What with the jolting of the camels as they wavered and slipped among the rock-boulders of the Ghineh ravine, which leads into Maghara; what with the fatigue occasioned by clambering up an indescribable chaos of *debris* to the breast of the mountain walls of the Wadi on which the sculptures are carved; last of all, what with the merciless blaze which the sun poured forth upon us as we stood and copied some of the cartouches and other figures cut upon the scarped sandstone; it was not difficult to comprehend how traveler might follow traveler in long succession without adding much, on ground like this, to the common stock of human knowledge. The Maghara sculptures belong undoubtedly to the best period of Egyptian art, and so to a very high antiquity. For vigor and grace, the animal forms will compare with anything to

be seen at Thebes or Abydos. We believe that the Egyptian treasures of the Wadi and Gebel Maghara are far from being exhausted; and a thorough exploration of the district by competent scholars, armed with the appliances of the draughtsman and photographer, is much to be desired.

The account in Ritter of the world-famed inscriptions of the Wadi Mukatteb, and other parts of the Sinaitic Peninsula, scarcely rises to the level of our present acquaintance with them. We shall have occasion to speak of these inscriptions elsewhere. It will be sufficient here to make a general remark or two. That the Sinaitic character proper is Shemitish, and that the writings in this character are the work of an ancient Shemite people, no one will doubt who is competent to form an opinion on the subject. That it should be seriously maintained that the Israelites wrote the inscriptions of this class, is hard to understand in presence of the undeniable fact, that whatever the language in which they were written may be, it certainly is not Hebrew. The more we revolve the problem of their authorship, the less we incline to connect them directly with the era of Moses and the wilderness-life of Israel. That they are linked in some way with the religious feeling which for untold ages has gathered about Sinai and Serbal, seems past question. But at present the uncertainty attaching to the reading and interpretation of the inscriptions themselves, and the haze which rests upon the early history and ethnology of the peninsula, so combine as effectually to nonplus the keenest spirit of investigation. We are satisfied the mystery will be cleared up at last, and we cannot but believe that whenever this occurs it will turn out that the inscriptions in Sinaitic letters were the handiwork of an Arabian population living in the country, whether in pre-Christian, or very early post-Christian times we scarcely venture to surmise. To one point perhaps not hitherto remarked upon, we call attention for its bearing upon the general question of the age and sources of the inscriptions. It is well known that there are a few Latin inscriptions in the Waldi Mukatteb and elsewhere. Not unfrequently inscriptions occur both N. W. and N. E. of Sinai, written in Arabic, sometimes in the Cufic, sometimes in the ordinary character. We observed several very beautiful pieces of Cufic writing in the Mukatteb Valley. Greek inscriptions, too, are by no means uncommon on both the Suez and Akaba lines of route leading to the

sacred mountains. But what we think has not been sufficiently observed is the great number of Coptic inscriptions—such as they appear to be—which show on the written rocks, either alone or in company with writings in other languages. With peace to everybody, we feel sure that scores of inscriptions in the Sinaitic Peninsula have been set down as Greek which are really Coptic. The peculiar letters of the Coptic alphabet, for example the *fei* and the *shei*, are perpetually to be traced, where a hasty glance might see nothing but the familiar characters of the Greek. And the very close connexion in which these Egyptian or half-Egyptian inscriptions sometimes seem to stand to the distinctively Sinaitic writings, is not without its significance for determining the value and origin of these writings themselves. History testifies to the prevalence of the Egyptian language through the S. W. of the peninsula in the early Christian centuries; and it is surely worth ascertaining whether the numerous Coptic inscriptions of the Wadi Mukatteb, Hadhera, &c., may not be made to render up their meaning, and whether light may not be gained from this quarter on the more perplexing phenomena with which they are associated. Possibly an unknown dialect of the Coptic may be in reserve for Egyptologers. Possibly these same Coptic inscriptions may help to throw open a new world of early Arabian Christianity, of which the rock writings in the venerable Sinaitic character are the only extant literature.

The passage from the farther end of the Wadi Mukatteb to the nearer end of the Wadi Feiran is as utter a desolation as can be imagined. It is the very ideal of stoniness, burning, and wild and terrible grandeur. We entered Feiran between three and four P. M. on the 25th of March, over a vast outspread of scrub and drift, our camels pausing continually to feed on the bushes and tufts of green which showed among the boulders. In all directions might be seen flowers resembling hawkweed, asphodel, chamomile and petunia (sakkara, the Bedouins called petunia), with a fine broad-leaved sorrel, the delight alike of Arab and camel. We found our tents pitched among the flowers on the left side of the Wadi, just where an enormously deep moraine*—

* The boulders of this moraine were chiefly granite, varying from the size of a pea to masses of many cubical feet in bulk. We remarked instances here as in so many other parts of the Peninsula, of boulders in which there was a clear junction of granite and greenstone. This phenomena occurs very frequently likewise in the case of rocks in situ, and some examples of it are singularly striking and impressive.

such it appeared to be—tongued out upon the general level, with grave-looking granite hills, green, red and brown, behind it. On the opposite side of the Wadi ran a noble rampart of towering rock; while before us Serbal soared majestically above a breast-work of mountains, and the part of Feiran through which we had traveled disappeared behind among sharply cut, steep ridges of granite, gneiss and greenstone. It was a scene of strangely mingled beauty and grandeur, as we sat that evening among the wild flowers at the foot of the ruinous precipice of drift, with birds singing all around us in the trees or on the hill sides, and the amber light of an Arabian sunset drenching the rock-panorama with many-colored splendor, or burying its mountain masses in shadows of awful darkness.

In the course of the following morning (the 26th,) we traveled most of the length of the Wadi Feiran; and it may not be unsuitable to reproduce the substance of the notes which we made on camel back during the four or five hours' march which brought us to our tents in the palm groves at the foot of Serbal. We mounted a little before nine o'clock, under great heat of the sun. To the right, the greenish-hued rampart, with its patches and ribbon-like stripes of red, apparently all granite, greenstone and gneiss, was backed by towering mountains of dim white shaded with lavender. On our left, rose the broken wall of drift, with large white and black hawks sailing lazily in the brilliant light-blue sky above it. In front, a row of ridges, peaks, and pyramids crowded into view, with the mountain shell of Serbal in misty purple cleaving the heavens behind them, its base buttressed by two huge lumps of crystalline rock, half-light, half-shade, all green and brown—these same lumps being the sides of the Wadi in the distance. So we set off among the aromatic plants and flowers which tufted the sandy, boulder-strewed, water-trenched floor of the valley, the camels each following his fancy and making a prolonged breakfast as he went, but all moving towards the ravine into which the Wadi narrowed a little in advance. Within the first fifteen minutes of our ride we were compelled to make a considerable *détour* to avoid going over a wall of drift which ran across the Wadi. This brought us near to the mountain sides to our right, which looked as if the general bulk of them was clothed in serpent skin; while beautiful yellow-green patches of a species of saxifrage rested here and there upon

their parched and somber steeps. At 9.15 we entered the narrower part of the Wadi, a hot, strong wind, charged with the smell of innumerable desert plants, meeting us as we moved forward. Half an hour after, broad, parallel dykes of what seemed to be granite or felspathic rock were seen running through the mountain masses on either hand—even to ungeological eyes a most striking and imposing spectacle. At 10, we found ourselves in an elliptical basin of mountains, with great rock protuberances jutting forth from the sides of the Wadi, or standing isolated on the level of it, while a vast mass of very green greenstone presented itself *in situ* side by side with granite. Meantime the sand wind began to blow in blinding, roaring gusts, as it had done the day before in the Wadi Mukatteb As we advanced slowly and painfully, all was moistureless, vitrified, wild, stupendous. Every now and then we were seemingly landlocked. The quiet, naked magnificence of the Wadi, as we went winding through it, sometimes at sharp angles, was not to be described ; at 10:45, a grand mountain prospect revealed itself in front, round a bend of the Wadi. The ridge of Serbal, which had been for some time hidden, came suddenly full into view through the sand-mist, with piles of mountains packed beneath it, stretching upward toward its breast. The heat by this time was overpowering, and the clouds of sand driving directly down the valley increased the discomfort, which it caused us not a little. A bird, with a note not much unlike the English garden warbler, found no difficulty, notwithstanding, in making music for us here. Still less did the beetles—of which we here caught a magnificent sample, with a back like a locust's—seem to be hindered at all from going through their usual exercises of running and hunting on the torrid sands.* At 11, not only were the peaks of Serbal distinctly seen, but also the various configurations of the surface of the mountain. Soon after, we passed one of the numerous small branch Wadis or *Sils*, which we had struck from time to time along the course of Feiran, having numerous blocks and boulders of what we took to be white granite, scattered about at the entrance of it. Half an

* Beetle fanciers should visit the Sinaitic Peninsula. They will find there the objects of their interest in every conceivable sort and size. The beetles may be obtained in abundance both by day and night, and within the tent at all hours, almost as freely as in the open air. Portmanteaus and bed clothing also, will often serve the purpose of self-acting nets for catching, not only beetles, but all kinds of insects, great and small.

hour later, where a mountain of gneiss met us at the bend of the valley, we might have been going where Tennyson carries his gallant "six hundred," so deep and cavernous was the gloom into which we were plunged on a sudden. About this point the floor of the Wadi was painted into a most picturesque motley by drifted blocks of granite and felspathose rock, straw-colored, buff, lavender, yellow, brick-red, blood-red, grey, &c. The variety of shade was wonderful. Just before 12, a Sinaitic inscription appeared on a red rock to the left, quite low down. Soon after, where another Wadi went off to the left, an enormous pile of drift, some thirty or forty feet thick at least, stood against the mountain side. Beyond, a great red vein was seen ribboning the breast of the left hand mountain, while the mountain rocks to the right were covered with plants up to the top, and ghurkuds and acacias adorned the base. Now a cross cut upon a rock. Then came another prodigious accumulation of drift on the right. At this time the heat in the Wadi was dreadful, the thermometer reading 93° in a basket carried by one of the company in front of him as he rode his camel. At 12:15, several Sinaitic inscriptions appeared on detached rocks at the bottom of the mountain on our left. A little farther on, the camels seemed to suffer a good deal from having to make their way over a thick drift deposit filled with enormous boulders. At 12:25, a sharp bend in the Wadi brought us in sight of another Sinaitic inscription, and just beyond there was a magnificent opening with Serbal as its culminating glory. There we found a considerable sprinkling of acacias, but they looked winterly, their leaves being only just on the point of forming. A tolerable carpet of green, too, began to show now upon the Wadi; only it was a very thin and tattered "Kidderminster," not the rich, dense "Brussels" which our expectation looked for. So far the Wadi Feiran had turned out very unlike what we supposed; it had abundantly less vegetation, and the scenery was unspeakably more wild and weird and sublime. At 12:40, a few stunted palms, with acacias, broom, &c., gave notice of our approach to Heswa, a well-known resting place of pilgrims, and the doorway to the lovely palm region in which the Wadi Feiran terminates. Here we found Bedouin houses built of rough stones and untrimmed palm trunks; wells, too, protected by logs of palm put round them; and, what was best of all after the water, groups of palms, fine *nebeks* bearing their fast ripening fruit, half cherry, half crab

apple, and other trees and shrubs, amidst the shade and green of which our camels wandered with no less satisfaction to themselves than to their scorched and blinded riders. In half an hour more the graceful twin peaks of El Benat rose to view behind green-brown mountains in front of them: to the right was the Wadi Aleyat, leading up to Serbal, with the low, ruin-capped hill at its mouth, where tradition makes Moses to have sat while Amalek was defeated; immediately beyond, to the left, creeping up the mountain side, were to be seen the broken, tumbled remains of the ancient town and bishopric of Pharan; and close before us, running on as far as the eye could carry, a long ravine, bounded on either side by steep and most picturesque mountain walls, filled with groves of palm, tamarask, nebek, &c.—the Arabian paradise, and worthy of its name. A few moments longer, and we were dismounting at our tents among the palms, and almost as soon, were prostrate on the sand, drinking eagerly of the living water which runs down the Wadi and makes glad this Eden of the desert.

Ritter says, it is much to be wished that we had more minute accounts of the Pharan ruins. We examined the ruins soon after reaching our tenting-place beyond them; but we fear we can add little except in one or two particulars, to what is already known on the subject. The first set of ruins to which we directed attention were those described above as lying on the mountain-side to the left of our course along the Wadi, and nearly facing the entrance of the Wadi Aleyat. Here we found a large number of houses running up the steep, not unlike the modern Arab huts in their style of architecture, and huddled together without any discernable order or arrangement. They were mostly built of boulders and fragments of stone taken from the mountain or the neighboring drift. Not unfrequently hewn stones were to be seen; sometimes short lengths of wall built of such stones. Cement was used in many cases. All the houses were open at top. Some of them originally had more than one story. There were what we judged to be places for windows in the higher parts of some of the walls. The door-ways were low; often with a single short stone as lintel, placed upon two other short stones as side-posts. The door-ways in not a few instances, were closed with palm planks, either loose or fitted to the size of the opening, and secured with clay, stones, or iron chain; all this, of course, being

the work of the Bedouins of the Wadi, who appear to use the ancient buildings as temporary dwellings and storehouses. Little niches, or recesses, were observed in the inner walls of a multitude of the buildings, and in some of the houses were caves, leading, we knew not how far, into the depths of the mountain; pits, likewise, in the floors, apparently burial-places, not unlike those in the grottoes of Egypt, as at Beni Hassan and elsewhere. While the majority of the houses were mean in their construction, some were more solid, lofty, and spacious, and altogether followed a more respectable model than the rest. All, however, appeared to have been constructed quite as much for defense as comfort. They were castles and places of refuge as well as houses. In one of the walls we found a block of red sandstone over an entrance, with a weathered bead-ornament upon it. In another place, a millstone had been built into a wall. Close to the millstone we lighted upon a very interesting monument. It was the lintel of the doorway of what appeared to be the most important building in the place—the Episcopal palace, not impossibly. It was a large single block of stone, having at either end a large cross, contained within a circular band carved upon it, the middle part of the stone being occupied by a row of three arches, with a double line of inscription upon them. The crosses at the two ends nearly fill the breadth of the stone. The one to the left is much defaced, that to the right is perfect. The arches were originally filled with figures, probably of Christ and his apostles. A standing figure with uplifted hands is still quite visible in the arch to the left. Several small crosses, apparently of later date than the main carvings are cut on different parts of the stone. The inscription, which contains about fifty letters, is to all appearance Coptic. It has suffered from age. We copied it carefully, but have not, as yet, been able to interpret it. It is a writing well worthy of critical attention from Egyptologers and ecclesiastical scholars. Tischendorf and, possibly, others have spoken of this inscription. We believe it has not hitherto been noted that the language of it is Coptic, nor has any minute description been given before of the stone on which it is carved.*

A rough clamber down among the granite blocks and wild flowers brought us again to the flat of the Wadi, on the opposite

* Mrs. Lieder, of Cairo, informs us, that she has in her possession a "rubbing" of this inscription.

side of which is "Rephidim." It is a small hill, standing like an island-rock at the junction of the Wadis Aleyat and Feiran, surrounded by magnificent mountains, with scanty room about it for any such battle as that described by Moses in connection with the attack upon Israel by Amalek. In ancient times, the hill seems to have been ramparted. Many parts of it are covered with remains of buildings. The substructures of the buildings were stone; for the upper parts, mud taken from the drift of the neighborhood was often used. On the north side were indubitable remains of a church, with fragments of columns, a portion of the apse, &c. The top of the rock showed lines of wall running in various directions. Evidently the whole hill, as well as the rising ground to the south of it, had once been thickly occupied by buildings. Ruins crowned the crests and ridges of several mountains adjacent, and the mountain on the south side of the entrance to the Wadi Aleyat was much grottoed both at its base and through its middle slope. Plainly Pharan was once a populous and flourishing Christian settlement. If it was built and originally held in face of an enemy, there was every sign of a Christian possession of the region, which was eventually quiet, and, in its quietness, of no very brief continuance.

Farther on in this paper we shall say a word or two on the much-vexed question of the respective claims of Gebel Serbal and Gebel Musa to be the Sinai of Moses. Here, it may not be without its service if, even after the eloquent and masterly account by Stanley, we describe an ascent of Serbal, which the writer and a friend made on the 26th of March, the day following that of our arrival in the Wadi Feiran.

We set out from our tents in Feiran at 4:40 in the morning, accompanied by two Bedouin guides, carrying a skin of water, a bundle of eatables, and sundry very modest pieces of cooking apparatus. The night had been stormy, the wind blowing in vehement gusts with ominous lulls between; and not only were our Bedouins indisposed to go, but we ourselves were half inclined to question the wisdom of venturing so high above the palm tops. We decided, however, to make the attempt. The sky was a good deal overclouded when we set out, though the moon still had power, and day was already dawning. We had no choice of routes. Our path lay up the broad Wadi Aleyat, the mouth of which opened on Wadi Feiran, not many hundred yards below

the spot where we were tented. We were scarcely out of Feiran, before we found ourselves threading a difficult track amongst the boulders and fragments of a huge moraine which chokes the valley from end to end, whilst vast mountain ramparts of granite, braided and ribboned with dykes of felspar, greenstone, and basalt, looked darkly down upon us from either side, in the dull twilight.

The moraine up which we moved baffles all description. It was an enormous ocean-river, often of prodigious depth, made up of sand, gravel, and boulders of different rocks, especially granites The boulders were the chief marvel of it. In point of size they ran the whole length of the scale from a mere pebble to rock-masses as large as a mammoth or a good-sized two-story house. What was no less striking, at the same time that their surfaces were always water-worn and weathered to a general roundness of outline, the larger boulders were scooped and caverned into the wildest and most fantastic forms imaginable. Sometimes they took the shape of a colossal skull, or vertebra, or ball and socket joint. Sometimes you might fancy yourself surrounded by shells such as must have lain on the shores of Gulliver's Brobdignag, only he was not conchologist enough to speak of them; sometimes a coarser imagination would have conjured up to itself a countless multitude of gigantic Dutch ovens, mushrooms, hour-glasses, gargoils, and fractured bombs, all jumbled together and grotesque and portentous chaos. Had good old Dr. Borlase been with us he would have gone into an antiquarian frenzy over the altars, the sacrificial basins, the troughs and reservoirs for water or the blood of victims, which the Druidical forefathers of those twin-races, the Cornish and the Amalekites, had carved out of the rocks in this "unked" seat of their blood-loving superstition. The boulders lay at every conceivable angle, and were piled upon each other to heights which almost made one tremble to think of the forces which have wrought to produce phenomena of such stupendous magnitude and awfulness.

For some distance up the Wadi the difficulty of the journey was much increased by the circumstance that innumerable sherds of red felspathic rock lay scattered about in every direction, adding greatly to the labor of climbing among the larger blocks and masses of stone already described. If the traveling was toilsome, however, there was much to set over against it. From the very

outset, the air was filled with the perfume of *ser*—supposed, without reason by some to be the first element in the name of the mountain—and other desert plants. A multitude of wild flowers too, shot out of the sand, or filled the crannies of the rocks. Moreover, the rugged mountain-slopes on either hand grew more and more picturesque as the advancing light brought out their divers hues of purple, green and brown; while behind us, far overtopping Feiran and its majestic walls of rock, the gentle peaks of El Benat gleamed with a russet glory under the rays of sunrise. To crown all, Serbal itself in front revealed its magnificent peaks and clefts with a constantly increasing clearness and impressivenes, the spectacle being all the grander because of the clouds, which now and again swept impatiently over its summit.

Some three-quarters of a mile or so up the valley we found ancient stone buildings, belonging apparently to the period of the Christian hermits. Here and there likewise, both below and above this point, there were small groups of palm or acacia. Perhaps a mile-and-a-half from the entrance of the Wadi we met with Sinaitic inscriptions and figures on the rocks—these same writings continuing to present themselves at intervals up to the top of the mountain. Besides the now familiar characters, we observed representations of a man on horseback, a man with lifted arms holding a sword in one hand and a shield in the other, ibexes with prodigiously long horns, forms of animals which seemed to be intended for goats, and various nondescript creatures, which the ingenious author of *Israel in the Wilderness** might view with reverence indeed, but which we assure him, even he could not look upon without a feeling of amusement.

In about an hour and a quarter's brisk walking we reached what might be considered the roots of the mountain, the Wadi sweeping round to the right, and hiding from view the colored peaks of El Benat and their magnificent accompaniments. By this time the sun had mounted above the valley wall behind, and

* It is not fair of Mr. Forster to speak as he does (Israel, &c., p. 61) of Dean Stanley's "labored attempt to throw ridicule upon the rude delineations of animals, especially . . . the ibex" as seen in the Wadi Alleyat; and to insinuate that none but a "neological eye" could discern in them "disproportion and deformity." There is no trace of any unworthy design in the language employed by Stanley; and we entirely agree with him in doubting whether the ibexes and other animal figures have "any serious signification."

threatened by his heat to add indefinitely to the toil of our further progress. His face, however, was soon clouded over; and the wind, which continued to blow heavily from the N. W., rendered the atmosphere cool and flush; the precipices to our left meanwhile protecting us from its unchecked violence. The appearance of Serbal was now one of indescribable majesty. The whole assemblage of its stupendous heights and of the no less stupendous depths which part them, stood forth to view. How to scale any one, much less one of the loftiest of those bare mountain bosses of granite, that reared themselves thousands of feet perpendicular above our heads, seemed a problem past solving; nor was much light shed upon it by the aspect of the Wadi Abu Hamad, or Wild Fig-tree Valley, up which our guides led the way for us from the Wadi Aleyat towards the summit of the mountain. The Wadi Abu Hamad is, in fact, a long, steep gorge, running up between two frightful walls of mountains to a platform of rock, some three-quarters of an hour's distance from the culminating peak of Serbal northward, and filled through its whole extent with rocks and boulders, like those which choke the Wadi below it, only still more prodigious, and still more wildly tumbled and heaped in their ruinous confusion. Near the bottom of this almost inaccessible staircase, a spring flows from the base of the precipice to the right into a small natural basin, whence it falls gently to the rock a little way beneath, and almost immediately disappears among the neighboring boulders. This is the spring which Dr. Stanley makes to issue from the mountain "amidst mosses and fern."* We were not fortunate enough to discover these pleasant additions to the charms of the spot; and we were captious enough to surmise that the confervæ which painted the water and the rocks about it, might have led the gifted professor unconsciously to transfer to Arabia the romance of Devonshire and the English lake district. We had been advertised that the water of this Serbal spring was bad. We drank it critically, notwithstanding the thirst which we brought to it, and were agreed that nothing could surpass its sweetness. It was about six o'clock A. M. when we reached the spring; and, after resting awhile—for we were already much

* If the fern at the Serbal spring was the creation of fancy, it was to be seen elsewhere. We afterwards found the "maiden hair" growing at a fountain on Gebel Musa.

heated and wearied—we replenished our water-bottle, and then set out on our dizzy climb to the top of the Abu Humad. With great difficulty, we accomplished this in about three hours. The ascent was not particularly dangerous, except where huge boulders, lying together, with hideous gulfs yawning between them, threatened us at every step with fracture of leg or skull. The strain and labor, however, were enormous; and had it not been for the frequent and timely help of our Bedouins, and for the strength which we gained from our resolution, our water-skin, and a long series of rests, we should never have gained the summit. As it was, our tongues literally "clave to the roofs of our mouths," so that at times we could scarcely articulate; and more than once we were thrown into alarm by a faintness, which promised to place us in most embarrassing circumstances. It was up, and up, and still up. Often we were obliged to take to our hands and knees, in order to make our way over the monster boulders and rock-masses; and the ridge above us seemed only to recede higher and higher into the air, as if in mockery of our attempts to reach it, the more eagerly we climbed and scaled. Apart from their native agility, our guides performed the climbing with greater ease than we did, through their going barefoot. Where the hard ascent began they hung their sandals on a wild fig, and so gained a hold on the granite, which was vainly essayed by our inelastic boot-soles.

Meantime, as we slowly mounted upward, we found ourselves surrounded by scenes of unlooked-for magnificence. El Banat had not long retired behind the mountain to our right, before a noble panorama opened to us over the peninsula, E. and S. E. of Serbal; and we gazed with admiration and awe on the distant Gebel Musa and the towering mountain group of which it is the glory. In a little while, however, the sun became hidden by clouds; the face of the sky was covered with dense masses of moving mist; the landscape beneath us disappeared; the wind rushed tempestuously with loud roar through the chasms and gorges of the mountain; rain fell at intervals either in heavy drops or smart showers; and not unfrequently the summits above us were invisible for a time in the wrack and whirl of the elements which beat above them. It was an awful spectacle—Serbal in storm. The last ten minutes before reaching the crest of the Wadi were a mounting not to be forgotten. Nothing was to

be seen above us, but a sheer edge over which the wind came pouring from the Gulf of Suez like a furious torrent; and what was to become of us on reaching it, when we were already compelled to cling hard to the rocks, lest the sudden gusts should carry us away, was a question which we could not help revolving with some anxiety. Happily the wind granted us truce while turning the ridge; and what before was nothing—the part of the mountain beyond the sharp line that bounded our view below—revealed itself now as a broad, uneven platform of weathered granite, held up in the arms of prodigious domes and peaks that rose majestically above, and presenting us over its farther border with a brief but charming prospect of the Red Sea and the coast line running up it as far as eye could reach. Even here there still remained for us some forty minutes' climb up the giant pile of rock which formed the northern peak of Serbal. This was not easy; for though artificial staircases of stone assisted us here and there, the rain and wetting mist had made the face of the granite slippery, and it was often hard to avoid rolling miserably down into fathomless abysses beneath. It was while we were accomplishing this last stage of our ascent, that we witnessed a phenomenon which might well have shaken stronger nerves than ours. An enormous volume of dense white vapor came suddenly roaring through the gorge which had discovered the sea to us, and swept across the platform on which we had stood a moment before, precisely as if a mountainous steam engine was discharging its boiler between the gigantic precipices right and left. With the good help of our Bedouins, however, we made our way safely, and amidst the rich smell of the *ser* and other fragrant plants, which we found growing at our journey's end even more luxuriantly than through the course of it, we passed through a narrow defile of red granite which led to the summit, and sought shelter from the wind and cold under a huge caverned boss of rock that formed part of the mountain top. Here we cowered, all shivering like aspen leaves, while the Bedouins lighted a fire and boiled us coffee. Then the ready sword of one of the Arabs—an admirable substitute for our forgotten knives—carved our chicken for us, and cut up our bread and other provisions; and we ate and drank together in that strange place, and were soon able, notwithstanding our fatigue and the cruel cold, to explore our position, and appreciate more precisely the sublimity and

terror of it. It was a scene of unutterable grandeur. Such mountainous bosses and humps of smooth granite, towering into the clouds, and running down headlong into gulfs below which it made one shiver to look into, we never saw before, and never expect to see again. We do not know what the Cordillera or the Himalaya may be; but we can scarcely suppose them to offer anything more wild and overawing in their scenery than the marvelous head of Serbal, with its rounded granite pyramids, its arched plates of crystalline cliff, its all but bottomless gorges and crevasses, and the Titanic magnitude of the boulder masses which hillock its peaks and stream down its fissured sides. To us the terribleness of all this was enhanced by the tempest, which, with occasional remission, continued to lash the mountain through the whole period of our stay upon it. How the mists hurried over the mountain, sped by the vehemence of the wind that rushed roaring through the gorges, as if it would carry a hundred Serbals away with it; how now and again our horizon was reduced in a moment to an area of a few square yards, peak and boss and precipice and everything being lost in the thick clouds that swept over us; how at intervals the giant heights of the mountains stood out like islands above the ocean of white vapor that washed their breasts, and hid their steep slopes from our view; how once and twice and thrice the air grew clearer for a while, and gave us glimpses of the vast panorama of mountain range and wadi, stretching away and away in endless labyrinth and with unspeakable distinctness of definition and wealth of coloring to the Gulf of Akaba; all this it would be idle to attempt to picture in language. One such revelation of the landscape beneath will be forever memorable. The light of the sun so fell upon the mountains east and south, as to bring out the lines of their rocks, with all their dykes and veins in the freshest and most fairy-like manner conceivable, while the wadis, which ran among the ridges, showed like rivers of silver winding and coursing far and near over the illuminated rock-map.

After we had well inspected the neighborhood of our dining-place, we went up to the "tortoise back," which forms the highest point of this part of Serbal, and there on our hands and knees, benumbed with cold and clutching the great stones of the cairn to prevent ourselves from being blown over the mountain top, we let our eye range, as the elements allowed, over the great expanse

of the Peninsula, and waited in hope that fuller revelation might come with kindlier conditions of the atmosphere. As time wore on, however, and there was still no prospect of amendment, we resolved to descend, having first made a hasty survey of the rocks within our reach, in search of Sinaitic inscriptions. On this point Stanley is undoubtedly wrong, and Burckhardt right. "On Serbal," says Stanley,* speaking of the inscriptions, "I think we could hardly have overlooked any; but we saw no more than three, though it is difficult to reconcile this with the statement of Burckhardt, that he had there seen many inscriptions." Our own observations agree with those of Burckhardt. It is by no means unlikely that there are inscriptions on the top of the mountain, which we did not see. We certainly saw them, however, in four or five different places, and one very large granite boss on its upper sloping surface was completely covered with them.

Our ascent of Serbal occupied four hours and three quarters. We were about two hours on the top of the mountain. Five hours were consumed in the descent. The process of descending was dangerous at first, through the slipperiness of the wet granite; afterwards it was simply most fatiguing. One grand display of landscape from the head of Abu Hamad atoned for much of the toil and pain we underwent. The clouds lifted as by magic from the prospect below, and hung over it like an umbrella, while all the glorious detail showed itself mapped out and richly colored before our eyes. What else could we think of but "the face of the covering" taken away from off the land of Ishmael? Some while later, a partial clearing of the sky gave us another sight of Sinai, and, strangely enough, discovered to our view the almost awful spectacle of a "pillar of cloud" passing in the far distance along the front of the holy mount. So we went on, exhausted and footsore, the weariness running hard upon collapse at certain points of the journey. We followed the lead of our Bedouins mechanically. The way seemed to lengthen with every hundred yards of our progres. Rest after rest was taken, but we were not rested. Even the delightful spring relieved us but a moment. The Wadi Aleyat appeared endless. It did end. By about 5 P. M. we were thankfully resting in our tents among the blessed palms of Feiran.

* *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 61.

The day following we had the opportunity of walking at leisure some distance up the Wadi, in the direction of Sinai. For a while we followed the delicious running stream which is the praise of all visitors to Feiran. It ran almost close to the mountain wall of the valley to our left, a prolonged grove of palms and other trees lying to the right. In and about the water we found brook-lime, with its blue flowers, exactly as in England; a kind of ice-plant; what appeared to be willow herb, only without smell; mallows likewise; also rushes, grass, and abundance of the less romantic conferva. The floor of the Wadi was everywhere made up of sand and drifted pebbles and boulders. Many fallen palms were strewn about. The standing ones were ill-pruned, old withered branches being allowed to remain and draggle on the ground. Soon we came to stone enclosures and booths or tabernacles formed of palm branches, with chamomile growing on the Wadi around them. In several cases untrimmed palms were made to form umbrella-like shelters and flat or sloping house-roofs. At a point where the mountain-sides were wondrously banded with dykes of red, we lighted upon a Bedouin cemetery. A multitude of stones was set up, chiefly pointed. Often two stood together at the head of a grave, and two at the foot, while a bit of palm-leaf was stuck between each pair of stones—this last a remnant, doubtless, of the decorations of the recent festival of the dead held on the first day of Beiram. Sometimes, we observed, the graves were wholly or partially enclosed with low walls of loose stones. Farther on, the mountain to the right showed a highly quartzoze whitish granite, scored with parallel lines and veinings of a subordinate granite of a beautiful pink color. Near this the same side of the Wadi presented curious alternations of granite and gneiss. Sorrel and scentless mignonette were found hereabouts growing on the sandy level of the valley. The geological phenomenon, which most struck us during our walk, was one which we next encountered. On the mountainous precipices to the right, patches, some larger, some smaller, of yellowish stratified mud-enclosing boulders, were seen at various heights—in several instances heights of not less than 100 or 150 feet up, adhering to the sides of the mountain. On our way back to our tents we remarked this phenomenon again on the opposite, or north side of the Wadi; but it was on a smaller scale than that of the south side. When was that drift deposited? What was the elevation of Fei-

ran above the sea level when the deposition took place? and how was the Wadi then related to Serbal and the more southern mountain-groups of the Peninsula? To what causes, moreover, are we to attribute the excavation of the drift, which must have filled the Wadi, to its present depth?* The geologist who shall thoroughly explore the Sinaitic Peninsula, and write worthily upon it, will achieve for himself a well-earned scientific immortality. We can scarcely imagine scientific labor at once more desirable and more sure to command its just recompense than the two brilliant monographs, which we trust are by and by to be written, on the geology of Egypt, and on that of the Peninsula of Sinai.

At the remotest point from our tents reached at this time, we found a Bedouin booth with a family in it. Near the entrance coffee was pounding; within sat two women wearing horns, one of them nursing—what we had hardly seen before in the East—a tolerably clean baby. The lady of our company could not resist the temptation of taking this little rarity into her arms; and, though the mother appeared somewhat fearful, she was so far in advance of the Egyptian women as to permit the license. Looking back from this spot there was Serbal in the distance, lifting its head above the walls of mountain which crossed in front of him; nearer, the Wadi formed one great garden of palm, tamarisk, nebek, apricot,† and other trees of beauty or use; while castle-like ruins frowned upon us from a shoulder of the mountain to the right. As we set out to return, one of the Bedouins from the booth joined us, and walked before us down the Wadi. He wore a white dress with a felt skull-cap, "and had a leathern girdle about his loins." His face was kindly, but he was remarkably erect and independent in his carriage. He had, in more than ordinary degree, that jirking motion of the hips in walking which is so observable among the Bedouins. Moving on, with dragon-flies every now and then darting around us, and nightingales singing on the mountain-sides, we came to the source of the stream which runs down the Wadi. It oozes out of the sand near the middle of the Wadi, and flows in all per-

* Lepsius and others have speculated on some of these questions.—Ritter, vol. i, pp. 381.

† Ritter (vol. i, p. 308) endorses Burckhardt's statement, that the apricot does not grow in the Wadi Feiran. It is there now.

haps a mile as far as Aleyat. The view down the channel of the water was very pretty; the blue-green, rambling tamarisks on either hand; palms in advance; the stream crossing and recrossing the vista; and, as far as the eye could see, embroidering the grass which attended the water all down its course, groups of purple petunias and other flowers in full bloom. Then we plunged into a grove of trees, and after rough traveling over prostrate trunks and branches of palm, made our way past a garden of nebek, their fruit showing green, yellow and red, all at once, back to the point from which we started. The early night saw us watching Orion and Pleiades among the soft, dark tops of the palms, while our Bedouins sat round their fire and made *chiaroscuros*, such as Rembrandt only dreamed of when his dreams were brightest.

Soon after seven the following morning, we had mounted our camels, and with a glorious sun shining down the Wadi, and bringing out the intense green of the palms, we were moving single file, lay and cleric, Englishman, Nubian, Arab, Egyptian, camel and camel gear, towards the burning desert which divided us from Sinai. Here, of course, we retraced, for a while, our steps of the day preceding, with nebeks, tamarisks, and date-palms all around, and the magnificent russet mountains rearing themselves close to us on either side of the ravine. Soon a great mass of mud-drift presented itself, with rounded surfaces and hollows in them looking towards the Wadi. Presently, a dyke of salmon-colored felspar came down the mountain-side in giant steps, like the steps of a pyramid. Soon after, more drift showed itself on the mountain-side to the left. Then again, we had it standing totteringly, like a decayed pyramid, upon the right. Often the drift, whether higher up the mountains or lower, was streaked and honeycombed, plainly by the action of water. Large boulders also appeared in it, chiefly in the masses near the base of the mountains. The highest drift deposit would not be less than 150 feet above the existing floor of the Wadi. As we rode on, the Wadi began to wind; a cool wind met us; and pink-brown mountains came into view with deep violet shadows. Still the horizontally-stratified mud-drift continued to appear at short intervals on both sides of the valley; now as a wall of some eight or ten feet high, running under the foot of the mountain; now stacked in protected places, as at the mouth of

ravines, particularly on their upper sides; now as broken yellow cliffs, backed by soaring masses of granite, felspar, porphyry, and other crystalline rocks of the district. It was a curious picture—the mild-looking, light-colored drift strata in front, and close behind them the stern, dark, rugged mountains, that seemed to look down upon them with mingled anger and contempt. In the course of an hour from starting, we had distanced the last palm-tree of the Wadi, the tamarisks only remaining to cheer us with their green, and our foreground in all directions was an indescribable motley of masses of drift taking the most various and fantastic forms; cones, pyramids, towers, ramparts, batteries, house-walls, gable-roofs, hay-stacks, ovens, bee-hives—the most accomplished word-painter could not say what forms they did or did not take. Verily, earth and water played strange gambols on the way to Feiran before our grandfathers, or Pharaoh's either, ever thought of peering into the nature of things. So we bade farewell to the Sinaitic paradise, and took our thirsty course over sand and rock by the famous ladder of Nakb-el-Hawi and the noble outspread of Wadi Raha, to the valley of the Sinai convent and the mountain glories of Musa and Katrin.

With respect to the convent of St. Catharine, we have nothing to say either as to its history, its architecture, the manner of life followed by the monks who live in it, or the relations in which it stands to the Bedouin tribes of the Southern peninsula; on all these points very full and satisfactory accounts will be found in our author. We are sorry that we cannot indorse the representation which Ritter gives of the intelligence of the monks. Though they are almost to a man Greeks, the mass of them cannot even read the text of the precious Greek MSS. of Scripture contained in their library; and in all our communications with them as guides, we found them utterly empty and wooden. High and low alike among the brethren however, showed us the utmost civility and kindness; nor were we disposed to attribute this wholly to the liberal bakshish which they received from our company, though certainly they made no attempt to veil the keenness of their love for dollars and sovereigns. The only instance of anything like impropriety occurred in the melancholy charnel-house. Here to the right of the entrance, the upper skeleton of the last superior had been mounted on a box or barrel, with a red tarbosh stuck jauntily upon the skull; and the monk

who showed us round, as we went out, gave the ghostly object a push, at the same time looking to us for the smiles which his performance did not draw.

One passage in Ritter, referring to the Sinai Convent, we may be permitted to remark upon. In vol. i, p. 237, Mr. Gage writes: "In the apartment which was formerly occupied by the Archbishop, there is said to have been seen by many travelers a beautiful Greek MS. written in letters of gold and illuminated; but Tischendorf was unable in his first visit to obtain any trace of it, notwithstanding the favor shown him by the librarian of the convent, who permitted him to take many other MSS. to his own room and copy them there." It should have been added that, when at Sinai on his last Mediterranean journey, Tischendorf not only saw the golden MS. but was able so far to examine it as to determine it to be an evangelarium, and not what European scholars generally had, up to that time, believed it to be—a codex of the Greek Gospels or even of the entire Testament. In his *Aus dem heiligen Lande*, published in 1862, Tischendorf describes the manuscript in brief, and expresses his opinion as to the time at which it was written. The writer of this paper, in company with the friend who mounted Serbal with him, had the golden MS. in his possession for several hours during the visit which they paid together to the convent in 1864; and without knowing that Tischendorf had anticipated them in the discovery of the true character of the MS., they not only verified his observations, but were able to make out a list of the Gospel passages contained in the volume, and to prepare a pretty full account of the form, material, writing and other characteristics of this best-prized, though not most precious, treasure of the Sinai library. The substance of the notes which were taken on that occasion will be found in the numbers of the Athenæum, for the 12th and 19th of November, 1864. It may be proper to state further, that on one of the days on which we inspected the golden MS., the superior of the convent showed us hastily two or three very ancient uncial MSS. of the Greek Scriptures. One of them struck us as hardly inferior in age to some of the most valued codices as present in the hands of biblical scholars; and we are persuaded that there are still MS. treasures in the keeping of Sinai monks, which, if not rivals of Tischendorf's famous *Codex*

Sinaiticus, may hereafter—unless, indeed, they are used for fire-paper—add much to the existing resources and appliances of biblical criticism. Among other literary curiosities, the monk who was with us while we examined the golden MS., produced a tattered papyrus volume, which seemed to be a MS. copy of the *Psalter* in Ancient Armenian. He told us, that no stranger had ever seen that MS. before. We took this for as much as it was worth: but, coupled with what the superior showed us, it raised the question strongly, what literary wealth there might not yet be in the convent, which the world knew nothing of, but would value above all gold if it could only lay hands on it. We may add, that in the estimation of the monks, the golden MS. is the palladium of their foundation. This the steward of the convent told us, speaking most seriously in his own name and that of his brethren. He stated further, what we suppose is a corollary of their doctrine, that no money, as they said, would ever induce them to part with it. The migration of the great Sinai Codex to Europe was evidently a very sore place with the convent; and we heard Tischendorf spoken of in connection with this affair in terms which were anything but complimentary to his principles.

Ritter only does justice to the importance of the traditional Sinai, in the copious descriptions which he gives of the mountain group and its surroundings, and in the careful criticism which he expends upon the historic questions, which link themselves in particular to Gebel Musa and its rival Serbal. On the chief of these questions—namely, whether Serbal on the one hand, or Gebel Musa—whether the peak so named, or the mountain headland which fronts and joins on to it, Safsafeh, or both of them—on the other, is to be considered the scene of the giving of the law, we will simply express a judgment in a word or two. We had climbed Serbal, and so far as opportunity allowed, had scrutinized the neighborhood of the mountain. A few days after we were at what is commonly known as Sinai. Here we stayed for four or five days, and of course did our best to put ourselves in possession of all such knowledge as might warrant our forming an intelligent opinion on the great historico-geographical question of the Peninsula. We mounted Gebel Musa and Gebel Katrin. We made our way northward from the top of Gebel Musa along

that wonderful spine of mountain, which unites the sacred peak with the rugged crest of Safsafeh. We examined the Wadi Raha, which stretches away north from the foot of the grand escarpment of Safsafeh on to Nakb-el-Hawi. We walked through the length of the Wadi west and south of the holy mountain. A gentleman of our company, well practised in the critical use of his senses, and remarkable for strength of judgment, rode his camel down the Wadi Sebaiyeh, east and south-east of Gebel Musa, for several hours in succession, with the simple view of ascertaining its dimensions and the relation in which it stood to Musa. We left nothing undone, indeed, which would enable us to base an opinion upon adequate observation and inquiry. And, so far as we know, the conclusion come to by our whole number was unanimous. All felt, that esthetically Serbal ought to have been the theater of Divine legislation. It had a grandeur of elevation and form, such as Gebel Musa could not pretend to; and if the question were to go upon considerations of this class, there could no longer be any doubt on the subject: Serbal was Sinai. But if Sinai, wherever it was, must furnish room in its neighborhood, for the multitudes to whom God spoke, when He appeared on the mountain—room where, though they might touch the mountain if they pleased, they could yet go afar off, and still be witnesses of all that transpired on the top of it, it was equally and most strongly felt, that Serbal could never by any possibility answer these conditions. We think there are two facts, which ought at once to put Serbal out of court. In the first place, Serbal could not be touched by the Israelites, and therefore could not be the mount about which bounds were to be set, lest the people should come nigh. In the second place, there is not room—we do not hesitate to say, it is absurd to affirm that there is anything like room—for such a host as that of the Exodus to stand in the Wadis about Serbal, so as to see what the sacred narrative declares was to be seen by the spectators of the terrible glory of Horeb. With Gebel Musa, however—and we now include in this term, what is really part of the same mountain, the Ras Safsafeh—the conditions demanded by the sacred text ought surely to be recognized at length as fully satisfied. Gebel Musa is quite as truly in the "backside of the desert" as Serbal—to notice an objection of Mr. Foster's—whether your

local reckoning takes Egypt as its base or Palestine. It may be closely approached on several sides, particularly on the north, where Safsafeh plunges down with a wall-like front upon the Wadi Raha. No one, we are satisfied, can stand at the bottom of Safsafeh, and lay his hand, as we have done, upon the flat of that stupendous precipice, without feeling that here at least there is reason why bounds should be drawn, if the mountain must not be touched and that so far Gebel Musa meets the requirements of the Scripture narrative as no other mountain height of the Peninsula could do. Then, as to the capabilities of the adjoining Wadi to hold the people, so that they might be at some distance from the mount and yet witness the displays of the Divine majesty upon it, though it is true that the very peak of Gebel Musa is not visible from the nearer end either of Raha or Sebaiyeh, the general summit of the mountain is distinctly seen from far and near; further, it is now determined beyond all doubt, that some little space down Sebaiyeh the peak of Musa likewise comes distinctly into view, and is not afterwards lost sight of through a great stretch of Wadi; and, with these conditions of sight provided for, it will surely not be disputed whether Raha, with its long-acknowledged amplitude of dimensions, and Sebaiyeh, with its recently-discovered but unquestionably large reach of available area —to say nothing of subordinate Wadi—were together capable of containing the entire number of the Israelitish congregation. For our own part, we should not fear the most rigorous application of Dr. Colenso's arithmetic and land-surveying in relation to this question; nor should we object that the "mixed multitude" even should be taken in at a reasonable computation, and made an integral part of the host for which room must be found within sight of the mountain.

There is one outstanding difficulty in the way of the claims of Gebel Musa, as against Serbal, which we candidly confess ourselves unable fully to dispose of. It lies in the fact that the early Christian centuries appear to have generally identified Sinai with Serbal. Some of the evidence adduced by Mr. Foster on this point is valueless. The testimonies of Dionysius of Alexandria, and of Eusebius, for example, prove nothing. But it cannot be denied, that the Sinai of the fourth and one or two following

centuries, was the mountain close to Pharan—which must of necessity be Serbal; while, on the other hand, obscurity rests upon the claims of Gebel Musa, so far as they depend upon the most ancient ecclesiastical sanction. At the same time we do not see how it is possible to plead with any reason for Serbal so long as the two great Scripture arguments against it, brought forward above, remain unanswered. In what has now been said, we have limited ourselves to a material point or two of this very curious controversy. It does not comport with our present design to enter into an elaborate discussion of the whole question. At present, however, we give our verdict in favor of Gebel Musa, and say that this is Sinai.

XII.—THE AGRICULTURAL METAPHORS OF ST. PAUL.*

BY REV. J. S. HOWSON.

Rapid transitions from one metaphor to another are characteristic of St. Paul; and this remark may be used for connecting the present paper with the two which have preceded it.

One transition of this kind is to be found in the eighth verse of the tenth chapter of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. St. Paul has been using language drawn from the incidents of a campaign to describe the course which he himself might be compelled to adopt, if those to whom he writes, or others, were to persist in their disobedience. In such a case he might be compelled to put all his spiritual power into action, and to "pull down" their "strong-holds" of arrogance and pride, just as the rock-forts of his native Cilicia were destroyed in the Roman wars with the pirates. Such a course of procedure would be a cause of deep regret to him: for, as he says in the verse before us, the "authority" which "the Lord had given," was intended for purposes of "edification" or building up, not for purposes of "destruction" or pulling down. This is the last echo of the military image,—or rather not the very last echo,—for the identical phrase is found again at the very close of the epistle,† but it *is* an echo of the military image, though in the English version it is muffled, as it were, so as to be almost inaudible: and the fact to which attention is invited is the close juxtaposition in one sentence of the military and the architectural metaphor.

Another instance of rapid transition may introduce us directly to the subject of the present paper. The *agricultural* metaphors of St. Paul are not by any means the most prominent, but they constitute a sufficient topic for one occasion. "Ye are God's husbandry, ye are God's building," he says to the Corinthians, in the ninth verse of the third chapter of his First Epistle.

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* From the *Sunday Magazine*, April, 1867. [H. B. H.]

† See 2 Cor. xiii. 10.

The agricultural and the architectural image are here side by side, as, in the last case, the architectural and the military. We have already given our attention to the architectural allegory which follows this point of transition. Our subject now is the agricultural allegory which precedes it. "I have planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the increase. So then neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth: but God that giveth the increase. Now he that planteth and he that watereth are one: and every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor. For we are laborers together with God: ye are God's husbandry."*

Paley points out very acutely the delicate yet perfectly unconscious harmony of this passage with what we read in the Acts, and uses it as an argument for the authenticity of both the Epistle and the History. Not only must Paul have been at Corinth before Apollos, but Apollos must have been there in the interval between the Apostle's visit and the writing of this letter. This is not our subject now, except so far as this, that it leads us to notice more closely the Providential sequence of one teacher after another in God's gracious work of preparing and maturing his Church.

This image of a large cultivated garden, in which many are employed, is indeed a most apt, a most copious illustration of nearly all the main characteristics of the Christian Ministry. There is first the succession of which I have spoken,—the tasks assigned now to one and now to another, according to the law of the seasons and the will of the great Master of the garden—one beginning when another has left off—one completing what another has prepared. At the same time there is justice to each: "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor." And yet all the work is one. Though many hands are employed, according to their aptitude, and the time when they are required, the progress is one through the advancing year to one result: "He that planteth and he that watereth are one." All, too, is entirely dependent on an unseen power: "Neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth: but God that giveth the increase." Then there is all that lesson of cheerfulness, hopefulness, and patience; that habit of not looking for immedi-

* 1 Cor. iii, 6–9.

ate results; but at the same time that confident expectation that in spite of adverse weather the flower and fruit will come at last, which is necessarily associated with the very thought of a garden, and which should be diligently fostered by every Christian Minister in his own heart and mind. And lastly, there is the duty of giving diligent heed to the young plants. How much may be expected, if they are vigilantly and carefully tended at first one by one! "Let us get up early to the vineyards; let us see if the vine flourish, whether the tender grape appear, and the pomegranates bud forth."*

It has been said before, that the references to nature in St. Paul's writings are almost entirely to nature in connection with human labor; not to its beauty and to the impressions which the mind passively receives from it, but to its useful and beneficent processes under the work of cultivation. There is hardly any mere natural imagery in his Epistles. We find more of this kind of imagery in the one short epistle of St. James, than in all the writings of St. Paul. What we read in the fifteenth chapter of the first letter to the Corinthians:—"There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star differeth from another star in glory,"† is no real exception to this. This is not an outburst of adoring admiration, like those of the Psalmist, when he considered "the heavens, the work of God's fingers, the moon and the stars, which He hath ordained."‡ It is really the continuance of the preceding argument, and a new illustration arising out of that which he had used before. He had been speaking of the difference between "bodies terrestrial," or the organization of beings like ourselves adapted to an existence on earth; and "bodies celestial," or the organization of beings, like the angels, adapted to a heavenly residence. And nothing is more natural (if I may so speak) than that this contrast should suggest another connected with the heavens themselves. The sun, the moon, and the stars, though they all give light, are very different among themselves, and each is suited to its own place and its own function. So above he had said that among the organizations of animal life on the earth there are great varieties, each according to its office in the economy of God's world. "All flesh is not the same flesh; but there is

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* Cant. vii, 12. † 1 Cor. xv, 41. ‡ Ps. viii, 3.

one kind of flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds." Now, going backwards again along the line of the Apostle's illustrations, we have the passage which I am aiming at: "But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die; and that which thou sowest thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain: but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body."* Here we have that reference to nature in its connection with human labor and its productive operations rather than its mere phenomena, to which allusion was made just now. As, in speaking to the uneducated Lystrians, St. Paul had urged "the rains from heaven and the fruitful seasons" as an argument for gratitude and a lesson against idolatry, so here he presses on the speculative Corinthians the facts with which they were familiar in the sowing and reaping of every year, as one reason for casting aside all theoretical objections to a resurrection of the body. The grain and the corn plant, the seed and the harvest, are the same, and yet not the same. They are so connected as to be identical, and yet a wonderful change of form and organization has taken place under the operation of mysterious laws. Why should it be otherwise with our frames? He returns to this illustration again, after deviating just rapidly to touch the other illustrations: "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body."† We have here then what I think may truly be termed an agricultural allegory. The appeal is to the universal experience of man in the work of husbandry. And if there is just one Jewish touch where the subject is first approached in this chapter, "Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming," this is quite what we should expect.‡

This image of the harvest, in various applications, as we know, pervades the whole of Scripture, from its very earliest portions, from the dreams of Joseph or of Pharaoh, and the gleaning of

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* 1 Cor. xv, 35–38. † 1 Cor. xv, 42–44. ‡ 1 Cor. xv, 20–23.

Ruth and her mother. But St. Paul uses it so pointedly, and so much in a way of his own, that I think it may be included as an element in his characteristic style. The progressive change of organization along with absolute identity of being, has just been adduced in connection with the Resurrection. How solemnly is this train of thought applied (in the sixth chapter of Galatians) to the ultimate results to ourselves in eternity of the life which we had in the moments of our time! "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting."* Here is the principle of inevitable retribution, the growing and growing according to irresistible laws; the moral organism passing into new forms without losing its identity, just as the rich waving harvest is developed from the poor shriveled grain. And clearly here the human side of the subject, the actual agricultural process, is a very prominent part of the image and the lesson, whether it be viewed in the aspect of warning or of encouragement. And the same train of thoughts meets us in a nearly contemporary Epistle, in reference to another subject—namely, the blessing, "twice blest," of generous giving. "He which soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly: and he which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully; God loveth a cheerful giver." It is written of such a man that he "disperses abroad—he gives to the poor"—and yet he is no loser—his "righteousness"—or rather it ought to be his liberality and beneficence, his power of doing good—"endureth" still.† A man is no loser by sowing his grain, in faith, with an open hand; he secures the harvest, and he secures a larger supply of grain than ever, for sowing in future over wider fields. In the beautiful verses which conclude the passage, I will not stay to inquire whether the true reading gives the Apostle's words in the form of a promise or a prayer; for indeed promises and prayers in the apostolic writings run into one another, so that we can hardly distinguish them, even as the readings of the manuscripts do in such passages. "Now He that ministereth seed to the sower" in the world of nature and in the work of agriculture—"may He multiply (or he shall multiply) your seed sown, and increase the fruits of your righteousness,"—

* Gal. vi, 7,8. † 2 Cor. ix, 6–9.

or rather, as before, "your liberality and beneficence,"—"being enriched in everything unto all bountifulness, which causeth through us thanksgiving to God."* No imagery could set before us more vividly the rich and increasing reward which waits upon faithful and generous service on our side, or the overflowing blessing on God's side, which gives life and abundance and growth to all honest spiritual husbandry.

This passage leads me to notice a word which is certainly very characteristic of St. Paul. The word "*riches*" has often been noticed as marking his style: and the same is true of the word "*fruit*," and it is not merely a verbal but also a moral characteristic. It seems to me to express that kind of exuberance, so to speak, which will never allow him to hope and believe by halves. The former word is a metaphor from the market, the latter from the cornfield or the orchard. He desires to visit the Romans that he may have "some *fruit* among them also, as among other Gentiles."† Writing to the Philippians of the precariousness of his life, he says (so I understand him) that he valued this continuance "in the flesh," as the condition of bringing forth "*fruit*" in his work.‡ Writing to the Colossians, his expression concerning the Gospel is that in all the world it is ever "growing," and ever "bringing forth *fruit*."§ And this I notice (unless I am mistaken) as a mark of St. Paul's way of using this word, that he always applies it to what is *good*. And that this should be so seems to us very appropriate and very beautiful. The blessedness of the righteous man is that, planted as he is "by the waterside," he "bringeth forth his fruit in due season," whereas the ungodly is "like the chaff which the wind driveth away."‖ The passage which most naturally occurs to us here is that in the Galatians where the *fruit* of the Spirit is contrasted in detail with the *works* of the flesh.¶ It is a contrast very similar to that which we find elsewhere between the *wages* of sin and the *gift* of God.** Nor is that passage in the Galatians a solitary instance. We find the same in the Ephesians—"Walk as children of the light; for the *fruit* of light is in all goodness and righteousness and truth,"††—the force of which is very much enhanced by our noticing what follows: "Have no fellowship with the *unfruitful*

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* 2 Cor. ix: 10, 11. † Rom. i: 13. ‡ Phil. i: 22. § Col. i: 6. ‖ Ps. i: 3, 4.
¶ Gal. v: 19–23. ** See Rom. vi: 23. †† Eph. v: 8–10.

works of darkness." And similar language is found in the Epistle to the Romans—"What *fruit* had ye then in those things whereof ye are now ashamed?" but "now, being emancipated" from that dreadful master, sin, and "become servants to God, ye have your *fruit* unto holiness, and the end everlasting life."* Sometimes the phrase is applied generally, as (not to repeat again that passage concerning "the *fruits* of righteousness" addressed to the Corinthians †) when he desires that the Philippians may be "filled" with these "*fruits* of righteousness" which are by Jesus Christ to the glory and praise of God," ‡ or that the Colossians may be "*fruitful* in every good work, and increase in the knowledge of God." § Sometimes the reference is specific, as when he says that he is going to Jerusalem to deliver and lay up safely in store, and to seal, "the *fruit*" of the liberality of the Christians in Macedonia and Achia, ‖ or when he says afterwards of similar generosity which came to himself from Macedonia, not because I desire a gift; but I desire *fruit* that may abound to your account," ¶ or when he urges in one of the Pastoral Epistles that those who profess Christs religion must learn to maintain good works, and contribute to those wants of others which must of necessity be brought before us, in order that with all this profession they "be not *unfruitful*." ** But in all these cases whether they are general or specific, the reference is to what is good. One apparent exception may very naturally here come into the mind, namely, that in which two consecutive verses end, the former with the phrase "bring forth *fruit* unto God," the latter with the phrase "bring forth *fruit* unto death." †† But that passage occurs in the seventh of Romans, and even if the image were the same, I think it would be natural to call the passage an oxymoron, and so it would really be an instance of the rule, and not an exception. I conceive, however, that the image is different, and that the reference is to fruit as the offspring of marriage. I believe it will be found true that when St. Paul applies to moral subjects the word "fruit," as derived from the cornfield or the orchard, he applies it to what is good. I say nothing of the other parts of Scripture. But it is as if he thought the term too honorable—expressing as it does the result of man's honest, useful labor, in subordination to and in dependence on the beneficent

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* Rom. vi: 21, 22. † 2 Cor. ix: 10. ‡ Phil. i: 11. § Col. i: 10.
‖ Rom. xv: 22 ¶ Phil. iv: 17. ** Tit. iii: 14. †† Rom. vii: 5, 6.

and life-giving influences of heaven—too honorable and too cheerful to be applied to what is bad. "The root of the righteous yieldeth fruit."* "He shall be as a tree planted by the waters, neither shall cease from yielding fruit."†

One particular passage—a remarkable and difficult passage—in that Epistle to the Romans, now claims a moment of close attention.‡ I allude, of course, to the allegory drawn in the eleventh chapter from the grafting of the olive tree. The image first appears in the sixteenth verse, and (as we have seen in other instances) in close combination with another image:—"If the first fruit be holy, the leaf is also holy; and if the root be holy, so are the branches:" and then it is rapidly developed with varied and pointed application, up to the end of the twenty-fourth verse. With all the great doctrinal and historical questions arising from this passage we have on the present occasion nothing to do; our concern is with the outward imagery, and in it there is this very strange circumstance, that the lesson is drawn from the grafting of branches of a wild olive-tree on the stock of a good olive-tree—the grafting of branches of a wild fruit-tree on the stock of a good fruit-tree; a process unheard of among gardeners. Commentators have tortured themselves with this difficulty, and some of them have adduced instances of this process with certain supposed good results as regards the productiveness of the olive. I confess I am very sceptical on this point, and the explanation which I suggest is very simple, though I am not aware of having seen it suggested elsewhere. I believe that here partly is the very point of the parable, that the grafting *was* contrary to the law of nature. So strange a grafting as that which had taken place in the case of the Gentiles made the lesson far more emphatic to them. It was the very *contrary* to the grafting which took place in the olive grounds to which all readers of the Epistle were accustomed. This work of artificial cultivation is indeed the basis of the parable, but it is the basis by way of contrast rather than of comparison. So our Lord, in St. Luke's Gospel, compares God to a *selfish* man and an *unjust* judge, and makes the argument for the answering of prayer all the stronger.§ Or let us take another illustration. St. James says to the rich tyrants of his day, "Your gold and silver is rusted, and the rust

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* Prov. xii: 12. † Jer. xvii: 8. ‡ Rom. xi: 16–24. § Luke xi: 8; xviii: 6.

of them shall be a witness against you."* Now gold does not rust. St. James knew this very well. But here, I apprehend, is one part of the point of the image. Their very gold should become mysteriously their curse. So in the case before us. St. Paul knew very well the processes which took place in the olive grounds, which were abundant then, as they are now, in all parts of the Levant. He must have seen them often when he was a boy at Tarsus. Boys notice all such things; and the experience of early life becomes, even in an Apostle, the basis of religious teaching. To find fault with him for inexactness seems to me very like finding fault with him (as some critics do in these days) for inaccurate applications of the Old Testament. He knew the Old Testament, and so did his Jewish readers, far better than we do. But we must not leave our proper subject.

And one other side of the subject must be touched before it has been handled completely. Agriculture has to do with the Animal as well as the Vegetable world; and something within this province, too, in the writings of St. Paul, will reward our careful attention.

I have sometimes been impressed with the fact, while thinking of this subject, that the critical words addressed to the Apostle from heaven at the threshold of his Christian career, were in truth *an agricultural metaphor*—"Saul! Saul! it is hard for thee." Who knows—I write it with reverence—whether at that moment the operations of ploughing might not be going on within sight of the road along which the persecutor was travelling? At all events the image is certainly drawn from those operations, as certainly as the images in the Sermon on the Mount were drawn rom the lilies which grew in the field, or the birds which flew over it. All who have journeyed in the East, or even in the South of Europe, are familiar with that ox-goad, the resistance to which only increases the suffering of the restive animal, and in allusion to which the force of conscience, sharpened by God's Spirit, is depicted in the words, "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks."† And it seems to me interesting to notice, on the one hand, that our Blessed Lord's words spoken on this occasion from heaven were a parable, like the parables which He graciously uttered on earth, and on the other hand, that they are

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* James v: 3. † Acts xxvi: 14.

in harmony with, and might almost be fancied to have given a holy suggestion of, one class of the Apostle's own habitual imagery.

I may remark that what was said in the earlier part of the paper, in reference to orchards, vineyards, and cornfields, has its counterpart here in reference to flocks and oxen. St. Paul's illustrative language deals with human labor and its useful results, rather than with nature viewed poetically on the side of beauty and mere expressiveness. So here the animals under the care of man are presented to us more on the industrial side than the contemplative. It is the farmer near the large town, rather than the shepherd in the wilderness, who comes before us in the pages of this Apostle. It is remarkable that nowhere, in all his unquestioned Epistles,* is Jesus Christ set forth as the Good Shepherd. I do not forget those touching words in the address at Miletus, "Take heed to the flock; feed the church which God hath purchased with his own blood, for grievous wolves shall enter in, not sparing the flock."† And perhaps it would be strange if no one instance were found in St. Paul of the employment of an image which is almost universal throughout the rest of Scripture. But still it is not characteristic of his style. It is very different with regard to St. Peter, in whose first Epistle these words, "Feed the flock; be examples to the flock,"‡ are a true echo of the words at the end of the Gospels, "Feed my sheep, feed my lambs."§

With St. Paul's habit of illustration, the concourse of men where business goes on, and buying and selling, is more in harmony than the solitary mountain-side, where the sheep are following their shepherd and busily cropping the thin herbage on the rocky slopes. We see this in that passage of his epistles when he does mention the *flock*. "Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof? or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?"‖ the real meaning of which is this, "Who keeps a vineyard or a flock of sheep without living by the profits of the grapes and the milk, when they are brought into the market?" Here, as in so many cases, three metaphors—one military and two agricultural—are rapidly thrown together. The point on which they are brought to bear is the claim which Christian Min-

* See Heb. xiii: 20. † Acts xx: 28. ‡ 1 Pet. v: 2, 3.
§ John xxi: 15, 16. 17. ‖ 1 Cor. ix: 7.

isters have on the support of the people, whether or not they may find it necessary or politic to urge that claim. With this it seems natural to combine another passage in another Epistle (remarkable also for the heaping up of metaphors), though there the duty of the *minister* to *labor* among his people is urged, his support being assumed, while here it is *their* duty to *support* him which is pressed, his labor being assumed. "No man that enters on a soldier's career mixes himself up with the common business of life; no man, striving in the games, will obtain the prize unless he has kept the rules; the husbandman that laboreth must be first partaker of the fruits;"* *i. e.*, it is the farmer that works who has *the first claim* to the profits of the produce of the farm. The idle Farmer, the idle Clergyman, deserves to starve. Perhaps the word "fruits" might more naturally seem to connect this sentence with the earlier part of this paper: but it is better to have taken it in its present connection, because of the common bearing of both these passages on one subject—the Christian Ministry—which also is the subject of the one remaining passage with which I am now about to conclude.

"Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn." When a passage from the Old Testament is more than once quoted in the New Testament, it always seems to have a peculiar claim on our reverent attention. And St. Paul quotes this passage from Deuteronomy twice, in two Epistles written at very different periods, and each time brings it to bear on the same topic. "It is written in the law of Moses, Thou shalt not muzzle the mouth of the ox that treadeth out the corn. Doth God take care for oxen? or saith He it altogether for our sakes? For our sakes no doubt, this is written: that he that plougheth should plough in the hope of a harvest, and he that thresheth should do this in the hope of partaking of the harvest" † (for so I conceive the true meaning of the latter words would be given). The eye ranges here over the whole agricultural process, from the ploughing and sowing to the reaping and threshing, and all this ought to be conducted in hope; otherwise all the cheerfulness, all the elasticity of the work is gone. The Christian people ought to be very careful that their Clergy are not weighed down by the perpetual harassing care of the maintenance of their families and

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* 2 Tim. ii: 4–6. † 1 Cor. ix: 9, 10.

the education of their children. When they see all the harvest of wealth around them, they ought, if they labor patiently, at least to have some little share of it. There may possibly, as Chrysostom says, be a hint to them—to this effect, that they do labor diligently, that they be not impatient under the irksome monotony of routine, and that they be content with, it may be, a very scanty portion of all this profusion of wealth. But the main lesson is to the Christian people, that they support the hearts and strength of their Clergy by endowments, and gifts, and liberal payments, and still more by sympathy, and respect, and large coöperation. The lesson is riveted for ever on the Church, in strong words, by the other passage, "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine, for the Scripture saith, Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn."* How beautifully is this large lesson of charity and justice developed out of what might seem a very trivial and unimportant precept! "Doth God take care for oxen?" Certainly He does, but He takes care for man much more. When He tells us that it is a duty to be considerate of the former, He reminds us that it is a still more urgent duty to feel sympathy for the latter. It is our Lord's argument, "Not a sparrow falls to the ground without your Father: ye are of more value than many sparrows;"† and again, "Which of you shall have a sheep fallen into a pit on the Sabbath and will not lift it out? How much is a man better than a sheep?"‡ By thus inculcating the duty of considerately caring for dumb animals, the Jewish Law really enforces the general principle, the wider duty, which embraces all things, both great and small. Our poet's words come here irresistibly into the mind,

> "The dear God who loveth us
> He made and loveth all."

And indeed this considerate care in the minor instance is itself a training for humanity and kindness in reference to the greater. Such a suggestion as that of this little precept in the Pentateuch, furnished to a thoughtful, devout, and feeling mind, spreads out into a thousand instances, and finds its opportunities in all the relations of life, and especially those relations where service on our behalf has established a claim to our gratitude.

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* 1 Tim. v: 17, 18 † Matt. x: 29, 31. ‡ Matt. xii: 11, 12.

XIII.—THE CHERUBIM AND THEIR SYMBOLICAL MEANING.*

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The time of mere dogmatism in the exposition of the Scriptures has passed, but many will not observe it, and in the period of the manhood of interpretation are perfectly content to wear the garments of their childhood. Therefore it is important in regard to the cherubim to *prove* that they are the ideal combination of all living creatures; and this proof we will now undertake.

In respect to the derivation of the word "cherubim," numerous conjectures have been proposed, but with no result, thus far, except a state of hopeless discouragement. The cause of this failure lies in the incorrect determination of the nature of the cherubim. As soon as we perceive in the cherub the ideal unity of life, the meaning of the name follows completely from the name itself. It signifies "as a multitude," the combination of all the multitude upon earth in a unity. We have the explanation in Ezek. i: 24; "And I heard the noise of their wings, as the noise of many waters, as the voice of the Almighty in their going, the sound of the noise *like the voice of a host.*" Here the "like many" is unfolded to us.†

* Translated from Hengstenberg's *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung*, June, 1866, by S. O. Allen, B. A., Yale Theological Seminary.

† *Cabul*, "as nothing," the name of the province which Solomon gave to Hiram, 1 Kings, ix: 13, is analogous. (Ewald and Thenius). The כ enters into the formation of the proper name, and thus the name can stand in the plural and with the article. From the origin of the name, however, is to be explained the tendency to use the singular along with the plural, as in Ps. xviii: Ezek. ix: 3. That the כ does not belong to the root, is, as Abenezra in Ezek. xxv: 18, says, the old Jewish tradition; and since the time of Abenezra, who opposed this view, it has remained the usual Jewish assumption. Buxtorf says, Exercitationes, p. 100, "Hanc traditionem fere omnes neoterici Judaei amplectuntur." In the interpretation of the second part of the name, these Jewish expositors departed from the right view which did not agree with their assumed interpretation that the cherubim are angels. They interpret "as *youth*." We can, however, show that in still earlier times, this second part also was rightly apprehended, at least philologically. Theodoret repeats several times the remark that the word, translated into Greek, means the *multitude* of knowledge, on Ezek. i: 22, x: 1, and at the end of chapter x, πληθος and πληρης occur constantly in this author. We might extend this explanation still further. According to Philo, in his life of Moses B. 3, p. 668, the name of the cherubim signifies *much* knowledge and wisdom. The word itself gives the *much*, but the idea of *knowledge* originated in his own inventive brain.

The term "the living creatures" supplies the place of a second proper name of the cherubim. The idea of the living creature is firmly established as early as in the first chapter of Genesis. There the living creature is only upon the earth, including the water and the air. According to Gen. ii: 7, the living being has a two-fold origin, from the earthy material and the quickening breath of God. According to Gen. ix: 16, ("every living creature of all flesh that is upon the earth,") the idea of the living creature is united with that of the (animated) flesh which belongs only to the earth. That the cherubim are called "living creatures," could in itself be only a mark of the genus to which they belong,—only indicate that they are like many other living beings. This single principle that the cherubim are to be looked for among living beings, would at once put to rest a number of erroneous theories. The *angels*, particularly, which have been supposed to be the cherubim, according to a view widely extended among both Jews and Christians, and which was first thoroughly refuted by Vitringa, do not belong to these "living creatures." The remark of Theodoret, "Living creatures are angels as well as men, the latter mortal, the former immortal," and likewise that of Keil, "The cherubim, as living creatures, occupy the highest place in the kingdom of *spirits*," are at variance with the *usus loquendi* according to which the "living creature" as opposed to dead matter, always designates the animate earthly creation. But we may go further. That the designation of the cherubim as living beings directly supplies the place of the proper name, (for the word "cherubim" does not once occur in the Apocalypse; they are only designated as living creatures), shows that by this term their nature must be completely expressed, that the genus does not exist with them, but is completely represented by them. All doubt, however, is removed by the fact that with the designation of the cherubim as living creatures there is interchanged the singular, "the living creature." (Ezek. i: 20, 21, "The spirit of the living creature was in the wheels," x: 15, 20: "And the cherubim were lifted up. This is the *living creature* that I saw by the river of Chebar.") This mark of unity shows that the cherubim represent the whole race of living creatures upon the earth, both men and beasts.

Furthermore, there is imprinted upon the cherubim in the clearest manner, the symbol of the *number four*. Four beasts

appear in Ezekiel and in the Apocalypse. In the former the number four is given still wider scope; the four beasts have each four faces and four wings. Now this number four points to the earth. It is exhibited everywhere in the Old Testament as the symbol of the earth. We have four classes of living creatures upon the earth besides man in Gen. vii: 21, 23: "All flesh that moved upon the earth, both of *fowl* and of *cattle* and of *beast* and of every *creeping thing* that creepeth upon the earth." In Ps. 148, the creatures which are to praise God upon the land are four times four. Compare especially verse 10: "Beasts and all cattle, creeping things and flying fowl." Thus the number four compels us to confine our attention to the earth, and does not allow us once to think, for example, of the angels, who belong to heaven. We are led still further on, however, when we take a nearer view of the four beasts of which the cherub is composed. Only on the theory that the cherub is the composition of all living creatures upon earth, can this combination be reduced to a rational basis. The four beasts are exhibited as the representatives of the principal classes of living creatures. An old Jewish saying runs thus: "There are four, the highest in creation: the lion among the wild beasts, the ox among the tame, the eagle among birds; man is over all, but God is the Most High." Here we have a brief and excellent explanation of "who sitteth above the cherubim." That the ox really appears as the representative of the *cattle*, is proved by the fact that in order to prevent other interpretations, the calf is twice designedly substituted, which does not possess those characteristics of the ox which these other interpretations have in view, Ezek. i: 7; Rev. iv: 7; and that the eagle has the office of representing the race of birds, the same passage in the Apocalypse shows: "And the fourth beast was like a *flying* eagle," where the epithet of the eagle can have no other design.

Significant, also, is the position which *man* occupies in the composition of the cherubim. It is entirely that which we should expect to find, if the cherubim are the representation of all living creatures upon earth. According to the position among the living creatures which is assigned to man in the Mosaic account of the creation, there could be, in a symbolic exhibition of living creatures, no simple classification of him with the other races of living beings. In a representation of life, man

must predominate, and precisely so do we find it in the cherubim. In the cherubim of the tabernacle, and of the temple, everything is human, as it appears, with the exception only of the wings. All the rest of animal existence must be satisfied by this one symbolic representation, borrowed from that class, which, in the history of the creation, introduces the series of living creatures just as man concludes it. In Ezek. i: the human face is towards the *east.* In the Old Testament that is the foreside and the principal side. At the right and left are the lion and ox; behind, the bird, which, as observed in Genesis, occupies the last place. The creation progresses from the lower to the higher: first fish, (which are here omitted as belonging to a low grade of life), then birds, and last, man. Furthermore, according to Ezek. i: 5, the human form is predominant, and this is very expressively elevated to the highest place in the description: "And this was their appearance; they had the likeness of a man." They all have the upright position, the hands and other peculiarities of man, who, according to Gen. i: is the crown of the living creation, as the only bearer of the Divine image, the lord over all the rest of the creation.

That the cherubim exhibit the living creatures taken together, is evident also from this, that according to 1 Kings, vii: 29, in the temple, upon the bases of the wash-basins for the purification of the sacrificial offerings, "lions, oxen and cherubim" were portrayed. This fact shows on the one hand, that Solomon's cherubim did not of themselves, like those of Ezekiel, have the face of the lion and ox. It is only explained by the fact that in Solomon's cherubim, from an external view, only man and the race of birds standing at the other end of the life-gradation were represented; man by the whole figure, the bird by the wings, whose office of representing the flying creatures appears especially clear from this passage. Josephus, who adds the eagle upon his own responsibility, and Züllig, who thought the eagle was "carelessly" omitted, overlook the fact that the eagle could not appear, because birds had already been represented in the form of the cherubim itself. On the other hand, however, the addition to the cherubim of the lions and oxen, which Dr. Riehm knows not what to do with, shows that they must stand in an intimate relation to them, and such a relation only exists when the cherubim exhibit the living creatures. The lions and oxen, then, are sup-

plementary and explanatory additions, since they exhibit those classes of living creatures which had not been expressly represented in the cherubim, although comprehended by them. Züllig justly remarks that the grouping of the cherubim with the lions and oxen, presupposes the thought that the whole animal kingdom is divided into those four classes which are designated by the above mentioned noblest of every class. Not merely upon the ark of the covenant and the walls of the temple, but also upon its utensils was imprinted the signature of the Almighty Lord of Nature. Everywhere was Israel to be reminded that his God is not *a* god, but absolutely God, endowed with infinite power to bless and to punish, the only one in the whole universe who is worthy to be feared and loved, and that with all the heart, soul and strength. Hand in hand with his absolute power goes the demand of unconditional surrender to him. The God of the spirits of all flesh desires an undivided heart. Everything else depends unconditionally upon him; therefore it is unreasonable to divide the heart betwen him and it; and because unreasonable, wicked; and because wicked, an object of Divine resentment.

Only as the cherub exhibits the living creatures, is its connection with the palms and flowers explained. According to 1 Kings, vi: 29, in Solomon's temple, "All the walls round about were covered with figures of cherubim, palm trees and open flowers." It is clear that the cherubim must be placed under one point of view with the palms and flowers. If one assumes with Bähr that the palms and flowers are symbols of happiness in general, that the decking with flowers shows the condition of the richest fullness of life, prosperity and success, he violently tears away the flowers from the cherubim with which they are inseparably connected. Ezekiel says, in the description of the new temple, in chapter xli: 18, 19, 25: "And there were made cherubim and palm trees, and a palm tree between a cherub and a cherub; and a cherub had two faces, and the face of a man towards the palm tree on the one side, and the face of a lion toward the palm tree on the other side; they were made through all the house round about, and there were made on the doors of the temple cherubim and palm trees like as were made upon the walls." The inseparable connection between the cherubim and the palms appears here still stronger than in the temple of Solo-

mon, namely in this, that the faces of the cherubim looked towards the palms. I cannot regard Dr. Kliefoth's opinion as correct, when he says: "The palms remind us of the feast of tabernacles; the figures of the cherubim are symbols of the presence of God, who here has his abode." Here cherubim and palms fall entirely asunder. There is only one way to explain the connection of the cherubim with palms and flowers. The cherubim are proximately an exhibition of the animate creation; at the same time, however, since the living creatures form the crown of the whole earthly creation, they are used to represent the whole. This addition of palms and flowers serves to show this more comprehensive meaning, namely, that the living creatures are not opposed to the rest of nature, but rather that they represent it. Next to the living creatures the vegetable kingdom is the most glorious revelation of God's creative power. In modern science it is connected with animate existence in the idea of the organic creation. The vegetable kingdom, however, could not be represented better than by the palms and flowers. According to Celsius, the palm is called by the Arabs, "The blessed tree." Libanius says of it, "The palm rises aloft and withdraws itself the greatest distance from the earth. It hastens, as it were, to heaven, and does not endure to remain on the earth, although having sprung from it." Celsius expands the proposition that the palm and man are in many respects alike. Linnæus called the palms "the princes of the vegetable kingdom." Humboldt, "the noblest form of vegetation, to which the nations constantly awarded the prize of beauty." As animal life attains its highest point in man, the lion, ox and eagle, so the vegetative in the palms and flowers. Plants and trees are the two parts of the vegetable kingdom in the history of creation; the three-fold division, which several expositors have assumed, rests upon an erroneous explanation. The plant attains its highest point in the flower; the king of trees is the palm. We have a commentary upon the connection of the palms with the cherubim in Ps. cxlviii. In this psalm, whose object is to rejoice the heart of God's children by pointing to his almighty dominion over nature, the Lord is praised, verse 9, by "mountains, and all hills; fruit trees, and all cedars;" verse 10, "beasts, and all cattle; creeping things and flying fowls;" in verse 11 *et sq.*, men, with the kings at the head and from these down to the humblest. As

what is adduced in verse 10 *et sq.*, as a telling proof of God's omnipotence, corresponds to the cherubim, so the fruit-trees and cedars to the palms and flowers. The cedars and the palms strive for the rank of being "the trees of God." Ps. civ: 16, lxxx: 10.

That the cherubim represent the living creatures upon earth and the earthly creation generally, appears also from the relation in which they stand, in Ezekiel, to the firmament. It is stated in Ezekiel i: 22, "And the likeness of the firmament upon the heads of the living creature was as the color of the terrible" (*i. e.*, awe-inspiring, imposing, glorious) "crystal, stretched forth over their heads above." This firmament is the place of God's throne. In verse 26, it is said: "And above the firmament that was over their heads was the likeness of a throne, as the appearance of a sapphire stone; and upon the likeness of the throne was the likeness as the appearance of a man above upon it." It can be subject to no doubt that the firmament is an image of heaven; for in the exhibition of the universe, as it is given in this majestic vision, heaven cannot be omitted, especially since it appears in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as absolutely the most important part of the creation, the earth occupying a low place in relation to it. Furthermore, after the early statement of Gen. i: the firmament is everywhere the firmament of heaven. Moreover, heaven appears invariably in a great number of passages as the *place of God's throne;* for example, in Is. lxvi: 1, "The heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool." "Stretched out" usually designates the relation in which the heavens stand to the earth, as Isaiah, in chap. xl: 22, says: "It is he that sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers; that *stretcheth out* the heavens as a curtain, and spreadeth them out as a tent to dwell in." To the comparison with the terrible crystal, corresponds what Daniel says in chap. xii: 3, of the sublime luster of the firmament of heaven. If upon these grounds it is firmly established that by the firmament heaven is designated, the cherubim under the firmament can only represent the earthly creation; for in the Old Testament heaven and earth are generally brought together as the spheres of God's glory. Upon what is exhibited to the prophet in a figure, the Lord uppermost, under him the firmament, under the firmament the

cherubim, Isaiah gives a comment in chap. xlii: 5, "Thus saith God the Lord, he that created the heavens and stretched them out, he that spread forth the *earth* and that which cometh out of it, he that giveth breath unto the people upon it and spirit to them that walk therein." As Ezekiel contrasts him who is enthroned above the firmament and the cherubim as an image of terror to sinners in their security, who imagined they could obtain salvation without repentance, as he shows them that in the whole universe there is no hiding-place for them, so Isaiah places him who stretches out the heavens, spreadeth forth the earth and gives breath unto the people upon it, as a security for the poor worm, Jacob, that he is not to remain in death, but awake to a glorious life and obtain a world-dominion. In the whole universe is there no power to do him harm, and all powers which prevail in the universe stand absolutely at the disposal of him who will accomplish the salvation of Zion.

It is also of decided significance that He who sits upon the cherubim is many times connected with the God of *Hosts*, the God whom sun, moon and stars serve, which are exhibited in the Scriptures not merely as glittering lights, but as the "powers of heaven," which far surpass the earth in glory. The entire earthly sphere is worthy to stand by the side of the heavenly sphere of God's omnipotence only as represented by the cherubim, the combination of living creatures, in which the united earthly creation has its head. The lxxxth Psalm, which expresses Judah's grief over the carrying away of the ten tribes, and implores God to make an end to the wasting of his vine, begins with the words, "Give ear, O Shepherd of Israel, thou that leadest Joseph like a flock; thou that sittest enthroned upon the cherubim, shine forth." He addresses himself first to God's love and shepherd faithfulness, then to his omnipotence, to which the whole earthly creation with all its powers is subjected. The second strophe begins with the words, "O Lord God of *hosts*, how long wilt thou be angry against the prayer of thy people?" Here the Lord of the heavenly and the Lord of the earthly powers appear side by side. In 1 Sam. iv: 4, it is said: "So the people sent to Shiloh, that they might bring from thence the ark of the covenant of the Lord of *hosts who sitteth upon the cherubim*." The author has already in his eye the sad catastrophe which he has to relate afterward, the seizure of the ark of the covenant by the

Philistines. In the face of this he brings forth the idea that the ark of the covenant is the sanctuary of the Almighty Lord of heaven and earth, so that its loss cannot be attributed to weakness of Israel's God, but only to the sin of the people, whom God by his just judgment condemned to the loss of his sanctuary. According to 2 Sam. vi: 2, David goes with all the people to bring up the ark of God, which is called by the name of the Lord of *hosts that sitteth upon the cherubim.* The words show that the undertaking was a great one, such as opened a new epoch for the people of God. He who with it renewed his advent to them was not one among many, but the Almighty Lord of heaven and earth. The explanation of the two names "Jehovah Sabaoth," and "He that sitteth upon the cherubim," we have in Ps. 148. Here the Lord is praised, first from the heavens and the heights, by all his angels, and all his hosts, sun and moon and all his stars of light; then of the earth, by beasts and all cattle, creeping things and flying fowl, kings of the earth and all people, young men and maidens, old and young. The practical result is this: He exalteth the horn of his people, the glory of all his saints, the children of Israel, the people which draweth near to him. The church is as certainly saved as its God rules with omnipotence in heaven and upon earth. No power prevails there which had not its origin in him, which is not given and taken away by him.

We are also led to the assumed interpretation by the fact that he who sits enthroned upon the cherubim is several times connected with the name *Elohim*, which designates the God of Israel as the Godhead, absolutely, the possessor of the entire fullness of the Godhead; for example in 1 Sam. iv: 4, and in Ps. lxxx, and likewise with other designations of the true Godhead and of unconditioned omnipotence. Hezekiah, when he was pressed to the last extremity by Assyria, the concentration of worldly power at that time, prays (2 Kings, xix: 15): "O Lord God of Israel, thou who sittest upon the cherubim, thou art God alone over all the kingoms of the earth; thou hast made heaven and earth. Let all the kingdoms of the earth know that thou, Lord, art God alone." Here the sitting of God above the cherubim appears as the firmest security that the worldly power can in no respect harm God's people; it appears in the same line with being God over all the kingdoms of the earth, and with the creation of the world which is added to this thought, the same

with being God alone. No other interpretation of the cherubim can explain this fact. In no other is given, with the sitting above the cherubim, simply the idea of omnipotence and particularly dominion over the earth. In no other is the sitting above the cherubim unconditionally equivalent to being God alone and creator of heaven and earth.

David, in his picture of the almighty interposition of God against his enemies, Ps. xviii: 10, says: "He rode upon a cherub and did fly; he did fly upon the wings of the wind." Usually elsewhere, God sits upon the cherubim; here he rides upon them. This is explained on the ground that the Almighty Ruler of the earth, from whose hand no one can deliver, who is able to save, if he will, even him who is sunk in the lowest depths of misery, and can destroy, if he will, even the mightiest, is here in activity. As certainly as God sits, he also rides. The sitting denotes the constant relation; the riding, the individual activity of this relation. If God is the Lord of all earthly creatures, he must practically exercise this dominion for the salvation of his people and the destruction of his enemies. What specially interests us, however, in this passage, and furnishes an important contribution to our knowledge of the nature of the cherubim, is the connection of the cherubim with the wind. This connection is explained only when we see in the cherubim the representation of the living creatures. The wind represents the power of nature. The Lord of all living beings is at the same time he who gives direction to the clouds and winds. Whoever has him for a friend, need not despair, if the cords of hell compass him about and the snares of death overcome him. His God sends from above, takes him, and draws him from great waters.

Hand in hand with the combination of cherub and wind, in Psalms xviii, goes the fact that in Ezekiel, under and by the cherubim, four *wheels* are exhibited. By these wheels the powers of nature are designated, which serve God no less than the living beings. The point of comparison is the weight. The thought which finds its picturesque expression in the wheels, John Heermann, in the song, "O God, how dreadful is thy wrath," expresses thus:

> "Thou art the Lord, and God alone;
> The thunder, lightning, fire and wind,
> Are waiting servants of thy throne,
> Swift messengers to do thy will.

O God, where is there one like thee,
In realms of heaven and earth complete?
Who rules so vast domain as He
Whose subjects worship at his feet?"

The proof for the opinion that the wheels mean the powers of nature, is given by the connection of the cherub with the wind Ps. xviii, and the passage, Ezek. x: 13, where the prophet makes an express explanation concerning the wheels: "The wheels were called in my hearing the whirlwind." According to that, the wheels mean the whirlwind and what stands with it in a like relation, compare Is. v: 28. As there the wheels on the war chariots of the secular power, sent out by God for the punishment of his rebellious people, are compared to the whirlwind; so here, the order being reversed, the whirlwind is exhibited as representing the powers of nature which are like it in weight, under the figure of wheels. A further proof is given in Ezek. x: 6. There, the *fire* with which the wicked Jerusalem is to be burned, is taken from between the wheels, and indeed by the cherub, which hands it to the angel. Jerusalem, unlike Sodom and Gomorrah, was to be burned by men. But their activity is one of subordination to divine conditions. They take the fire from between the wheels; behind and above them stands the angel which controls the work of burning. These are very clear and firm positions, which leave no doubt in regard to the meaning of the wheels. To the wheels in Ezekiel, correspond, in Ps. clviii: 8, "Fire and hail, snow and vapor, stormy wind fulfilling his word," which there appear with the living creatures upon earth as the actual praise of God, as the security for the victory of his Church. How the powers of nature serve God with the cherubim appears in the history of Job. Of the four catastrophes, two are accomplished by human instrumentalities, so that they belong to the sphere of the cherubim, and two by the powers of nature, the fire of God and the wind. The words of the Psalmist also serve to explain the symbol of the wheels (Ps cvi: 3, 4), "He maketh the clouds his chariot; he moveth upon the wings of the wind. He maketh winds his angels, flaming fire his servant." Here the clouds appear as the chariot of God because he guides them whither he will; they are obedient to him as their master, as steeds to an earthly charioteer. The application to the relations of God's people is this: He who gives

direction to the clouds and winds, will also direct thy steps. It is said of the cherubim, in Ezek. i: 20: "Whithersoever the spirit impelled them to go, they went, and the wheels were lifted up uniformly, for the spirit of the living creature was in the wheels." The creature and the power of nature work uniformly for God's designs, to save or destroy, because both are in like manner dependent upon the spirit of God which impels them; so that nowhere has one really anything to do with man or beast, fire or storm, but everywhere with their Lord, who summons them and sets them in motion. The unity of the spirit in the beasts and in the wheels, shows that both harmoniously serve the will of God, whether for blessing or punishing, in consequence of a like dependence upon God, as the Chaldeans and the fire worked together in the destruction of Jerusalem. Only as the cherubim are the combination of all living creatures, is there an explanation of the fact that they, as well as the wheels, appear in Ezekiel and in the Apocalypse, entirely covered with *eyes*. In Ezek. i: 18, it is said the felloes of the wheels connected with the cherubim were full of eyes. This shows that the powers of nature, notwithstanding their apparent disorder, are under the guidance of divine Providence. The wind appears to go where it will; but in reality this will is not independent; a secret, hidden power guides by wise counsel all its movements. "The eyes," remarks Hitzig, "are naturally attached to the outside of the felloes, rather than to the inside; for they are to look outward into the world and upon the course, not turned inward to look upon the spokes and axle." The place where the eyes are situated indicates that the powers of nature, in their activity upon the world, are not in their relation to men subjected to a blind chance, but are guided by deliberate counsel; that there is reason in them because above them. While the passage of Ezekiel just mentioned relates only to the wheels, it is said in chapter x: 12, of the cherubim themselves: "And their whole body, and their backs, and their hands, were full of eyes round about;" and in Rev. iv: 6, "And in the midst of the throne, and round about the throne, four beasts full of eyes before and behind." The Psalmist utters the thought expressed by the symbol of the eyes upon the cherubim in the words (Ps. civ: 24): "O Lord, how *manifold* are thy works!" (Cherub means the being which exhibits this *multitude* of God's works), in "*wisdom* hast thou made

them all." This thought, therefore, is founded upon that in Prov. viii: 22–31, which relates to the creative wisdom of God. In the living creation, no chance prevails, but everywhere law, order and design. It is not a *monstrum horrendum ingens cui lumen ademptum*, as the modern materialists teach, who put themselves in the same line with the apes from which they derive the origin of the human race, but everything in it is guided by intelligence. This intelligence does not belong to creatures as such, but to God who has created, guides and rules them in wisdom. The whole living creation is permeated by spirit, and where spirit is, there is also reason, design, purpose; for the spirit is that of the personal intelligence. The entire living creation has its origin in God, and for that very reason bears the seal of intelligence in its being and its activity. The worm in the dust has the mark of the eye as well as man. That this is the meaning of the symbol of the eyes, is seen in Zech. iii: 9, where upon the one foundation-stone of the temple, which was to be rebuilt at that time, are engraved seven eyes. The thought can be no other than this, that the building of the temple is under the most particular direction of divine *Providence*. So in Zech. iv: 10, where the seven eyes of the Lord which run through the whole earth, rule over the building of the temple. These eyes run through the whole earth in order to defend the kingdom of God on all sides, and to bring aid from every quarter. According to Rev. v: 6, the Lamb has besides seven horns, seven eyes which are the seven spirits of God sent forth into all the earth. Here horns and eyes designate the completeness of divine strength and intelligence with which Christ is endowed for the destruction of his enemies and the salvation of his people. If the eyes are thus taken as an image of that intelligence which is not inherent in the cherubim, but is displayed upon them, it is also explained why in Rev. iv: 8, the eyes of the cherubim are brought into connection with their ascription of praise. Accordingly this tribute of praise forms an *explanation* of the eyes. This passage reads, "And round about and within they are full of eyes, and have no rest day and night, and they say, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God, the Almighty." The first clause, "they are full of eyes round about (in front) and within (in the back parts)," would be a needless repetition, if it did not stand in close connection with what follows; and because they are a living, practical testimony

of God's wisdom and glory, they incessantly say "holy" by their very existence.

The cherubim are full of eyes. In harmony with this, modern science, so far as it really deserves the name of science, and is not a secretion of "evil beasts, slow bellies," perceives that nature is exhibited everywhere as the work of intellect, and that the image of Providence is everywhere stamped upon it. The celebrated naturalist of St. Petersburg, Karl Von Baer, in his work, "What is the correct view of Animate Nature?" (Berlin), 1862, calls the life process, the thought of creation. He finds in the instincts of the insect world "something original, not proceeding from the bodily constitution; but standing above it." Instinct, in his view, is "an emanation from the universe, not a result of bodily relations. The intelligence which appears to lie at its foundation is *not the intelligence of the animals, but a necessity which a higher intelligence has laid upon them.*" He cites, among other examples, the life-process of the gnat, which begins its life in the water and completes it in the air. It takes its position upon a floating leaf or overhanging blade of grass, and drops its eggs into the water because the new-made germs must begin their existence in water. We cannot attribute a foreknowledge to the gnat, and yet it acts in this case just as if the future destiny of its young were well understood. It avoids the water as long as it does not need it; it seeks it when it is necessary for the future germ. The lamented Schubert pointed to many similar facts in his "Mirror of Nature," which appears not to have obtained its merited circulation. Professor Fichte, in his introduction to the German translation of Janet's treatise upon materialism, says: the spirit of materialism and the spirit of natural science are diametrically opposed to each other, standing intrinsically in an irreconcilable antagonism. What all natural science animates and continually fills with new inspiration, is the real, never deceived confidence that *there is reason in things*, that an inner harmony and an intelligent mutual adaptation embrace the whole as well as the individual of nature; in short, that that great principle is nowhere and never sacrificed, which speculation has termed "immanent teleology," an inner design and *omnipresent reason* in things. What natural science therefore really discovers, what it proves in minutest detail and brings to undeniable acknowledgment, is only the continual confirmation of that great thought. In its proper spirit it

is *an uninterrupted divine service*, a thoughtful, intelligent glorification of that inexhaustible Wisdom which reveals itself in nature. The materialistic view is by no means merely a protest against a philosophical or religious theory, but against the entire round of experience, against the nature of the universe itself. The creation would have to be a different thing, if materialism were proved true; and this we say with confidence, that in case it should ever prevail as the true and satisfying view of the world, in that time also would the last remembrance of the great results of natural science have perished, and scientific barbarism have broken in. These are golden words, and had the author uttered no others, he would not have lived in vain. He has thereby fulfilled the highest problem proposed to science, "I will ascribe righteousness to my Maker," Job xxxvi: 3. Let them by this learn shame, who, like C. Vogt, are round about full of eyes and yet cannot see, who thus deprive themselves of the high privilege of man, to know Him whose seal is stamped upon all nature. Shame to them and wo to them if they do not come to reflection!

The cherub means what is living upon earth. Only when this is perceived, is explained the connection of the cherub with the elders in the Apocalypse. The elders are there the representatives of the church. If they are purely ideal beings, there will also be an ideal element in the cherubim with which they are connected, and they will err who perceive simply real existences. In chapter xiv: 3, the church of the perfected saints upon the heavenly Zion, sing the new song "before the throne and before the four beasts and the elders." The reason why the four beasts are there connected with the elders we perceive in v. 4, where it is said of the elect in their heavenly perfection: "These were redeemed *from among men* as first fruits unto God and the Lamb." The four beasts, or rather the four "living creatures," have their highest type in man, and the transfiguration of the human race in the glory of the elect is here celebrated. In the similar scene, chapter vii: 9-17, in which the believers in Christ are brought before us in the heavenly glory which awaits them, the elders precede the four beasts, while in chapter iv, they are placed after them. Where the elders precede they appear as the first interested. On the other hand, the four beasts have a title to the first place because they represent the genus, while the elders exhibit only a species of this genus. By a change of order, two aspects

of the case are satisfied. No less transparent, according to our view, is the connection of the elders and the four beast in chapter xix: 4. There the four and twenty elders and the four beasts fall down and worship God who sits upon the throne, saying, Amen, Alleluia. The occasion, the great favor of God, which calls forth worship and praise, is the downfall of the great harlot. With the representatives of the church which suffered the bloody persecution of the Roman power, represented by the amorous woman, the representatives of the living creation upon earth also present their thanks for the redemption of the earth, which, according to verse 2, she corrupted by her fornication, by her crafty, coquettish policy. Not merely the church, but also all down-trodden humanity is interested in the downfall of world-ruling Rome.

Only on the ground that the cherubim are the combination of living creatures upon earth, is explained, in the Apocalypse, their participation in the judgments upon the earth. In the opening of the first four seals, in chap. vi: 1, *sqq.*, the prophet hears every time one of the four beasts say, as with a voice of thunder, "Come and see." The beasts announce the different scenes of the judgment, because they are the representatives of the living creatures upon the earth to which these judgments relate. In chap. vi: 6, it is further said, "And I heard a voice in the midst of the four be sts say, A measure of wheat for a penny, and three measures of barley for a penny, and hurt not the oil and the wine." The voice is uttered "in the midst of the four beasts," because this notice concerns them. The cherubim therefore represent beings which are interested in the increase of wheat and barley, oil and wine, beings which must suffer in years of famine. Here, all other interpretations of the cherubim must fail, for example that of the creative powers of God, the angels, the four evangelists, the officers in the church. In chap. xv: 7, one of the four beasts gives to the seven angels seven golden vials full of the wrath of God who liveth forever and ever. The earthly creatures of God acknowledge by this act the justice of the judgment which comes upon them. They say with bowed heads, We receive what we have deserved.

Only on the assumed interpretation, also, is explained the fact that the cherubim so invariably appear beneath the throne of God, and, indeed, under circumstances where it was their object

either to give comfort to the church in the face of the apparently omnipotent world, and to give it the pledge of certain victory over it, as in the fourth chapter of the Apocalypse, or to oppose the delusion of the degenerate sons of the church, who presumed they could escape the vengeance of their offended God, as in Ezekiel. The cherubim beneath the throne, which represent that God is the God of the spirits of all flesh, oppose in like manner the despair and the self-security of the church.

Finally, the interpretation still somewhat plausible among the various views of the cherubim, which also is wide-spread and so tenacious of existence that it constantly reappears, the angel interpretation, utterly fails on Rev. v: 11: "And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders; and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand," and on Rev. vii: 11: "And all the angels stood round about the throne, and about the elders and the four beasts, and fell before the throne on their faces, and worshipped God." The distinction of the beasts and the angels here appears clear as the sunlight. The myriads of angels, *all* angels, surround the circle, in which, with the throne and the twenty four elders, are also the four beasts. Moreover, the sphere of the cherubim is everywhere defined as very different from that of the angels. The cherubim never perform the service of messengers, of "spiriits sent forth to minister," Heb. i: 14, "that excel in strength, that do his commandments, hearkening unto the voice of his word." Ps. ciii: 20. Their business is only to be beneath God's throne, to portray his omnipotence, to bless and praise him, because their existence is really the praise of God, in harmony with Ps. ciii: 22, "Bless the Lord, all his works, in all places of his dominion;" as according to Ps. xix, the heavens declare the glory of God, of which they are a speaking proof, and then on account of his benefits which he imparts to his creatures upon earth; finally an activity in the prefiguration of the judgments which befall the earth. Only a few words are anywhere put in their mouths, a proof that speaking is not their proper employment, that it is only loaned to them for the explanation of the real speech which is given by their very existence.

Our task of establishing the correct interpretation of the symbol of the cherubim is completed. It still remains for us to examine more closely some of the principal passages in which the

cherubim are mentioned. It is our object to make the rich treasures for edification which the cherubim present, the inalienable property of our readers, and therefore we may hope that they will accompany us with participating interest in the remaining part of our discussion.

In this special part of our inquiry we give our attention in the first place to the really fundamental passage, Gen. iii: 24, "And he drove out the man, and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden the cherubim and the flame of the glittering sword, to guard the way to the tree of life."

The thought which is here presented, in the clearest manner, in harmony with the condition of the human race, which is pictured as it were before our eyes, is this, that men by the *omnipotence of an offended God*, are entirely excluded from the life which was designed to be the reward of their faithful obedience.

The wrath of God is represented by the glittering sword. We must not assign the sword to the cherubim, for it is not said *with* the flame, (although Luther translated: "The cherubim *with* a naked, cutting sword,") but "*and* the flame." The sword appears with the cherubim as an additional power. One sword also would not be adapted to the completeness of the cherubim. Moreover, elsewhere the cherubim have nothing to do with the sword. To the divine wrath which is represented by the sword, they are themselves wholly unrelated. Under other circumstances, if man had not fallen, being in friendly company they would themselves appear friendly, as the cherubim on the ark of the covenant prove. According to all parallel passages we have rather to regard as bearer of the sword, either God or his angel which is mediator of all his transactions with the human race. In the books of Moses, it is God himself who speaks, Deut. xxxii: 41: "If I whet my glittering sword, and my hand take hold on judgment, I will render vengeance to mine enemies, and I will reward them that hate me." With a drawn sword the angel of the Lord appears to Balaam, and likewise to David, when he had sinned by numbering the people. 1 Chron. xxi: 16. Also in Josh. v: 13, and in Is. xxxiv: 5, the sword belongs to God and his angel. If the sword is here to be placed in the closest relation to God, the same will hold good also in regard to the cherubim. According to the analogy of all other passages we shall have to regard God as enthroned upon them, as appearing above them ·

and the more so, because the cherubim are never used as the angels, for a mission. The apparent independence of cherubim and sword was occasioned by this fact, that in the entire apparition just those points specially attracted the attention of the primitive men, in substance God's wrath and omnipotence, which caused every attempt to obtain what he had forbidden to appear vain and foolish. "He caused the cherubim to dwell and the sword," is therefore equivalent to he who sits upon the cherubim and wields the sword drove them out. "To cause to dwell" occurs also elsewhere in the sense of establishing of permanent consequence. Josh. xviii: 1. He set them up, not without and beside himself, but appearing himself enthroned above them. In reality the setting up of the cherubim takes place now after every sin. Conscience cries out to the sinner that he, by offended Omnipotence is completely excluded from access to salvation. A whole swarm of erroneous opinions upon this passage opposes us. The cherubim are not "guardians of paradise," not "executors of justice;" they are not mediators of "the majestic presence of God *according to its wrathful side*," with which the cherubim in themselves have entirely nothing to do, which is here represented by the sword alone; much less may it be said that the garden was given to the cherubim as a *place of abode*, which would also be true of the sword. We have here no "mythical beings," no "griffins," but the exhibition of an eternally true thought in picturesque form, in the spirit of the primitive time, in which thought took on flesh and blood of its own accord. That is the truth in regard to one of the many unfortunate hypotheses concerning the second and third chapters of Genesis, which viewed the contents of these chapters as an attempt to transfer a hieroglyphic picture to words.

We now turn to the cherubim over the *ark of the covenant* in the tabernacle. The facts as laid down in Ex. xxv: 16, *sqq.* are these: In the ark of the covenant is placed the "testimony," outwardly exhibited by the two tables of the law. Over the testimony is the "atonement," outwardly exhibited by the lid of the ark. Above the atonement, in immediate connection with it, rise two cherubim, outwardly exhibited by being made of the same mass of gold as the atonement, and as it were, growing out of it. The cherubim stand on the two sides of the atonement. Their countenances are directed toward each other. They look down upon the atonement. The atonement is covered by their

outstretched *wings*. The Lord is enthroned above the cherubim, and thence makes known to Moses all his commands for the people.

The explanation of these facts is this: The foundation of God's covenant with Israel is the testimony, the revelation of the will of God to Israel. That is a great grace which the Lord gave to his people and in them to the church of all times, so that in his word they possess a light for their way; as the psalmist sings: "He sheweth his word unto Jacob, his statutes and his judgments unto Israel. He hath not dealt so with any nation, and judgments have they not known." So Moses himself says in Deut. iv: 8, "Where is there a nation so glorious, that hath statutes and judgments so righteous as all this law which I set before you this day." If they are faithful in this blessing, if they endeavor with all their heart to fulfill the commands, they have in the "atonement" the pledge of the pardon of their sins of weakness, or as Philo expresses it, of "the gracious power of God." That is the second great benefit. From the second arises a third; from the expiation appears the protection of the cherubim, whose countenances look propitiously upon the atonement and the expiated people, and their wings protectingly cover them. All things must serve in the best manner those who love God and are loved by him; the creatures are connected with their Creator, and if the people of God only have him on their side, the whole creation stands in a friendly relation to them.

We have still some points to explain more definitely. In regard to the form of the cherubim, Züllig remarks: "According to Ex. xxv: 20, the faces of the two cherubim were directed toward the lid of the ark of the covenant. Had they been the cherubim of Ezekiel, only one of their four countenances could have stood in this direction, while the three others must have looked in directions corresponding to the other three sides. Every one therefore had only one face, while those of Ezekiel had four." The cherubim of the ark of the covenant had the human form and human countenances, and the three other classes of living creatures were represented by the wings taken from birds, which in the history of creation form the beginning of the living creatures just as man forms the end of the series. These wings maintained the two-fold office of forming the throne of God above and of overshadowing the "atonement" beneath.

Why do the cherubim appear above the ark of the covenant?

In general they belong there because it was of the greatest consequence to show that Israel's God is absolutely God, which in the Pentateuch, from the first chapters onward, is made so emphatically and designedly prominent; that the temple is consecrated to the God of the spirits of all flesh, who is almighty to deliver those who keep his commands and to destroy those who violate them. For the same purpose were cherubim also to be interwoven in the interior curtains or hangings of the tabernacle, Ex. xxvi: 1. We have already shown what special significance the cherubim had in connection with the whole ark of the covenant. This meaning is in the first place one of consolation, but in the background stands one of admonition and alarm. If the church is not earnest in regard to the foundation of the whole, the testimony, the revelation of the divine will; if it treats with wantonness the great grace of knowing its Lord's will; if the commandments which ought to be obeyed, it has only upon the lips, to boast of them and to judge others by them, Rom. ii; the atonement at once loses its meaning, the protecting power of the cherubim inseparably connected with it has an end, the countenance turned complacently towards it changes to one of terror, the majesty of the offended God enthroned above the cherubim arms them for the punishment of his unfaithful people.

The further question, why do the cherubim form one part with the atonement, is answered by what has already been remarked. The fact shows that from the expiation comes the protection which the cherubim afford.

That the faces of the cherubim are turned towards each other, indicates the mutual harmony of the creatures among themselves, which rests upon their common relation to the Lord whose spirit prevails in them.

That the face of the cherubim is turned toward the "atonement" does not signify "that grace is the most adorable secret," (the passage 1 Pet. i: 12, referring to the angels which have nothing to do with the cherubim, has without reason been placed in connection with them), but the attentive countenance is a mark of the friendly disposition which the creature cherishes towards the church which is reconciled with God, Ps. xxxvi: 16, as the countenance averted or concealed is often the mark of a hostile disposition. As the cherubim, and in them the Lord enthroned above them, here look upon the atonement, so in Ps. lxxvi: 20, in

a time of severe affliction of the church, the Lord is entreated to "look upon the covenant." Thus apprehended, the countenance of the cherubim directed to the atonement is in harmony with the fact that they cover the atonement with their wings, and both facts come under one point of view.

There can be no doubt that the covering of the atonement is a symbol of the protection which the cherubim afford to the reconciled church. "Covering" appears frequently as a covering of protection, *e. g.* Ps. cxl: 7, "Thou *coverest* my head in the hour of battle," and wings are repeatedly an image of protection, *e. g.* Ps. xxxvi: 7, "How excellent is thy goodness, and the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings;" Ps. lxi: 4, "I will abide in the tabernacle forever; I will trust in the covert of thy wings." But it is entirely decisive that in Ezek. xxviii: 14, according to the context the covering cherub must necessarily be one of protection. This throws more light on the covering of the cherubim in the sanctuary, as the prophet borrowed the figure from them and expressly alludes to them. The thought which lies at the foundation of the symbolic exhibition, that the creature is in harmony with its Creator, that the church reconciled with its God rejoices in the protection of the creature, we frequently find expressed in the Old Testament. Thus it is said in Lev. xxvii: 3, *sq.* "If ye walk in my commandments" (the right conduct towards the *testimony* as the condition of participation in the *atonement*)—"I will rid *wild beasts* out of the land, and the sword" (man, the highest type of the living creatures) "shall not go through your land." On the contrary, in verses 22, 25, it is said of those who despise the testimony and thereby *deprive* themselves of participation in the atonement, "And I will send *against* you the living creature of the field, and it shall rob you and destroy your cattle and make you few in number and your name shall be desolate. And I will bring upon you an avenging sword *for the avenging of the covenant*," (the *atonement* which can never be idle now acquires a destructive meaning)—"and I will give you into the hand of the enemy." In Hos. ii: 18, it is said of the people excited to repentance, "And in that day will I make a covenant for them with the beasts of the field and with the fowls of heaven and with the creeping thing of the ground; and I will break the bow and the sword and the battle out of their land. Here we have of the "living creatures"

which the Lord makes friendly to his recovered people, a number four; from the irrational creature the prophet ascends to man. Also in Ezek. xxxiv: 25 *sq.*, peace with God is followed by peace with the creatures: "And I will make with them a covenant of peace, and I will cause the evil beasts to cease out of the land; and they shall dwell safely in the wilderness and sleep in the woods.—And they shall no more be a prey to the heathen, and the beasts of the earth shall not devour them, and none shall make afraid." The "beasts of the earth" often appear also in human form. By the lion, one of the countenances of the cherubim in Ezekiel, the Pagan wickedness and tyranny is several times designated, e. g. in Is. xxxv: 9. In Nebuchadnezzer are exhibited at the same time, man, lion and eagle. The four kingdoms in Daniel do not appear in the form of four beasts to no purpose. In Is. lvi: 9, the beasts of the field are the heathen whom the Lord sends upon his degenerate people. So Schiller also sings: "Women become hyenas." The bound which the original ordering of creation established between men and beasts can be destroyed by the degeneracy of men.

The cherubim in the *temple of Solomon* require, in the principal facts, no separate consideration. The same holds good of them as of the cherubim in the tabernacle. Solomon's constructive activity was here confined to narrow limits. In substance he was only permitted to reproduce what Moses had received by revelation. Only some individual points attract our attention. According to 1 Kings vi: 23 *sq.*, to the smaller figures of the cherubim directly over the ark of the covenant, Solomon added "in his temple two others, ten cubits high, carved from the wood of the olive tree and overlaid with gold, which, with extended wings stood near the ark of the covenant. Their outstretched wings formed a second, higher covering above the ark of the covenant." (Züllig). That the wings of these cherubim reached from one wall of the holy of holies to the other, represented the completeness of the protection which God grants to his people by the mediation of his creatures.

According to 1 Chron. xxviii: 18, David gives to Solomon the gold "for the pattern of the chariot of the cherubim that spread out their wings and cover the ark of the covenant of the Lord." The cherubim here do not draw a chariot, but they are themselves the chariot, as also in Ecclesiasticus xlix: 8, the chariot of

the cherubim is the chariot which consists of the cherubim themselves, and in Ps. xviii: 10, "God rides upon the cherub." The relation of God to his living creatures is like that of the charioteer to his chariot, which is completely under his control. God, the absolute controlling principle in and for his creatures, is the thought which lies at the foundation of denoting the cherubim by the chariot.

When the figure of the chariot, first used by David in Ps. xviii, was once adopted, it was natural to give wheels also to the chariot. We have already seen that these wheels, at the same time under and with, or by the side of, the cherubim, not subordinate to them but coördinate with them, in Ezekiel, represent the forces of nature which are guided by the Lord of creation, as well as living creatures in harmony with them. The proper source of this symbolic exhibition, however, is not to be found in Ezekiel. Vitringa clearly proves that it goes back to Solomon, and they who will still deny it, either are not acquainted with his argument or have not properly estimated it. In place of the single laver for the purification of the sacrificial offerings, which Moses, according to Ex. xxx: 18, placed before the tabernacle, between it and the altar for burnt offerings, there are in the temple of Solomon besides the brazen sea, ten lavers which by the order of Solomon were made by Hiram, the artizan. The description of these lavers is very brief; it occupies only one verse. On the other hand no utensil of the temple has the author of the Book of Kings so minutely described as the pedestals of these lavers; he devotes to them no less than twelve verses, 1 Kings vii: 28–39. This implies at the outset that these pedestals must have a deeper, substantial meaning, and it will not perplex us that these pedestals, together with the lavers resting upon them, outwardly viewed, had only a very subordinate position; for what was represented on the part, belonged to the whole, and it was natural to represent it just here, for only here on these newly added utensils was given free scope for the sacred art, while in the more important utensils the Mosaic patterns had to be copied. Now upon these pedestals were represented lions, oxen, cherubim and palm trees. This showed that the temple was consecrated to the Lord of the whole organic creation. "The symbol," says Velthusen, "indicated the presence of the only true, supreme Lord of all nature, and therefore distinguished this building, conse-

crated to him, where he was worshipped and had graciously promised to receive sacrifice and prayer, from all idol temples." Under the pedestals are four wheels. That these must have a symbolic meaning is evident, not only from the analogy of the significant figures on the pedestals, and from comparing Ezekiel, where, as here, the wheels connected with the cherubim and occupying the lower position in relation to them, for clear and decisive reasons signify the forces of nature, but it lies also in the nature of the case, since there is no practical end which the wheels could serve. It has been supposed the wheels were designed to render the pedestals with the lavers easily "portable." They only occupied a fixed position as is expressly said in 1 Kings vii: 39, and a portability is not to be thought of.

We will conclude with a consideration of the magnificent vision of the cherubim in Ezekiel. First, however, let us examine the incidental mention of the cherub in Ezek. xxviii: 14. Here, in his prophecy against the king of Tyrus, the prophet says to him: "Thou wast an anointed cherub, the covering [cherub]." As the cherub embraces in a unity the multitude of created things, so the king the multitude of his people. The nature of the royal position can hardly be designated more appropriately than by the name of Cherub. Jeremiah, in Lam. iv: 20, calls the king of Israel the life-breath of his people, inasmuch as they live or die with him. Like the cherub also, the king is a concentration of created being. Bähr says truly: "The accompanying description of the wisdom, beauty, perfection, power, greatness and glory of this king, clearly shows that the term Cherub is conferred upon him because he stands upon the highest grade of created life. Everything which this creation has of greatness and glory was united in him as in the cherub." The king calls himself God. The prophet concedes to him a position like that of an anointed cherub, but because he transcends the position loaned him by God who had anointed him and by his spirit endowed him with gifts, God wrests it from him and he sinks to naught. The cherub is further designated as "the covering." The article alludes to the well-known, covering cherub in the sanctuary, and especially to Ex. xxv: 20. As the cherub in the sanctuary covers the ark of the covenant and especially the atonement, as a mark of the protection which it affords to the covenant people in consequence of the action of

God ruling over it, so the king of Tyrus is the protector of his state with all the people who are dependent upon him. As however in case of the cherub the protecting power proceeds only proximately from it, but in reality from the power of God which animates it, so the king of Tyrus only has power to cover by the grace of God, and when he has made himself unworthy of this grace, the power is lost. Much perplexity has been occasioned by the mistake of extending too far the comparison with the cherub, which is limited solely to the words quoted; as for example Bähr remarks: "Here the king of Tyrus is called figuratively a covering cherub, and it is said of him; "Thou dwellest in Eden the garden of God," and Riehm says: "The King of Tyrus is compared with the cherub which dwells upon the mountain of God and walks in the midst of stones of fire." The clause in verse 13, "Thou wast in Eden the garden of God," in a condition glorious like that of the first man in paradise, and likewise that in verse 14, following the comparison with the cherub, "Thou wast upon the mountain of God, in the midst of the stones of fire" which formed a protecting wall about thee, so that under God's mighty protection thou couldst protect thy subjects, stand in no immediate relation to the cherub, but represent the glory of the king of Tyrus under another figure. In this glory of his he is like (1), the first man in paradise, (2), the cherub, (3), one who upon a high mountain is surrounded by a fiery wall.

We now turn to the exalted vision of the cherubim which opens the prophecies of Ezekiel.

The historical occasion of this vision was the false hopes which at that time had seized the minds of those who had remained in Jerusalem with king Zedekiah at their head. A giddy-mindedness had pervaded the people. The prophecies of Jeremiah, which announced the impending consummation of judgment by the Chaldeans, were disregarded. From confidence in the league with the Egyptian power, which about that time must have been in the ascendant, they hoped they could soon free themselves from the Chaldean supremacy. The exiles also shared these hopes, as appears from the letter of Jeremiah, in chap. 29, addressed to them. In it he admonishes them: "Let not the prophets, which are among you deceive you, and obey not your diviners, for they prophesy falsely unto you in my name." They thought a return to their native country would soon be permitted,

and to this thought was added that of coöperating to accomplish it. Ezekiel was to counteract these illusions and agitations which prevented the people from traveling God's appointed way of repentance. This counteraction was effected in the first place by the vision of the cherubim, the real import of which Grotius thus well expresses in few words: "After the long patience of God, everything went forth to vengeance." The subsequent remarks of the prophet are to this opening vision as an explanation to the text.

Parallel with Ezekiel's vision of the cherubim, is the seething-pot coming from the north, which appears to his older colleague, Jeremiah, at his calling, Jer. i: 13, with the subjoined explanation, "Out of the north evil shall break forth upon all the inhabitants of the land; for lo, I will call all the families of the kingdoms of the north, and they shall come, and they shall set every one his throne before the gates of Jerusalem and against all the walls thereof round about, and against all the cities of Judah." The vision of Ezekiel serves to uphold and confirm that older vision against the oppositions of the age. To all hopes of salvation it opposes offended Omnipotence. We have here, at the same time, the counterpart to that first appearance of the cherubim in Paradise. As there, God appearing above the cherubim excludes from the tree of life by the flaming sword, so here, God appearing above the cherubim stands between the people and salvation and cuts off every avenue to the latter for the people.

The description begins, Ezek. i: 4, with the words, "And I looked, and behold a tempest came out of the north, a great cloud and a fire infolding itself, and a brightness about it (the cloud, from the fire shining through it) and out of the midst thereof as the appearance of *chasmal*, out of the midst of the fire." That the appearance bears a threatening character, is shown from the connection of the three principal figures of wrath, judgment and punishment, the storm, the cloud, and the fire whose further description as fire *infolded*, in balls, borrowed from Ex. ix: 24, shows that the same energy of God's punitive justice which once, in early times, manifested itself toward the Egyptians, is now directed against the chosen people of God, who have despised the grace of that God who with earnest admonition had said: "The Lord thy God is a consuming fire, a jealous God."

From the midst of the fire the image of God appears to the prophet as the appearance of *chasmal*. *Chasmal* here designates the essence of God's personality, his holiness, that is, the infinite glory, the unconditional exaltation over every creature, his incomparableness, his perfection. That it designates something of brightest luster, the similar brightness in chap. viii: 2, leaves no remaining doubt. The Alexandrian version renders it by electrum, a metal distinguished for its luster, consisting of gold mixed with a fifth part of silver. "From the midst of the fire" causes a shudder in the inmost depths of the soul. It is a fearful thing to have the source of all salvation an enemy. All hope is thereby destroyed. There is no one in heaven or on earth who rescues from his hand. Still the case has also a comforting side. It is better to fall into the hands of God than of men, better to deal with God than with the terrible Chaldeans. If he is in the first place angry, and indeed with a wrath which burns to the lowest hell and consumes the land with its increase and sets on fire the foundations of the mountains, Deut. xxxii: 22, yet there is always in him a back-ground of mercy, and indeed of a mercy which is as great as he is himself, the infinitude of which is an emanation of his holiness, and salvation will follow repentance.

The further description of the vision as it is given from verse 5 onward, presents the following points. First, under the high throne, on which God sits in human form, like a glorious king, appears the *firmament*, the image of heaven, the embodiment of the name Sabaoth, by which the Lord is so often designated as the Almighty Ruler of heaven. The description of the firmament is very brief, because in the present case "the powers of heaven" are not immediately interested.

So much the more detailed is the description of those points in the vision which exhibit God as the Lord of the beings and forces of nature; for, just these was the Lord to summon for the punishment of his unfaithful people. The Chaldeans, the representatives of the living creatures, the union of man, lion, ox, and eagle (Dan. vii: 4), were to capture Jerusalem, and it was to be burned with *fire*. The living creatures are represented by the cherubim, which in this connection admits only the one explanation, that God sends the creature against his rebellious people. The forces of nature are represented by the wheels. It is a wholly imperti-

nent question in what manner the wheels were connected with the cherubim. It was sufficient for the image of the chariot that the cherubim occupy the higher position; the wheels, under which figure the forces of nature are exhibited on account of their weight and energy, the lower position. All is to be regarded as light and airy. We have before us an ideal picture, too etherial by far, to be grasped by painting and sculpture. "The appearance of the wheels and their work was like that of the Chrysolite." This indicates the glory of the forces of nature. "A wheel was in the middle of a wheel," into every wheel another wheel is inserted. "In their going, they went according to their four sides." This implies that the forces of nature are absolutely at the disposal of God, that he can use them where he will, and send them whither he will. That the felloes of the wheels are full of eyes, signifies that the forces of nature do not work blindly, but are guided by Providence. That the spirit of the living creature is in the wheels, shows that one and the same divine power is active in living beings and in the forces of nature, so that they work harmoniously for the accomplishment of God's purposes. In the repetition of the vision of the cherubim, in chap. 10, the cherub stretches out his hand, takes the fire with which Jerusalem is to be burned from between the wheels, and hands it to the one clothed in linen, to the angel of the Lord, which received from him who sits upon the throne the commission to burn Jerusalem. By this is meant that the activity of the Chaldeans in the burning of the city, represented by the participation of the cherub, is entirely subordinate, that in reality the burning of Jerusalem is to be regarded like that of Sodom and Gomorrah, in which no human agency was employed. The fire is under the throne of God, is an element created by God, and the cherub only upon God's command hands it to the angel from which the direct action goes forth. In Ezek. xi: 22, it is said: "Then did the cherubim lift up their wings, and the wheels went beside them; and the glory of the God of Israel was above them." Kliefoth justly calls attention to the fact that it reads, "*the* wheels," but "*their* wings." This proves that the wheels, although they followed the movement of the cherubim, yet do not belong to them. Those who, in regard to the cherubim, do not distinguish between the thought and its garb, are greatly perplexed by the wheels. Velthusen well remarks

that the wheels are so connected with the cherubim and constitute so much one figure with them that they stop, go forward and rise with them, and neither is able to separate from other; so that whoever does not consider the cherubim as a merely figurative appearance, must at the same time regard wheels and thrones as things really existing in nature, which the Most High uses in his coming. The Jews observed this, and therefore regarded the wheels as a particular class of angels.

In the magnificent exhibition of the universe, in Ezekiel, we must distinguish between that which belongs to unchangeable being and that which relates especially to present circumstances, to the work of wrath which just now is executed upon the degenerate covenant people. This distinction is to be seen even in him who sits upon the throne. According to chap. i: 27, the appearance from the loins downward was as the appearance of fire which was included round about, concentrated fire; from the loins upward, as shining metal. This shining metal designates the unchangeable being of God, his transcendent glory. The fire beneath, toward the earth, signifies his wrath in the office of judge and avenger which just now displays itself, but yet, in reality holds only a subordinate place. The same distinction appears also in the cherubim. In them, "the feet, sparkling like the appearance of glowing brass," in chap. i: 7, with which they are to destroy everything which opposes, relate especially to the present circumstances. Likewise verses 13, 14, refer to the present mission, "And the appearance of the living creatures was like coals of fire, they burn like torches. The fire goes forth between the living creatures, and the fire is bright, and from the fire goes forth lightning. And the living creatures ran to and fro as the appearance of sparkling flames." The living creatures can hardly await the time when they shall fulfill their mission as servants of the divine vengeance. This is of a temporal character in Ezekiel's picture of the cherubim, just as in the first appearance of the cherub in Paradise, the connection with the glittering sword is only temporary and separable. Under other circumstances everything in them would bear a peaceful, friendly character. In the repetition of the cherubim picture in the Apocalypse where God appearing above the cherubim comes for the welfare of his Church, everything is excluded which indicates wrath, punishment and destruction.

Severe and threatening as the appearance here is, yet even here the friendly characteristic is not wanting, and one must allude to this in the conclusion, because there are so many indications that a repetition of that appearance is preparing. According to Ezek. i : 27, the whole appearance was surrounded with a brightness. "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about." Grotius correctly understood the real import of this figure: "The divine judgments, severe as they may be, will yet not destroy the remembrance of the covenant made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob." The rainbow, according to Gen. ix, is devoted exclusively to symbolizing returning grace, after a period of wrath. Although there is in us much sin, there is in God much more grace. This sentiment the delightful figure of the rainbow proclaims to the Church, terrified by the fearful clouds (v. 4), and trembling on account of its sins. The expressions, "I kill, and I make alive," and "He maketh sore, and bindeth up; he woundeth and his hands make whole," belong only to the Church, while the clouds are common to it and the world. The vision of the rainbow has been gloriously fulfilled, since the joyous return followed the Chaldean captivity, and the message resounded, "Behold, I bring you glad tidings of great joy, for unto you is born this day a Saviour," and so will it be fulfilled even to the end of time. "And it shall come to pass, when I bring a cloud over the earth, that the bow shall be seen in the cloud," is the eternal privilege which is granted to the Church of God on earth. If we keep this in mind, the clouds will not make us afraid, but fill us with joyful hope. The denser they are, the more glorious will be the beams of the rainbow.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

—The great literary enterprise—the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library**—one of the most useful of the century, is rapidly progressing. Four volumes have already appeared since the close of last year, and two more volumes are promised before the close of the present.

The first volume contains the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, (Clement of Rome, Polycarp, Barnabas, Ignatius,) together with the Martyrdom of Polycarp, the Martyrdom of Ignatius, the anonymous, but most noble and interesting Epistle to Diognetus, the Pastor of Hermas, the Fragments of Papias, and the spurious Epistles of Ignatius.

The second volume is taken up with the writings of Justin Martyr and Athenagoras, namely, the two Apologies, the Address to the Greeks, the Exhortation, the Dialogue with Trypho, and the treatise on the Resurrection of the Dead by the latter.

The third volume embraces the apologetic writings of Tatian and Theophilus of Antioch, and also the Clementine Recognitions. The more important, though heretical, pseudo-Clementine Homilies are not given.

The fourth volume contains the principal writings of the Alexandrian School of theology, who died A. D. 217. We regret that his instructive and beautiful ethical tract, τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος, *Quis dives salvetur?* is not included in this volume.

We have thus already the principal ecclesiastical writers of the second century before us, with the exception of Origen and Tertullian, who partly belong to the third. The translation is made by different responsible scholars, and so far as we have compared it with the original, is ably and faithfully done. The several writers are introduced by short biographical and critical notices which breathe a free protestant, as well as reverent spirit. It is to be regretted that the editors have not seen proper to accompany the translations throughout with brief illustrative foot notes, which would greatly facilitate the understanding of these ancient writings and their many remote allusions.

To those who have no access to the original Greek and Latin, this Ante-Nicene Library which is to embrace all the patristic writings to the year 325, is an invaluable aid in forming a correct view of that interesting age when Christianity struggled against the combined power of heathenism and Judaism, the religious policy, science and art of the ancient world, and finally, by purely moral and spiritual weapons, gained a complete and lasting victory.

P. S.

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* *Ante-Nicene Christian Library. Translations of the Writings of the Fathers down to A. D.* 325. Edited by the Rev. Alexander Roberts, D. D., and James Donaldson, LL. D. Vols. I.–IV. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, and Chas. Scribner, New York, 1867.

— The able essays of Professor Tyler of Amherst College, on the *Theology of the Greek Poets*,* are a valuable contribution to Christian apologetics. In consequence of the persistent efforts of the opponents of Christianity to claim for Pagan religions the highest and best of the moral teachings of the gospel, a more thorough understanding of the ethical character of the various forms of ancient and modern paganism has now become necessary to a theologian. From this point of view, these essays on the religious ideas of the ancient Greeks, by an accomplished scholar, are especially timely. The late Edward Everett once said that he rose from the reading of the Koran with increased faith in the Scriptures as a revelation from heaven; and no one, assuredly can read this interesting volume without feeling more deeply the glory of the gospel. The contents of the several chapters are: The Head of the Church Head over all things; The Homeric Question; The Homeric Doctrine of the Gods; The Homeric Doctrine of Sin, its Expiation and its Penalty; The Theology of Aeschylus; The Theology of Sophocles.

— Those who desire to gain a comprehensive and trustworthy view of the present state of linguistic science, will find in Prof. Whitney's *Language and the Study of Language*,† a work of uncommon interest and value, on a subject with which every man of liberal culture is expected to be more or less acquainted. With a broad philosophic spirit and great clearness of expression, enriched by abundant and apt illustrations, the author brings out the principles on which human speech has apparently been formed and developed, the influences which subject it to change, and the present classification of the languages of the globe with their relations to each other. The various important problems which present themselves in these and kindred discussions are treated with good judgment and taste, and in a manner which will be likely to commend itself to candid readers. Whether, in consequence of divine communications with our first parents, which seems to be intimated in the first chapter of Genesis, the original construction of language might not have been rapidly *accelerated*, is a point on which the author's plan does not require him to speak. The work, which is published simultaneously in Great Britain and the United States, will be regarded, we doubt not, in both countries, as an honor to American scholarship. Certainly few can read it without feeling richer in the possession of new lines of thought and a broader outlook.

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* *The Theology of the Greek Poets.* By W. S. Tyler, Williston Professor of Greek in Amherst College. Boston: Draper & Halliday. 1867. 12mo. pp. 365.

† *Language and the Study of Language: Twelve Lectures on the Principles of Linguistic Science.* By William Dwight Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit and Instructor in Modern Languages in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 489.

XIV.—THE EXPIATORY NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.*

For two centuries, Evangelical Protestantism has had no great dogmatic theologians. The men who were strong enough to reorganize the whole theory and contents of the Christian revelation, and whose vast and massive theological "systems," gave a shelter and refuge to the religious thought of the most powerful nations of Christendom, when all faith was imperiled by the tempests of the Reformation, have left no successors. Isolated doctrines have been laboriously investigated; the history of important controversies has been illustrated with consummate learning; but all the great achievements of modern Protestant theology have been in the departments of criticism and exegesis. In our own country the race of dogmatic theologians disappeared with the men who drew up the Westminster Confession and the Savoy Declaration.

But during the last two hundred years there have been fundamental changes in the general intellectual condition of Europe; and the history of the church proves, that whenever Christendom passes through any great intellectual revolution, dogmatic creeds are inevitably subjected to rigorous revision. The theology of the Reformers and their immediate successors is beginning to show the operation of the silent forces of decay. In many parts of Protestant Europe it is sinking into ruins; and everywhere the work of reconstruction is necessary, if the Protestantism of the next century is to have a theology at all. Reconstruction, we say, is necessary—not repair. The philosophical methods of the present century are new; its exegesis is new; and, although we believe that none of the great articles of the Evangelical creed will be finally rejected, theological systems must be rebuilt from their foundations. There is nothing in this to occasion astonishment or dismay. The scientific theology of every age is the result of two factors; one of them is divine and permanent, the other human and variable. The truths of revelation—these are eternal; the philosophical methods which determine the form

* From the *British Quarterly Review*, October, 1867.

in which they shall be conceived and defined—these change with the changing thoughts of men.

In the development of the doctrine of the Atonement, the intimate relations between Philosophy and Christian Dogmatics are strikingly illustrated. It is, however, a mistake contradicted by the whole history of the thought of Christendom, to maintain that the idea of a Vicarious Sacrifice originated in any philosophical theory of the moral government of the universe; the "idea" has remained constant while theories of the universe have changed. The conception of an atonement, so far from being the creation of scientific theology, has been one of its greatest difficulties. The great problem of a long succession of theologians has been to show the harmony between ethical principles accepted as fundamental, and a Fact which the Church asserted to be supernaturally revealed, and which seemed the answer to some of the most passionate demands of man's moral nature. The difficulty has been to construct a theory of the moral universe which should afford a scientific basis for the acknowledged necessity, in order to accomplish human redemption, of the incarnation and death of the Son of God.

The problem was originated not by Philosophy, but by Faith. Faith has persistently maintained that Christ was an Expiatory Sacrifice; she has asked philosophy, not to prove that expiation was necessary, but to give an account of God's moral government in which the necessity should be recognized. Faith has persistently maintained that the sins of men are pardoned because Christ died; she has asked philosophy, not to prove the atoning efficacy of Christ's death, but to explain it. Whether solved or not, the problem remains; the failure of Philosophy to construct a theory, does not disturb the confidence of Faith in the fact. In our own times the doctrine is in danger, not because modern exegesis has successfully impeached the proof that our Lord himself, and his apostles taught that his death on the cross is the immediate ground of human forgiveness, but because the theories of the relation and of the death of Christ to the divine government and to the moral condition of mankind, which satisfied the intellectual necessities of Europe two centuries ago, are now affirmed to be untenable; and no later theory has secured general acceptance. It must also be acknowledged, that while modern exegetical methods have left the scriptural

argument as conclusive as it was in the time of the great systematic theologians, the mode of treating the argument is altogether new.

In a recent article* we criticised at some length what, for the sake of convenience and courtesy we called the "Moral Theory" of the Atonement; we propose now, to indicate the kind of evidence, which may be alleged for the Fact that the Death of Christ was an Expiatory Sacrifice for human sin; and we shall attempt to show that the expiatory theory is in harmony with our profoundest conceptions of the relations of God and man to the eternal law of righteousness.

From the nature of this investigation our first appeal must be to the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles. Those who believe that he came to reveal God, and that he was "God manifest in the flesh," must accept without question whatever he taught; and, apart altogether from any theory of the inspiration of the apostolic epistles, it must be granted—if the apostles were commissioned by him to preach the Christian faith—that they were not likely to misinterpret his teaching, on any of the graver questions relating to the salvation of our race.

In asserting that the authority of Christ is final we do not mean to imply that the moral and spiritual faculties of man are to be paralyzed in the presence of a supernatural revelation. We cannot anticipate any contradiction between the voice of God within us and the voice of God speaking to us from without. The nature of man is older than both the Testaments; and the laws written on the heart are not repealed, either by Jewish or Christian prophets. The same God that became incarnate in Christ, and that dwelt as the Spirit of truth in the apostles, made us in his own image and breathed into us his own life. It is, indeed, reasonable to expect that we shall discover very much in the last and highest revelation of the divine character and will, that our own moral powers had not enabled us to anticipate; but to imagine it possible for any controversy to arise between the original revelation of God to the human conscience and his revelation in Jesus Christ, is to forget that both came from one source, and that this fountain cannot send forth sweet water and bitter.

It is also reasonable to expect that the last and completest

* On "*The Moral Theory of the Atonement;*" See THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC, vol. iv, pp. 364–409.

expression of the moral light of God will so exalt and develope the moral life of man, that what must be received at first on his bare authority, without the support, though not in violation of our natural, moral and religious perceptions, will gradually be recognized as indissolubly associated with the elementary principles of our religious faith. Nor has any moral truth obtained a firm and secure hold of man's intellect and heart, until it has ceased to rest on authority, and has been firmly rooted among the original and indestructible convictions of man's moral nature.

It is necessary, however, to define the legitimate province of the moral sense—to use a brief and useful, though by no means unobjectionable term for the sum of our moral perceptions, and for the faculty or faculties of which they are the product; no revelation claiming to be divine, which is in hostility to our necessary moral convictions, can command our acceptance; but it does not follow that we are able to perceive the moral reasons of every act of the divine government. Our faculties are equal to the exigencies of our position; they enable us to appreciate the moral glory of God's attributes; to repose an intelligent trust in his equity and goodness; to recognize in the general order of the universe the supremacy of a righteous will. But as we are not called to the administration of functions which are the prerogative of the infinite and eternal God, there are a thousand questions which we are unable to resolve, in relation to his government of moral beings. For instance, we may pronounce, confidently, that as there are gradations in human guilt, there ought to be gradations in human punishment, and our moral nature may resent the singular theory, that because every sin, even the slightest, is an offence against an infinite God, it deserves an infinite penalty; but we cannot fix the precise amount of suffering which it is just to inflict for any particular sin. We have no calculus to determine the right relations between wickedness and misery. That in every case there is a limit to retribution beyond which equity will not pass, we are sure; where the limit lies in any case, we cannot tell. Our moral sense discovers such overwhelming evidence of the righteousness of God that we are able to rest quietly in the conviction, that when the divine acts transcend our powers, God is righteous still.

We are prepared, therefore, reverently to acknowledge the claims of God on our confidence where we are unable to pene-

trate into the real moral ground of his acts. Hence, those theologians occupy a perfectly tenable position, who maintain, that although no satisfactory theory of expiation may ever have been constructed, yet we are bound by God's authority, to accept the fact that the forgiveness of human sin is conditional on the death of our Lord Jesus Christ. We may be unable to perceive even the necessity of expiation, or how, if necessary, the death of Christ could effect it; and yet if there be clear and authoritative indications that Christ died to render the infliction of the penalty of past sin unnecessary, as well as to originate new motives to future holiness, we have no right to say that the purpose of his death is exhausted in its moral effect upon the heart of man. The relations of Christ's sufferings to God's moral government may be involved in impenetrable mystery; it may be impossible to develope the philosophy of the Atonement; yet there may be irresistible proof that the death of the incarnate Son of God was a response to imperious claims of the eternal law of righteousness, and not merely the final appeal of the divine love to the conscience and affections of the human race.

Neither on one side nor the other can this controversy be closed by an appeal to our moral intuitions alone. Unless our knowledge of God makes it absolutely irreconcilable with his character, that the death of Christ should be remission of human sin, we must inquire whether there is adequate evidence that men are pardoned because Christ died; our inability to construct a philosophy of the Atonement does not invalidate the fact. On the other hand, though it may be shown that the theory of expiation is in harmony with the divine attributes, the fact of expiation is not demonstrated. The existence of angels is not proved by showing that it is perfectly consistent with all we know of God, that he should have created such intelligences as we suppose angels to be, neither is the fact that Christ's death was expiatory established by any theory harmonizing the idea of expiation with our conceptions of God's moral character. In the determination of this question, as of many others, exegesis lies at the foundation of Dogmatic Theology. The fact must be given by authority, though the theory is framed by philosophy.

The first question, therefore, to be determined is, whether Christ himself and his apostles, represented his death on the cross as only the last and heaviest calamity, which came upon

him from human malice and ingratitude, and therefore the supreme test at once of his constancy and courage in doing the will of God, and of his love for the human race; or whether they also represented it as having mysterious and altogether unique relations to the pardon of sin. In the divine thought, is the death of Christ directly connected with the release of men from the penalties of moral transgression? There ought to be no inseparable difficulty in arriving at a clear and final answer to such a question as this.

It is, of course, quite beyond the scope of this article to present even a summary of the proof which appears to us to demonstrate that our Lord himself regarded his death as expiatory, and that this conception of the crucifixion was wrought into the very structure of apostolic thought. Nor do we very much believe in the conclusive force of "proof-texts." No doubt there are a few very unambiguous passages which may be quoted for every one of the great articles of the Catholic faith; and, perhaps, as many can be quoted for this as for any other. But the New Testament was not written to supply passages which should constitute a short and easy refutation of heresy and demonstration of truth. If any one asks us for proof of the divinity of our Lord, we point to his own life, as presented in the gospels, and to the whole type of religious thought and feeling exhibited in the Epistles. And if we are asked for proof that the doctrine of expiation was held by the founders of the Christian faith, we answer, "Read the history and discourses of our Lord, and the writings of the apostles, Peter, Paul and John." Many of the "proof-texts" of earlier theologians seem to us worthless, but we think we recognize the presence of the doctrine in almost every page of the New Testament. What we propose to do, is to select, by way of illustrating the true method of this inquiry, a few fragments of evidence which may dispose some of our readers, who have rejected the idea of expiation, to read the New Testament for themselves, in order to learn whether or not it is really there.

It is admitted by all who are parties to this controversy, that human salvation includes the recovery of man's nature from evil by the communication of the divine life, as well as the remission of sin. In the preaching of our Lord, these two elements are seldom separated. It was hardly possible, indeed, that he should distinctly enunciate the special benefits which were to be

conferred as the results of his crucifixion while he was claiming the loyal trust and obedience of the Jewish people as their Messiah. He accepted, as the basis of his ministry, the history of the nation. Through sixteen hundred years the descendants of Abraham had been expecting his coming; inspired prophecies, bitter sufferings, hopes which sometimes kindled into frenzy, disappointments which sometimes sunk into blank despair, had intensified the longing of the elect race for the manifestation of the kingdom of heaven. It was in him that the divine idea, which was the explanation of their national constitution, and of all the strange vicissitudes of preternatural glory, and of almost preternatural misery through which the nation had passed, was to be fulfilled. That idea had been most imperfectly apprehended by the noblest saints; by the mass of the people it had been altogether missed. But the passion it had awakened was most real and powerful; and to this passion, though it clung to the hope of a kingdom founded on force, and rich in all secular splendors, Christ appealed. From the very first, however, he indicated the real nature of the kingdom he had come to establish. He promised no material wealth, but charged men to lay up for themselves treasures in heaven, and reminded a scribe who wished to become his disciple, that the "Son of man had not where to lay his head." He intimated that his followers were not to assert his authority by arms, but were to be "the light of the world," and "the salt of the earth;" that their service was to be the service of prophets, not of soldiers; and that they would be reviled and persecuted, as other prophets before them had been. The laws he proclaimed as the foundation of his kingdom were a clear declaration of its spiritual character; they were laws reaching to the secret thoughts and impulses of the heart, and were such as no secular tribunals could administer. He taught that the kingdom of God was not to win any sudden victories; that it was to be inseparably associated with the divine "word," speaking to the souls of men, and that that word was not to have irresistible power, but was to be like seed, much of which is fruitless altogether, and the rest fruitful in various measures. When the excited people wanted to make him king, he escaped from them into mountain solitudes. But still he preached that the kingdom of heaven, which the Jewish race had been waiting for, was "at hand." He charged all who heard him to repent, that they might be ready to enter into it. The

substance of his own preaching was the substance of the preaching of his twelve apostles and of the seventy, whom he sent "two and two before his face into every city and place whither he himself would come." It was open to the nation to receive him. No divine decree compelled them to crucify the Christ; nor did our Lord ever address them as though they were predestined to commit that awful crime. Had they acknowledged his claims, the history of the world and of the universe would have taken a direction about which it is in vain for us to speculate; but he did not madden them into guilt by speaking to them of his death as irrevocably determined; he did not assume the attitude of a rejected Savior until men had virtually rejected him. To have told them from the first, that the evil deed to which they were drifting would be so worked into the complicated scheme of God's government, as to result in the expiation of the sin of all mankind, would not have been to treat them fairly. While they were still free he recognized their freedom.

It may be hastily inferred that these remarks are intended to introduce an apology for the absence in our Lord's own teaching of any clear evidence for a vicarious atonement. But they are hardly less necessary to the case of our opponents than to our own. As little is said by Christ about the moral power of his death as about its expiatory value, though the supreme significance of his crucifixion in apostolic teaching cannot be disputed or ignored. Let it be granted that the expiatory theory is baseless, still it is the death of Christ by which we are "crucified to the world;" and if the governmental relations of his death are seldom referred to by our Lord, it is equally true that he seldom refers to its mystical and spiritual effects. How could he develope the theory of his sufferings, while it was still within the province of the will of the Jewish people to confess that he was "God manifest in the flesh," and to crown him with adoration and love instead of with thorns? His lips were closed even to his disciples; and when, as the crisis drew on, he told them that he was to be "delivered to the Gentiles," and "mocked and spitefully entreated, and spit upon," that they would scourge him and put him to death, the disciples seem to have been incapable of receiving any just impression of what he meant; "they understood none of these things, and this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things which were spoken." If they could not

grasp the fact of the crucifixion, it would have been useless to give elaborate explanations of its purpose. We should not, therefore, look for passages in his teaching, explicitly affirming the doctrine, but for passages which show that he himself thought of his death as an expiation.

We should read the four gospels, not as if they were the abstract of a theological system in which we might expect to find dogmatic definitions, but as being the record of a life in which the thoughts of one, who could not teach men all he knew because they were not able to bear it, are incidentally revealed.

Now it is evident that to Christ's own mind the dark events which he predicted, at first obscurely, but afterwards in words which look like his history rather than prophecy, were present from the beginning, and it is equally evident that he regarded his future sufferings and death as having the profoundest moral significance.

We pass over express statements and incidental references which deserve careful notice, and which admit of being developed into very striking illustrations of Christ's conceptions of the purpose and effects of his crucifixion, and limit our criticism to his words at the institution of the Lord's Supper. These are specially important, because associated with one of the two great symbolic ordinances of the Christian Church. They must have been unintelligible at the time to the apostles, although they were remembered very vividly afterwards: "This is my blood of the new covenant which is shed for many for the remission of sins." Deny the fact of expiation, and these words are an inexplicable paradox. In the crucifixion of Christ, the worst passions of the worst men were confederate to effect the blackest deed in the history of the world. It was treachery, perjury, murder, all in one. It was terribly *punished.* The traitor who betrayed his Lord with a kiss died a terrible death, and has been condemned to eternal infamy. The men who cried, "His blood be upon us and upon our children," surrendered in Pilate's judgment hall the hope and glory of their race; and their imprecation surrounded Jerusalem with armies, and has made their descendants wanderers over the earth for nearly two thousand years. And yet Christ said that his blood was shed "for the remission of sins." How could the supreme act of human wickedness—an act which cried for vengeance, and was awfully avenged—have been directly

connected by our Lord with "the remission of sins," if within the range of human passions there had not been a divine purpose which accomplished itself by the "wicked hands" of wicked men, who knew not what they did? Was the perfect innocence of the victim, which aggravated the crime, a reason for pardoning the sins of a race capable of committing it? When wickedness is guilty of its most appalling outrage against human sanctity and divine law, does the displeasure of God relent, and does he lay his thunders by? If Moses had been crucified by the idolaters at the foot of Sinai, would that have been a ground for blotting out the previous and future guilt of the weak and inconstant race he was sent to redeem? Did the personal dignity of Christ, as "God manifest in the flesh," destroy the moral offense of his murderers, and transform it into an act of sublime and heroic virtue? The words are an insoluble mystery unless we believe that, in "the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God," the very crime which was to bring upon the Jewish people the most awful temporal doom, was to be the means of expiating the sin of the world.

It may be suggested that our Lord meant that he had known from the first the agony and the shame which were before him; and that his constancy "even unto death," in proclaiming to mankind the divine mercy, revealing the divine life, and sharing the miseries of man's earthly condition, would so touch the hearts of millions, that they would repent of sin and forsake it, trust God and turn to him; and that then they would receive the divine pardon. Had he said this, it would have been true; but he did not say this. Those to whom he was speaking could not have suspected that he meant this. They were Jews, and under their law "without shedding of blood there was no remission," though there might be repentance: repentance might prompt a man to offer the sacrifice, but remission was the effect of the sacrifice; and our Lord's language was studiously chosen to associate pardon and "blood" under the "new covenant," just as they had been associated under the old.

How the crucifixion of Christ could in any sense take the place of the ancient sacrifices; how the crime of rejecting him and putting him to death could have any relation to the pardon of sin, the apostles at the time must have been quite unable to conceive. They caught the words; they received the impression

which the words naturally produced; but it was not until afterwards that the sacrificial and expiatory character of the death of their Master, could have become at all clear to them. Whether they ever developed any theory of the relation of Christ's passion to the divine government and the forgiveness of human sin, may be fairly questioned; but that, having been disciplined by the Jewish law to connect God's pardon with an expiatory sacrifice, they came to recognize in the crucifixion of our Lord the true and effectual sacrifice for the sin of the human race, admits, as we believe, of irresistible demonstration. They may have had no philosophy of the atonement; but that the remission of sins is the direct result of Christ's death, is one of the most characteristic articles of their creed.

It is not contended that the relation of the death of Christ to human forgiveness was as fully apprehended, even by the apostles themselves, at the moment of the descent of the Holy Ghost on the day of Pentecost, as it was afterwards. The promise that when "the Spirit of Truth" came, he would "guide" them "into all the truth," does not imply that everything would be revealed at once; no intelligent and candid reader of the New Testament will deny that the supernatural revelation to the apostles gradually became broader, deeper, and more distinct. The evidence of this may be regarded as imperfect, because Luke has not recorded in his history of the earlier years of the church the teaching given by Peter and Paul to those who already acknowledged Jesus as the Christ. With rare exceptions, the discourses of the apostles contained in the Acts, were addressed to those who were ignorant of the Christian faith, or hostile to it; but the theory that everything was as clear to inspired men from the first moment of their inspiration as it ever was afterwards, is wholly inconsistent with the growth of doctrine which can be traced in the Epistles themselves.*

But from the first, the apostles insisted on the sufferings of Christ as a necessary part of God's conception of his history, and as indispensable to the actual scheme of the divine government of mankind. They did not represent his death as an obstacle to the establishment of his kingdom—an obstacle which God had surmounted by raising him from the dead; but they constantly

* See this finely traced in Bernard's "Bampton Lecture," 1864, on *The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament.*

reiterated the argument of our Lord himself from "Moses and the prophets," and asked, "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?"

When the multitude came together on the day of Pentecost, excited and amazed by the new miraculous gifts suddenly conferred upon the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, Peter's first impulse was to show that these gifts had been predicted, and that the resurrection of the Messiah from whom they came had been predicted also; but as soon as his hearers, "pricked in their heart," and terrified at having put the Messiah to death, exclaimed, "Men, brethren, what shall we do?" Peter answered, "Repent and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins;" the acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah —an acknowledgment to be visibly and publicly expressed by submission to Christian baptism—was to be immediately followed by the divine pardon. When brought before the council, and charged with intending to bring this man's "blood" upon the rulers of the nation, Peter told the high priest that God had exalted Jesus "to be a Prince and Saviour," to give "repentance and *remission of sins*." He had previously told them that there is "none other name given under heaven whereby we must be *saved*."

When Philip met the servant of Candace, Queen of the Ethiopians, and "preached unto him Jesus," the text of the evangelist was that prophecy of Isaiah's which declares most clearly that the sufferings of the Messiah were to be the ground of human salvation.

Paul, in the synagogue of Antioch, closed his appeal to the ancient history and Scriptures of the Jewish people with these emphatic words: "Be it known unto you, therefore, men, brethren, that through this man is preached unto you the *forgiveness of sins, and by him all that believe are justified* from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses."

These passages are sufficient to show that from the first the apostles believed—

1. That forgiveness is one of the most conspicuous blessings promised to those who receive Jesus as the Christ.

2. That the divine pardon is not the result of the gradual escape of the soul from the power of *sin*, but an immediate response of the divine mercy to human faith.

3. That forgiveness is granted through his name; what he was, what he had done and suffered being the immediate ground on which forgiveness rests.

4. That the crime of crucifying the Messiah, instead of destroying all hope of human salvation, had resulted in investing him with the prerogative of conferring the remission of sins.

It is fully granted that in all this there is no explicit authority for the doctrine of expiation; but have we not in these passages the germs of that doctrine? Into what else could preaching of this kind have grown? If these rudimentary and unorganized statements concerning the relation of our Lord Jesus Christ to the pardon of human sin, are to be developed into a theology, must not that theology include an objective atonement?

The doctrine ought to be still more clearly present in the epistles, and there ought to be evidence that it gradually assumed a more distinct and articulate form in the minds of the inspired teachers of the faith. This evidence ought not to rest on the uncertain interpretation of isolated expressions, on the precise force of doubtful prepositions, on the meaning of an obscure quotation from the ancient Jewish Scriptures, on the incidental use of an illustration from the ancient Jewish ritual. It should, however, be remembered, that as the apostles did not write systematic treatises on Christian doctrine, but occasional letters intended to meet the accidental circumstances of the churches they had founded, it might easily happen that a truth—if it be a truth—so fundamental as this might receive no full and elaborate treatment in any of their writings. This, if our hypothesis be true, is one of the principles of the doctrine of "Christ" which every church learnt at first, and was not likely ever to forget. Its conceptions in reference to other parts of the Christian faith might arise and need correction, but in reference to this, mistake was hardly possible. That the incarnate God had died to atone for the sins of the world, was too startling a declaration not to strike deep into the intellect and the heart. Nor was this doctrine likely to be soon perverted. Jewish traditions and Jewish pride might originate heresies about the permanent authority of the Mosaic law, but not about the necessity of a sacrifice for sin. The former habits of Gentile converts might obscure their moral perceptions and make them think lightly of the grossest vices; but they had been used to propitiate their old gods; and heathenism itself was friendly to the idea of expiation. The

greatest truths were precisely those on which it was least necessary that the apostles should write elaborately. When Christ had left the world for nearly seventy years, St. John had to assert the true humanity of our Lord; but we look in vain, in any of the earlier epistles, for any exposition of the truth concerning our Lord's person, such as we have of the truth concerning the resurrection in the first epistle to the Corinthians. The divinity and humanity of Christ are among those fundamental articles of the Christian creed which the epistles take for granted; they are appealed to, as motives and arguments for various Christian virtues; they are implied in the development of other doctrines of inferior importance; but, with the exception of a sentence or two here and there, they are never formally and categorically stated. The absence in the apostolic epistles of any express and elaborate vindication of a Christian doctrine, may be a proof of its importance. But if the fact of expiation was acknowledged at all by the original preachers of the Christian faith, it could have had no obscure or secondary place in their conception of the divine government; it must have affected their whole system of religious thought, colored their style, determined their moral attitude in relation to the world which it was their duty to evangelize. That the doctrine of the Atonement is supported by proof of this kind cannot of course be fully shown within the limits of this article; but a few passages may be selected to illustrate what we mean.

Let us take, for example, the first epistle of Peter, and without examining the idea which underlies the phrase in the very first verse, "elect . . . unto obedience and *sprinkling* of the blood of Jesus *Christ*; let us pause at chap. i: 18, "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." This passage is frequently quoted to show that redemption does not imply expiation or substitution, since the word is used here in connection with a subjective and moral deliverance. A deeper consideration of the passage will lead to a very different conclusion. The only natural explanation which can be given of this remarkable phraseology is, that in Peter's judgment, the Gentiles were delivered from their old heathen life by a sacrifice which atoned for their old heathen sins. The emphasis which is placed upon "the blood of Christ, and the

representation of him as a lamb without blemish and without spot, came from a mind to which the expiatory conception of our Lord's death was always present; such language would never have occurred to one who conceived of the sufferings of Christ as simply revealing the infinite love of God. Most modern theologians—even those who believe in expiation—would have said that the Gentiles were delivered from heathenism by the discovery of the folly of idolatry, or by the revelation of the true God in the life and death of our Lord Jesus; but St. Peter cannot speak of the great moral transition through which they had passed without founding it on that expiation which is the true ground of their new relations to God. He says they were not delivered merely but "redeemed;" and the precious blood of a "lamb without blemish and without spot" was the means of their redemption.

Explicitly as the passage in chap. ii: 21—25 affirms the fact that Christ's sufferings were vicarious and expiatory, ("Christ also suffered for us. . . . Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree. . . . By whose stripes ye were healed)," its force is derived as much from what it implies as from what it asserts. The apostle is telling Christian slaves to be subject to their masters, "not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward." "If when ye do well, and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable to God. For even hereunto were ye called: because Christ also suffered *for us*, leaving us an example that ye should follow his steps: who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth: who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered he threatened not; but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously: *who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree*, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness: *by whose stripes ye were healed*." The words we have italicised really lie beyond the immediate and direct purpose of the passage. They are no necessary part of an appeal to Christ's sufferings, as illustrating the patience with which it is our duty to suffer "wrongfully." But Peter could not speak of the death of Christ as an example, without introducing another aspect of it which touches the heart still more deeply, and inspires a passion to please him in all things. Nor should it escape notice, that the last clause we have quoted, especially when taken in connection with what follows, "Ye were as sheep going

astray," indicates that the great expiatory prophecy in Isaiah was vividly present to the apostle's mind at the moment of writing; his words are an echo of what had been written seven hundred years before: "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and *with his stripes we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray;* we have turned every one to his own way, and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all."

The passage in chap. iii: 17, 18 is equally striking. There again, it did not lie in Peter's way to speak of the death of Christ as vicarious. "It is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well doing than for evil doing. For Christ also hath once suffered *for sins, the just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God.*" This diversion from the direct line in which the apostle's thought was running, is another proof, not only that he believed that Christ suffered for *sins*, but that this particular conception of Christ's death had such power over his mind, that he could not escape from it, even when the subject on which he was writing would have led him to represent Christ's sufferings only under their exemplary aspect.

Let the first epistle of John be now considered; it was written half a century after the resurrection. Grave evils already disturbed the church. Portentous doctrinal heresies were threatening the very foundations of the faith; already "that spirit of antichrist," which was revealed in the Gnosticism of the next century, was leading Christian men to deny or doubt the reality of the incarnation. The hope of the church would be wrecked if this were lost. It was because the Eternal Life which was with the Father was manifested in the *flesh*, so manifested that the apostles could declare what they had "heard," what they had "seen," what their eyes had looked upon, and their "hands had handled of the word of life," that man had been raised into fellowship with God. It was because the Eternal Life had really dwelt in all believers. This was the supernatural "seed" which John spoke of as remaining in every one born of God, and which made divine sonship not a name merely, but a most wonderful fact. The false spiritualism of heresy is confronted and destroyed by the development of the true mystery of the incarnation, and it is shown that the divine assumption of human nature is the ultimate ground of the restoration of man to union with God. In

the special circumstances which determined the contents of the epistle, it would not have been surprising had the relations of Christ's work to the remission of sins received no explicit recognition. But no language can be more distinct than that in which these relations are affirmed. The apostle says, "I write unto you . . . because your *sins are forgiven you for his name's sake*." By virtue of the life which comes to us through Christ, he that "is born of God doth not commit sin;" but, "if any man sin, we have an *advocate* with the Father," not merely an interior power rising victoriously over the evils which still cling to the regenerated soul. The atonement of Christ is represented under a form which gives almost perilous emphasis to its objective aspects: He is the *propitiation* for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." Dr. Bushnell, indeed, says that propitiation "supposes, first, a subjective atoning, or reconciliation in us: and then, as a further result, that God is objectively propitiated or set in a new relation of welcome and peace."* In other words, that which really "propitiates" God, or changes his relations to us, is our repentance, our faith, our sanctification. This is what he calls taking off "the pagan color of the word." The process is curious; but the effect is not satisfactory. "He is the propitiation for our sins," becomes an unmeaning proposition, unless what Dr. Bushnell calls the "pagan color" is kept on. "As commonly used by the pagan writers," the word "implies expiation,"† and if it does not imply expiation here, it is inexplicable that the apostle should have used it. The distinction drawn by St. John between the relations of Christ as "advocate," and his relations as "propitiation," is noteworthy: he is the "advocate" of those who "walk in the light," but whose remaining sins need pardon; he is the "propitiation" for the sins "of the whole world," even for the world "lying in the wicked one." In another passage of the epistle, John himself has taken off whatever "pagan color" may have remained in the word, but has taken it off without making the word absolutely colorless, or dyeing it a different color altogether. The word might have suggested that there was hostility in the heart of God until Christ died; the word was unfit to be used at all, unless by Christ's death, God was in some sense reconciled to man. But

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* "*Vicarious Sacrifice*," p. 488. † Ibid, p. 445.

the pagan conception of an avenging, wrathful deity, placated by the blood of an innocent victim, is effectively corrected by the exclamation, "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his son to be the propitiation for our sins." (Chap. iv: 10).

The analysis of the evidence of this doctrine in Paul's epistles would fill a large volume. The first few chapters of the epistle to the Romans alone, afford more than sufficient evidence to sustain our position. In the second chapter and the early part of the third, he has maintained that the whole world—Jew and Gentile alike—is "guilty before God." He is not discussing rival methods of moral and spiritual discipline, and inquiring how men may be made pure and good, but how those who are condemned by conscience, and condemned by the "oracles of God," may be justified. He is anticipating the time when "God shall judge the secrets of men." That the Gentiles were guilty, the Jews loudly maintained: but the condition of the Jews was equally hopeless, for the apostle shows that "by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified." That this argument should be crowned with an unambiguous statement of the doctrine of expiation was inevitable, if Paul believed in that doctrine. Had he omitted all mention of it here, or touched it lightly, no incidental phrases elsewhere seeming to imply it, would have had much force. But where we should naturally expect to find it, there it stands in language which can hardly be strained to another meaning. On the other hand, this is just the place where the other doctrine ought to have been found, if the apostle had believed in a merely subjective atonement. Having affirmed the universal guilt of mankind, he ought to have gone on at once to illustrate the power of the life and death of our Lord over the human conscience and heart, winning the soul from sin by the beauty of holiness, melting it to pathos and tenderness by suffering love, inspiring it with trust by the revelation of an infinite benignity. But there is nothing of all this. It is of our justification before God that the apostle is speaking, and he says we are "justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." He speaks of Christ, not as recovering men from sin in order that God may come to regard them with favor, but he uses the word which has a "pagan color" in it, and says that He is set forth to be a propitiation (through faith) in his blood

—a sacrifice for guilt, with the blood upon it, to secure pardon and justification—not purity—for all who believe. Christ's sufferings are not represented in this passage as intended to make us holy, but "to declare God's righteousness." For centuries God had been passing over the sins of men: in his forbearance he had hidden his anger and his justice; but it is revealed now, and the manifestation of his righteousness was the counterpart of his neglect and long-suffering.* The apostle is not satisfied with affirming this once; he repeats it—that God hath set forth Christ to be a propitiation—not, as some say, to reveal his mercy merely, but "to declare at this time his righteousness; not that *we* might be made just, but that *He* might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." †

Having reached this point, Paul turns aside to discuss the relations of this doctrine of an atonement for all mankind to the prerogatives bestowed upon Abraham. When he returns to his main line of thought, expressions occur again and again which can be accounted for only on the hypothesis that Paul believed in expiation. Christ "was delivered for our offences;" died for the ungodly;" "while we were yet sinners Christ died for us;" "we are justified by his blood;" "when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son." ‡

What Paul's doctrine must have been is forcibly shown by the very misrepresentation of it which he found it necessary to refute. He and his brethren so taught, that they were "slanderously reported to say, "Let us do evil, that good may come." When he first notices this perversion of the truth, he smites the slanderers

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* Jowett, *in loc.* † Dean Alford's notes on this passage are very admirable.

‡ The last passage may, perhaps, be claimed on the other side; and if it were an isolated sentence, its interpretation might be doubtful. But in its actual place, we hold that it can have only one meaning. (v. 10.) "If when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life," is a parallel to verse 9: "Much more being now *justified* by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him." The second clause of verse 10, the being "saved by his life," corresponds to being "saved from wrath through him;" and the first clause, "when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his son," corresponds to "being now justified by his blood." The passive use of ἐχθροί is exemplified in chapter xi: 28 ("as concerning the gospel, they are *enemies* for your sake; but as touching the election, they are beloved for the Father's sake,") and is necessary to the even run of the passage. The reconciliation spoken of here is on God's part to us, not on our part to God.

down with an indignant anathema—"whose damnation is just." But this was not enough. After developing his doctrine of justification, he thinks it necessary to meet it deliberately, and asks the question, "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" No such misrepresentations would have been possible if he had taught that Christ atoned for our sins simply because by his sufferings and death there is a change wrought in us by which we are reconciled to God.* Whatever other evil results may be ascribed to the "moral theory" of the atonement, not even the most prejudiced and fanatical opponent could charge those who held it with encouraging men to continue in a life of sin. There is no point in the development of that theory at which it would be rational to introduce the discussion which occupies the sixth chapter of the epistle to the Romans. But with the theory of an objective atonement, and a divine system of government resting upon it, the misrepresentation was possible, and the discussion necessary. Paul therefore proceeds to show that although "remission of sins" comes to us as one of the direct results of the death of Christ, another result is the passing away of our old life, and our resurrection with him to a new life in God. It is not the apostle's doctrine that through Christ we receive a new life which secures release from the guilt of former sins, but that through Christ's death and resurrection the sins we have already committed are pardoned, and that the evil nature which was the root of sin is supernaturally regenerated.

We have not attempted to present the argument from the apostolic epistles in a complete form. It cannot be so presented. In many evangelical systems of theology may be found a classification of the passages in which the death of our Lord Jesus Christ is represented as a *ransom*, as a *sacrifice*, and as a *sacrifice for sin;* passages in which it is said that *he died for us;* that he *bore our sins;* that he *took away our sins;* that he is the *propitiation for our sins;* that he was *made sin* for us; that he was *made a curse* for us; that *through his blood*, *remission of sins* is conferred upon all who believe. But we repeat, this method of illustrating the scriptural argument, strong as it is, fails to convey the impression which is received from a careful and thoughtful study of the epistles themselves. Let any man who has no

* Bushnell's *Vicarious Sacrifice*, p. 450.

antecedent moral or intellectual bias, read the epistle to the Romans, the epistle to the Galatians, the two epistles to the Corinthians, the first epistle of St. Peter, and the Apocalypse, (we purposely omit the anonymous epistle to the Hebrews,) and we think he can hardly resist the conviction that whether the apostles were right or wrong, and whether they had a consistent and articulate theory of the atonement or not, they believed—

(1) That whatever may have been the human passions and the accidental circumstances which led to our Lord's crucifixion, his death takes the place of the second death to which we are liable on account of sin.

(2) That therefore the death of Christ has relations to the eternal law of righteousness, which God honors in his government of the universe, and is not simply an appeal to the human conscience and heart—a "moral power" to effect our restoration to a devout and holy life.

(3) That it is on the ground of Christ's death that human sin is pardoned.

The worth of the apostolic testimony to these great truths may be invalidated, by alleging that while the apostles received from Christ during his earthly life, and perhaps after his ascension into heaven, a revelation of the substance of the Christian revelation, the form in which they conceived it, and in which they communicated it to others, was necessarily imperfect, and can have no permanent authority. We must separate, it is alleged, the real and essential ideas of the Christian faith from the temporal vesture in which they were clothed. We are no more bound by apostolic forms of thought than by apostolic forms of speech. As we do not express Christian doctrine in the same dialect, we need not shape it in the same intellectual moulds. The apostles —Jews themselves, and for the most part writing to Jews—thought and wrote as Jews. We belong to a different race, having different traditions and a different culture; we must think and write in our own way; we may preserve the substance of the truth while changing its form. In other words, the doctrine that Christ is an expiatory sacrifice is a Jewish way of stating a truth which it is possible for us to state in another way altogether.

We are not disposed to be very careful about how the truth is stated, if the truth itself be preserved. To very much that is

urged as to the differences between ancient and modern thought, and the necessity of varying from age to age the forms in which religious ideas are presented, if the ideas themselves are not to become unintelligible, we are quite ready to assent. The language and imagery of the epistle to the Hebrews would not have been used by an inspired teacher writing for Englishmen of the nineteenth century; and the whole structure and coloring of the argument would have been different. "They shall perish, but thou remainest; and they all shall wax old as a garment; as a vesture shalt thou fold them, and they shall be changed." The imagery of these words addressed to the Creator of the visible universe, and contrasting his eternity and immutability with the transient splendor and certain decay of all his works, is equally true in another region of thought.

Human conceptions of God and of his acts, even though these conceptions be derived from supernatural teaching and from institutions divinely organized, are transient and temporary; they never adequately represent the infinite realities for which they stand: we "know in part," and at every approach to "perfect knowledge," that which is in "part shall be done away."

Let the idea which underlies the conception of a vicarious sacrifice for sin be kept unimpaired, and, though we may doubt whether any new symbols and expressions have yet been discovered which represent the idea more perfectly than the old, we shall be satisfied. It is not the name but the thing, not the conception but the fact, about which we are anxious. The name, however, was always inappropriate; the conception was always not merely imperfect, but wholly false, if the death of Christ did not constitute the objective ground for the forgiveness of human sin. This belongs to the very substance of the apostles' thought; it is not the temporary vesture of their faith, but their faith itself. Every article of their creed is dislocated and disturbed if this is not recognized. It affects, not merely their exposition of Christian doctrine, but the very spirit of their Christian life. If we annihilate this, we do not merely change the form in which they conceived of the effect of the death of Christ on the relations between God and man; we must renounce the very substance of their belief, and reconstruct the whole Christian system.

To most Christian thinkers there are considerations of another order which will have great weight in the determination of this

controversy. It is alleged that the death of Christ is represented in the New Testament as a sacrifice for sin, because *sacrificial forms of thought had been worked into the very life of the Jewish race.* How did this happen? On any theory that acknowledges Jesus of Nazareth as "a teacher sent from God," the divine origin of Judaism must be admitted, whatever becomes of the inspiration of the Old Testament; the institutions were divine, whatever theory we may hold about the books. "Forms of thought" derived from a ritualistic system established by divine authority are not to be lightly abandoned, especially when habitually used by men who, whatever may be our belief about the mode in which revelation came to them, and the limits of their spiritual knowledge, are confessed to speak under the authority of God.

Again, it so happens that while Paganism and Judaism were in conflict on many of the gravest questions touching religious truth and practice, they were perfectly at one in maintaining that sacrifices were necessary to atone for human sin. It looks as though this conception were of such importance and value, that Divine Providence had taken care that it should be familiar to the whole human race, so that when the apostles taught that God laid on Christ the iniquities of us all, and that through the blood of Christ we have forgiveness of sin, they might be intelligible to all who heard them.

And now, if it be a revealed fact that Christ's death is the objective reason for the pardon of human sin, can we see how this fact is related to the general system of God's moral government? In entering on this inquiry, it is necessary, first of all, to determine the fundamental idea of the divine government. Is the moral law, which it is the highest function of God to sustain, simply the expression of the divine will, or is it independent, necessary and eternal? The history of opinions on the *fons et origo* of moral distinctions includes the whole history of ethical philosophy. Among Theists, the controversey is now practically reduced to the solitary question whether truth, justice, charity, or any other moral virtue, is good because God commands it, or whether God commands it because it is good. Is the will of God the original ground of moral obligation, or is God himself righteous simply because he is true to the eternal law of righteousness?

If an appeal be made to the natural and uncorrupted instincts of man's moral nature, the answer to this question will be definite

and prompt. The distinction between truth and falsehood, justice and injustice, is never conceived of as arbitrary. It is thought of as lying in the nature of things, and as belonging to a sphere in which omnipotence is powerless. The obligation to do right extends to all beings who are capable of moral action. No reason can be imagined why any moral being should be released from it. Is it because of my weakness that I am bound to be just? Does the authority of the law of righteousness press most stringently on those who are least able to inflict injury on others? And is the authority of the law gradually diminished with every accession of intellectual and physical power, until in the presence of the Omniscient and Almighty, it vanishes altogether? Our moral nature recoils from this monstrous and incredible hypothesis. Wherever there is any moral life, the moral law is supreme. The very least are sheltered by its care; the greatest are not exempted from its power. And it is the chief glory of Him who is enthroned above angels and men, that from eternity to eternity the law of righteousness receives the homage not only of his infinite power, but of his infinite love.

This is the instinctive testimony of the moral nature of man when uncorrupted by the traditions and speculations of an ignoble philosophy.

Nor does God himself claim any relation to the moral law which implies that it is the creature of his will. The devout believer in divine revelation need not fear that he is guilty of presumption in refusing to acknowledge that the bare command of God could destroy the obligation of virtue, or make vice obligatory. No assertion or implication of a prerogative so wild as this, is to be found either in the Old Testament or the New.* The question which Dr. Twisse took the pains to discuss, and which he virtually determined in the negative, "*An voluntas Dei justitiâ reguletur?*" is not an open question with prophets or apostles. Abraham reasoned with God against the apparent injustice of the doom which impended over the cities of the plain, and was not rebuked; it was conceded by implication that "the judge of all the earth" is bound to "do right." The moral per-

* It was a common sophism among the Cartesians that to affirm the independence and eternity of the moral law is to deny the divine freedom, and to bind the actions of God in the chains of a blind and eternal fate. Leibnitz justly says that this is to confound metaphysical and moral necessity. *Théodicée 2e partie*, p. 180.

fections of God are constantly appealed to as the highest reasons for the love, the reverence, the trust, the obedience, which God claims from all mankind; but if there be no eternal and necessary distinction between God's moral perfections and their opposites,—if they derive all their virtue and all their glory from the determination of his will,—if righteousness is right only because he commands it, and if sin is evil simply because he forbids it,—what reason is there in asking us to honor God because of his justice, his goodness and his truth? According to this hypothesis, had God willed another set of moral distinctions, we should have been equally bound to honor tyranny, cruelty and falsehood. It denies that moral qualities, whether in God or man, are themselves admirable; in us, certain moral qualities are admirable, because he has commanded us to exhibit them. But why are they admirable in him? No praise is left to God but this,—that he is faithful to laws which are not authoritative in themselves, but which he wills to observe; that he has attributes which are not in themselves morally good and beautiful, but which he commands us to think so.

Admitting, for a moment, that moral obligation has no existence antecedent to the divine determination that certain things are morally right, how does the divine will originate moral obligation? Why does truth, for instance, become obligatory when God commands it? On what does the moral authority of that law rest? Why am I bound to obey? Am I bound to do God's will because God has been infinitely kind to me? That involves the concession of an eternal obligation to avoid suffering. Because, as a creature, I am naturally subject to God? That involves the concession of an eternal obligation resting on the creature to obey the Creator. So far from the commands of God originating moral obligation, "duty" is inconceivable if moral obligation does not exist antecedently to the divine commands.*

Deny the independence and eternity of moral obligations, and duty vanishes from the universe. Nor is this all: reason remains for fearing God because of his infinite power; but the splendor of his moral perfections is extinguished. "The only view of the connection between religion and morality which does not annihilate the very idea of the latter, is that which considers

* Cudworth has put this admirably in the second chapter of his *Immutable Morality.*

the Deity as not making, but recognizing and sanctioning moral obligation." *

It is humiliating to a Christian philosopher to be obliged to confess that, on a question so fundamental as this, the position of Mr. Mill should be sounder and nobler than that which has been occupied by some great theologians. But Mr. Mill might have gone further, and maintained that the view against which he protests annihilates not only the idea of morality, but the idea of religion too. Cocceius, referring to the opinion that the distinction between right and wrong is not from nature, but of positive institution, justly says: "Than which opinion, none can be devised more pernicious, and none more effectual for undermining all religion, striking at the very root of the divine justice and the necessity of a Saviour, cutting out the vitals of piety." †

Conscious of the chaotic inconsistencies into which this hypothesis must betray its adherents, many theologians have taught that the origin of moral distinctions is to be found in the *nature* of

* J. S. Mill's *Dissertations*, vol. i, p. 125. Turning to verify the above quotation, the reviewer discovered a passage which he had forgotten, but which had, no doubt, unconsciously to himself, determined the very expression of part of the preceding paragraph. It is quoted here, partly because of the unintentional coincidence of form, and partly for the sake of protesting against the implication in the sentence italicised. Mr. Mill says: "To have inquired, *Why am I bound to obey God's will?* would to a Christian of that age (he is speaking of the whole course of English thought down to the middle of the last century), have appeared irreverent. It is a question, however, which, as much as any other, requires an answer from a Christian philosopher. "Because he is my maker," is no answer. Why should I obey my maker? From gratitude? Then gratitude is in itself obligatory, independently of my maker's will. From reverence and love? But why is he a proper object of reverence and love?" &c. Mr. Mill must have forgotten for the moment that Cudworth's is only the brightest name in a constellation of English Christian philosophers who investigated the original grounds of moral obligation, and arrived, on principles very different indeed from his own, at the conclusion that the Deity *does not make but recognize and sanction moral obligation.* Even among the Puritans, and though Dr. Twisse presided over the Westminster Assembly, there was a far truer conception of God's relation to moral law than Mr. Mill seems to imagine was all but universal among Christians. The gross theory that all moral obligations are derived from the divine will, was held by very few. Maestricht, after stating the theory that the nature, not the will of God, is the ultimate ground of the moral law, adds, "Sic Reformati communiter, si unum excipias (probably Dr. Twisse) et forte alterum (Rutherford?) qui existimabant justum et bonum esse quidvis, quia Deus *vult:* non autem Deum *velle*, quia justum ac bonum sit." (Theoretico-Practica Theolog. lib. ii, cap. xv. parag. 31).

† Quoted by Witsius, *Div. Cov.* book i, cap. iii.

God. For ourselves, we believe that moral perfection is necessarily implicated in our very conceptions of the modes, and if we may so speak, the conditions of the divine existence. The idea of God is the intuition of the higher reason, and involves the affirmation that in him the ideal law of the conscience assumes objective reality. But if it be maintained that moral distinctions are *derived* from the divine nature,—the conception of the divine nature itself being determined not by the moral faculty, but solely by metaphysical necessities and logical inferences—then this second hypothesis is as untenable as the first. If the moral law be good and right, simply because it is the expression of the attributes of an omnipotent and omniscient being, on what ground are the attributes themselves to be called good and right? or, to put it differently, if an angel is morally admirable only because he is like God, on what ground is God himself to be adored?

If the attributes of God are the ultimate and ideal standard of moral perfections—as they are in one sense, but not in the sense in which the words are used by those who hold the theory on which we are animadverting—what praise, or indeed what meaning can there be in saying that these attributes are themselves perfect? Goodness must be *in itself* deserving of honor, or we cannot be required to honor any being, whatever his power may be, because he is good.

But the independent and supreme authority of the moral law is acknowledged by those Christian theologians who, in our own day, reject the doctrine of a vicarious atonement. They do not impeach the legitimacy of our moral perceptions, which affirm that there is an intrinsic and necessary distinction between right and wrong. They are the disciples of that illustrious succession of philosophers who, from the time of Plato, perhaps from the time of Pythagoras, have contended for the validity of those eternal ideas, first principles, innate ideas, laws of belief, first truths, principles of common sense, which alone render a theory of morals possible. They confess that it is God's glory, not that his will originated the moral law, but that his will has uniformly honored and asserted its authority.

Implicated in the acknowledgment of the eternal authority of the law of righteousness, is the acknowledgment that the violation of that law is justly followed by suffering. We are very far from accepting the extravagant statements of those divines who main-

tain that God's veracity, or his honor, or what they call his vindictive or vindicatory justice, obliged him to inflict the punishment due to sin; but that wrong doing deserves punishment is a law as absolute as that all moral beings are bound to be righteous. Our conviction that sin is justly followed by pain and loss, is one of those ultimate beliefs which cannot be resolved into any simpler elements. In whatever sense any moral conviction can be called universal, innate, necessary, this conviction is universal, innate, and necessary. The consciousness of moral responsibility implies—according to Mr. Mill it is identical with—the consciousness that if we do wrong we shall deserve to be punished.*

It is not, however, as Mr. Mill would argue, the expediency of punishment as a means of correcting the wrong-doer, or defending the interests of Society, that constitutes its justice. Mr. Bentham, or Mr. Bentham's translator and interpreter, M. Dumont, was conscious that his definition of the suffering inflicted as the penalty of crime—une *dépense* que fait l'Etat *en vue d'un profit*, ce profit c'est la prévention des crimes,"—was remote from the common conception of the processes of criminal justice, and was likely to be condemned as singular and affected. † It is not the language merely, but the idea, which the popular mind rejects: the question of the justice of a punishment is antecedent to the question of its expediency. We have to determine whether we have a right, in any particular case, to punish at all, before we are at liberty to discuss whether the punishment is likely to prevent the recurrence of the offense.

Our whole theory of the atonement will be vitiated if there is any uncertainty or indistinctness in our apprehension of this fundamental principle. If the divine penalty which follows sin has no other end to answer than the good of the universe, if it is not a recognition, on the part of God, of the essential evil of sin, and an act of divine homage to the eternal law that the wrong-doer deserves to suffer, our scheme of the divine government will rest on no solid foundation, and will have no place for an expiatory sacrifice.

Through hesitation and want of clearness on this point, the rationale of the death of Christ given by some orthodox theologians is open to annihilating criticism. They have regarded punish-

* Mill on Sir W. Hamilton, p. 507.

† Cette expression . . . . sera d'abord accusée de singularité et de recherche.

ment as having for its sole purpose the production of an impression upon the moral universe, and they have, therefore, represented the death of Christ as nothing more than an awful tragedy, intended to produce a moral effect upon the human conscience and heart. Their account of the atonement, stated briefly, amounts to this: It is quite true that there was nothing to prevent God from pardoning sin without expiation. He might, had he pleased, have simply cancelled the penalties of transgression: but it would have been very perilous for the moral universe to know this; and, therefore, to sustain the impression that sin must be followed by suffering—*though the impression itself is false*—God surrendered his only begotten son to shame, agony, and death: we theologians, indeed, are too wise to be deceived; but the deception is a salutary one for the commonalty of the race.*

Our philosophy, on the other hand, requires us to affirm that in the pain and the loss which God inflicts on wrong-doers, he is not only maintaining a salutary discipline, intended to deter men from sin, but acknowledging and honoring the law that the sinner deserves to suffer. Therefore, if the sinner is to be released from the suffering he deserves, a double question arises. (1). How can the ill-desert of sin be still recognized? (2). How can the moral results of punishment be still secured? The discussion of the second of these questions lies beyond our immediate purpose.

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* Without accepting Dr. Hodge's own theory of the nature of the satisfaction offered by our Lord to the principles of eternal justice, or approving the language which that theory suggested, his keen criticism on the fallacy of this view of the atonement may be quoted as quite unanswerable. "The atonement is an exhibition of God's purpose to maintain his law and inflict its penalty, and thus to operate as a restraint and a motive on all intelligent beings, *because it involves the execution of that penalty.* It is this which gives it all its power. *It would be no exhibition of justice, if it were not an exercise of justice; it would not teach that the penalty of the law must be inflicted, unless it was inflicted.*"—Princeton Essays, (American edition), First Series, p. 319. The Rev. James Martineau contrasts "the old Calvinism," which rested the necessity of an atonement on God's retributive justice, with the "new Calvinism," which rests it on the expediency of impressing the universe with the evil of sin, in language which, while it seems to us very unfair to the theologians who have developed the later theory, does not exaggerate the hollowness of the theory itself. "The theory of Owen, stern as it is, bears the stamp of resolute meaning consistently carried through into the inmost recess of the divine nature. The newer doctrine is the production of a platform age, which obtrudes considerations of *effect* into its thoughts of God and his government, and can scarce refrain from turning the universe itself into a theater for rhetorical pathos and *ad captandum* display."—*Studies of Christianity*, p. 163.

But is it possible for the sinner to be released from the suffering he deserves? If not, of course there can be no occasion to inquire on what conditions release can be granted. There are many indications that for the next quarter of a century the most formidable objection to the idea of expiation will rest on the ground that the laws which punish wrong-doing are irresistible in their action; that as it does not lie within the province of the divine will to repeal the precepts of the moral law, its penalties are equally independent, absolute and necessary. The same spirit that refuses any acknowledgment of the supernatural, and constructs a scheme of the universe resting on the hypothesis that there is nothing to be seen or known which is not the product of inviolable laws—the same spirit that destroys religious faith by denying a living and personal God, and destroys morality by denying the possibility of a free human will—reveals itself in the practical denial of the personal government of the moral universe, and in the theory that all the sanctions of the eternal law of righteousness are self-acting, and that God cannot, or at least will not prevent, in any case, the complete exhaustion of the complete penalty of transgression.

In our former article we gave extracts from Dr. Young's interesting and able treatise on "The Life and Light of Men," in which this dogma appears to be strenuously maintained; although we were at a loss to reconcile them with other passages in which he seems to hold a very different position. We cannot but believe that a man of Dr. Young's ability organized these apparently conflicting statements into a consistent and harmonious theory before publishing them, but we have tried in vain to resolve the discord. Whatever his view may be, there can be no doubt that the inordinate and blind devotion of the modern intellect to the conception of the history of the universe, as an eternal sequence of antecedents and consequents, uncontrolled by the action of any real will, divine or human, is bringing us very rapidly to the startling conclusion, that God never remits the punishment of sin, for the simple reason that the punishment cannot be remitted. "It must come down. It lies in the nature of things that it must come down. Ever and ever, justice inflicts an inevitable penalty, and exacts the complete satisfaction." There is a certain terrible fascination in the very sternness of this doctrine; but is it true?

If true, it is in strange contradiction to the conviction of thoughtful men in all ages and countries. Men have clung to the faith that there is a life beyond death, because they have been confounded by the apparent absence, in this life, of any equitable adjustment between human character and human condition. They have recognized the rudiments of a moral order, but only the rudiments; the laws which should punish vice and reward virtue have appeared to be thwarted and baffled. Neither external evils nor interior shame and anguish have seemed invariably to follow great crimes; and the lives of saints and heroes have seemed to be a perpetual struggle with every form of suffering.

And what are these laws which "avenge themselves" and dispense punishment or reward, visible or invisible, or both, "and in the exact amount in which either is merited?"

There are physical penalties for physical sins. By the structure of our physical organization, drunkenness, gluttony, impurity, entail certain forms of disease. But the entail may be partially cut off. There is provision in nature for remedying the evil consequences which these vices inflict. With the progress of medical science, new resources are at our disposal for arresting the natural development of the diseases which are the natural punishment of sin; and it would therefore seem that in the struggle between the human intellect and those natural laws which are holy, just and good, the intellect may win very substantial victories.

Of two men, both of whom have been guilty of the same excesses, one is rich enough to command the highest medical skill, and to spend six months at German baths, where the healthful waters partially renew the exhausted vigor of youth; the other is too poor to fight against the vengeance of violated laws, and his remaining years are years of suffering and prostration. Either the poor man suffers more than the just physical penalty of his sin, or the rich man suffers less. If the one does not suffer more than he deserves, the other, by the very assistance, not of Ahriman, but of Ormusd, escapes a large part of his merited punishment. As instruments and agents of Eternal Justice, physical laws are untrustworthy; gold bribes them, science masters them.

The provision which has been made by the merciful creator and ruler of our race for averting or alleviating some of the worst

physical results of vice, suggests, even apart from revelation, that we do not live under a moral constitution in which the penalties of transgression are invariably exhausted. Not the miracles of our Lord alone, but the curative agencies, which from century to century are discovered by human science, confirm the hope that we may escape the suffering which we righteously deserve; only, having escaped it we must "sin no more, lest a worse thing come upon us."

Self reproach is another of the penalties of wrong-doing; but this too, is most uncertain in its operation. The greatest criminals often suffer less agony of conscience from their worst crimes than many pure and sensitive souls from their lightest faults. This penalty actually becomes less terrible as guilt becomes more atrocious; the fires of moral anguish are deadened and quenched by the very sins which they should punish.

The moral judgment of mankind is another sanction of the moral law. We naturally desire the esteem, and dread the censure of our fellow-men. The universal indignation and loathing which are provoked by discovered treachery and cruelty are among the most intolerable tortures to a man whose moral nature is not altogether hardened. But sin must be *discovered* for these penalties to descend. These penalties, at least, are not "inevitable." They are not "certain." It cannot be said that "they must come down." Sometimes the public discovery of sin is made at once, and for the rest of his life, the wrong-doer has to endure the disgust and contempt of all about him; sometimes the sin is not known till long after it is committed, and the public shame covers only a few brief months or years; sometimes there is no scandal till the death of the offender has made the judgment of men a matter of indifference to him. Does he whose guilt is known before sunset, and who bears the burden of his shame for half a century, suffer only the just penalty of his offense? What, then, becomes of the righteous retribution, when the guilty man, with a hardened conscience, perhaps, and without fear of detection, lives in wealth and honor till old age, and is overtaken by tardy vengeance, only when life is almost over? And what becomes of this sanction of the law, when the sin is not discovered till after death, or, as in many cases, never discovered at all?

By far the strongest part of the case of those who assert "the inevitable punishment of moral evil," and that "the justice of the

universe, in this sense, is a tremendous fact, an eternal and necessary fact, which even God could not set aside," rests upon the laws of our spiritual being. But even though it were granted that the laws of the human soul are inexorable, and that the interior loss and evil which are the just and natural result of sin cannot be averted, the apparent uncertainty of the other penalties of wrong-doing requires to be accounted for, and to be harmonized with the theory which absolutely denies the possibility of remission of punishment. Either the spiritual penalty alleged to be certain, is adequate, and then the other penalties, when inflicted, are unjust; or the spiritual penalty alone is inadequate, and it requires to be shown how the uncertainty of the supplementary evils included in an exhaustive satisfaction is to be remedied.

Is it true, however, that even the spiritual penalty is inevitable? Can it be demonstrated that the laws are "inexorable" which punish sin with the degradation of the spiritual nature, the decay of those powers which render a pure and noble life possible, and the loss of capacity for the divinest joys?

No doubt every transgression of the law of truth, of generosity, of purity, is followed by instant and certain moral deterioration. By the constitution of the soul, habitual sin infects it with mortal disease. This, though not the only penalty of moral evil, is one of the most terrible; we should not cavil if it were called the most appalling. We venture, however, to challenge the assertion that even this penalty is always and everywhere exhausted. Here are two men, both of whom have been guilty of sins which corrupt the fountain of life. In both, the authority of conscience has been violently shaken and almost overthrown. The moral perceptions of both have been perverted; and to both, the eternal distinction between good and evil is becoming vague and uncertain. If they drift on from crime to crime till they sink into the abyss of irretrievable moral ruin, the spiritual laws which they have violated do but inflict a righteous penalty. This seems likely to be their common fate. Against the malignant forces which they have suffered to rise in revolt against reason and conscience they have no power to struggle.

But one of them is not left alone, and in his dark and evil days, a love clings to him which no guilt can quench and no shame repel. He is brought under the spell of an angelic purity. Every transient and feeble impulse to a better life, which, if

unsustained by eager and happy sympathy, would have spent its strength in vain regrets, is cherished and intensified. His despair of himself gradually gives way under the indestructible faith which has vowed to effect his reformation. His faint efforts to break the chains which lie heavy on his better nature—efforts which are again and again defeated—are again and again renewed, under the inspiration of the hope and affection which refuse to abandon him. Gradually, after many grave relapses, as the result, perhaps of years of persistent and patient devotion to his redemption, the victory is won; and, although the traces of old sin still remain in the soul, and the fallen man never recovers in this world his "ancient seat" of glory, and the fair inheritance of those who have never grievously sinned, he lives

> "In view
> Of those bright confines . . . .
> Or else in some bright zone
> Dwells, not unvisited of heaven's fair light,
> Secure."

His confederate in guilt, forsaken and unfriended, sinks from month to month, and year to year, though not without occasional but ineffective endeavors to escape from the passions of which he is the victim, into darker and still darker depths of sin, till at last he is altogether lost.

What is to be said about "inevitable" penalties, in the presence of these dissimilar issues of the same sins? We do not intend to suggest that there is any uncertainty or irregularity in the action of "spiritual laws" considered as structural laws of the higher life of the soul; but when their penalties are considered as adequate sanctions of the eternal law of righteousness, we find it hard to understand how these laws can be appealed to as always exacting the "completest satisfaction." In the one case, being uncontrolled by the interference of affection and purity, intent on rescuing the sinner from destruction, the irresistible force springing out of the essential constitution of things, whereby sin punishes itself, finally extinguishes the very life of the soul. In the other, that same irresistible force is overborne and ultimately subdued—not by the superior moral energy of the man's own spirit, but mainly by the zeal and patience and heroic love of a nobler nature. If—to resort to the dilemma already urged

—the one man endures no more than the righteous consequences of his sin, the other endures less. The case is a moral parallel to that of two drunkards, one of whom, being uncared for, dies under an attack of delirium tremens, while the other recovers, through the skill of his physician and the assiduity of his nurse.

About the ultimate "revelation of the righteous judgment" of God, the fear of which has haunted the souls of men in all countries and all ages, and to which the New Testament bears unambiguous testimony, we think it unnecessary to speak. This, at least, will not be the blind Nemesis of unconscious law, but the manifestation of the moral displeasure and resentment of a living person. Enough, we think, has been said to show that those forces which belong to the constitution of the universe of human society and the soul of man, do not inflict the penalties of wrong-doing with that unvarying and inflexible rigor which is ascribed to them. We seem to be surrounded with a thousand hints that we are not bound irrevocably to the just and natural consequences of our sin; that we live under a moral constitution in which the penalties of wrong-doing are not uniformly exhausted.

Nor can we see that there is anything ignoble in the desire to escape punishment. Miss Cobbe, whose little volumes on intuitive morals and duty, are among the most beautiful and valuable contributions to recent ethical literature, writes, as we think, under the influence of a positive moral fanaticism on this point. She says:—

"God executes punishment on all sin in his double capacity of sovereign judge of the universe, and father of spirits. As judge he executes the eternal law by inflicting equivalent *retribution* on every offender against that law: as father, he inflicts on all his children the correction which their moral welfare demands. . . . On *these* grounds, what room is there for the *remission* of the punishment of sin. Shall we ask the judge of the universe to forego the demands of the everlasting law, and to inflict on us less *retribution* than we have been proved to deserve? Shall we ask the father of our spirits to withhold the *correction* which he has seen is necessary to purge and heal our sick and sinful souls, and restore them to virtue?" *

Ask for less correction than is necessary to restore us to virtue? No. But the instincts which assure us that God is merciful as

* *Religious Duty*, p. 242.

well as just, encourage us to cry for remission of punishment. And we are sure that in the actual presence of the righteous penalties of sin, Miss Cobbe would forget her philosophy, and become an active party in assisting the sinner to escape. If a stranger in her house were lying prostrate under physical weakness and suffering, which were equitable consequences of his excesses, she would watch by his bedside, and endeavor by her loving and hearty ministry to rescue him from the just punishment of his wrong-doing. If a friend had committed an offense which the interests of society did not require to be publicly revealed, she would keep his secret and save him from the disgrace which would be only the righteous retribution of the sin. If she were shamefully injured by one whom she had trusted, we are greatly mistaken if her generous nature would not lead her to renew her confidence long before the offender had any right to claim it.

But the human heart is stronger than any theory of ethics; and what she calls "the pitiful cry" of the crouching slave shrinking from the lash—"Spare us good Lord," "Deal not with us according to our sins, neither reward us according to our iniquities,"—will continue to ascend, not merely from the selfish and the cowardly, but from the most magnanimous and devout souls, as long as there are sins to confess or sorrows to dread.

Some of the grounds on which the necessity of the atonement has been commonly rested, by orthodox theologians, appear to us really to support this theory, that remission of sin is impossible. It is alleged, for instance, that "it is not consistent with the *truth* of God not to execute the threatening of his law; for this would not only be giving up and making void his law, but acting contrary to his own declarations. Divine threatenings are *predictions* declaring what shall be, and what God will do in case of transgression of his law." * But the divine "threatenings" were not threatenings with an alternative: they did not *predict* that either the sinner himself must suffer, or a substitute suffer for him. If God is obliged by his veracity to punish sin, his veracity obliges him to punish "the soul that sinneth." †

Equally unsound, as a reason for the necessity of Christ's sacri-

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* Hopkins' *System of Doctrines*, vol. i, p. 396. (Boston, U. S., 1811).

† "To attach the penalty to *the person of the offender* is as much the provision of the law as to denounce it: they are equally component parts of one and the same regulation." Robert Hall's *Works*, vol. i, p. 493.

fice, is the argument that the debt of suffering incurred by sin must be paid to the last farthing, and that the penalties of the outraged law must be rigorously inflicted. As a matter of fact, according to the faith of those who believe in the atonement, the debt of suffering has not been paid; nor have the penalties with which sin might have been justly avenged been exacted. As soon as the theory is introduced that the sufferings of Christ were not identical in amount with the sufferings of those for whom he died, and that the dignity of his person gave an infinite *moral* value to sorrows which were not themselves infinite, the commercial idea vanishes. And those who do not believe that Christ endured the stings of remorse, the sense of hopeless and deserved exclusion from the divine love, the horrible slavery to evil passions, and the "second death," which are the ultimate penalty of persistent sin, cannot affirm that the very penalties which the guilty had incurred were inflicted on him.

Great confusion has arisen from confounding two very different propositions. Our moral nature is resolute in affirming that it is an absolute and eternal law, that the sinner deserves to suffer. But our moral nature does not affirm that the moral governor is obliged to inflict all the suffering the sinner deserves. If there be any trustworthiness in our moral intuitions, the exercise of mercy in the remission of the penalties of sin, is not only no violation on God's part of the eternal law of righteousness; it is one of his strongest claims to our moral reverence and love: but that he should require obedience to its precepts is an imperative and unchangeable obligation. Dr. Hodge, whose singular clearness of thought and felicity of expression give his theological writings very great value, even to those who differ most widely from his theological position, has justly said that the precepts of the law declare "what it is right for him to inflict."* Exactly: but in this antithesis all is said that could be said about the penalties, and about the precepts very much less. For the precepts declare not only "what it is *right* for God to require," but what he *must* require. This cannot be affirmed of the penalties; if it could, the possibility of an atonement and of the remission of sins would be annihilated. The precepts cannot be relaxed. Every moral being, by virtue of his moral nature, is bound to obey them. They refuse all compromise. They imperatively demand the personal

* *Princeton Essays*, First Series, p. 314.

and perfect obedience of every one who is capable of recognizing and submitting to their authority. But when the conscience is asked whether God is obliged to inflict on every sinner the ultimate penalties of disobedience, it hesitates, and suffers the heart to cling to the hope that he may be "merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and plenteous in mercy."

Apart, however, from the revelation of God's righteousness and grace in the atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ, the human mind would have endeavored in vain to solve the great difficulty which theologians have represented under the rude form of a conflict between the divine justice and the divine mercy. We have an indestructible conviction that it is honorable in God to forgive; but the conviction is equally strong that he is bound to recognize the law that the sinner deserves to suffer. The fact of the atonement having been revealed, and the sacrifice of Christ presented as the objective reason for the remission of sin, it is the function of theology to show that in this sacrifice there is an adequate recognition of the law which remission appears, if not to violate, at least to pass over and ignore. Is theology equal to the task?

It is possible that the atonement belongs to a region of the divine government, inaccessible as yet to human speculations, and that a devout soul can do nothing more than receive, with the humblest trust and gratitude, the divine assurance that the death of Christ is a sufficient reason for releasing the penitent from the penalty of his guilt. This has been the conclusion of some who have meditated most profoundly on the moral relations between man and God. They have believed that the whole subject lies within the shaded frontiers of what John Foster calls "that awful darkness which encompasses on all sides our little glimmering field of knowledge."

This reverential homage is infinitely nobler, and, on the highest spiritual grounds, infinitely safer, than any attempt to construct a theory of divine procedure by the aid of the mere technicalities of human legislation, or by logical processes which lie beyond the province of the conscience, and the successive steps of which cannot be separately verified by that moral sense which the theory is intended to satisfy. We believe that the rationale of the atonement, which for eight hundred years at least has been accepted by the theologians of Christendom, and the rudiments of which may be traced in the literature of the earliest Christian

centuries, is in substantial harmony with our deepest moral instincts; but there is too much justice in the charge that in the logical development of this doctrine theologians have lost sight of those eternal principles which underlie all the acts of God's moral government.

As the atonement is alleged to be the ground on which the penalties of sin are remitted, the true solution of the great problem, if a solution be possible, must be sought in the moral reasons on which those penalties rest. If what has been already said concerning the essential idea of punishment can be maintained, the penal legislation of God is the divine recognition of the law that the sinner deserves to suffer. The salutary impression produced on the universe by the evils inflicted on the transgressor is an incidental, though important result of punishment, not its original and fundamental principle. It is the function of Him who created all races of moral beings, and in whose will the moral law, to which they owe obedience, is resumed, invested with personal authority, and allied with the resources of omnipotence, to assert the principle that suffering is the just result of sin. If he does not assert it, by whom can it be asserted? In giving existence to creatures endowed with the perilous but glorious prerogative of moral freedom, he accepted all the possibilities which their freedom involves. If they sin, he cannot decline to recognize their sin; nor can he evade the recognition of the law which declares them obnoxious to punishment. But for him they would never have existed at all. The evil they commit became possible, through the exercise of his creative power. He cannot look on with passive indifference while they violate the eternal law of righteousness.

We miss the deepest significance of the penalties which come upon transgression, if we forget that, immediately or remotely, they are inflicted by God himself. If they came of themselves, and were the effects of a blind and unconscious necessity, they might still be awful warnings to all who were tempted to sin, but they could be nothing more. No moral character can belong to facts which do not spring from the free action of a moral being. The infinitely various evils which avenge wrong-doing arise from the constitution of the universe which God's will determined.*

* In a sense sin is its own punishment: the loss of purity is a calamity as well as

In adjusting the physical laws of man's nature, in fixing the relations between his intellectual and moral life, in providing for the development of those moral principles which are wrought into the structure of human society, and which control all the vicissitudes of national history, the divine power and wisdom were the ministers of the divine holiness. Not by accident, not by necessity, but by the action of God's will, freely acknowledging the infinite and essential superiority of moral perfection to mere happiness, the whole creation is in league with the eternal law of righteousness. And if the warnings in the New Testament of future judgment and final retribution are not the wild threatenings of a morbid fanaticism,—if the terrible metaphors have any solid meaning,—the divine will may be expected to assert in the most direct form the ill-desert of the sinner, and to inflict by an awful and irrevocable expulsion of the impenitent from fellowship with eternal life and light, the ultimate penalty of persistent and invincible antagonism to goodness.

The moral significance of the punishments which God inflicts on transgression is to be measured by his infinite love for his creatures. If he were indifferent to their happiness and their destiny, if it cost him nothing to cast them away from his presence—the profoundest moral element of God's acts of retributive justice would disappear. The sins of his creatures trouble him; their sufferings trouble him. The incarnate Son did not cease to be "the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person," when he was so deeply moved with compassion by the physical evils of man, that he released them by the direct exercise of his supernatural power, from the diseases and deformities which his own laws had inflicted on them. Those who saw him weep over Jerusalem, when the calamities which were to come upon it rose vividly to his mind, saw the Father.

"God cannot be tempted of evil;" but if he could, surely the temptation would come in an appeal to his reluctance to permit any, even the lightest sorrow to cast its shadow upon his moral creatures. They were made in his likeness; they are more than his creatures; they are akin to himself. His love for them makes

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a crime; but the eternal law which declares that the sinner deserves to suffer, is not to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than that sin deserves to be sin; it asserts the justice of sin-entailing suffering which can be discriminated from moral evil itself.

it hard for him to punish them, and invests his acts of retributive justice with awful solemnity.

That the *moral effort* necessary to execute the penalties of violated law is the highest moral element of punishment, is acknowledged by the common instincts of men. What is meant by the law being more honored when a man of high rank suffers the just reward of his crimes, than when one of the common people suffers precisely the same penalty? Something, perhaps, is to be ascribed to the impression produced by the tragic contrast between his station and his doom; and something to the fact that his elevated position awakens universal interest, both in his offense and its punishment. But what is especially significant in his fate is this—that justice is felt to overbear all the common influences by which men are swayed: his hereditary honors, his social power, his wealth, might be expected to prevent the course of law, and, in a state in which the judicial authority or the executive power was accessible to inferior influences, secure his immunity. When such a man is put on his trial, the fidelity of the public ministers of justice is tested; and if they do not swerve from the line of judicial duty, the law receives unusual homage—homage derived not so much from the rank of the criminal who suffers, as from the steadfast and resolute integrity which does not permit his rank to shelter him.

The same principle is to be applied in another form to the penalties inflicted by the divine ruler. Suffering in itself is an evil thing. In itself it cannot be regarded with satisfaction, either by God or any other holy being. Its moral value lies in this—that although God finds delight in the happiness of his creation, he voluntarily inflicts punishment rather than permit the eternal law that the sinner deserves to suffer to be unrecognized and unhonored.

But as a recognition of the ill-desert of sin, the moral value of God's act in atoning for sin far transcends the moral value of his act in punishing it. There is grandeur in the moral effort which inflicts penalties; but the grandeur of the moral effort which voluntarily endures them, in order that the guilty may be pardoned, is infinitely greater. Now, the theory of the Christian atonement is that Christ is God manifest in the flesh; that he chose to submit to penal suffering rather than to inflict it. Had the penalty of transgression been executed on the race which had

sinned, the execution of them would have been his act, and would have derived its moral significance from his love for the race which he punished. As we have already maintained, it belonged to him as the moral ruler of mankind to assert the law that suffering is the just result of sin. Instead of asserting it by inflicting suffering on the sinner, he suffers himself that he may be free to forgive.

Nor is this all. To affirm that in the atonement of Christ, the moral ruler of our race endured what he might have inflicted, is an inadequate representation of the truth. If God's love for the guilty invests the divine act which punishes them with profound moral significance, the love of the eternal Father for the Son invests the divine act which surrendered him to humiliation and death, that the ill-desert of sin might be recognized before it was pardoned, with infinite sublimity. He spared not his only begotten Son, but freely gave him up for us all. The mysterious unity of the Father and the Son rendered it possible for Deity at once to endure and to inflict penal suffering, and to do both under conditions which constitute the infliction and the endurance the grandest movement in the moral history of God.

We utterly reject that crude, and, as we think, immoral conception of the Christian sacrifice, which implies that God was indifferent whether the sinner suffered, or whether some innocent being suffered for him, if only the penalty of the law was executed. To punish the guiltless that the guilty may go free, seems to us an insane violation of the fundamental principles of equity. The theory that the personal dignity of our Lord invested his sufferings with their expiatory value—a theory which obviously involves the principle that any of God's creatures whose position in the universe is sufficiently illustrious, may, by the voluntary endurance of pain, effect atonement for the crimes of those who have violated the divine law—is equally opposed to the moral instincts of our nature. The punishment of sin is a divine act; and if sin is not punished, some other divine act of at least equal moral intensity must take its place. Not the dignity of Christ, but his position as the moral ruler of our race, invests his agony and death with all their atoning efficacy. For God to have inflicted the penalty of sin on any innocent creature, instead of being an act of homage to the law, would have been a violation of its essential spirit. He chose to suffer rather than to punish.

Our conception of the atonement admits of being expressed in four brief propositions, of which the preceding pages are the development:

(1). It is an eternal and absolute law that sin deserves punishment.

(2). It is the function of God as the creator and moral ruler of the universe to recognize this law.

(3). The moral significance of punishment inflicted on the sinful lies in its being the voluntary recognition by God himself of the ill desert of sin.

(4). The surrender by the eternal Father of the only-begotten Son to penal suffering, and the Son's voluntary endurance of that suffering constitute a divine recognition of the ill desert of sin far transcending in moral sublimity the infliction of punishment on the guilty.* The limits of this article forbid us to discuss the conditions under which expiation by the vicarious suffering of the moral ruler is admissible. It is, however, our firm conviction that every theory of the atonement is incomplete which does not distinctly acknowledge that no provision for the recognition of the ill-desert of sin could be a satisfactory reason for remitting its penalties, apart from a provision for inspiring the sinner with penitence, and purifying his whole moral and spiritual life from evil. Orthodox theology has not failed to insist on the sanctifying influence of the Christian sacrifice; but it has erred in not including this influence among the reasons which render it morally possible for the divine government of our race to rest on the ground of expiation. It is because the death of our Lord Jesus Christ is not only the highest expression of the law that suffering is the just penalty of transgression, but also the mighti-

* In the article already referred to [*Theological Eclectic*, vol. iv,] we dwelt at length on the emphasis with which the inspired writers insist upon our Lord's death as distinguished from his moral sufferings. To those who accept the authority of the Holy Scriptures, it is superfluous to offer any proof that death is a penal result of sin. In reply to those who maintain that death is simply the necessary result of necessary physical laws, it may be well to say that we have no knowledge of what man's physical life would have been had he not sinned. They cannot tell what provision God might have made for overruling, by the action of higher forces, the tendency to physical dissolution and decay. On the hypothesis of the existence of a living and personal God, such provision is perfectly conceivable. Anyhow, death, *as we know it*, and as it was endured by our Lord, is universally represented in Holy Scripture as the penalty of transgression; and the instincts of human nature support this representation.

est conceivable appeal of the divine love and holiness to the heart and conscience of the transgressor—an appeal which, but for sad experience, would seem to have altogether irresistible power—that the endurance of suffering by a divine person can be permitted to take the place of that punishment which the transgressor himself deserved. That the moral power of the death of Christ is not diminished, but indefinitely increased, when it is regarded as the objective ground of forgiveness, the closing chapter in Dr. Bushnell's "Vicarious Sacrifice," to which we called attention in our former article, sufficiently demonstrates.

The renewal of this great controversy imposes grave obligations on evangelical theologians. It will not do for them to fall back on the learning of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is not Socinus and the authors of the Racovian catechism that the doctrine of expiation has now to fear; and if Calvin and Turretin and Grotius, Howe and Owen and Baxter were living now, they would not be satisfied with a mere reiteration of the arguments by which they met and confuted the heresies of their contemporaries. To disguise from ourselves the existence, among devout and thoughtful men, of profound and general dissatisfaction with the form in which the theory of the atonement is commonly stated, is worse than useless, and will soon be impossible. Unless we are prepared to investigate the causes of the dissatisfaction, and to clear our theology of the fictions and technicalities which make it morally untenable, the idea of expiation itself will be imperiled. As yet we see but faint indications that the representatives and trustees of this great truth are at all conscious of the severity and magnitude of the contest which is imminent. Can their silence indicate that doubt has penetrated even more deeply and widely than we ourselves suspect? This will become the general conviction, if they continue silent much longer. We shall be grateful, if what we have written, though it may fail to solve the perplexities which are disturbing the faith of many, should induce a solitary theologian, here and there, to turn aside from the investigation of the controversies of remote centuries, and endeavor to render to our own age the same service which the men he loves and venerates rendered to theirs.

XV.—SECRÉTAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL FREEDOM.*

When the French mind has been brought under the influence of religion, it seems peculiarly suited to excel in the sphere of Christian apologetics. The metaphysics of a French thinker are singularly clear, even when profound; and his literary instinct, if not vitiated by vanity, enable him to present truth in its most attractive forms, and argument in the shape which offers least hold to sophistry. The courtiers of Louis XIV. inspire so little sympathy that the majesty of Bossuet tells upon the modern reader less than it would otherwise have done, but Fénelon is as subtle as Clarke and more readable. There is no name among German apologists that can be mentioned in the same breath with Pascal, or even with good old Abbadie; and we have ourselves no representative for whom we can put in such a claim, except Bishop Butler, and for him only in his own peculiar line.

Such being one of the aptitudes of the French mind, we might naturally expect to find it largely developed in a country speaking the French tongue, and however jealous of its political independence, sharing the great gift and tendencies of the race. Nor are we disappointed. Alexander Vinet alone would have been enough to make his country illustrious; and Ernest Naville and Charles Secrétan belong to the same generation, being by about twelve or fifteen years the seniors of the great Christian moralist and critic.

Vinet never published any professedly apologetical work; but the *Discours sur quelques sujets religieux*, which first appeared at Basle, in 1831, revealed in him a most eminent master of the nominally indirect, but effectual, method of apology which consists in commending religious truth to every man's conscience by the simple manifestation of the truth itself (2 Cor. iv: 2). He showed in this and in all his subsequent works, that the religion of redemption presents the heart with an object such as can satisfy the infinite cravings, and the conscience with the rule after which it aspires. He showed that the message of divine forgiveness reaches man in the depth of his being, reconciling his

* From the *London Quarterly Review* (Methodist), Oct., 1867.

instinctive love of happiness with the austere sense of obligation to pursue moral excellence for its own sake, and bringing all his power and feelings into harmonious coöperation. Vinet could not deal with any problem of life, or touch upon any question of education, morals or politics, or analyze any master-piece of literature, without having before his own mind, and suggesting to his readers, at once the glorious prerogatives of the human race, by original creation and birthright, the tragical realities of life, as sin has made it, and the revelation of the resources of infinite wisdom and love in the process of recovery. Emphatically a Christian thinker, his last words, uttered about two hours before he ceased to breathe, were characteristic: "I can think no longer."

M. Ernest Naville's principal works have been the long and valuable preface to his edition of the inedited works of Maine de Biran; the life of the same metaphysician, with extracts from his journal; the biographies of Father Girard and of Prof. Diodati; and the two series of lectures published under the titles of *Eternal Life*, *and The Heavenly Father*. He has exhibited himself as an able, brilliant, devout and catholic defender of faith in God, and, more summarily, but with an equal efficiency, of the specifically Christian faith in redemption. Maine de Biran has been his principal master in psychology, and Prof. Secrétan in the higher walks of philosophy; but the great French writers of the seventeenth century seem to be his favorite study, and he is comparatively little conversant with the German metaphysicians.

Less popular than Naville, less literary in his tastes, and brilliant as a writer than either Naville or Vinet, Prof. Secrétan is an eminently original thinker, and at the same time one who has passed through the most violent intellectual gymnastics practiced in German schools of thought. He was a pupil of Schelling in his second period, and not uninfluenced by him, though claiming independence for the principal features of his philosophical system. He appears to have studied our modern English metaphysicians very little; and, except in the preface to this last edition of the *Philosophy of Freedom* where Mr. Mill is sometimes mentioned in connection with Positivism, their names are not to be found upon his pages. His scheme is not the less a fortress commanding the field in which the disciples of Hamilton and Mansell, Mill and Spencer, McCosh and Calderwood, are battling; it

looks as if it had been built for that purpose, though really erected some years before these controversies opened.

But if our author does not seem to know much about Englishmen, may we not in our turn care to know little about him? Metaphysical speculation is not popular among us; it is one of the few stimulants which Englishmen are never tempted to abuse. May not the very title of this paper be enough to make some of our readers skip its pages as school-boys do the moral of a story?

We are not without misgivings, but we must contend that none who are capable of entering into subjects of this order should turn away from them without some qualms of conscience, for if ever there was a day in which Englishmen stood in need of a sound philosophy, it is the present. They who will not take the trouble are in danger of becoming or remaining all-unconsciously the disciples of a false philosophy; the fear of metaphysical discussion, as Dr. McCosh says, makes them fall into the net of sophistical metaphysics, "like those excessively cautious and suspicious persons to be met with in the world, who are so afraid of everybody cheating them, that they become the dupes of those more designing schemers who are ever warning them against the dishonesty of others." How often men profess to have no philosophy, but that of common sense, or of the Bible, while others can detect the injurious influence of the utilitarianism of Paley or Bentham upon their character or piety; how many minds, partially drawn into the vortex of Positivism, are only saved from its conclusions by a sort of voluntary blindness. It is not altogether unjust of foreigners to accuse us of feeling less need of consistency with ourselves than they do. That Englishman is too often to be met with whose religion, and science and metaphysics are hopelessly at variance with each other, and who gives himself no trouble on the matter except that of taking them up separately by a sort of instinctive precaution, like chemical elements that must be kept apart lest their contact should produce an explosion. He closes one drawer before he opens another; puts the glass stopper on the acids before he handles the alkalies.

Let us not be misunderstood. A hearty lover of truth, with large views, and a reverent fear of trifling with facts in any sphere, may find himself, for the present, unable to reconcile beliefs which he is not the less constrained to accept as true when he contemplates them alternately; and in such a case he will

wisely refrain from fastening precipitately upon some forced solution of his difficulties; he will wait in faith for the larger generalization that is to make all clear—aye, and die in that faith, if Providence should so require. But this act of humble and believing self-restraint is not to be confounded with the mere indolence that tries to hide its repugnance to any kind of intellectual toil under the cloak of piety or common sense. The labor of which we are capable is part of our fealty to the truth, and he who withholds it will be punished by the narrowness of his piety, or by the bad conscience that hangs upon and clogs his science, or by both together; we are never wrong with impunity.

The fact is, man is a born philosopher; we may not all be dialecticians; we are not all capable of drawing out, ring after ring, the chain of adamant on which a general cosmic scheme is suspended; but every human being above idiotcy forms for himself some conception of the world as a whole, and of his own relation to it. He has no choice; the philosophy may be grand and true, or mean and false, but he cannot do without it, and it is invariably a practical philosophy. The scheme of creation entertained by a London rough may include little more than a certain sum of sensual pleasures, coupled with the contents of his neighbor's pockets and the disagreeable presence of the policeman at the corner, but his philosophy is not the less true to our innate tendency to a synthetic view of things, and such as it *is*, it leads to prompt and cautious action. The world of a very frivolous young lady may consist essentially of articles of millinery at the center, and possible husbands at the circumference; but her circle is shaped as mathematically as if it were bigger, and her philosophy is as practical. From Tom Coffin's stand-point, the final cause of the existence of land, was that one might have a place upon which to dry one's fish, with mud bottoms for anchorage. The professional thinker tries to grasp in one system the whole known universe and his own place in it; his practical life may not be as immediately and as manifestly determined by his speculations, as is the case with those whose horizons are narrower; but it is so ultimately. He fixes for himself and for those who take his opinions upon trust, the method that is to be followed in all inquiry, the frame into which all acquisitions are to be fitted, and the principles by which all conduct is to be judged; and these principles are sure to filter through the mass of society,

and leaven the views of persons who have never heard of his name.

The fatal influence of Materialism in the high places of philosophy at the time of the first French revolution, is an instance of the danger of thus poisoning the rivers and fountains of water, and we may soon become only too familiar with similar results in this country. The assertions of the sophist in repute become the common-place traditions of the crowd, and they tell upon conduct in directions which seem at first sight altogether independent of philosophical speculation, as when both materialism and skepticism are seen to make men submit more unresistingly to all shapes of despotism. Thus Hegel was in favor with the court of Berlin, because his fatalism was rightly held to be anti-revolutionary. But if the consequences of speculative error are felt in all spheres, they are especially destructive in the highest, because they fall in with those secret influences of our fallen nature which draw men away from the source of light and life. Doctrines upon which no one could profess to act in common secular affairs recover their credit in a sphere where the realities that should neutralize them are out of sight, and the tendencies that put them forward as a pretext are equally powerful and insidious. Nor should a half-cultivated public be allowed to suppose them unanswerable by argument.

People happily may be religious without being metaphysicians. There are many instances on record of people who have got rich without metaphysics—nay, and tastes are such that it is possible some may find other reading more amusing than metaphysics. But it is certain that the habitual abstinence of the great body of intelligent Englishmen from the higher walks of thought for some generations back has told most injuriously upon art, science, and theology—upon every intellectual and moral province of our national life. The great ice-fields of the Alps may wear a cold and forbidding aspect, and only be reached by arduous ascents; but the relief and volume of the glacier determines the direction and the force of the stream that is to lay waste or else to enrich the valley; and the waters *will* find their way down. The elements that are at work in the higher regions do inevitably act upon the daily life, the pursuits and interests of multitudes who never visit the lofty solitude.

However, let the reader be reassured; we do not want him to

become a member of an Alpine club. He is only asked to follow with some interest from a distance the progress made by another up these giddy heights. This paper can be but a sketch—an attempt to set forth results rather than the process by which they were attained. We believe that any trustworthy philosophy must be accessible to all cultivated capacities, and the system before us, though resolution and perseverance are required to master it, is preëminently a philosophy of common sense. The author does not trifle about *phenomena and noumena*, but sets out boldly with the assumption of the authenticity of the reports made by the several human faculties. Skepticism cannot be refuted by reasoning, he says, with quiet irony; so that it would be very embarrassing if it could exist, which happily it cannot.

The *Philosophy of Freedom* was a course of lectures first given in the Academy of Lausanne in 1844 and 1845. It was nominally but the *prolegomena* to a moral philosophy; but, as we shall see, it followed from the very nature of Prof. Secrétan's views upon the universal constitution of things, that the attempt to determine the place and the principle of morals led to the exposition of the whole theory.

The edition of 1849 consisted of two volumes. In the first, after retracing the various attempts to reach the absolute throughout the whole history of philosophy, the author set forth his own *regressive metaphysics*, reasoning upward from the visible world with the free agents upon it to its cause and principle. It was practically a vindication of Theism. The second volume contained *progressive metaphysics*, reasoning downwards from the character of God to creation and redemption, showing that, without the recognition of a fall and of a redemption, the facts of nature, of history, and of every man's personal experience, would constitute an enigma equally dark and terrible; insoluble by reason and allowing the heart no refuge from despair and horror. It was at once a vindication of Christianity and a necessary complement of the previous exposition of Theism, because it proved that faith in God could not be maintained without faith in redemption; that he who would stop short in Theism must be beaten alike on the ground of speculation and on that of experience.

The volume before us is the reproduction of the first volume of the former edition, together with the four first lessons of the

second volume, being the part of progressive metaphysics which concerns creation and the manifestation of the divine character in it. This simplifies our task; for, if Prof. Secrétan is remarkably sober in his language, seeming jealously to weigh every word lest he should go beyond the conclusions he is entitled to draw, he is equally distinguished by boldness and originality of thought. There is much in the second part to which we could not do justice except at a length inconsistent with our limits, and there are points on which we should have to reserve our judgment.

M. Secrétan is arrested at the very threshold of his inquiries by the various philosophies of nescience. He does not notice that of Hamilton and Mansell; but he introduces the present edition by a preface of eighty pages, defending metaphysics against continental Positivists: Comte, Littré, and their followers set out with the fundamental proposition that the human mind is incapable of attaining absolute truth on any subject. We cannot seize, they say, the essence, the first cause, the final destination of anything; we are only cognizant of phenomena and their succession; there are no *a priori* affirmations of the mind constituting its native structure; there are no propositions of which the contrary is inconceivable according to the very laws of thought; the elementary truths of arithmetic and mathematics are but facts acquired by generalization from particular observations. We know that two and two make four, because we have always found it to be the case, &c. It is easy for our author to show that writers of this school are perpetually inconsistent with each other and with themselves. As it is not in man to carry out effectually that suppression or mutilation of thought which is their passion, they are constantly trespassing upon the ground from which they have warned away others, giving explanations that transcend the mere registry of phenomena—that is to say, propounding metaphysics of their own which only differ from those of their adversaries by being false.

Observation tells us that animals see with their eyes, and it tells us no more. The unsophisticated mind, from its innate disposition to ascend to the causes of things, and to find order and unity in the world, concludes that eyes were made to see. The Positivist is indignant at this attempt to assume anything beyond the bare fact observed, and in the same breath he proceeds to explain that the faculty of adjusting itself to necessary functions

is a property of living nature, and that the eye is therefore the product of this power of self-adaptation. Surely this proposition is as much a piece of metaphysics as that which it is intended to supersede.

The Theist and Positivist both go higher up than the simple phenomenon, the one accounting for it by a divine purpose, the other by a self-created faculty of all animated nature. It is thus with all the other negations of the system; notwithstanding all his professions, the Positivist is unable to refrain from attempting to satisfy the instinct of causality that is in human nature; he owns its existence by the very attempt to feed it with trash.

The affirmations, as well as the negations of the Positivist, betray his unconscious submission to *a priori* laws of thought of which he denies the existence or the legitimacy. Thus M. Littré speaks of the boundless universe: who told him it was boundless? Observation is limited. Where then is his authority for this jump from the finite to the infinite? Positivists are ever dwelling on the invariability of the laws of nature. We, too, believe in law, by virtue of that original constitution of the mind which prepares it to rise from a certain number of facts to the conception of a general law, but by what right does the Positivist assume that the facts he has observed will continue to be repeated in the same circumstances? It is true, indeed, he wants the doctrine of the continuity of nature to secure the world against any intrusion of supernatural power; but he can only attain the idea by a process which he has repudiated as illegitimate.

Every phenomenon naturally suggests two questions, continues M. Secrétan: how is it produced? secondly, why? The first question is to be resolved by observation; the second should not be allowed to interfere with it, and so far the exclusion of the search after final causes in physics is right; but when science has registered its answer to the question *how*, the human mind continues to ask *why*? Metaphysics appeared early in human history; the question children are ever asking was also that of the race in its childhood—*why*? But it will never lose its interest, and its suppression would be the suppression of reason. The distinction of the three ages, theological, metaphysical and positive, expresses an incontestable historical fact; the present age is positive, in so far that in it alone observation has been allowed its

due place; but there never will be an age exclusively positive; the true value of the increase in accuracy of observation is that it lays a foundation for sounder theology and surer metaphysics.

Positivism according to the theory should be neutral on religious questions; but its continental adepts at least are not so. Comte erected his personal antipathies into a system, his followers are ever assuming for their professed ignorance the rights of negative demonstration. Truth is but relative, they say; we know nothing about the absolute; and the very next moment it appears they know enough about it to deny its existence! They are as sure that there is no God as if they had visited all the universe, and ascertained that he was nowhere. "The world," says M. Littré, "is constituted by matter and by forces —matter of which both the origin and the essence are inaccessible to us, and forces inhering in this matter." A little further on he pictures man as finding himself alone in the immensity of space "without other masters, sureties, or forces than the laws that govern the universe." How can a man who professes to know nothing of the essence of matter be so sure that the universe contains nothing else? How can one for whom the origin of the world is confessedly an insoluble problem, proclaim with such assurance that its laws are our only masters?

M. Secrétan freely admits that none of our ideas are formed independently of experience; but the history of the acquisition of an idea does not exhaust its contents. The mind brings its own *a priori* faculties to take cognizance of the revelations that sensation makes. The abstract notions of being and cause, for instance, which are awakened but not conveyed by sensations, enter as elements into all experience. "They form the essence of language, without which it would be impossible, not only to express our thoughts, but even to think. The notion of being is involved every time we use a substantive; that of activity or causality constitutes the very nature of verbs."

M. Littré himself lately confessed that a scientific moral system has not yet been constructed on the Positivist platform. A very serious want in the theory of a school that offers to undertake the guidance of mankind; and it is not accidental—the void can never be filled. From no conceivable amount of sensations can the feeling of obligation be distilled: on no possible theory

of mere empiricism can the principle of obligation be explained. The word *law* has not the same sense in morals and in physics. The physical law gives me the simple fact as it takes place under certain conditions; moral law expresses that which ought to be, and which is too often the reverse of the fact. If I wish to do right, utilitarian considerations may direct me, but they cannot create the feeling that I *ought* to do what I know to be right; this *ought* is a primordial feature of human nature. It is all very well to have honorable and benevolent feelings, to find one's highest pleasure in respect for one's self, and in kindness to others, in lofty truthfulness, in serene superiority to evil and suffering, in self-denying charity; but, on the sensational theory, this noble stoicism, or this amiable epicurism, is but a matter of temperament. We are told that "reason judges between our personal and our impersonal impulses;" but on the empyrical hypothesis reason can but *class* our feelings; to speak of its *judging* them, if the word is meant to have a meaning, is to recognize the moral sense. We do not experience the least scruple in repressing some of our feelings and contradicting our desires; whence then the feeling that it is wrong to repress our so-called impersonal impulses? Selfishness may be a great mistake; but whence the *obligation* not to fall into this particular mistake? Vice may be the ruin of body and soul; but why am I *bound* to respect my own being?

Ah, Comte knew what he was about when, to quote his barbarously pedantic language, he said that henceforth "personal morals should be radically withdrawn from the arbitrariness of personal prudence, and fully incorporated into the body of public prescriptions." That is to say, his God being society, the true sanction of his system is the penal code. It will be made to sanction more than personal morals; when man is understood to be a mere receptacle for sensations, the machine cannot be too strictly regulated; thus, when the reign of Positivism comes, liberty of opinion in matters of science, politics or religion will be reduced "*within its normal limits.*" There will be a new clergy and a new index of prohibited books. The congress of Liége and that of social sciences at Berne, have given the thoughtful a glimpse of the sort of tolerance that is to be expected from Atheism, if it ever finds the secular arm at its disposal.

We now leave the preface and come to the *Philosophy of Freedom* itself. According to M. Secrétan, sensible experience alone can supply no philosophy whatever; indeed, vigorously speaking it cannot exist alone. To take cognizance of any external fact, it is necessary to apply to the *data* of the senses those universal and necessary ideas of substance, cause, possibility, reality, &c., which constitute the mind itself. Of course it follows *a fortiori* that the simple spectacle of the external world would not lead up to a first cause, if we vigorously excluded the notions that we find in ourselves and that accompany us to the inquiry. We could not logically conclude from a *finite* universe, however immense, to an *infinite* Creator, nor from contingent to necessary being.

He goes further still. The category of cause, if interpreted to mean simply this, "that everything which exists or happens has a cause," would not lead to a first cause, but to an infinite series, in which every apparent cause would prove in its turn to be only an effect, and so there would be no real cause after all, and nothing to satisfy the craving that had sent us forth upon this endless pilgrimage. No, the consciousness which finds an imperfect utterance in the rule, "everything has a cause," should be expressed thus:—*Things which have their causes out of themselves oblige us to ascend until we find that which has its cause in itself.* There is an instinct in the mind that prompts us to feel after the supremely real Being, and to look upon everything that has not its conditions of existence in itself as a something but partially real, and in which we cannot stop short. The proper name of this instinct is *reason.* Our philosophy is based at once upon sensible experience and upon the necessary laws of mind. The former acquaints us with the limited and the accidental, and reason forthwith takes occasion from the limited and the accidental to aspire toward the unconditioned and the necessary. We may refuse to think, from indolence or fear of what we may find, but if we allow thought to soar heavenward, she cannot rest, she never pronounces herself satisfied, until she has found that for which she need seek no higher cause. But why are we to believe the consequences involved in this obstinate refusal of reason to content herself with effects? Because we cannot do otherwise. We may refuse to interpret our thoughts to ourselves, but we cannot help their existence. The common sense that believes

in the reality of the external world is not more universal and ineradicable than the persuasion that the world has a cause behind it; and again, if this cause be understood as an effect not accounting for itself, that we must look behind it also. The word cause is used here in the most abstract sense. We are not yet supposed to know whether it is a personal Creator or an eternal system of things—some uncreated self-evolving law; all we know at this stage of the argument is that it is not chance, for chance is but a term to express our ignorance without honestly characterizing it as such. Were any one, like Topsy in *Uncle Tom*, to say "I never was made, *I growed*," he would take an uncaused law of growth for the principle of his being, and, however mistaken, would not the less illustrate the mental law of which we speak.

Kant, finding himself unable to refute Hume's skepticism by reasoning, acted like the poor Russian mother who threw a child to the wolves in order to delay them while she tried to gallop away with the rest. He sacrificed the world of sense; allowed sceptics to make it, if they liked, but a well-regulated dream; and then took refuge in the sense of right and wrong, as the solid ground on which the truth of man's being and God's might both be safely rested. But his concessions betrayed him into the untenable position of one who holds a science which is not true, and a truth which is not known, and supposes a determining action exercised by that which is not upon that which is real. We have at bottom the same *right* to believe in our own selves through our consciousness, in the world through our senses, and in God through our conscience.

We cannot logically prove our own existence or that of the world to any one who professes to doubt of either; but we know that such doubt is not serious; we cannot disbelieve in our senses. Our most elementary knowledge then, begins by an act of faith. But we have the same reason to believe in all our faculties as in our senses; he who will believe nothing but his eyes or his five fingers is still far too credulous, for he has not left himself a right to believe in anything. The reality of the absolute cause of the universe has a higher voucher than that of the sun in the heavens, for we know the latter from the simple fact—the *accident* of its existence; but the unconditioned cause of all things is *necessary*. Imagination might picture to itself a world in which

some other kind of agents filled the place of the sun, but no order of existence can be conceived which would not set the instinct of causality at work.

From all this it follows that the reality of the supreme fountain of being is not a thing to be logically proved, any more than our own or that of the external world. The idea imposes itself upon us, and the province of the thinker is not its demonstration, but its evolution; he has to draw out its contents. The truth he has reached as yet is common to the Theist and the Pantheist; and he must now choose between them. This absolute being, of which we have been speaking, this self-originated womb of all things—is it to be understood as a personal God and Creator, or is it a law acting fatally and unconsciously?

In one of the lectures in his work on "*Reason and Christianity*," * Professor Secrétan deals with that popular form of Pantheism which makes it a religion of progress, as when M. Renan says he only asks for two things to explain the universe—an indefinite period of time, and the law of progress. Our author shows that the admission of a self-acting law of progress as an absolute principle, involves the absurdity of creation by nobody out of nothing! Look forward, indeed, and the sides of the angle of progress recede from each other; but look back through the countless ages which geology reveals, and the sides approach until they meet in a point. The doings of this law of indefinite progress followed backwards lead us through a succession of effects even greater than their cause, until we reach a time when there existed next to nothing, and then at last a time when there actually existed nothing, and nothing itself proves to be the universal cause!

However, a Pantheistic theory may be propounded that does not fall into the metaphysical trap which this particular form of the doctrine digs for itself; and Professor Secrétan puts the great question between fatalism and freedom honestly, without trying to take the system to which he is opposed at any disadvantage. Physical science has a natural tendency to decide in favor of fatalism, it meets with law everywhere, it investigates the necessary operation of physical causes; to be able to predict future phenomena is its glory, whereas the acts of free beings lie without the sphere of scientific prediction. On the other hand, we feel ourselves free, or at least that we ought to be so, and we

* *La Raison et le Christianisme.* Twelve Lectures on the Existence of God, 1863.

cannot conceive freedom to be the ideal of our own nature without also seating it upon the throne of the universe. If the world be the result of the necessary action of an infinite principle, there is no room in it for human freedom; we are what we are necessarily, and our particular acts can be but the manifestation of that predetermined essence. It is not upon the simple consciousness of freedom that the author would have us found the persuasion of the divine freedom; consciousness might be subject to illusions, and mistake for freedom a sort of spontaneousness that could co-exist with the absence of real control over ourselves. The final and decisive consideration is the sense of right and wrong; the feeling of obligation supposes me a free agent, and this is an authority I dare not question. Doubt on this point would be criminal. We have a master then; the unconditioned Being whose existence imposes itself on our thoughts is a Supreme Legislator, infinite—but conscious and voluntary source of all order and of moral relation.

The controversy between Theism and Pantheism is therefore summarily decided by the existence of the conscience. We are not under obligation to ourselves, or we could release ourselves from it at pleasure. A stoic like Fichte may summon us to be true to the ideal of a lofty human character, and to all the better aspirations of our nature, but he is obliged to set out with begging the question that we are bound to preserve our own consistency and dignity. Every other attempt at a so-called independent moral system exhibits in one shape or other, the same surreptitious introduction of obligation. No; the law of duty written in our hearts attests our dependence. We are not orphans, for there is One whose claim over us we cannot but recognize, even when we rebel against it. As our existence leads up to the unconditioned, so our freedom requires the existence of unconditioned freedom. Professor Secrétan knows well that human freedom is impaired and practically lost, but the principle is maintained—the prescription kept up—even by the protestations of conscience.

He next asks if a counter proof for this immediate decision, founded on moral motives, may not be furnished by a longer, more strictly dialectical process. He undertakes to set out—not from a true definition of God, but from an elementary notion which every one is obliged to accept. The common basis of The-

ism and Pantheism is this: the universal principle is self-subsisting. The problem of metaphysics, therefore, becomes this: how to conceive absolute being so that its self-subsistence should involve no contradiction. In this argument the usual proofs of the existence of God are replaced by the demonstration of the personality and the absolute freedom of God. Hence the title of the work.

The principle of all existence has its cause in itself, or it would not be the first principle. It is well defined by Spinoza, *causa sui;* but he is not true to the definition, for he proceeds to reason as if the first principle were merely *uncaused;* whereas, if we rightly interpret the instinct which set us upon our search, it must be its own real and active cause. The source from all existence must be fed from itself. Experience shows us in organic beings substances that in an imperfect sense create themselves; their organs are produced by the operation of an internal activity, which in their turn they contribute to sustain. This double and constant movement from the center to the extremities, and from the extremities to the center, we call life; and the production and the maintenance of this living organism is the end of its activity. This mystery is the shadow of a higher. If the first principle be its own active cause, it must not only be *substance* but life; and it must be its own end, existing at once by itself and for itself.

But the idea of life is still inadequate, for the law of a living organism may come from without it, and we are required to conceive a life that proposes its own end, and gives itself its own laws. Here, experience again suggests an order of being that within certain limits complies with these conditions. *Mind* does really though partially determine the nature and direction of its own activity. Our characters, our convictions, our very faculties, are to a certain extent our own work. Then the Supreme Principle is not merely a living being. He is a *mind*. Substance, he is the author of his own existence; living, he is the author of his own substance; mind, he is the author of his own life.

We are proceeding by a legitimate method, for we are but applying the principle of causality to the general notion of being until we can ascend no higher; but to do this, there remains one step more. The first three degrees of being correspond to the different orders of finite realities; to inorganic nature, to organic, and to the human soul. But the minds with which we are ac-

quainted are only partially self-determined: the finite mind is what it is by nature as well as by its choice; it is conditioned, and we are constrained to aspire to the unconditioned or rather self-conditioned; our problem is to represent the first cause in such a way as to leave no room to question its self-subsistence in every sense. We are constrained, therefore, to believe that the Supreme Being is not only mind, or relative freedom, but *absolute freedom;* he is not only a free agent, but he is so by his own choice and gift: his character as well as his existence, his own eternal act. The Absolutely Free is the author of his own mind. The argument may be put summarily in this way: we find ourselves existing, and encompassed with other existences; we are constrained to believe there must be a first *something* from which all the rest has proceeded; this must be of such a kind that no antecedent is required to explain it. Then this first something must be *will*, and that will unlimited by any law or nature in itself or around it: for if such law or nature existed, we should have to ask for its cause in turn, and so on *ad infinitum*. The mind is satisfied when it reaches will.

It will of course be said that this is reasoning wildly above the clouds, with words that no longer represent definite ideas; the proposition that contains the very essence of our philosophy is altogether unthinkable. "So it ought," replies Professor Secrétan. Our distinct intuitions cannot rise higher than ourselves; man cannot by searching find out God. Reason obliges us to transcend reason. The sensible world is the only field of imagination, as well as perception. We can have no proper intuition of infinity and eternity, or of Him who is both infinite and eternal. All we can hope in such a sphere is to see clearly the reason of our ignorance; we have made the nearest approach to understanding the absolute when we are able to tell why it is incomprehensible. Our highest conception, according to the very *data* of the problem, must be that of a being surpassing all that appears to us to be possible: it must be reason demonstrating the reality and necessity of that which reason cannot grasp. That great law of our minds which forces us to seek for the cause of things, can only be satisfied by the conception of a reality of which it is impossible to ask the cause; and if the weakness and weariness of the mind, when imagination has utterly broken down, would be a reason for stopping short in the last effort, it would have been as well not to

have set out at all, not to have asked the cause of anything. To say that there is one, the cause of his own being and of all existence, who is absolute freedom, is at once to indicate his essence, and to mark the impossibility of adequately representing it to ourselves. We contemplate from afar in silent adoration the summit on which human foot can never be set. We are out of our depth—we are swimming in the dark—but the united currents of both logical and moral necessity carry us along in the same direction. The proposition, God is that which he wills to be, involves the creation, by an Almighty *fiat* of all the general laws of the universe, metaphysical and moral, which seem to us necessary, and which we are unable to conceive other than they are. That which is eternal and immutable in our eyes, is so because God willed it so, and willed our minds to understand it so. He is the author at once of the real and the possible; and the impossibilities that we perceive are impossibilities that he has created.

We are conscious of relative freedom under restrictions and limitations independent of those that moral evil has created, hemmed in as we are by time and space. But when reason has constrained us to pronounce that the self-existing must be free, we conceive his freedom as absolute—that is to say, altogether unlimited—and all his attributes are forthwith seen to be comprised in this idea. The very restrictions with which the *fiat* of the Almighty may be accompanied must be understood to form part of his will. The consequences of an act of finite will may be endless; but we have not willed nor foreseen them all, and the determination once put forth, the results are beyond our control. The consequences of infinite will, on the contrary, all that is and shall be, are contained and willed in one transcendent act. There is a necessity of things, but it has been freely determined upon; there are immutable laws, but they have been laid down. He that ordained the order of nature, included in the same act that organization of our minds by which we recognize it as necessary.

In the higher mathematics, and even in simple arithmetic, we are perpetually dealing with quantities which the imagination is wholly inadequate to represent, and the mind can nevertheless satisfy itself as to the truth or falsehood of affirmations made concerning these inconceivable quantities. It is somewhat thus

that we venture to speak of mysteries like self-subsistence and self-conditioning that are too high for us, and yet *must* be. The mount of God may be touched, though it cannot be scaled; and we are constrained to throw ourselves prostrate at its foot, though clouds and darkness are round about its heights.

The free beings that we are conversant with are so by nature; indeed they exhibit evident traces of having been meant by nature to be freer than they are; hence it is natural that metaphysical thought, in its first effort, should fasten upon the conception of a Being infinitely powerful, wise, and good *by nature*, and that from all eternity. The conception is too vast for our capacity; imagination cannot realize it by any representation; but we are accustomed to it, and are not startled by its unthinkableness. Professor Secrétan would replace this conception by another equally unthinkable, and, from its very novelty, more startling—that of a first cause who has no *nature*, but a *character* possessed from all eternity by His own gift, who acts by laws that he has laid down for himself. We pause, and ask if it is not foolish, presumptuous, perhaps impious, to speculate thus concerning the high and Holy One who inhabiteth eternity, to pretend to know what is to be found behind the veil where we may not penetrate?

We are told that he who gave us being, intended that we should trust our faculties, and that they should lead us up to Him. There is a golden altar before that veil. Again, of these two inconceivable propositions, one only has been reached by a legitimate method, and can be verified by its results. The idea of the *uncaused*, necessarily perfect from all eternity, does not satisfy the instinct of causality in the same way as the idea of the *self-caused*; the former leaves unanswered the last question we can ask, whence this eternal perfection? The latter leaves us no question to ask, though the last answer be an inconceivable mystery. He is perfect because he has eternally willed it so. The former, by putting nature instead of free choice at the summit of all being, has established the reign of necessity throughout the universe, has left itself no ground on which to resist the fatalist. The latter, by putting a mystery of freedom at the summit, has secured room for the mystery of creature freedom likewise.

The distinction of good and evil then, has been established by the divine will. To suppose moral order prœexistent and supreme would be to make moral order God. To suppose them

eternally simultaneous, would be to divide the sovereignty of the universe between abstract law and the being consenting to it. A being perfect by nature, and therefore ultimately passively perfect, would be less so than a Being who has freely said, "Let there be perfection!" and who has bestowed it upon himself.

It will of course be objected that indetermination—mere formal freedom—is the lowest kind of freedom conceivable, and therefore that this philosophy sets out with an idea unworthy of its object. But the first known truth is necessarily the most naked and imperfect, that which must be recognized by every school that will not do violence to the most general intuitions. The *minimum* logically precedes the *maximum;* indetermination precedes perfection; potential precedes real existence. It is not to be understood that this logical involves an actual chronological antecedence; eternity transcends time; we are not to suppose that there ever was what we should call a moment in the infinite past during which the absolute remained undetermined—a moment during which he had not yet caused himself in all the fullness of his being and attributes; his virtuality and existence must be co-eternal. The impossibility of pursuing thought independently of the relations of time is one form of our incapacity to grasp the unconditioned.

Spinoza's God was thought without a thinker; his immutable substance an abyss out of which nothing could ever have issued. Hegel's system has to be modified in order to become intelligible; his God was the logical process of ideas and the end in which they were to issue; he forgot that an end involves the intelligence that conceives and the will that pursues it. He made ideas create mind, instead of the mind creating ideas. It has become a common-place of modern Pantheism that God is the notion of the ideal as opposed to the reality, so that to affirm the existence of a being is equivalent to saying he is not God. Personality is relative, they say, therefore there can be no personal God; they who taught so once unconsciously anthopomorphized; they only projected their own image upon the sky. Secrétan confesses in reply that the Theist does find in himself that idea of freedom which he proceeds to attribute without limit to the author of his being; but contends that the proceeding is legitimate: we must make God either greater or less than man, and Pantheists make him less. What constitutes personality is the

possession of the dignity of moral being, the consciousness and the assertion of will. We only come in contact with limited wills, and we awake to a sense of our personality in presence of other persons; but that is no rational motive for contesting the Infinite Will, and the Divine Person. All persons in our experience have bodies: are we to conclude the body essential to personality?

Will is everything in heaven and earth. The several stages of being are marked by degrees of will, or in the lower stages by a sort of foreshadowing of will. Moral being alone is real, all the rest is accessory, and only willed to serve as means, while moral being has its value in itself. We do nothing, we are nothing, but by our wills; and that which we do involuntarily it is not we who do. Will is the essence of mind, ruling over every power; indeed, all our other powers are but inferior states or transformations of will—it constitutes the unity of our being, making all our faculties those of one and the same person. Let it but fail or give way, and all the faculties of the man are no longer instruments he uses, but independent and hostile powers that rend him asunder. The perfection of our being is the perfection of will; the will is the measure of man, since he is valued according to his conduct; our sovereign good is the sound direction and complete satisfaction of the will; nay, the very passions that carry men away like blind and fatal forces of nature, originated in tastes and habits voluntarily allowed and cultivated; so the past determinations of the will can be traced even where freedom has been alienated.

"I AM THAT I AM," said he who appeared unto Moses at Horeb in flaming but not consuming fire. "GOD IS LOVE," wrote John to his little children in the gospel. The former utterance, with its awful reserve, became the Self-existing, while not yet fully revealed; the latter suited the time when grace and truth had come by Jesus Christ.

The formula of Professor Secrétan seems fitted to serve as a transaction between them. God is what he is by his own eternal choice, and he has chosen to be love. The mystery of the ever-blessed Trinity allowed room in Deity for the exercise of love without being dependent upon created being for its objects: plurality and unity coëxisting from all eternity, there could be a circle of mysterious and ineffable communion contained in God himself before all worlds. Our author, however, does not touch

upon this grand theme, except when giving an account of the opinions of Richard of St. Victor. He has to do with the lessons to be learned from our own consciousness and from nature, independently of revelation.

The metaphysical attributes of God—omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience—are evidently contained in the very idea of absolute freedom: our author supposes that this is equally the case with the moral attributes, so far, at least, as they designate the divine character, irrespectively of the shape in which it manifests itself towards created existences. We should have some criticisms to make upon the analysis of this subject, but we spare the reader who has had the patience to accompany us thus far, and with Professor Secrétan, we pass from the sphere of metaphysics to that of theology.

God is love, because he has made himself love—first and supreme grace, containing in itself all other graces, and for which he is to be eternally adored. We bless him for the perfection with which he has clothed himself. The existence of the God of love is the eternal miracle—the cause of all that we know and that we are. Next, creation is to be understood as an act of free grace. God can have been constrained to it by no want in his being—not even that of being surrounded by creatures capable of knowing and loving him. The absolute can feel no want. Creation must have been a perfectly gratuitous act of absolute freedom; creature existence was not necessary to the divine felicity: it pleased God that there should be creatures bearing his image and sharing his bliss, and he is glorified in them; but he did not make them for his glory; he made them for their own sakes. The power, the wisdom, the goodness of God are indeed exhibited in creation; but the motive of creation cannot have been the procuring for himself a glory he needed not. It was the good of his creatures; and if he wills that his perfections should be known and celebrated, it is because the good of his children consists in knowing and adoring them.

Happiness is but the consequence of goodness. It is the consciousness of the reality, the harmony and the plenitude of being. God willed the goodness of the creature for its own sake as an act of free grace, and therefore mediately and indirectly willed its happiness also. Now, willing the goodness of the creature is synonymous with willing its resemblance to God, and therefore

the creature was made free; it was placed in conditions that summoned it to confer upon itself the highest perfection of which it was capable; it was created under the obligation to realize its own freedom, and become voluntarily like God, as it was so already virtually, by the law of its being.

When a plant has passed through the various stages of its development, the seed from which it sprang is produced over again in the ripe fruit with which it ends. The path of the philosophy of freedom leads through a region of metaphysics, but it sets out from the moral instinct, and it issues in the reduction of morals to the all-comprehending principle that the fundamental character of man is the reproduction of the image of God; that his essential calling is to make himself, by his own act, the free and happy being that he was intended to become.

The idea of duty now stands out in all its majesty. Creature freedom involves in itself a law—the obligation to work out its own realization, and to watch over its own preservation. The love that called us into existence, and seeks our highest possible perfection, alone makes it intelligible. Kant and Fichte were right in seeking the principle of moral law in our own nature: but their system requires as its complement the reference of our nature to God, without which the feeling of obligation remains an inexplicable phenomenon. Since the created will is free, it may alienate or destroy its freedom, but it is *bound* to retain and develop that freedom; aye, and to render it inalienable in fact as it is already by right. The moral law is the supreme law of creation; that for the sake of which all the rest was made; that of which all natural laws are the symbols and images. "Make thyself really that which thou art virtually, in principle, in substance: *become that which thou art.*" This is the sovereign and universal precept!

The creature will may constitute and assert itself in a relation of willing subordination, becoming its own master in order to give itself to God; or it may withhold its allegiance, and aim at becoming altogether its own center in a state of selfish isolation. This last choice is self-destructive: it is an effort to break away from the principle of its own being. Could it completely succeed it would be annihilation: but this the creature cannot attain; it can only condemn itself to an inward and devouring contradiction, to an everlasting and ever abortive suicide. The only

way for the creature will to take possession of its freedom and put it forth, and accomplish its end, and retain it unimpaired, or rather to transform it into a higher and holy determination; the only way is the freely loving God, and the willingly giving oneself to him,—free and unreserved self-surrender. As absolute freedom made itself to be love, so our limited freedom must assert and put itself forth in a response to supreme and eternal love. The meaning of creation is love looking forward to love, and that for the sake of the beings who are thus made to love.

By creating free beings, God consented to be no longer the only will in the universe. He limited himself, contradicting, so to speak, the infinity of his nature, because he was greater than his nature. But when created wills lend themselves to be the organs of the divine will, then the supreme being is once more absolute by the gift of his own creatures: in their love he becomes *all* as he was before. Wondrous condescension! He puts it in the power of the creature love to reinstate him in his own place. Hegel's celebrated formula—affirmation, negation, and their common synthesis, the realization of harmony by contrast—magnificent logical type as it is of all development, all history, and all life—is but the pale reflection of the real relation between God and the world.

In the love of creatures for their God, the end of creation is attained. The universe explains itself as a moral reality, in which everything is ultimately resolved into relations of will. The mind is satisfied: it has no more questions to ask. The work of metaphysics is over. Morals, speculative and practical, are complete. On the hypothesis of such a state, the very sense of duty would disappear along with the temptation to revolt and isolation: it would be transformed and lost in the bliss of interrupted communion.

Had creature will resisted the first inevitable temptation to reign in its own name, to assert itself as sovereign, and not merely endowed with conditioned freedom, it would have found in the love of God its end, its reality, and the full satisfaction of its deepest cravings; nor could any power or seduction whatever have drawn it away, and interrupted this blessed and supreme relation. Its love would not have been that of pure grace like God's, but that of gratitude. It would have eternally renewed the miracle of its creation and its own youth and beauty: for it

would have found in God the truth of its being, and beauty is the splendor of truth.

"To love, is to live; to love, is to feel oneself live; to love, is to possess oneself; to love, is to give oneself; to love, is to double one's existence. To love God is not merely to double one's existence; it is to emancipate one's being, in the truest sense, from the limits of finite existence, it is to give ourself the highest possible reality."

"And if feeling is but the echo of the depths within, if happiness is but the consciousness of power, harmony and truth, as wretchedness is that of emptiness, discord and falsehood; it is impossible that the love of God, the perfection of goodness, the plenitude of our being should not also be fullness of happiness."

"Thus the soul that loves God is rich, free, happy: she is satisfied, moreover, and feels no further want. What could tear her from such a condition? Not lassitude or satiety; for *ennui* is but the feeling of a disproportion between the principle of our activity and the object with which it busies itself. If satiety overtakes us in the midst of our enjoyments, it is because our joys are but the parody of happiness. He who is happy needs no diversion. The love of God would leave no room for the desire of change; nothing could turn away from it the soul that had really tasted of it."

Such is the ideal that we contract, says Professor Secrétan, not from *a priori* science, because the acts of absolute freedom could not be anticipated, but as the consequence of the first truth of experience—the certainty that there has been a creation. The next question is, how far have creature wills answered the end of their being? This too, is an appeal to experience, and to meet it we must consult nature, history, and our own heart. The second volume of the *Philosophy of Freedom*, which is not now before us, is devoted to this investigation.

The history of the search after the absolute principle in the various systems of philosophy from the Ionians to Hegel, occupies a considerable part of the first volume. We have not attempted to condense it, but will only say that M. Secrétan succeeds in showing that the great current of metaphysical speculation has not been the mere random and sterile series of contradictions that we are wont to suppose it. His own intellectual predecessors were essentially Duns Scotus, because he dwelled upon the idea

of cause rather than that of being; Descartes, because he attributed to God absolute freedom, though the insufficient development of the idea of self-causation left the way open for Spinoza; Kant, because he felt the imperative character of the human conscience, and the solidity of the support it offers for any weight that can be laid upon it; Schelling in his latest phase, though his notion of the divine freedom was inadequate.

The work which we have attempted to sketch, as much as possible in the author's own words, has attained the honor of a second edition. It has, however, probably been known even by name to very few of our readers. The question may be naturally asked, how comes it that, while the names of Kant and Fichte, Schelling and Hegel are familiar to all cultivated Englishmen, even to those who have never studied them, little or nothing has been heard of a writer whose philosophy should be more to the taste of the Christian public, and is second to none as an earnest, original, and sustained effort of intelligence? The answer is very simple. Professor Secrétan would have been known to the world long since, had he been a German, because his countrymen would have appreciated his labors, and made strangers acquainted with them. Unfortunately he writes in French, and he is not a Parisian. Even a native Frenchman and a Roman Catholic can have little hope of attracting attention, if a provincial: how much less, then, can he have who is a Protestant, and politically a stranger? Literary men in France have hardly as yet come to look upon Vinet even as one of themselves. M. Ernest Naville has yet to receive his letters of naturalization, though his works are translated into English, German, Russian, and, we believe, also into Italian. Rousseau and Madame De Staël were so completely recognized only because they underwent the indispensable baptism of Parisian life.

Minds capable of following the foregoing argument, who are not already committed to some other metaphysical system, must feel that it leads us to higher grounds than any occupied by the leaders of thought amongst ourselves. English metaphysicians seem in a state of confusion, like hostile vessels in a fog; sailing, some of them at least, in directions that they do not mean, and confirmed in their wrong courses by the corresponding mistakes of their adversaries. How poor, and how artificial, and how untrue to human nature does Mr. Mill's positivism look beside the

philosophy of freedom. Here we have will in heaven, and real wills on earth, and reasons for things, and the principle of obligation justified, instead of reducing the *ego* to little, and the *non ego* to less, and refusing even to ask *why*, and extracting moral law from the association of ideas. And yet M. Secrétan could sympathize with all that is right and true in Mill's criticism of Hamilton and Mansell.

Mr. Mansell's position is the most remarkable illustration of the dualism that too often exists between an Englishman's science and his religion. His faith in revelation saves him personally from Pantheism; but his philosophy, taken alone, would but confirm the Pantheism of those who are not kept by faith in revelation. "A cause," he says, "cannot as such be absolute; the absolute cannot as such be a cause. The cause as such exists only in relation to its effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation." Here is an abyss out of which no existence could ever issue; but when it is suggested that the Absolute is his own eternal cause, the proposition may transcend conception, but the supposed inherent contradiction vanishes.

Again, the one and the many, according to Mr. Mansell, are alike incomprehensible, if regarded as the beginning of existence. The absolute, as conceived, is not only capable of a necessary relation to everything else, but it is also incapable of an essential relation within itself; "for if there is in the absolute any principle of unity distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives." We accept the former alternative. Will is the principle of unity and the true absolute, and before it all these unhealthy subtleties disappear. The *Philosophy of Freedom* does but repeat with scientific rigor the process by which the sound uncultured mind rises from nature to nature's God.

If the infinite be but a fasciculus of negations, and the absolute the supposed subject of all possible predicates to an unlimited extent, of course these unmeaning abstractions are self-contradictory; but this cannot be affirmed of the positive idea of unconditioned and almighty will.

We share the indignation of Mr. Mill against the supposition

that justice, mercy, benevolence in God, may mean something so different from the same terms when predicated of man, that we cannot reason from one to the other. Can man be asked to trust an unknown God? Can he be told to love with all his heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, a being whose feelings towards him are represented as something different and inconceivable? The divine perfections surpass conception; but if we cannot measure their *degree*, we understand their *kind*. We cannot gaze upon the sun; but the light upon which we do open our eyes, and for which they were made, does not deceive us as to the nature of the direct solar ray. Our God-consciousness leads us in the right direction, though it cannot bring us to the very presence of Him who dwelleth in light unapproachable. The little child has no adequate and scientific knowledge of the mystery that constitutes paternity, and yet it is not mistaken, when it looks up and says —father.

Vulgar atheism at home and abroad is ever harping on the sophistical argument of Proclus, the Neoplatonician, that the conception of a personal God is an anthropomorphism. Our highest conception of the Supreme Being must be taken from our own nature, because it is the highest we know. It is confessedly inadequate, but so far as it goes must be true; the highest creature *must* be the nearest image of the Creator. We are told that the cause of all things is inaccessible; that it is high out of the reach of our groveling minds, and then the same teachers proclaim it at a zero, a chemical molecule or some blind and fatal force. In order not to make it like man, they make it immeasurably less than man. We know but one real cause—the human will, and it is from it that we rise to the conception of the first cause.

Mr. Herbert Spencer is not a *vulgar* atheist. He is another Mansell, who is not kept from following his principles to their consequences by faith in revelation, and so, while sincerely desirous of reconciling the religious needs of mankind with the conclusions of science, he can attain no higher than the erection of an altar to the unknown God. After showing at length that an inscrutable power manifests itself to us through all phenomena, that the consciousness of absolute existence is the obverse of our own self-consciousness, that in the very denial of our power to learn *what* the absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; he refuses to represent the ultimate cause to himself as per-

sonal, because he repudiates the assumption that the choice lies between personality and something lower than personality.

"The choice is rather between personality and something higher. Is it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical motion? It is true that we are wholly unable to conceive any higher mode of being. But this is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the reverse. Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phenomena? Is it not proved that this incompetency is the incompetency of the conditioned to grasp the unconditioned? Does it not follow that the ultimate cause cannot in any respect be conceived by us, because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived? And may we not, therefore, rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own nature, are not elevations, but degradations? Indeed, it seems somewhat strange that man should suppose the highest worship to lie in assimilating the object of their worship to themselves."

Now we submit that the doctrine of an absolute will presents the character of transcendency which Mr. Spencer requires, while it meets other cravings more necessary and equally imperious. As we ascend the scale of creation, every new order of beings exhibits an essential characteristic that did not exist in the preceding order; but it does not the less retain the character that had marked that preceding order, and all the others that had successively prepared for it. The agency of imponderable forces continues to subsist in the ponderable elements of the world; mineral molecules continue to subsist in plants, though conditioned by the higher principle of vegetable life, the previous element not being lost but carried up; vegetable life continues to subsist in the involuntary functions of animals; imponderable forces and chemical molecules, and vegetable life, and animal instincts and feelings, all co-exist in the microcosm, man. Animals cannot understand man; his being is greater than theirs; but when a dog looks upon his master as another animal—a living creature like himself—he is not mistaken; the conception is true so far as it goes.

The conclusion is obvious: we reach in man the highest known

order of creation, the end for which all the other orders exist—a being able both to appropriate and to understand the world. The transition from this highest creature to God is not a mere additional ascent in the scale of creation, as if God were a man with some unknown higher element superinduced upon humanity. There is no proportion between the creature and the Creator. The unconditioned cannot take any place, even the highest, in any conceivable series. We stand on the brink of a chasm of which we can neither fathom the depth nor measure the width. But experience has taught us that inferior orders of being contain characters common to themselves and to a superior order, without being able to measure the superior. Then, may not the ultimate cause of all things contain in itself something akin to that which is highest in the noblest of creatures, without prejudice to its own transcendent superiority? This is but a surmise founded upon analogy: but it is changed into certainty when the investigation of the universe shows it to be the work of a mind that our own can interpret; when we understand its laws so well that we can predict future phenomena; when the laws of thought constrain us to attribute all things to a cause which is itself an absolute beginning: when, finally, the sense of obligation holds us amenable to a supreme lawgiver. It is not our presumption, it is the adorable grace of our God, that enables us to trace the spiritual kindred of man with God.

We read, "In the image of God made he man." This, our relative divinity, is the strength of the argument for Theism; like is known by *its* like. This, our relative divinity, makes the incarnation credible; it was possible for the eternal Son to make a human will concentric with his own. This our relative divinity made the atonement possible; for it was the reality of our Lord's humanity that gave him the right to take upon him the sins of the race. The same fundamental truth guarantees Theism and Christianity, faith in God and faith in redemption.

XVI.—WILLIAM LAW, AND HIS INFLUENCE ON HIS AGE.*

The Church of England owes a great debt of gratitude to William Law, a debt which is perhaps not adequately acknowledged nor understood. But few men of the present day have even seen Law's works, fewer still have read and considered them. The nine volumes of them which have been published are a scarce book, and many of his works are not contained in these volumes, some being in all probability utterly lost. Of Law no biography exists worthy of the name, although the materials for constructing one are neither few nor scanty. The extraordinary work placed at the head of this article† is a laborious attempt to bring together these materials, and to lay a foundation for an adequate life of Law. But the diligent and enthusiastic writer despairs of finding a competent biographer for his favorite, so transcendent is the genius (according to him) of this great divine and *Theosopher*. We may add that should a writer be discovered to suit his requirements, he would not be a fitting biographer for Law, for his ground of admiration for Law is his mysticism, and mysticism cannot be made intelligible or attractive to the uninitiated. But William Law has far higher merits than those of the mystic. As a controversialist, among the most logical, keen, exact, and conclusive that the Church of England has produced; as a moralist, plain, impressive, exalted; as a champion of practical religion in the midst of a material, scoffing, and corrupted age—he challenges the admiration of all good men. When Law lived and wrote, practical religion in this land may be held to be not unfairly represented by Dr. Trapp, and his famous book, on the "Sin and Folly of being Righteous overmuch;" popular theology found a fitting exponent in Bishop Hoadly, and his "Plain Account of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper;" and the morality of the day may be guaged by the fact that the wives and daughters of the gentlemen of England went, night after night, to the play-house, to hear and enjoy the filthy

* From the *Contemporary Review*, October, 1867.

† *Notes and Materials for an Adequate Biography of the celebrated Divine and Theosopher, William Law.* (Printed for Private Circulation).

licentiousness of Dryden, Wycherly, Congreve, and Fielding. Who can say how much of the reaction against this debasement was prepared by the grave, learned and devout man, who could handle his pen like a master, who was ready to do battle against every form of evil, who annihilated Hoadly, abashed Dr. Trapp, refuted Warburton, and exposed the shallowness of Tindal, who boldly rebuked the blatant vice of the theater, and by his "Christian Perfection" and "Serious Call" drew out from among the mass of carelessness and profanity some master spirits who were to begin the regeneration of their age?* This man has higher claims upon us than his mysticism; and those transcendental and unintelligible rhapsodies which Mr. Walton has heaped up in his "Materials," are by no means, in our judgment, the most fitting monument to "the sublime genius of William Law." We are, however, grateful to Mr. Walton for having got together many interesting facts about the life of Law, and as the publication of Dr. Byrom's Diary† by the Cheetham Society furnishes us with a great mass of additional particulars respecting him, we propose to endeavor to sketch the work and influence of William Law in those profane and licentious times in which his lot was cast.

William Law was born at the small town of King's Cliffe, in Northamptonshire, in the year 1687. His father was a grocer and chandler. He was sent to Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in the year 1705, and, after graduating, was elected Fellow of that Society in 1711, whereupon he took Holy Orders. He retained his Fellowship till 1716, when by refusing to take the oath of allegiance to George I. he forfeited it, together with all prospect of advancement in the Church. Of the second great batch of nonjurors, of whom Law was one, but little is known, and we are inclined to think that the subject would well repay investigation. We know, however, that Law joined with Blackburn in opposing the *Usayers*‡ (the ultra-Ritualists of those days), and that though he would not support the new dynasty, he continued

* The state of religion at this period is well described by a writer quoted by Dr. Parkinson; Mr. Piers, Vicar of Bexley, said "that Deism, together with the formal outward profession of the Gospel, is all the religion that is (generally speaking) left among us.

† *The Literary Remains of John Byrom.* Edited by John Parkinson, D. D. (Cheetham Society. 1857).

‡ Lathbury's *History of the Nonjurors*, p. 371.

all his life eminently faithful to the Church of England. A letter of Law's, written on the occasion of his resigning his fellowship does him great credit. "I expected to have had a greater share of worldly advantages than what I am now likely to enjoy, but I am fully persuaded that if I am not happier for this trial, it will be my own fault."* At this time he drew up a paper of "Rules for his Future Conduct," which exhibits the deepest sense of religious obligation. William Law quitted Cambridge soon after the loss of his fellowship, and his father and mother being now dead, went to reside in London, though it is not clear what means he had of support. His first appearance as a writer was in the famous Bangorian controversy, and it is not too much to say that among all the great phalanx of divines who assailed the latitudinarian Bishop, there was none who handled the preposterous statements made by him more ably, and exposed his sophistries more thoroughly, than the young nonjuror. The compiler of the "Materials" does not dwell with much complacency upon this first performance of his hero, but takes occasion to point out that the High Church principles which appeared in Law's first work were afterwards laid aside by him. We cannot agree with him on these points. We admire Law as a staunch and hearty defender of the principles of the Church of England. We grieve over those mystical tendencies which at length led him into strange utterances, and made him, if not impugn, yet grievously undervalue, the dogmatic teaching of the Church. The one point on which Law unsparingly and triumphantly follows up Hoadly throughout the "Three Letters" which he wrote against him, is the Bishop's unfortunate and, in fact, purely heathen assertion that sincerity is all that is required in religion. "A man's title to God's favor cannot depend upon his actual being or continuing in any particluar method, but upon his real sincerity in the conduct of his conscience."† A young and talented controversialist could scarcely desire a better opening than this, and William Law made a good use of it. His vigorous and pointed hits distinguished him among the number of writers, amounting to several hundreds, who took part in that noisiest of controversies, and Dr. Sherlock, Bishop of London, tried, by the offer of preferment, to secure the services of so able a writer for the Church. Law, however, was faithful to his nonjuring princi-

* *Materials*, p. 344. † Hoadly's *Preservative*, p. 90.

ples, and declined the offers made to him. But more open and unblushing forms of unbelief than those countenanced by the Bishop of Bangor, soon came in Law's way, and engaged his powerful pen. There is scarcely a better specimen of crushing irony than that with which he annihilated the licentious blasphemies of the "Fable of the Bees;" and in his answer to Tindal's "Christianity as old as the Creation," he sometimes rises into real eloquence, while never letting go his tenacious grasp on the fallacies which he is employed in refuting. In the year 1726 Law published his tract against stage entertainments, proving himself therein a worthy successor to Jeremy Collier. The utter pollution of the stage at the time when he wrote, fully justified the unreserved condemnation which he expressed, in demonstrating the "absolute unlawfulness" of such a sink of iniquity to any Christian man or woman. The historian Gibbon, the son of Law's friend and pupil, has ridiculed this performance, but the compiler of the "Materials" very justly observes, "No admirer of sound reasoning, who was a Christian, ever found fault with it, nor is it possible for such an one to do so." In the same year came out Law's first great practical treatise, "Christian Perfection," and in the following year his "Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life." These two works, though not the highest of Law's writings in point of literary ability, are certainly the most important if we judge by their effects. It is scarcely too much to say of them that they were the saving of religion in this land. What Hammond's "Practical Catechism" was for the times of the Rebellion, what "The Whole Duty of Man" was for the period of the Restoration, this, and perhaps more, were Law's serious and solemn words for the dissolute era of the first Hanoverian kings. The great and good Bishop Wilson says that he "read the 'Christian Perfection' over and over, and recommended it so heartily to a friend near London that he procured eighteen copies for each of our parochial libraries, which I have recommended to my clergy after the most affecting manner, as the likeliest way to bring them to a most serious temper." What was the effect of these books on the Manx clergy we cannot perhaps trace, but we can trace their influence in other and more important directions. In reviewing his early impressions, John Wesley says:—

"Meeting now with Mr. Law's 'Christian Perfection' and

'Serious Call' (although I was much offended at many parts of both, yet) they convinced me more than ever of the exceeding height and breadth and depth of the law of God. The light flowed in so mightily upon my soul, that everything appeared in a new view. I cried to God for help, and resolved not to prolong the time of obeying Him as I had done before. And by my continual endeavor to keep his whole law inward and outward 'to the utmost of my power,' I was persuaded that I should be accepted of him, and that I was even then in a state of salvation." *

The last words indicate to those who are acquainted with Wesley's views the ground on which he would afterwards step aside from Law, a divergence which will be more fully illustrated below. But during all the years of Wesley's first phase of religious life, before he had passed into his second stage of the assurance doctrine of the Moravians, Law continued to be his favorite writer. At his religious meetings in Georgia, he was accustomed after the psalm and prayer, to read from Mr. Law's "Christian Perfection," † as being the most edifying book which he could find for his people. Charles Wesley was even a greater admirer of Law than his brother John, and continued for a longer time to be under his influence. ‡

But it was not only in the effect produced on such men as the Wesleys that the power of William Law over his age is to be estimated. Among the gay and careless men of the world, the frequenters of coffee-houses and clubs, there were many whose attention was caught and whose minds were strongly impressed by this earnest and outspoken advocate for religion. One of these men has left us a minute record of his life, and allows us to trace the influence of Law gradually growing over him, until at length he becomes in all points, and to all lengths, his complete disciple and follower. John Byrom having distinguished himself at Cambridge, was elected Fellow of Trinity, but soon afterwards married, and having taken the degree of doctor of medicine, settled at Manchester. Instead of busying himself with medical pursuits, Byrom took up as his employment the teaching of shorthand writing, and in order to carry on this, was usually resident in London, where for the fee of five guineas he imparted to all who pleased to learn, the mysteries of his art. His diary, kept

* Wesley's *Journal*, p. 42 (ed. 1828). † *Journal*, pp. 13, 14.

‡ This is several times asserted in Byrom's *Diary*.

for his wife in short-hand, and his letters addressed to her, have been deciphered and published by Dr. Parkinson for the Cheetham Society. They are almost as valuable a contribution to our historical literature as the famous diaries of Samuel Pepys or John Evelyn, and, as a picture of men and manners in the earlier half of the eighteenth century, are of the highest interest. From this source we are able to trace William Law's influence in his generation as it is exemplified in the case of Byrom and some of his friends. It is curious that in the first notice of Law in Byrom's diary he is spoken of in a very slighting manner. Byrom was still an undergraduate at Cambridge, though about to dispute for his degree. He writes to his friends at home,—

"There is one Law, an M. A. and Fellow of Emmanuel, has this last week been degraded to a Soph, that is the year below a Bachelor, for a speech that he spoke on a public occasion, reflecting, as is reported, on the Government. . . . He is much blamed by some and defended by others, has the character of a vain conceited fellow."

It would seem then that Law was in heart with the Nonjurors, even before the Hanoverian succession caused him to take an open part with them. There is no further notice of him in Byrom's Diary until sixteen years afterwards (1729), when the professor of short-hand being then in London, records in his journal: "bought Law's 'Serious Call' at Rivington's." The effect of the purchase is quickly perceptible, and is communicated from Byrom to others.

"I find the young folks of my acquaintance think Mr. Law an impracticable, strange, whimsical writer, but I am not convinced by their reasons. Yesterday Mr. Mildmay bought it because I said so much of it; he is a very pretty young gentleman. But for Mr. Law and Christian religion and such things, they are mightily out of fashion at present."

But soon, in spite of his want of fashion, Byrom and Mildmay are found going together to Putney to seek a personal interview with the writer of the book which had so much impressed them. Mr. Law was then living as tutor in the house of Mr. Gibbon, the grandfather of the historian, and was residing during term time with his pupil, the historian's father, at Cambridge. The two inquirers found him out, and were favorably impressed by his conversation. They talked about Malebranche, and Byrom discov-

ered "that the good man could joke." Some good seed was already sown, for when they went to their club at night the friends spoke of the unlawfulness of the stage, grounding themselves on Law. Young Gibbon, Law's pupil, became a student of shorthand with Byrom, which drew the intimacy closer between him and Law. A clerical friend, Dr. Deacon, writing to Byrom, says, "I want sadly to see you, to know what Mr. Law says to you." Evidently the effect of Law's conversation on Byrom had already been observed by his friends, and indeed the Diary gives us plentiful evidence of it. Jan. 3, 1731:—

"Had much talk with Sturt, Pits, &c., about Christianity, which I defended as well as I could, Pits talking in favor of reason. . . . I exhorted Sturt to lay aside a little vanity and to embrace Christianity. He was for necessity, and I for free will; there were twelve of us in all, Gerhard, White, &c. I promised to go see Sturt, who said if I could make him believe a future state I should do him the greatest favor; they seemed to whisper about me when I came to them, but were very civil, and desired I would favor them with my company—*Sit anima mea cum Christianis.*"

Thus Law's influence was beginning to tell effectually on the men of his time. Mr. Walton says of him at this period that "he became so celebrated that he was consulted by serious persons personally and by letter, as a kind of oracle or spiritual director, to whom he failed not to afford every needful instruction for their several cases, to remove their doubts and scruples and to satisfy their minds." Among these was Miss Dodwell, daughter of the famous Henry Dodwell the Nonjuror, who had become so perplexed by her father's strange lucubrations, that she wished to get rid of her doubts and difficulties by joining the Church of Rome. Law addressed three letters to her, which were first published in 1779, to dissuade her from this step. The devout mind of Dr. Johnson was not likely to be insensible to the earnestness which breathes in Law's practical writings.

"When at Oxford," he says, "I took up Law's 'Serious Call to a Holy Life,' expecting to find it a dull book (as such books usually are), and perhaps to laugh at it; but I found Law quite an over-match for me, and this was the first occasion of my thinking in earnest of religion, after I became capable of rational inquiry."

Great indeed was the service thus done to the cause of religion

and morality. The undaunted champion who stood up so manfully for the right in his day, was the worthy successor of him from whom he had learned the first great lessons of devout living.

Had Law continued in the same track which up to this time he had pursued, enforcing with vividness and power the practical truths of religion, both by his conversation and his writings, a still more wide and lasting effect would be traceable to him. But about this period of his life (between 1733 and 1736) he first became acquainted with the mystical writings of Jacob Behmen, and, captivated by the spirit of intense devotion which seemed to breathe in them, he was gradually subjugated to the mystical views. He devoted himself to the study of German in order fully to enter into the mind of his author, and he afterwards became the translator and editor of Behmen's work for the "unsympathizing public of England." This, which the compiler of the "Materials" considers the happiest and most exalted event of his life, we are disposed to regard with considerable regret. There is no comparison between the writings of Law before and after the beginning of his mysticism. The one clear, plain, devout, and eminently practical; the other dark, strange, and unsatisfying. Much indeed of good is to be found in all Law's writings, but the strange jumble of metaphysics and divinity, the attempt to put in bondage the outward and objective life to the inward and subjective, which are the characteristics of the mystic, lamentably disfigure his later works. To what a height his admiration for Behmen went may be judged from the following, in which Law would appear distinctly to claim for his hero the great discoveries of Newton:—

"Here, also, that is, in these properties of the Desire, you see the ground and reason of the three great laws of matter and motion lately discovered, and so much celebrated; and need no more to be told that the illustrious Sir Isaac ploughed with Behmen's heifer, when he brought forth the discovery of them. In the mathematical system of this great philosopher these three properties are only treated of as facts and appearances whose ground is not pretended to be known. But in our Behmen, the illuminated instrument of God, their birth and power in eternity are opened; their eternal beginning is shown, and how and why all worlds, and every life of every creature, whether it be heavenly, earthly, or hellish, must be in them and from them, and can have no nature either spiritual or material, no kind of happiness or misery, but according to the working power and state of these properties."

Perhaps the most melancholy aberrations of Law's theology under the mystical taint are to be found in his "Treatise on Regeneration and the New Birth." In this he gives a painful misrepresentation of the doctrine of the atonement, almost openly declares for Universalism, and advocates the most mischievous of all the mystical tenets, viz., that he who has received the true illumination of the soul "*cannot* sin."

But it will not be without interest to trace Law's gradual advance in the mystic paths, which we can do through Byrom's Diary. In 1735 we find him hesitating somewhat as to the full development of mysticism, but still thoroughly in love with it, and bent upon following it up. He writes of Madame Bourignon, one of the most wild of the mystical writers:—

"From some things I said in our late conversation concerning some passages in the life of Mrs. Bourignon, you may perhaps imagine that it was my intention to dissuade you from reading her books, which indeed it was not. For though I have not ventured to recommend her books to any persons, because of certain uncommon sayings and passages, which I was apprehensive might be made an ill use of, yet I have and do often read her works with great admiration of an extraordinary spirit in them. Neither would I, on any account, presume to say that she was not guided by the Holy Spirit in that manner which she asserts. And I should think it very criminal in me if I ventured to dissuade any person from reading her books. For they have something strangely awakening in them, and it may easily be believed that her writings have had extraordinary effects upon variety of persons. When I meet with some things in her writings that I can't account for either from reason or Scripture, as they don't concern the substance of religion, I pass them by. They do me no hurt if I leave them alone. I don't immediately conclude either that she is in such things illuminated by the Holy Spirit, or carried away by some evil one. For as I am myself a stranger to, and utterly unworthy of, that divine illumination which she pretends to, so I neither dare nor ought to pretend to say how it is, or how it must be, with persons in that extraordinary state which she ascribes to herself. If her writings do not lead you into a disregard and neglect of the external worship, sacraments, and institutions of religion (which perhaps was not her intention, though many passages in her writings seem to look that way), or if you guard against this, she may prove a good instructor to you, especially since you so much approve of her."

Shortly afterwards in a conversation with Byrom, Law said —"much about Madame Bourignon and against her, seemed to

think that she had great assistance from the spirit of God, but questioned much if she did not mix her own, as Luther did; said that Taulerus had all that was good in Mrs. Bourignon, but yet the humblest man alive. Upon my asking if Rusbrochius was the first of those writers? he said, "You ask me an absurd question. 'Excuse me,' says he 'for being so free, there never was an age since Christianity but there had been some of those writers.'"

In two years' time he is more decided against Madame Bourignon, but not on anti-mystical grounds:—

"She was (said he) all delusion, which he argued much about, as if it was the chief topic that he intended on at that time, and mentioned a manuscript of Freher's wherein it was said that he had sent her forty-five contradictions extracted from her works; he said that she was peevish, fretful, and plainly against the sacrifice of Christ, that she was against priests, and then when to write against the Quakers, she pretended to honor them. He said of Madame Guion that though she was much more prudent than Mrs. Bourignon, yet carried away, that she played at cards with Ramsay, that her commentaries upon the New Testament would not do in English (nor Mrs. B.'s), but that they were flat and not bearable."

Yet Law was at this moment the devoted admirer of Behmen and Freher.

"He commended Taulerus, Rusbrochius, T. a Kempis, and the old Roman Catholic writers, and disliked, or seemed to condemn, Mrs. Bourignon and Guion for their volumes, and describing of states which ought not to be described; when I mentioned J. Behmen as a writer of many books, he said that it was by force he had writ, that he had desired that all his books had been in one, that, besides, he did not undertake to reform the world, as these people had done; that if Mrs. B. had lived, why she would have writ twenty more books, and Poiret would have published them."

These opinions were now attracting much attention, principally on account of the Moravians and Count Zinzendorf, who came to England about this time (1738). John Wesley had written from Georgia to inquire about them, and soon after his return to England, having adopted the Moravian theory of sensible and instantaneous conversion, had gone into Germany to study their teaching and way of life in their own settlement of Herrnhut. This was the second phase of his religious life, from which he soon

afterwards recoiled with violence, when he formally excommunicated the Society in Fetter Lane.* In 1739 Byrom writes—

"Went with Mr. John Wesley to Islington to his brother, at Mr. Stonehouse's. . . . He (Stonehouse, Vicar of Islington) had been a great reader of the mystics, particularly Poiret, who he said was the best of them; that Jacob Behmen was not to be reckoned among them, being a true man at all points. That Tauler was a good author. Mr. Wesley said that John Gambold (the Moravian Bishop) said that he was a spiritual deist." †

The masculine and confident spirit of John Wesley could not long remain in bondage to these fanciful writers, neither did their contempt for outward means of grace please him. February 16, 1739,—

"Went to Mr. Stonehouse's, talked about the mystics, of whom Mr. Stonehouse had asked me if I thought he had said anything against them, and I saying, why, a little tending that way, he said he did not intend to lessen them; and I considered why he and J. Wesley should be so different, and he said that Mr. J. Wesley was outrageous upon that article, and also himself said that if their scheme was different from the Scripture, which he thought it was; and I said it appeared to be agreeable to it to me, and he seemed to say that Mr. J. Wesley had persuaded him by telling him that he had conversed with people and they had told him the mischief of the mystics, and I said that he seemed to me not to understand them." ‡

A mutual repulsion was in fact now going on between Law and the Methodists.

"Had some talk with Mr. Rivington about Methodists; he said they were all wrong; that they had left Mr. Law, that Mr. Wogan § was against them, that they would do a deal of mischief, that they thought they had more of the Spirit than anybody, that Mr. Hutton had writ to J. Wesley about his preaching without notes, which he thought was wrong to do." ‖

Charles Wesley is mentioned as being more favorable to the mystics than his brother.

"They have both together printed a book of hymns, amongst

* Wesley's *Journal*, July 20, 1740. † Byrom's *Diary*, ii, 215.

‡ Ib., ii, 228.

§ Of Ealing, in Middlesex, famous in his day as a millenarian (note to Byrom's *Diary*).

‖ Byrom, ii, 234.

which they have inserted two of Mrs. Bourignon's. They have introduced them by a preface against what they call mystic writers, for whom they say they had once a great veneration, but think themselves obliged (very solemnly) to acknowledge their error, and to guard others against the like, which they do by certain reasons that I do not see the reason of. . . . There has been a famous gentleman among them, Count Zinzendorf. . . . He is a bishop in Bohemia or Moravia; is, I think, under banishment; he is a good-natured, mild, loving-tempered man; he has been in all parts to raise up a spirit of Christianity among such as are ignorant of it; he disapproves of Mr. Wesley's preface, at least of some strange expressions in it, though he charitably thinks it is permitted for their humiliation." *

One more extract from Byrom's Diary will sufficiently illustrate this point, which is of considerable interest and importance in the history of religious opinions in the eighteenth century.

"Have been with Mr. Law, and he showed me John Wesley's letters to him, and his answers. The first letter of John Wesley to him was of his not teaching faith in the blood of Jesus; that he had preached the doctrine of his two books, but found that neither his hearers nor he could follow it; that he might have been under this burden till death, had he not met with a man who had the Spirit of God (Peter Böhler), who bid him believe; and he charged Mr. Law strangely with not directing him to this faith, and asks whether that man of God did not say true? That when he talked with him he mentioned faith, and Mr. Law was silent, and then talked of mystical matter. . . . Mr. Law answers upon two suppositions—first, that he had faith, and that this was a man of God, and submits to them in that capacity, and that if they should say that he corrupted every one that he spoke to, he would submit to the truth, and blandly submitted to their judgment and God's mercy. But upon the second supposition—that he (Wesley) was too hasty, tells him of his printing Kempis, of the Theologia Germana, that he desired to be sharer with Kempis in the crime at least, and gives a very sober and civil answer to everything. . . . In short it was a very strange account that he gave, and this John Wesley, who always appeared to me in a [†] light, appeared still worse." ‡

In estimating Law's religious influence upon his age, we must then, for the present, exclude John Wesley. Much of the first impulse had been communicated to this energetic character by Law's devout writings, but afterwards their paths diverged: one

* Byrom's *Diary*, ii, 247. † This word not decipherable from the short-hand.
‡ Byron's *Diary*, ii, 268–70.

turned to the contemplative dreamings of the mystics, the other to the bold advocacy of what we may perhaps call rough-and-ready religionism.

"I was once," writes Law in 1756, "a kind of oracle with Mr. Wesley. I never suspected anything bad of him, or ever discovered any kind or degree of falseness or hypocrisy in him. But during all the time of his intimacy with me I judged him to be much under the power of his own spirit, which seemed to have the predominance in every good thing or way that his zeal carried him to. It was owing to his unwillingness or inability to give up his own spirit that he was forced into that false and rash censure which he published in print against the mystics, as enemies to good works, and even tending to atheism—a censure so false and regardless of right and wrong, as hardly anything can exceed it—which is to be found in a preface of his to a book of hymns." *

We will now exhibit William Law in connection with some other prominent men of his time, whose shortcomings either in doctrinal or practical divinity he combated by his writings and his personal influence. His first controversial effort had been against Bishop Hoadly, with whom, as we have seen above, he combated with singular skill in the Bangorian controversy. Hoadly's mission seemed to be to *write down* all emphatic Christian teaching on every subject. In completing his survey of the objectionable peculiarities of Christianity, he of necessity had to consider the subject of the Holy Eucharist. Around this the reverence of ages had spread a mysterious awfulness, which to a mind that abhorred mysteries was especially provoking. Accordingly, by way of demolishing this fabric of uninstructed faith, he gave to the world his famous treatise called a "Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper." The book was highly acceptable to the Socinians and Arians of the eighteenth century, and in this class unhappily were included a great number of the clergy. Bishop Herring (afterwards Primate), if not an Arian, could yet see no special reason to object to these views.† William Law, appalled by this manifest apostacy from Christian truth, rushed to the rescue, and put forth (in 1739) his book, "A Demonstration of the Gross and Fundamental Errors of a late Book," &c. Nowhere can Law's peculiar merit as a controversialist be better seen than in this reply. He has

* Law's *Works*, ix, 124.

† Herring's *Letters to Duncombe*, p. 28.

not, indeed, the vast theological acquirements of Waterland, who afterwards answered this same treatise indirectly in his great work on the Eucharist, but he is far more clear, biting, and crushing. He undertakes to show that Hoadly's book was not only "against the truth of the Sacrament, but plainly destructive of the principal doctrines of the Christian religion;"* and he does what he proposes. When, however, in the latter part of his treatise, he propounds to us his own system and gives his special views of the atonement, as the introduction of a new *subjective* principle of fire or life into the soul, which is not only in no way connected with reason, but is contrary to it, we see the radical error of the mystics perverting his theology. The crucial test between mystic and non-mystic may be perhaps said to be, "Does grace operate through the human faculties, or apart from, and entirely independent of them?" Law argues eagerly for the latter alternative; but though the religion of Unreason may destroy the religion of Reason, yet it cannot long survive it. The mystical notions of the "Demonstration" of course call forth the admiration of the eccentric compiler of the "Materials" for Law's life.

"The latter portion of the work explaining the nature and extent of the redemption of all mankind by Jesus Christ may, as already intimated, be considered an introduction to that grand system of fundamental and practical truth, or of true philosophical divinity, which is opened to the world in so noble and captivating a manner in all his subsequent writings."†

But the mysticism of the Demonstration was rather a difficulty even to the devoted admiration of Byrom. "This morning I read at breakfast out of Mr. Law's new book, and thought it very plain and good, but could not have thought, unless he had said it, that there was any stricture against the Quakers."‡ Certainly it would be hard to object to the Quaker sentiments on the principles of this book. To others the book, which might have been highly edifying, was repulsive on these grounds.

"Read a little of Mr. Law. Mr. Lloyd said to-day that Mr. Birch had said that he would never trouble his head about him again, nor read his books."§ "I believe he has met with somebody that does not like Mr. Law, by his telling me the other day of the objections made against the title of the book, 'A Demon-

* Law's *Works*, v, 2. † *Materials*, p. 369. ‡ Byrom's *Diary*, ii, 168.
§ Ib., ii, 169.

stration,' and my zeal for vindicating the book is too great, I fancy." *

There are frequent allusions in Dr. Byrom's Diary to the extraordinary effects of the preaching of George Whitefield, and how dukes and earls pressed to hear him at Moorfields. It is hard now to perceive in what Whitefield's great attraction consisted, as his published sermons are poor and weak, and he was clearly a man of no great ability. We attribute his power chiefly to the intense earnestness with which he declaimed against the vices of the day. This is always a popular topic, and especially when it is accompanied by violent attacks on the clergy, in which Whitefield, unlike John Wesley, was fond of indulging. We gather from Byrom's Diary that William Law had no very high opinion of Whitefield, and that he did not particularly approve of his "spleen against the clergy." † When, however, one of the clergy set upon Whitefield in a manner which Law thought excessive, and at the same time took occasion to advocate low and poor views of the obligations of the Christian life, the ready pen of the author of "Christian Perfection" was at once set in motion against him. The peccant divine in this instance was one Dr. Trapp, Rector of Harlington, and Vicar of Christ's Church and St. Leonard's Foster Lane. This gentleman had published against Whitefield "Four Sermons on the Nature, Folly, Sin and Danger of being Righteous overmuch." The sin against which he was anxious to warn his people was at any rate not a common one in his day, and well did he deserve the crushing irony with which Law pursues him.

"To the world eating and drinking and rising up to play, he harangues upon the madness, danger and folly of too much temperance, abstinence, mortification and severity of life. To the world asleep, insensible and careless, not only of the purity and perfection, but of the first principles of the gospel, he boldly, rashly, reproaches all appearances of holiness that are uncommon and extraordinary. To no part of the world does he represent or propose the perfection of the Gospel, or recommend it as that which deserves all that they can do or suffer for the sake of it." ‡

In a day when bishops like Hoadly, Lavington, and Warburton were pouring contempt upon all religious earnestness, under the name of enthusiasm, the bold front and telling words of this

* Byrom's *Diary*, ii, 182. † Ib., ii, 267. ‡ Law's *Works*, vi, 8.

undaunted champion of the truth were of incalculable service. With the redoubted Warburton himself, William Law did not fear to break a lance; but we must introduce this episode in his literary history with a preliminary account which represents to us Warburton in a much more amiable character as a controversialist than we have ever met with him elsewhere. After his spirited attack upon Dr. Trapp, William Law had written at greater length, "An Appeal to all that doubt or disbelieve the Truths of the Gospel," by way of a more complete confutation of the anti-spiritualistic notions then in vogue. This, although much disfigured with the phraseology of the mystics, and the absurd dogmatism in which these writers indulged as to things mysterious and unrevealed, is yet a noble testimony for spiritual religion and the high obligations of Christianity. Byrom, the devoted follower of Law, was so impressed by it, that, having a knack of making rhymes, he proceeded to turn some of it into verse, calling his composition an Essay on Enthusiasm. Warburton is not badly sketched therein :—

> "Another's heated brain is painted o'er
> With ancient hieroglyphic marks of yore—
> He old Egyptian mummies can explain,
> And raise them up almost to life again;
> Can into deep antique recesses pry,
> And tell of all the wherefore and the why;
> How this philosopher and that has thought,
> Believed one thing and quite another taught;
> Can rules of Grecian sages long forgot,
> Clear up as if they lived upon the spot.
> What bounds to *nostrum?* Moses and the Jews,
> Observed this learned legislator's views,
> While Israel's leader purposely concealed
> Truths which his whole economy revealed;
> Where erudition so unblest prevails,
> Saints and their lives are legendary tales.
> Christians, a brain-sick visionary crew,
> That read the Bible with a Bible view,
> And through the *letter* humbly hope to trace
> The living Word, the Spirit, and the Grace." *

Many a man has (as Lowth expressed it) been "whipped at the cart's tail in a note to the Divine Legation," for a good deal less

* Byrom's *Diary*, ii, 522.

than this. Yet, wonderful to relate, Warburton wrote Byrom a letter of gentle expostulation.

"What I think an injustice to myself and inconsistent with your professions of Christian charity and universal benevolence, are your insinuations of my being an unbeliever and an enemy to Christianity, that I regard Christians as a brain-sick, visionary crew. What handle have I ever given for so unchristian a reflection? I have made frequent professions, and without the least ambiguity, of my belief in revelation. I have done more—I have composed books in defense of it; and though on such principles as you condemn, that can never justify you in representing me as an infidel, unless the faith be to be transferred from Jesus and his doctrines to your apostles, Mr. Law, and his. You would convince men of the truth of the Gospel by inward feelings, I by outward facts and evidence. But for this difference why should I be any more an infidel to you than you are to me?"*

To this dignified and becoming letter Byrom replied very civilly, "Permit me, Rev. Sir, to assure you, first, that it never was in my thoughts to represent or accuse you as an infidel, and next that it is not in my words, nor can without a forced construction be thence inferred." In a second letter Warburton was equally mild, and among other amenities tells Byrom that his translation of a passage in Cicero was equal to the original. At this extreme meekness Law is astonished. "He seems to be sensible of your magnitude, for I never saw him write in so humble a style before."† He himself had on more than one occasion cause to know that mild words were not always the characteristic of this impetuous writer. The onslaught which Law, in common with so many others, made on the "Divine Legation," was thrown into the form of a letter to Warburton's most able antagonist, Bishop Lowth. Its title is in bad taste and somewhat pretentious, "A Short but Sufficient Confutation of the Rev. Dr. Warburton's Projected Defense (as he calls it) of Christianity in his Divine Legation of Moses." This treatise is not composed in the happy vein with which he had attacked Hoadly, Tindal, and Trapp. It was evident that Law's mysticism was tending to make him illogical and unintelligible. The strange and discordant jargon of physics, metaphysics, and theology, which the

* *Byrom's Diary*, ii, 522. We are greatly indebted to Dr. Parkinson, the editor of Byrom, for unearthing these letters of Warburton, never before published.

† Ibid, p. 532.

compiler of the "Materials" so much admires, had gone far to incapacitate this acute and devout thinker from doing efficient work in the cause of the truth. It is pleasant to find, even in the midst of all this, the traces of Law's genuine and best influence, as in the case of the good Bishop Hildesley, the successor of the saintly Wilson in the See of Man. In a letter to Byrom he writes:

"Upon opening my boxes from London I found all Mr. Law's works neatly bound and packed, as a present from a good lady who is his constant reader. His 'Spirit of Prayer' is what I have chiefly been engaged with since my arrival here. His manner of treating this subject is very sublime, not to say sometimes mysterious (but this may be owing to the dullness of my apprehension), but upon the whole very interesting and edifying. I pray God give me a heart susceptible of his Christianity, so far as I shall understand or find it clearly deducible from the fountain-head. I will only say I think I can comprehend our Saviour's sermon, and other occasional directions of our Lord's as being rather more suited to my unmetaphysical capacity."

Such was the impression which a plain good man could still derive from Law's writings. Yet it was a great grief to many of his former friends and admirers to see the vain babblings of the mystic thus impair the strength of his great and most salutary influence. John Wesley thought himself called upon to write to his old friend a letter of remonstrance and expostulation—a letter which had the effect of making Law very angry. He writes to Byrom: "I declined all thoughts of remarking upon Mr. Wesley's letter myself, and discouraged others that would have done it for me, having no desire to help the world to see him and his spirit in a worse light than was done by his own pen." To another friend he writes more angrily,—

"Mr. J. W. is an ingenious man, and the reason why his letter to me is such a juvenile composition of emptiness and pertness, as is below the character of any man who had been serious in religion but half a month, is because it was not ability but necessity that put his pen into his hand. He had condemned my books—preached much against them; and to make all sure, forbid his people the use of them; and for a cover to all this he promised from time to time to write against them. Therefore an answer was to be made at all adventures. What you happen to hear of Mr. J. W. concerning me or my books, let it die with you. Wish him God-speed in everything that is good. But this

you may easily know that he and the Pope have the same reasons and are under the same necessity of condemning and anathematizing the mystery revealed by God in J. B."* (Jacob Behmen).

A great friend and admirer of Law and Byrom, and at the same time an intelligent judge of the theological peculiarities of the former, was John Lindsay, minister of the nonjuring congregation in Trinity Chapel, Aldersgate-street, London. He was the author of several useful works, but, like most others of the same opinions, greatly pressed for the ways and means of life. In a letter of his to Byrom it is amusing to find that the physical theories which Law had taken up from Behmen had exposed him to charges of heresy against the Mosaic cosmogony, both from the respectable Mr. Jones of Nayland, and also from a worthy physician called Robinson, who wrote a book to prove that the sun moved round the earth by virtue of its magnetic attraction. It is strange to think that only a century ago the Hutchinsonians were gravely writing books against the philosophy of Newton, and undertaking to derive all language from Hebrew primal roots. But with regard to Mr. Jones' theological judgment, we are disposed to come to the conclusion that he hits the mark very exactly when he says:

"Mr. William Law, after writing so excellently upon the vanity of the world and the follies of human life (on which subjects he has no superior), has left us nothing to depend upon but imagination, and reduced the whole evidence of Christianity to fancied impulses and inspiration, so as to render the sacraments useless and the means of grace contemptible."†

The more strange and wild a man's opinions are, he is generally the more fiercely dogmatic in support of them. Yet Law, writing to Bishop Sherlock, assumes somewhat of an apologetic tone as regards his mysticism.

"I am conscious that in my later writings I have raised a prejudice against me by espousing the writings of Jacob Behmen. It was very easy for the world to find fault with me on that account. Matter of censure lies very open to the critical reader of his books, though the true ground of every doctrine and article of Christian faith and practice is there opened in such a ravish-

* Law's *Works*, ix, 181.

† Jones, "*Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity*," p. 13.

ing, amazing depth and clearness of truth and conviction, as has never been seen or thought of in any age of the Church."*

Under the guidance of this sublime instructor William Law at length arrived at a complete contradiction of the views which in his early manhood he had urged with such force against Hoadly and his doctrine of an invisible Church.

"Church unity is, and can be nothing else, but the unity of this or that man or number of men with God, through the power and nature of Christ. And therefore it must be the truth and the whole truth that nothing more is required, nor will anything else be able to make any one a true member of the one Church of Christ, out of which there is no salvation, and in which there is no condemnation, but only and solely his conformity to and union with the inward spirit and outward form of Christ's life and behavior in this world."†

On the same ground the indifferent nature of all outward rites, including the Sacraments, is shown, and the one thing needful is said to be "to listen to the voice of his ever-speaking word and to watch the movings of his ever-sanctifying Spirit within us, waiting and longing in the spirit of prayer to be inwardly quickened and revived."‡ The circumstances in which Law was placed gave him the opportnity of practicing in perfection this quietistic and mystical religion which he so much loved. He had established himself at King's Cliffe in Northamptonshire, his native place, with two elderly ladies, Miss Gibbon and Mrs. Hutcheson, as a sort of spiritual director, almoner, and chaplain. These ladies were both possessed of ample means, and the charities which they exercised under Law's management and direction were systematic and abounding.

"As near as can be ascertained, the annual income of Miss Gibbon was from five to seven hundred pounds, and that of Mrs. Hutcheson about two thousand pounds; none of which, it is believed, was retained or allowed to accumulate. As the expenditure within the house was remarkably frugal, great must have been the disbursement without; so great, indeed, as to make those at Cliffe, who remembered Mr. Law and his companions, say, in relating it to parties still living there, that their acts of charity were boundless. The report of such munificence spread to places far from Cliffe, and produced applications from many

* Law's *Works*, vol. ix, letter i. † Ib., vol. ix, letter ii. ‡ Ib.

whose wants were of a different character to those of food and raiment; who were often gratified by charitable donations."

There was a school for the education and clothing of boys, with a provision for putting them out in trades after their education was completed, an almshouse for poor widows, a school for girls, conducted on the strictest religious principles, as well as a most liberal and systematic distribution of alms to all that needed. Mr. Law's day was regularly arranged so as to be spent in study and acts of devotion and almsgiving. In spite, however, of the great and ample benevolence of this little religious society, the strongest prejudice and ill-feeling was stirred up against them. Mr. Piemont, the Rector of King's Cliffe, continually preached against them, and things even went so far as for a memorial to be drawn up and presented to the neighboring magistrates praying for their interference to stop this systematic almsgiving. This the religious ladies and their friend naturally resented, and prepared a counter memorial to be presented to the Bishop; but the opposition appears to have gradually died away, and they were left undisturbed to pursue their devout course. Dr. Byrom, in his Diary, records occasional visits to Law, at Cliffe; but the pious mystic had almost wholly withdrawn from the world, still, however, keeping a watchful eye on the state of religious opinion, and from time to time setting forth his views for the edification of those who looked up to him for guidance. That these were a very considerable number, especially among the clergy, there is much reason to believe. The doctrine of the inward life and direct inspiration was one very well suited to take possession of the hearts of good men in that age of gross carelessness and palpable neglect as to all the great means of grace. When the sacraments of the Church had almost fallen into disuse, when public worship was irreverently and negligently ministered, when preaching was a dry enunciation of vapid morality, what more likely than for the presbyter, feeling that there was nothing of power in the system which he administered, to fly to the inward and mystical part of religion, and to disparage the outward part as of trifling importance? In his last work, the "Address to the Clergy," not printed until after his death, Law with great vigor and power contended for the sole and paramount importance of the inward life, not allowing learning, reason, care, prudence,

diligence, to have any share in the work, but attributing all to the *direct* inspiration of the Spirit.

"All that can be called your own are mere helpless sin and misery, and nothing that is good can come from you, but as it is done by the continual immediate breathing and inspiration of another Spirit given by God to overrule your own; to save and deliver you from all your own goodness, your own wisdom, and learning, which always were and always will be, as corrupt and impure, as earthly and sensual, as your own flesh and blood."*

The excellent writer does not think it necessary to tell us how the world is to fare if the clergy are to be turned into a band of self-contemplating mystics, or how the Antinomian is to be answered, if religion be nothing else but a waiting for a divine illumination. Very nearly coincident in point of time with these words was the publication of Butler's noble sermons on Human Nature—a manifestation of a higher wisdom than that of the enthusiast of King's Cliffe. And yet we cannot doubt that the bold and eloquent claims thus put forward for spiritual religion were of the highest and most lasting value to the Church. Everywhere within the Church of England men holding the place of teachers were employed in ingeniously disparaging and explaining away the doctrines of grace. The majority of the clergy were Arians of the school of Samuel Clarke and Sykes. The movement against subscription to the Articles, begun about this time by Archdeacon Blackburne, the notorious author of the Confessional and the gross slanderer of Bishop Butler, was an expression of the uneasiness of men who felt themselves condemned by the formularies to which they were pledged. Even the best divines of the day, Sherlock, and Horne, and Jones, spoke in timid and half-subdued accents of the spiritual life. It was happy for the Church of England that there was one man at least who did not scruple to speak, and to speak boldly, even extravagantly on the work of the Spirit. The Methodist leaders were compromised by their eccentricities and by their deification of the phenomena of hysteria. The school of Calvinistic Evangelicals was as yet in its infancy. Warburton had turned the laugh against the Hutchinsonians, and seemed to have it all his own way. The writings, life, and conversation of William Law, all an emphatic testimony for the spiritual life and the need of divine grace, were a great and providential blessing to the Church of England.

* Law's *Works*, ix, 17.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

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— In striking contrast with Guizot's work is the spirit of Froude's *Short Studies on Great Subjects*,† a collection of lectures and also of essays published in Frazer's Magazine, the Westminster Review, etc. Mr. Froude's style is fresh and elastic, and many of the thoughts are good and true; but those who have become familiar, through his attempted vindication of Henry VIII., with his loose morality, will not be surprised at the under-current of religious doubt everywhere manifest in this volume, and in which the author apparently glories. The chapter on "Criticism and the Gospel History" is a striking instance of the eagerness with which the disciples of the school of "Free Thought" fasten upon difficulties, and their entire ignorance apparently of the explanations by which these difficulties have been removed, or at least diminished.

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Ausleger des Alten Testaments. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Kritik und Exegese. 53 pp. 20 Sgr.—*Böttcher*, Ausführliches Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache. Nach dem Tode des Verfassers herausgegeben und mit ausführlichen Registern versehen von Fd. Mühlau. II. Bd. 1 Hälfte, Barth, 8vo. pp. 1—320. 2⅔ Thl.—*Buxtorfii*, Lexicon chaldaicum, talmudicum et rabbinicum denuo edidit et annotatis auxit B. Fischer. Fasc. 5 et 6. pp. 161—240. Jed. Fasc. ⅓ Thl.—*Neteler*, Studien über die Echtheit des Pentateuchs. I. Thl. Untersuchung der Ergänzungshypothesen. Münster, 192 pp. ⅔ Thl.—*Oertel*, Paulus in der Apostolgeschichte. Der historische Charakter dieser Schrift an den paulinischen Stücken nachgewiesen 8vo. 310 pp. 1⅔ Thl. —*Ritter*, Philosophische Paradoxa. Leipzig, 1867. Brockhaus, 8vo. 378 pp. 2 Thl.—*Düsterdieck*, Apologetische Beiträge. 2. Beitrag. Die gottseligen Geheimnisse. 1. Gott und seine Schöpfung. 2. Der Mensch und seine Sünde Göttingen, 1867. 116 pp. 16 Sgr.—*Blom*, De synoptische verhalen van den doop van Jezus in de Jordaan en van zijne verzoekingen in de woestijn onderzocht en verklaard. Dordrecht. 115 pp. 25 Sgr.

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XVII.—MORAL THEORIES AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS.*

Why is Ethical Science, as pursued in this country of late years, even to reflecting men, so little attractive and so little edifying? The cognate study of metaphysics has, after long neglect, recently, in a wonderful way, renewed its youth, but to moral science no such revival has as yet come. And yet human character, the subject it deals with, is one, it would seem, of no inconsiderable interest. Physical science has no doubt drained off the current of men's thoughts, and left many subjects which once engaged them, high and dry. But man, his spiritual being, his possibilities here, his destiny hereafter, these still remain, amid all the absorption of external things, the one highest marvel, the paramount center of interest to men. It cannot be said that modern literature—the great exponent of what men are thinking—circles less than of old round the great human problems. Rather with the circuit of the suns, not only have the thoughts of men widened, but also their moral consciousness, we will not say their heart, has deepened. Modern literature, as compared with that of last century, has nothing more distinctive in it than this—that it has broken into deeper ground of sentiment and reflection, ground which had hitherto lain fallow, non-existent or unperceived. About the deeper soul-secrets, literary men of last century either did not greatly trouble themselves, or they practiced a very strict reserve. But our own and the preceding age has seen an unveiling of the most inward—often of the most sacred—feelings which has sometimes gone beyond the limits of manliness and self-respect. This bringing to light of layers of consciousness hitherto concealed, though sometimes carried too far, has certainly enriched our literature with new wealth of moral content. In the best modern poetry it has shown itself by greater intensity and spirituality; in the highest modern novels, by delicacy of analysis, discrimination of the finer tints of feeling, variety and fine shading of character hitherto unknown; in the modern essay, by a subtleness and penetrative force which make

* From the *North British Review*, Sept., 1867. [H. B. H.]

the most perfect papers of Addison seem slight and trivial. It farther manifests itself in the growing love and keener appreciation of the few great world-poets, who are after all the finest embodiments of moral wisdom. It may be that so much ethical thought has been turned off into these channels that it has left less to be expended in the more systematic form of ethical science. It may be too, that, as the field of moral experience widens, and the meaning of life deepens, and its problems become more complex, it demands proportionably stronger and rarer powers to gather up all this wealth, and shape it into systematic form. Certain it is that the modern time produces no such masters of moral wisdom for our day, as Aristotle and Marcus Aurelius were to the old world, or even as Bishop Butler was to his generation. Wide, many-sided, sensitive, deep, complex, as is the moral life in which we now move, if we would seek any philosophic guidance through its intricacies, any thinking which is at once solid, clear, practical, and instinct with life, we must turn, not to any modern treatise, but to the pages of these bygone worthies. What help ardent spirits, looking for guidance in our day, have found, has been not from the philosophers, but from some living poet, some giant of literature with no pretension to philosophy, or some inspired preacher. Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, Newman, Frederick Robertson, these, not the regular philosophers, have been the moral teachers of our generation, and to these young men have turned, to get from them what they might. And now it seems that in these last days many, wearied out with straining after their high but impalpable spiritualities, have betaken themselves to a style of teaching which, if it promises less, offers, as they think, something more systematic and more certain. In despair of spiritual truth, they are fain to fill their hunger with the husks of a philosophy which would confine all men's thoughts within the phenomenal world, and deny all knowledge that goes beyond the co-existences and success of phenomena.

From aberrations like this perhaps no moral philosophy would have delivered men. But it would be well if, warned by such signs, it were to return closer to life and fact, deal more with things which men really feel; if, leaving general sentiments and moral theories, it would attempt some true diagnosis of the very complex facts of human nature, of the moral maladies from which

men suffer, the burdens they need removed, the aspirations which they can practically live by. Instead of this—instead of dealing with the actual and the ideal, which co-exist in man, and out of which, if at all, a harmony of life is to be woven, philosophers have been content to repeat a meager and conventional psychology, taken mostly from books, not fresh from living hearts; or they have lost themselves in the metaphysical problems which no doubt everywhere underlie moral life, but which, pursued too far, distract attention from the vital realities. These two causes have exhausted the strength and the interest of moral study—either a cut-and-dried conventional psychology, or absorbing metaphysical discussion. The former, in which moral truths appeared shriveled up, like plants in a botanist's herbarium, is the style of things you find in the most approved text-books of the last generation.

"Never before," as one has smartly said, "had human nature been so neatly dissected, so handily sorted, or so ornamentally packed up. The virtues and vices, the appetites, emotions, affections, and sentiments, stood each in their appointed corner, and with their appropriate label, to wait in neat expectation for the season of the professional lectures, and the literary world only delayed their acquiescence in a uniform creed of moral philosophy till they should have arranged to their satisfaction whether the appetites should be secreted in the cupboard or paraded on the chimney-piece; or whether certain of the less creditable packets ought in law and prudence, or ought not in charity, to be ticketed 'Poison.' Everything was as it should be, or was soon to be so—differences were not too different, nor unanimity too unanimous—opinion did not degenerate into certainty, nor interest into earnestness; moral philosophy stood apart, like a literary gentleman of easy circumstances, from religion and politics, and truth itself was grateful for patronage, instead of being clamorous for allegiance. Types were delicate, margins were large, publishers were attentive, the intellectual world said it was intellectual, and the public acquiesced in the assertion. What more could scientific heart desire?"

This description may contain something of caricature, and yet there are books enough on moral science which justify it—books which no doubt have been successful in disgusting many with the subject of which they treat. Nor has moral philosophy suffered less from those deeper and more abstract discussions which have often in modern times been substituted for itself. Men of a profounder turn have so busied themselves with investigations of the

nature of right, the law of duty, freedom and necessity, and such-like hard matters, that these have absorbed all their interest and energy, and left none for the treatment of those concrete realities which make up the moral life of man. Not that such discussions can be dispensed with. They are always necessary, never more so than now, when the spiritual ground of man's moral being is so often denied by materialistic or by merely phenomenal systems. It were well, perhaps, that they should be a department by themselves, under the title of Metaphysics of Ethics, to be entered on by those who have special gifts for such inquiries. For when substituted for the whole or chief part of moral inquiry, they become "unpractical discussions of a practical subject," and as such alienate many from a study which, if rightly treated, would deepen their thoughts and elevate their character.

For what is the real object with which moral science deals? Every science has some concrete entity, some congeries of facts, which is called in a general way its subject-matter. Botany, we say, deals with plants or herbs, geology with the strata which form the earth's crust, astronomy with the stars and their motions, psychology with all the states of human consciousness. What, then, is the concrete entity with which moral science deals? It is not the active powers of man, nor the emotions, nor the moral faculty—not these, each or all. It is simply human character. This is the one great subject it has ever before it. About this it asks what is character, its nature, its elements, what influences make it, what mar it, in what consists its perfection, what is its destiny? This may seem a very elementary statement, but it is quite needful to recur to it, and even to reiterate it, so much has it been lost sight of in the pursuit of side questions branching out of it. At the outset, before any analysis is begun, the student cannot too deeply receive the impression of character as a great and substantive reality. Some vague perception of character all men, of course, have. They are aware, whether they dwell on it or not, that men differ not only in face and form and outward circumstances, but in something more inward, they cannot exactly tell what. But farther than this confused notion most persons do not go. Others there are who see much more than this, who have a keen penetrating glance into every man they meet, apprehend his bias, know what manner of man he is, and deal with him accordingly. This gift, so useful in practice, we call an eye

to character; those who possess it, good judges of character. It is the same gift of discerning the quality of men which some persons have of judging of horses and other cattle. Hence Æschylus spoke of a good judge of character as *προβατογνώμων*. But this practical insight, so useful in business, and it may be to a certain extent in speculation, is something distinct from a fine and a deep perception of the higher moralities of character. Shrewd observers of human nature are often keen to discern the weaknesses and foibles of men, and even to exaggerate them, but slow to perceive those finer traits of heart which lie deeper. The apprehension of character with which the student should begin, and which his moral studies ought to deepen, is something very different from this. It is an eye open to see, a heart sensitive to feel the higher excellencies of human nature, as they have existed, and still exist in the best of the race. It is a spirit the very opposite of that of the cynic, one which, while it looks steadily at the moral maladies and even basenesses into which men fall, yet without being sentimental, loves more to contemplate the nobler than the baser side—which, behind the common places and trivialities, can seize life's deeper import, and look up, and aspire towards the heights which have been attained, and are still attainable by man. To call out and strengthen in young minds such perceptions is one main end of moral teaching. No doubt there are influences which can do this more powerfully than any teaching. To have seen and known lives which have embodied these fair qualities, to have felt the touch of their human goodness, to have companioned with those

> "Whose soul the holy forms
> Of young imagination hath kept pure;"

to have fed on high thoughts, and been familiar with the examples of the heroes, the sages, the saints of all time, so as to believe that such lives were once on earth, and are not impossible even now—these are, beyond all teaching, the "virtue-making" powers. But moral philosophy, though subordinate to these, is useless, if it does not supplement them; if it does not at once justify the heart's aspirations on grounds of reason, and strengthen while it enlightens the will to pursue them. Character, then, in the concrete, truthful, solid, pure, high, as "better than gold, yea than

fine gold, its revenue than choice silver,"—as the best thing we know of in all our experience, the one thing needful for a man, which to have got is to have got all, to have missed is to miss all—this cannot be too fully set before the learner at the outset, as the goal to which all his inquiries must tend, which alone gives his inquiries any value. If this is not seen and grasped broadly and deeply at first, and its presence felt throughout all our reasoning, the discussion and analysis that follow become mere words—hair-splitting and logomachy.

To observe moral facts, and retain them steadily, requires a moral perception innate or trained, or both. Every one will remember Aristotle's saying that "he should have been well trained in his habits who is to study aright things beautiful and just, and in short all moral subjects. For facts are the starting-point." Quickness and tenacity of moral perception is not so much an intellectual as a moral gift. Nay, it is easy to overdo the intellectual part of the process. Too rigid logic, too exact defining and subdividing of that which often can be but inadequately defined, kills it. It is like trying to hold a sunbeam in an iron vice. The faculty that will best catch the many aspects and finer traits of character must be a nice combination, an even balance between mental keenness and moral emotion. It is the heart within the head which makes up that form of philosophic imagination most needed by the moralist. If moral character, in its higher aspects, were set thus truly and strongly before young minds, it would require little else to counteract Materialism. Such elevating views might be left, almost without reasonings, to work their natural effect on all who were susceptible of them.

Character has been defined as "a completely fashioned will." This, as has been said, is to be kept continually before us in all moral inquiry as its practical end—that which gives it solidity. But when once we have looked at it steadily, whether as it has existed actually in the best men, or in the ideal, the question at once arises, How is this right character to be attained? How is the good that is within to be made ascendant—the less good to be subordinated, the evil to be cast out?

Of the numerous questions which this practically suggests, as to the standard by which character is to be tested, the foundation of moral goodness, and many more, the simplest and most obvious is to ask, What is in man? What are the various elements

of man's nature? Thus we are at once landed in psychology. And so it has happened, that almost all great ethical thinkers, whatever their method, even when it depends mainly on certain great *a priori* conceptions, have attempted some enumeration of the various parts or elements which make up human life. Begun by Plato and Aristotle, carried on by the Stoics, revived in modern times by Hobbes, not neglected even by demonstrative Spinoza, this way of proceeding by observation of living men, and of our own minds, formed the whole staple of Bishop Butler's method. It is strange as we read the first fetches into human nature of those early thinkers, with how much more living power they come home to us than modern psychologies. This comes probably of their having read their facts straight off their own hearts, or from observation of other men. There is something in the first thoughts of the world which can never recur, something in having been the first utterer of those words, the first noters of those distinctions, which thenceforth were to become the common inheritance of all men. Compared with theirs, the moral psychology of recent times has for the most part become stale and unprofitable, because, the first main outlines having been already explored, the moderns have but repeated with slight alteration the old analysis, presenting us with tabulated lists of appetites, desires, passions, affections, and so forth, at which men only yawn. In fairness, however, we must allow that although we dissent most entirely from the fundamental principles of Professor Bain's philosophy, we have found in his elaborate work on the "Emotions and the Will" many facts which are either new, or at least which we have not before seen registered in systematic treatises. Certainly if psychology is to interest and instruct once more, it must leave the stereotyped forms, and enrich itself with new and hitherto unnoted facts, gathered partly from the more subtle and varied shades of feeling, partly from the wider survey of human history, and the deepened human experience, which our present civilization has opened up. The surest method then for ethical science, is to begin with moral psychology; that is, with a close study of the phenomena which make up man's moral nature. This is its beginning, but not its end. From observation of these, it will be led down to fundamental ideas which underlie them; that is, it will land us in theology or religion.

There are two ways in which psychology may go to work. It

may begin at the center, the core of man's being, at the mysterious conscience "I," the fully formed personal will, and then show how the several powers and faculties group themselves round this center. But perhaps the better way is, beginning at the outside, to follow what we may conceive to be the historical growth of the individual, as well as of the race, and to show how each of the phases of our being successively rises into prominence. Such a survey would place before us man in his earliest stage as a mass of natural appetencies or instinctive tendencies, each seeking blindly its appropriate end, the reaching of which is necessary to continued existence. Accompanying these primitive desires, we should find certain faculties which are the instruments by which the former reach their end—the executive as it were of the blind impulses. During this stage, the spontaneous action of these appetencies engenders certain secondary passions, such as love of things which help the attainment of their ends, hatred of things which thwart them. Of these primitive outgoings, some we can see have reference to the good of self, some to the good of others, long before self-gratification can be set before us as a conscious object. Such is the earliest stage of our existence—the appetitive, the spontaneous or semi-conscious, as we see it in infants, or in uncivilized tribes. This is the raw material, as it were, out of which character is to be formed. The aggregate amount of all these proportions in which the higher and the lower are mingled in each man, will go far to determine what he will ultimately become.

But out of the midst of this blind congeries experience develops new powers. Very early in the appetitive life the desires must meet with obstacles, and the faculties that purvey for them, being thwarted, are driven inward, and forced to concentrate themselves for a more conscious effort to remove the hindrance. Here, then, is the first dawning, the earliest consciousness of will, within us. Again, out of the appetitive life, when experienced long enough, there arises a power of intelligence or reflection which, observing that each desire has its own end, and that the attainment of that end brings pleasure, generalizes from these separate goods the idea of a general good for our whole nature, a satisfaction arising from the permanent gratification of all our desires, or at least of as many of them as may be possible. Reflection soon perceives that desire left to act blindly—our nature swayed now by this,

now by that impulse—does not attain to any stable happiness. Some kinds of action, it observes, make towards this happiness, others thwart it; the former it calls useful actions, the latter hurtful. From these observations it generalizes the idea of a total personal good or self-interest as an end to be aimed at, and forms subordinate rules of conduct with a view to attain that end. Self-interest thus intelligently conceived may become an end of life, or what is called a motive—an ever-present motive to guide the will. Governed by this motive, the will can control anarchic passions, and introduce order into a man's desires and conduct. In doing this, the will, besides the power of reflection, is fortified by the emotions; because, by a law of our nature, self-interest, when once conceived as an end, is eagerly embraced as a new object for the affections. This is the second or prudential stage of our nature. Some men remain all their lives in the former or appetitive stage, and these we call impulsive men. Others regulate their actions by well-calculated self-interest, and these we call prudent, or it may be, if self-interest is too absorbing, selfish, men. But though the two types of character are clear, yet so infinitely diversified are these simple elements in themselves, and in their degrees of strength, that perhaps no two men ever lived in whom they were compounded exactly alike, in no two men was the same physiognomy of character ever reproduced.

But not any or all the elements yet noticed, however mingled, would make what is called a moral being; they do not yet rise above the life of nature. To do this, there needs must dawn another and higher consciousness. Reflection cannot stop at the idea of merely personal good, for it sees that there are other beings of the same nature and desires as ourselves who have each a self-interest of their own as well as we. But as the personal good of others often collides with ours, and as one or other must give way, we begin to see that the good of others deserves as much respect, ought to be as sacred in our eyes, as our own. So we rise to feel that, above our sensitive and individual life, there is a higher, more universal order to which we and all individual souls even now belong, that this higher order secures and harmonizes the ultimate good of all rational beings, and that the particular good of each, though in harmony with this order, and an element of it, must be subordinated to it. To realize this

spiritual order, and be a fellow-worker with it, is felt to be the absolute, the moral good, an end in itself, higher and more ultimate than all other ends. This idea, this end, this impersonal good, once conceived, comes home to us with a new and peculiar consciousness. In its presence we for the first time become aware of a law which has a right to command us, which is obligatory on us, which to obey is a duty. Seen in the light of this law, the good of others, we feel, has a right to determine our choice equally with our own, and our own good loses its merely temporary and finite, and assumes an impersonal and eternal character. This consciousness it is which makes us moral agents. Only in the idea of such a transcendent law above us, independent of us, universal, and of a will determined by it, does morality begin. All other elements of our nature are called moral, only as they bear on this, the overruling moral principle. The consciousness just described constitutes the third or moral stage of human nature. Not that the second and the third stages occur in every man in the order we have followed. A man may become alive to the moral law, and to its obligation over him, before he has conceived of self-interest as an end of action. But the order here given marks the relative worth of the respective principles, and the culmination of our nature in that one which is its proper end.

It would be easy to show how all the moral systems have taken their character, from giving one or other of these three principles of action, the emotional, the prudential, and the moral, a special prominence, investing some one element, or some particular disposition of all the elements, with paramount sovereignty. But we must pass on to notice a defect inherent in this and every attempt to map out human nature into various compartments, a defect which, when unperceived, as it mostly is, distorts, if not falsifies, the whole work of the analysts. Even if the most exact enumeration, the most minute analysis could be made, would this give all that makes up character? It is a common mistake with psychologists to suppose that it does. They fancy they can grasp life by victorious analysis. There can be no greater, though there is no more common delusion. What is it that analysis, the most perfect, accomplishes? It gives the various elements which go to make up a moral fact, or it may be said to give the various points of view which a phenomenon or group of phenomena

presents. But is this all? Is there nothing more than what is found in the analyst's crucible? The analysis, that is the unloosing, the taking down into pieces of the bundle, may be complete; but where is the power of synthesis, the bond which held the bundle together? Where is the life which pervaded the several elements, and made of them one entire power? It is gone, it has escaped your touch. Can the botanist, after he has divided a flower into its component parts, pistil, stamen, anther, petals, calyx, put them together once more, and restore the life and beauty that were there? This is the main error of psychologists. They fancy that when they have completed their analysis they have done all, not considering that it is just the most unique and mysterious part of the problem which has eluded them.

What the late Professor Ferrier shows so well against the psychologists, that the "ego," the one great mystery, ever escapes them, the same takes place in the analysis of every other living entity. In a human character, when you have done your best to exhaust it, to give its whole contents, that which is its finer breath, has it not escaped you? must not you be content to own that there remains behind a something "which no language may declare?" What end then serves analysis? By bringing out, separately and in detail, each side, aspect, or element in any problem, and fixing the eye on each successively, it helps to give distinctness and exactness to our whole conception of it. But it is only the multiplicity that is thus given; the unity or rather the unifying power still remains ungrasped. And if we are to see character in its truth, we must, after analysis has done its work, by an act of philosophic imagination remake the synthesis, put the elements together again; and if we do this rightly, something will reappear in the synthesis which had disappeared in the analysis, and that something will be just the idiosyncratic element which gives individuality to the whole man. To a moral philosophy which shall give the truth, this synthesis is not less essential than the analysis.

Of the many questions which have been, and may still be asked respecting virtuous character, there is one, not the least important, and certainly the most practical of any, which has received less attention from moralists than it deserves. It is this: supposing that we have settled rightly what the true ideal of character is, how are we to attain to it? what is the dynamic power

in the moral life? what is that which shall impel a man to persevere in aiming at this ideal, shall carry him through all that hinders him outwardly and enable him, in some measure at least, to realize it? Other questions, it would seem, more stimulate speculation; none has more immediate bearings on man's moral interests. For confused and imperfect as men's notions of right may be, it is not knowledge that they lack, it is the will and the power to do. Change one word, and all men will make the apostle's confession their own: "To *know* is present with me, but how to perform that which is good I find not."

On this subject, then, the dynamic or motive power in moral life, we would turn attention in the sequel. Under the word *motive* three things are included, which are usually distinguished thus: the outward object or reality, which, when apprehended and desired, determines to action; the mental act of apprehending this object; and the desire or affection which is awakened by the object so apprehended. To this last step, which immediately precedes the act of will, and is said to determine it, the term "motive" is often exclusively applied. But in our inquiry into the dynamic or motive power we shall use the word in a wider sense, including all the three elements in the process, and applying it more especially to that one which is the starting-point, namely, the outward object or reality, which, addressing the understanding and stirring the affections, ultimately determines the will. And the question we ask is, What is that outward object, or class of objects, which determines the will in a way which can rightly be called moral? What are those truths which, apprehended and entering into a man, enable him to rise into that state of being which is truly virtuous or moral?

In doing so it will be well to ask first what answers to this question may be found in the works of some of the great masters of moral wisdom. In his survey of moral systems, Adam Smith remarks that there are two main questions with which moralists have to deal. The first is, What is virtue? or, more concretely, In what consists the virtuous character—that temper and conduct in a man which deservedly wins the esteem of his fellow-men? The second is, What is the faculty in us by which we discern and approve the virtuous character?—in other words, by what power do we distinguish between right actions and praise them, and

wrong actions and blame them? Of the question we are now to consider, the dynamic power which enables us to do the right, it is remarkable that Smith makes no mention. In discussing this, which we may call the third main question of morals, we shall have occasion to advert to the former two, but we shall do so no farther than as they bear on the third, which is our more immediate concern.

Smith has classified philosophers mainly by the answer they give to the first of the three questions, according as they place virtue in the proper balance and harmony of all the faculties and affections which make up our human nature, or in the judicious pursuit of our own happiness, or in benevolence, that is, in the affections which seek the happiness of others. The first of these three answers to the great question, What is the virtuous character? has been sanctioned by the greatest names of past times—by Plato, by Aristotle, by the Stoics, and by Bishop Butler. Let us glance at their theories, with a view to find what help there is in them as to the dynamic power we are in search of.

With Plato originated the idea that virtue is a proper balance or harmony of the various powers of soul; and though it has often since been elaborated into detail, it has never been put in so beautiful and attractive a form. It is one of those great though simple thoughts first uttered by that father of philosophy, which have taken hold of the world, and which it will never let go. Repeated in our ordinary language, it sounds a commonplace; but in the Greek of the "The Republic" it stands fresh with unfading beauty. He divides the soul, as is well known, into three elements—desire, passion or courage, and intellect; and this division, variously modified, has held its ground in philosophy till now. The *δικαιοσύνη*, or righteousness of the individual soul, he places in a proper balance or harmony of these three elements, in which each holds that position which rightfully belongs to it. The state is the counterpart of the individual soul, and its *δικαιοσύνη*, or right condition, is attained when the three orders of guardians, auxiliaries, and producers answering to reason, passion, appetite, respectively stand in their proper order of precedence. This is the philosophy which Shakespeare makes Ulysses speak. "In the observance of degree, priority, and place, stands—

"The unity and married calm of States."

. . . "How could communities,
Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
Primogenitive and due of birth,
Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,
But by degree, stand in authentic place?
Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, hark, what discord follows! each thing meets
In mere oppugnancy."

The man is righteous in whom each of the three elements holds its proper place, and does its proper work; and this inward harmony expresses itself in an outward life which is every way righteous. The power which discerns the right and orders all the elements of the soul is intellect or reason, whose right it is to rule. But how is this harmony of soul, once discerned, to be reached, maintained, made energetic? Plato, of philosophers the least mechanical, the most dynamic, the most full of powers of life, cannot have left this question wholly unanswered, though he has not dealt with it systematically. His hope was that this may be done in the State by educating the guardians, who are philosophers; in the individual, by educating the reason, which is the sovereign principle, by the continual study of real truth, the contemplation of the ideal good. The highest object of all is the Essential Form or Idea of the Good which imparts to the objects known the truth that is in them, and to the knowing mind the faculty of knowing truth. This idea of the good is the cause of science and of truth. It gives to all objects of knowledge not only the power of being known, but their being and existence. The good is not existence, but is above and beyond existence in dignity and power. "The purpose of education," he says, "is to turn the whole soul round, in order that the eye of the soul, or reason, may be directed to the right quarter. But education does not generate or infuse any new principle; it only guides or directs a principle already in existence." So far in *The Republic.*

Again, in the famous myth where reason is imaged by a charioteer driving a chariot drawn by two horses, one high-spirited and aspiring, the other earthward groveling, Plato makes the charioteer able just to raise his head, and look out for

a moment on that super-celestial place, which is above heaven's vault, and to catch a glimpse of the realities that are there,—the colorless, formless, intangible substance on which the gods gaze without let or hindrance. The glimpse which the better human souls get fills them with love of the reality. They see and feast on it and are nourished by it. It is this idea or essence of the good, the cause of existence and knowledge, the vital center in the world of thought, as the sun is in the world of sight, which is the object of contemplation to the reason. "And reason," Plato says, "looking upward and carried to the true Above, realizes a delight in wisdom, unknown to the other parts of our nature." This idea of good is the center at once of morals and politics, the rightful influencing power in human action. It should be ever present to the mind; a full philosophic consciousness of it should be the ruling power in everything. Nor is it an object merely for the pure reason, but for the imagination also, and an attractive power for the higher affections which side with reason. This glimpse, then, granted only to the purest in their purest hour, may be supposed to be to them an inspiration that will not desert them all their lives after. It will make them hunger and thirst after truth and righteousness, and despise, in comparison of these, all lower goods. So far this intuition of the good will be a dynamic power. But this master-vision, if it be possible at rare intervals, for the select souls of earth, and if it were adequate to sustain them in the pursuit of goodness, is at best a privilege for the few, not an inheritance for mankind. And Plato did not dream of it as more. From the mass of men he turns in despair, and leaves them to their swine-troughs. He did not conceive that for all men there was an ideal, or any power sufficient to raise them towards it. In Plato, then, the moral dynamic force we are seeking is in small measure, if at all, to be found.

Shall we find it in Aristotle? Although the *Ethics* contains more than one division of human nature, which helped forward psychological analysis, yet the whole system is not determined by any such division, but by certain leading objective ideas. Foremost among these is that of an end of action. There is an absolute end of all action, an end in itself, and man's constitution is framed conformably to this end, and in realizing it lies the total satisfaction of his nature, his well-being. Everything in nature has its end, and fulfills it unconsciously, but a moral being must

fulfill his end not blindly, but with conscious purpose. The end in itself consciously chosen and pursued, this is Aristotle's fundamental ethical idea.

The end or the good for man is a vivid consciousness of life, according to its highest excellence, or in the exercise of its highest powers. Sir Alexander Grant, in his very able dissertation on *ἐνέργεια*, shows, with singular felicity, how Aristotle regarded man's chief good as "nothing external to him, but as existing in man and for man; existing in the evocation, the vividness, and the fruition of his powers. It is the conscious vitality of life and the mind in the exercise of its highest faculties. This, however, not as a permanent condition, but one that arises in us, oftenest like a thrill of joy, a momentary intuition. Were it abiding we should be as God. In order to find in which part of man this highest excellence is to be found, Aristotle has recourse to a pschychological division, not of his own making, but apparently well-known at the time. He divides the internal principle (*ψυχή*) into the physical or vegetative part, the semi-rational or appetitive, and the purely rational. The first has no share in human excellence, in the second lies moral excellence or virtue, in the third lies intellectual excellence. Aristotle here founds the distinction between moral and intellectual, beyond which we have not yet got. Practical moral excellence has its seat in the second division of our nature, in the passions, which, though not purely rational, have communion with reason. And though Aristotle in the end, gives to the purely intellectual excellence, which consists in philosophical contemplation, a higher place than he assigns to the exercise of the moral virtues, yet it is of these he chiefly treats, and with these we have now to do. Moral virtue, then, he defines as consisting in a developed state of the moral purpose, in a balance relative to ourselves, which is determined by reason. This is Aristotle's famous doctrine, that virtue is a mean, an even balance, a harmony of man's powers. It is a mean as exhibited in particular actions, and also a mean or balance struck between opposite excesses of feeling. Feelings, passions, actions, are the raw materials out of which character is to be wrought by aiming at a balance. Right reason is the power which determines what the mean or balance is. It reviews the whole circumstances of the case, strikes the balance, apprehends the rule by which the irregular feelings may be reduced to that

regularity in which virtue consists, virtue as well in particular acts, as in habits, and in the whole character. The mean is not a "hard and fast line," but a balance struck anew in each particular case, from a consideration of all the circumstances. The virtuous character is slowly elaborated by a repetition of virtuous acts; acts, that is, midway between extremes. And then as to knowing what the real mean is, man must begin and act from his own perceptions, such as they are. His own individual reason must be the guide he starts with, but he is not therefore, shut up in subjectivity. He has a surer standard than individual judgment to appeal to, even the universal moral sentiment of men. Or rather in the wise man, the ideally perfect man, he has a kind of objective conscience, an embodiment of moral law; and he judges according as he knows that this ideally wise man would judge. Here then we have a theory of virtue and the virtuous character, but no answer to the question, What is the motive power which shall propel men towards this ideal? Indeed, full though his treatise is of wise and penetrating practical remarks on character, this subject is nowhere discussed by Aristotle; but if we may gather an answer for ourselves, it might have been something like this:—

Reason of itself cannot reach the will and mold the choice. Yet reason and those emotions which are most obedient to it, act and react on each other. In time, by the law of habit, they blend together and make up a moral habit of soul, which restrains and directs all the lower impulses. When intellect and the more generous emotions combine in seeking one end, and by repeated acts form a habit, the result is the perfected moral judgment or practical wisdom, which itself is both a guide and a sufficient motive power to impel the soul steadily to good. *Φρόνησις* is with Aristotle the perfection of the moral intellect. He does not say that it is an interpenetration of the moral with the intellectual side of human nature, but that there is an inseparable connection between this practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*) and moral virtue. In his view, these two sides, if not blended in one habit, are brought much closer together than in Plato, and that, both in the discerning and in the ruling moral faculty.

The elaboration of the virtuous character by the formation of good habits is a long and slow process. Does Aristotle point to any spring of inspiration which may carry a man through it?

Plato after his own fashion does. Far off and inaccessible as his idea of the good may be, there is something in it, and in his enthusiasm for it, which must kindle, as by contagion, all but the dullest. But in Aristotle, though at every turn you meet insights into human nature which you feel to be penetratingly true, yet, after all, you are left to evolve the virtuous habit out of your own inward resources. There is in him no pointing to anything which may come to a man inwardly, and supplement his mortal weakness by a strength beyond his own. All that he suggests is of a merely external kind. Besides moral teaching, such as himself and other moralists give, he bids men look for help to such institutions, either domestic or political, as may assist them in the cultivation of virtue.

Amongst moderns, it is well known, Bishop Butler has been the chief expounder of the idea which originated with Plato, that the virtuous character consists in a harmony of the different powers of man. This, the leading idea of his sermons, has so worked itself through his teaching into modern thought, that it need not now be dwelt on. A system, a constitution, an economy, in which the various parts—appetites, passions, particular affections—are all ranged in due gradation under the supreme conscience, this is his doctrine of man. In working out this idea, while the great Bishop has contributed much of his own, especially the masterly analysis by which he proves the existence in man of originally unselfish, as well as of self-regarding affections, he recalls here the teaching of Plato, there that of Aristotle. Though he deals entirely with individual man, he illustrates his idea of gradation and moral harmony by Plato's image of a civil constitution, with its various ranks subordinated under one supreme authority. On the other hand, his idea of conscience comes much nearer to that of Aristotle's *φρόνησις* than that of Plato's reason. But in Butler's "conscience," there is a much more distinct presence of the emotional or moral element, while the notion of an obligatory power or right to command, so characteristic of modern as distinguished from ancient thought, comes strongly out. But paramount as is this idea with Butler, it is strange that whenever we go beyond it, and ask for a reason why conscience should be supreme, he fails us. Entrenched within his psychological facts, he refuses to go beyond them. Ask what is the rule of right, the canon by which conscience decides, he

replies, Man is a law to himself; every plain honest man who wishes it, will find the rule of right within himself, and will decide agreeably to truth and virtue. This is like saying that conscience decides by the rule of conscience. If asked, Why should I obey conscience? Butler can but assume that conscience "carries its own authority with it, that is our natural guide"—that it belongs to our condition of being, and therefore it is our duty to obey it. If a further sanction is sought, he seems to find it in the fact of experience, that the path of duty and that of interest coincide, "meaning by interest happiness and satisfaction." If there be exceptions, these will be set right in the final distribution of things. "Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part here, entirely hereafter; this being implied in the very notion of a good and perfect administration of things." In this coincidence of duty and interest, so far fulfilled in our present experience, and ultimately made sure by the existence of a Moral Governor of the world, seems to lie a great part of the dynamic power in Butler's system. To this may be added his remark, in the spirit of Aristotle, that obedience to conscience, when it has grown into a habitual temper, becomes a choice and a delight.

But in the sermons on the Love of God he strikes a higher strain. He there demonstrates to an unbelieving age that this affection he speaks of is no dream, but the most sober certainty. For as we have certain lower affections which find sufficing objects in the world around us, so we have higher faculties and moral emotions, which find but inadequate objects in the scattered rays of created wisdom, power, and goodness which this world shows. To these faculties and affections God himself is the only adequate supply. They can find their full satisfaction only in the contemplation of that righteousness which is an everlasting righteousness, of that goodness in the sovereign mind which gave birth to the universe. This is Butler's highest doctrine, which he sets forth with a calm suppressed enthusiasm almost too deep for words. This contemplation would give rise to the highest form of happiness, but it is not for this that it is sought. It would cease to be the ultimate end that it is, if sought for the sake of happiness, or for any end but itself. There can be no doubt that if once realized, it would be, as we shall see, in the highest measure, the dynamic of the soul.

Butler's search for virtue is wholly through psychology. Plato and Aristotle, though they do not begin with it, very soon have recourse to it. Kant, on the other hand, when seeking for principles of morality, disdains to fumble after them among the *débris* of observation and experience, but searches for them wholly *a priori* among the pure ideas of the reason. We find nothing in him about the virtuous character consisting in a harmony of the mental elements, although it might be said that his idea of virtue is a will in harmony with the moral universe. Laying his hand at once on the individual will, and intensifying to its highest power the idea of responsibility, he starts with the assertion that the only real and absolute good in the whole world is a good will. And a good will is one purely and entirely determined by the moral law. This law is not a law generalized out of human experience, binding therefore only within the range of that experience, but a law which transcends it; is wide as the universe, and extends in its essential principle to all beings who can think it. Man, according to Kant, shut up on every other side of his being to a merely relative knowledge, in the moral law for the first time comes into contact with absolute truth, valid not only for all men, but for all intelligents. Human conscience is nothing but the entering into the individual of this objective law—the witness, as it has been called, that the will or self has come into subjection to, and harmony with, the universal reason which is the will of God.

From the reality of this law Kant deduces three great moral ideas. First, since it commands imperatively, unconditionally, we must be able to obey it. Freedom, therefore, as a necessary consequence, follows from the consciousness of an imperative law of duty hindered by many obstacles, crushed by many miseries, unrewarded with that happiness which rightfully belongs to well-doing. There must, therefore, be a life beyond this phenomenal one, where the hindrances will be removed, where duty and the will to obey it will have full play, where virtue and happiness, here often sundered, shall at last meet. That is, there must be an immortality. Lastly, reason represents to us the moral will as worthy of happiness. But we see that they do not coincide; nature does not effect such a meeting. Man cannot constrain it. There must be somewhere a Power above nature, stronger than man, who will uphold the moral order, will bring

about the union between virtue and happiness, between guilt and misery. And this being is God. Such is Kant's practical proof of the great triad of moral truths in which the morally-minded man believes, Freedom, Immortality, and God. The necessity for the belief in these arises out of the reality of the moral law.

To Kant's ideal of duty it matters nothing, though it is contradicted by experience, though not one instance could be shown of a character which acted on, or even of a single action which emanated from the pure unmingled moral law. The question is not what experience shows, but what reason ordains. And though this ideal of moral excellence may never yet have been actualized, yet none the less it remains a true ideal—the one standard which the moral heart of man approves, however in practice he may fall beneath it. On this pure idea of the moral law, Kant would build a science of ethics, valid not for man only, but for all intelligent beings. Applied to man, it would need to be supplemented by an anthropology, and would then stand to pure ethics, as mixed stand to pure mathematics.

As to the relation in which, according to Kant, the objective moral law stands to the human conscience, there is a very ingenious speculation of the late Professor Ferrier, which will illustrate it. He asks the question whether it is the existence of our minds which generates knowledge, or the entering of knowledge into us which constitutes our minds? Is the radical and stable element mind, and is intelligence the secondary and derivative one? Professor Ferrier's reply is, that "it is not man's mind which puts him in possession of ideas, but it is ideas, that is, knowledge, which first puts him in possession of a mind." The mind does not make ideas, but ideas make mind. In like manner, applying the same principle to poetic inspiration, he shows that it is not the poetic mind which creates the ideas of beauty and sublimity which it utters, but those ideas which, entering into a man, create the poetic mind. And so in moral truth, it is not our moral nature which makes the distinction between right and wrong, but the existence of right and wrong, and the apprehension of them by us, which create our moral nature. "I have no moral nature," he says, "before the distinction between right and wrong is revealed to me. My moral nature exists subsequently to this revelation. At any rate, I acquire a moral nature, if not after, yet in the very act which brings before me the distinction.

The distinction exists as an immutable institution of God prior to the existence of our minds. And it is the knowledge of this distinction which forms the prime constituent, not of our *moral* acquisitions, but of our *moral* existence." This very ingenious speculation is in the very spirit of the Platonic philosophy, and may serve to illustrate Kant's view of the priority and independence of the moral law to our apprehensions of it.

Where, then, is the motive power in the Kantian ethics? Kant's answer is plain. It is the naked representation of duty, the pure moral law. And this, according to Kant, exerts so strong a motive power over the will, that it is only when a man has acknowledged its obligatory force, and obeyed it, that he learns for the first time his own free causal power, his independence of all merely sensitive determinators. The naked moral law, defecated, as he speaks, of all emotions of the sensory, is the one only dynamic which is truly moral. This, acting on the will, with no emotion interposed, will alone, he insists, place morality on a true foundation, will create a higher speculative ethics, and a higher practical morality, and will awaken deeper moral sentiments, than any system of ethics, compounded now of ideal, now of actual elements, can do.

In the rigidity with which he holds that in a pure moral action, the law shall alone sway the will, that all emotion, love the purest, pity the tenderest, shall be excluded, Kant is ultra-stoical. The representation of duty, when embraced, will awaken reverence for the law, and this is a pure moral emotion. But in determining the act, the stern imperative must stand alone, and refuse all aid from emotion or affection. For these there is no place in a pure morality, except as the submissive servants of duty.

In making this high demand, it should be remembered that Kant is setting forth, not an actual state which he expects to find in human nature, but an ideal, which nevertheless because it is an ideal, affects human nature more powerfully than any maxim merely generalized from experience. And perhaps if the moral idea is to be set forth in its native strength and dignity, it is well that it should be exhibited thus nakedly. It does come shorn of much of its power, when so largely mingled, as it is in Butler, with considerations of mere prudence.

As has been remarked, however, even Kant, much as he desired to get rid of experience in constructing his morality, was

not able to do so. He was obliged to come to experience before he could give content to his moral law—"So act, that thou couldst consistently will the principle of thy action to become law universal for all intelligents." So Kant shaped his imperative. This is not very unlike Austin's utilitarian question, "What would be the probable effect on the general happiness or good, if similar acts were general or frequent?" Again, as we saw, he is obliged to supplement his moral life here with the belief of a future, where virtue and happiness shall be one, where the ideal shall become actual; thus proving that human feelings cannot to the end be banished from a moral system, that some account must be taken of happiness, though Kant is right in giving to such considerations a subordinate, not a primary, place.

From the brief survey of the motive power as it appears in the systems of some of the most famous "Intuitive Moralists," it would have been interesting had our space allowed, to turn to the Utilitarian theorists, and examined at length the answers they give to the same question. As it is, however, a few remarks must suffice. This school of philosophers, as is well known, maintains that utility, or the tendency to promote pleasure or to cause pain, is the only quality in actions which makes them good or bad. They hold, moreover, that pleasure and pain are the only possible objects of choice, the only motives which can determine the will. These are the fundamental tenets of that school of philosophers represented by Epicurus in the ancient world, and by Bentham, and his followers Mr. Mill and Professor Bain, in our own day. If by the happiness which is said to be the end of action is meant merely the happiness of one's-self, the system is one of the plainest and most intelligible, the dynamic force is the most obvious, and the most surely operating that can well be imagined. But then the course of action dictated by the desire of exclusive self-interest is not, according to the view of most men, a moral one at all, and the motive is not moral, but selfish. The aim of all morality, as we conceive it, is to furnish men with a standard of action, and a motive to work by, which shall not intensify each man's selfishness, but which shall raise him in a great measure above the thought of self. If, on the other hand, it is said that it is not my own private interest, but the general interest, which I am to aim at, this may be said in two distinct senses: Either I am to seek the greatest happiness of all men,

the sum-total of human interests, because an enlightened experience tells me that my happiness is in many ways bound up with theirs,—but then the good of others thus pursued is but a means to my own private good, and I am still acting on the motive of self-love—a strong but not a moral one: Or I am to aim at the general happiness for its own sake, and not merely as a means to my own; but then I am carried beyond the range of self-interest, and acknowledge as binding, other motives which lie outside of the utilitarian theory. To the question, Why am I to act with a view to the happiness of others? the utilitarian can, on his own principles, give no other answer than this, Because it is your own interest to do so. If we are to find another, we must leave the region of personal pleasure and pain, and allow the power of some other motive which is impersonal. With Bentham it is a fundamental principle that the desire of personal good is the only motive which governs the will. This is the one exclusive mode of volition which he recognizes. He denies the other two, unselfish regard for others, and the moral law or the abstract sense of right, and yet these two exist as really as self-love. It is just as certain a fact that men do sometimes act from generous impulses, or from respect to what they feel to be right in itself, apart from all consequences, as that they do often act merely with an eye to their own happiness. In the naked form, therefore, in which Bentham puts it, utilitarianism is founded on a psychological mistake. But the utilitarian system takes many forms. Yet, as Jouffroy, who has discriminated between the varieties with great acuteness, observes—

"Whether a man pursues the gratification of impulse, or the accompanying pleasure, or the different objects fitted to produce it; whether he prefers, as most fitted to promote his highest good, the satisfaction of certain tendencies and pleasures; or finally, whether for the attainment of his end he adopts the circuitous means of general interest, or the direct pursuit of his own, it is of little consequence to determine: he is impelled to act, in each and every instance, by calculations of what is best for himself. Self-love remains essentially the same under all its forms, and impresses a similar character upon the various schemes of conduct to which it leads."

In Mr. Mill's treatise on Utilitarianism there is no departure from the fundamentals of the utilitarian creed, though much straining of ingenuity to make it include principles and senti-

ments which do not readily come within that theory. Indeed, in this treatise one prominent characteristic of all the author's writings is more than usually conspicuous. On the one hand we see an amiably obstinate adherence to the sensational and utilitarian tenets which formed his original philosophic outfit. On the other hand, a redundance of argument, sometimes verging on special pleading, to reconcile to his favorite hypothesis views and feelings gathered in alien regions, with which his wider experience has made him familiar. This effort continued throughout his *Utilitarianism* has occasioned, if we may venture to hint it, a want of clear statement and precise thought, with sometimes a straining of the meaning of terms, which we should hardly look for in so trained a logician. This comes no doubt from the fact, that in order to adapt the utilitarian theory to the primary moral perceptions of men, it is necessary to go counter to the natural current of thought, and to give a twist to forms of speech, which have interwoven themselves into the very texture of language. One of those strange contortions is the following opinion—that it is the idea of the penal sanction which makes men feel certain acts to be wrong; not that they are wrong in themselves, and therefore visited with punishment. Or, as Mr. Mill otherwise expresses it, "the deserving or not deserving punishment lies at the bottom of the notions of right and wrong." This doctrine, which Mr. Mill seems to hesitate to state in all its breadth, else instead of "deserving" he would probably have written "imposition of punishment," has been stated more explicitly by Professor Bain, who maintains that "the imposition of punishment is the distinctive property of acts held to be morally wrong;" and again, that "the primary germ and commencement of conscience is the dread of punishment." Another equally startling position maintained by Mr. Mill, is that virtue is pursued primarily only as a means to an end, namely happiness, just as money is; but that in time it comes to be regarded as part of the end, happiness, and as such is pursued for its own sake, just as misers come to love money for itself, and not for its uses. He holds that in man originally there is no desire of virtue, or motive to it, save as a means to gain pleasure or avoid pain. But even when desired for its own sake, which he grants it comes to be, its worth arises, not from its own intrinsic excellence, but from its being the most important of all means to the general happiness. But what it

more concerns us to remark at present is the answer which Mr. Mill gives to the question, What is the sanction of the utilitarian ethics, what the motive to conform to this standard? It is of two kinds, the external and the internal. The external motive is the hope of favor or the fear of punishment from our fellow-men or from the Supreme Ruler. The internal motive is primarily the desire of our own happiness, which, however, when enlarged by intelligence, expands into a desire for the good of others. It does so because the more we are enlightened the more clearly we perceive that our own good is inextricably bound up with theirs; because there is in us a natural desire to be in unity with others; lastly, because an unselfish regard for our neighbor springs, by the principle of association, out of intercourse begun at first merely from self-regard. It is observable, however, that Mr. Mill, though he stretches to the utmost the motive of self-regard, combining with it as much as possible of what is otherwise admirable in human nature, and though it seems to allow the existence, in a certain subordinate degree, of purely unselfish sympathies, yet in the last resort makes self-regard the center to which all the other feelings, as accretions, cling, and round which they are woven into "a complete web of corroborative association." In his ground-plan of human nature, the unselfish sympathies and the moral principle are not made to occupy—what we believe they in reality do occupy—as substantial and independent a place as the feeling of self-interest. Hence neither the standard of action, nor the motive power he sets forth, however much transformed by the magic touch of association, ever gets clear of the original taint of self-reference. Mr. Mill's utilitarianism does not, any more than other forms of the same doctrine, give either a really moral standard, or a self-forgetting and moral motive. As water cannot rise above the level from which it springs, no more can moral theories. Self-love may be, and as a fact often is, the first impulse that drives a man to seek to become morally and religiously better. And there is a measure of self-regard which is right, which, if kept in its due place, ought not to be underrated. But before a man can become either truly moral or religious, self-regard must have been wholly subordinated to, if not exchanged for, a higher principle of action and a purer affection.

In the opening chapter of his work on Jurisprudence, Austin

sets forth the utilitarian doctrine with a distinctness of outline, which we think, far surpasses Mr. Mill's exhibition of it. He does not, like the latter, assert that conduciveness to general happiness is the essence, but only that it is the index of right action. The rightness and wrongness of all acts Austin grounds primarily on the divine will or command. God designs the happiness of all his creatures; and as he has given us faculties to perceive what actions tend to produce this, and what actions tend to thwart it, he has given us therein a criterion by which to know what His will is, that is, what actions we ought to do, what to avoid. This representation of the theory furnishes a lever above and independent of utility, namely, the will of God—and therefore, in one point of view, a motive which, if once realized, is every way adequate to engender moral action. But still it does not rise above the utilitarian subjection to pleasure and pain. For Austin sums up the divine will in pure benevolence, and grounds obedience to it solely on the fact that God can reward and punish to the uttermost. But to obey God chiefly or entirely for such a reason, does not amount to moral obedience, nor is such a motive a moral motive.

A recent subtle and original writer on metaphysics will perhaps pardon us if we here allude to certain points in his ethical views, although he has not yet given these to the world. Differing from the utilitarian view, in that he regards virtue as consisting in a perfect harmony of all the faculties and functions of man; maintaining the existence of a moral sense, distinct altogether from a sense of interest, he yet agrees with the utilitarians so far, that he regards pleasure as the universal motive power. He maintains that in all cases where a choice is made, pleasure, or as it is sometimes phrased, interest, is the determinator of the choice; that in all conscious actions, thoughts, feelings, where a preference is made, it is because the pleasure of the one preferred is felt by the agent to be greater than the pleasure of those not preferred. The maintainer of this theory would say that the commonly-received distinction between pleasure and duty is a misleading one. For whenever any act is preferred, this itself proves that that act, however painful it seems, is not only pleasurable, but the most pleasurable. Let there be two acts, he would say, one a gratification of sense, and as such pleasurable, the other a denial of this gratification, and so far painful, yet if the

latter is done from what is called a sense of duty, the fact that it has been preferred proves that it was not only pleasant, but the most pleasant to him who preferred it. For that which in the event is chosen to be done is thereby proved to be the most pleasurable. To this it may be replied that to make the pleasurable synonymous with that which is actually preferred, is to give the term a quite new meaning. So to stretch the idea of pleasure is to change it entirely, and to render it wholly vague, and empty of content.

It may be true that in most, perhaps in all moral acts, there is present, more or less, a conscious pleasure, but it is present as a consequence, not as an antecedent of the choice. It is also true that virtue and pleasure are so far from being incompatible, that the higher a man advances in virtue the greater is his delight in it; indeed, that the measure of his delight is in some sort a gauge of his moral progress. But, on the other hand, it is no less true that while man remains in this state of moral struggle, in some of his acts of purest duty the ingredient of pleasure must be so faintly present as to be scarce, if at all, appreciable. To all theories of virtue which give pleasure or self-love a foremost place in it, whether as entering into its nature, or operating as its moving spring, it is enough to answer that they withdraw from moral action that which is a main constituent of it, namely, its unselfish character, and so reduce it to the level of at least mere prudence. They fail to recognize what Dr. Newman has so well described as "a remarkable law of ethics, which is well known to all who have given their minds to the subject. All virtue and goodness tend to make men powerful in this world; but they who aim at the power have not the virtue. Again, virtue is its own reward, and brings with it the truest and highest pleasures; but they who cultivate it for the pleasure's sake are selfish, not religious, and will never have the pleasure, because they can have never the virtue." To our minds there is no truth of ethics more firmly established than this. And it is not merely an abstract principle, but one which embodies itself in practice every day before our eyes. How continually do we see that the pleasure-seeker is not the pleasure finder; that those are the happiest men who think least about happiness! Because, in order to attain to that serene and harmonious energy, that inward peace, which is the only true happiness, a man must make, not pleasure, but some higher

object the end he lives for. So true is it that, as has been said, the abandoning of some lower end in obedience to a higher aim, is made the very condition of securing the lower one. Or, as the author of "Ecce Homo" writes: "It is far from universally true that to get a thing you must aim at it. There are some things which can only be gained by renouncing them." And such a thing is pleasure. Does not this characteristic of it, that, when you make it your conscious aim, it is gone—at least the purer essence, the finer bloom of it—prove that it is merely a subsidiary attendant on moral action, the attendant shadow, not the substance, and cannot be its end or propelling power?

Our survey of systems, ancient and modern, has been long, perhaps even to weariness, and yet we have not found the thing we seek. In what have been called the intuitive theories, the motive presented, if high, has been remote and impalpable, not such as would naturally come home to the hearts of ordinary men. The narrower forms of utilitarianism offer a motive near and strong enough—self-love; but then it is one which men of moral aspiration most long to rise above. And when the endeavor is made to combine with it benevolence, and to take in the whole human race, the motive is no doubt elevated, but at the expense of its power; it is emptied of the strength which self-love peculiarly possesses. On the whole, then, from this want of practical help in many ways, and especially from their lack of a moral dynamic, it is no wonder that most men turn from ethical theories with weariness approaching to disgust. Young students, and older men professionally interested in these subjects, can hardly imagine how widely this is the case, not with those so immersed in transitory interests as to have no time or heart for higher matters, but with the devoutly religious, with men of ideal longings, with those who have been most exercised with earnest questionings. Men simply religious turn from theories of virtue, as not only useless, but as cold, hard, unloving—hindrances to all their heart holds commune with. Morality seems to draw all its help from man's own internal resources, and they feel too keenly that not in these is help to be found, but in a strength out from and above themselves. The inmost breathing of the devout heart is, "Lead me to the Rock that is higher than I." Again, the deep-hearted poet, weary of abstractions, and longing for life, more life, and fuller, turns from moral theories with a passionate—

"Away, haunt not thou me,
Thou vain Philosophy!
Little hast thou bestead,
Save to perplex the head
And leave the spirit dead.
Unto thy broken cisterns wherefore go?
. . . . . .
Why labor at the dull mechanic oar,
When the fresh breeze is blowing,
And the strong current flowing
Right onward to the eternal shore?"

Again, when we read the lives of those men who have had the deepest spiritual experience, to whom, on the one hand, the infinity of duty, the commandment exceeding broad, and on the other, the depth of their own spiritual poverty, has been most laid bare, we find them confessing that the seventh chapter of the Romans describes their condition more truly than any philosopher has done. With their whole hearts they have felt St. Paul's "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me?" Such are the men who, having come out of great deeps, become the spirit-quickeners of their fellow-men, the revivers of a deeper morality. To all such there is a grim irony in the philosophic ideals when confronted with their own actuals. So hopelessly wide seems the gap between their own condition and the "Thou shalt" of the commandment. Not dead diagrams of virtue such men want, but living powers of righteousness. They do not quarrel with the moralist's ideal, though it is neither the saint's nor the poet's. They find no fault with his account of the faculty which discerns the ideal, though it is not exactly theirs. But what they ask is not the faculty to know the right, but the power to be righteous. It is because this they find not, because that which reason commands, the will cannot be or do, that they are filled with despair. As well, they say, bid us lay our hand upon the stars because we see them, as realize your ideal of virtue because we discern it.

But is there no outlet by which, from the mere forms of moral thought, a man may climb upward to the treasure-house of its power? Let us turn and look once more at the moral law, as exhibited in its purest form by Kant. In his view this law is not a higher self, but an independent reality, which, entering into

a man, evokes the higher self within him. To the truth, as well as the sublimity of Kant's conception, all hearts bear witness, by the reverence they must feel in its presence. And yet we know that, when we lay this bare law to heart, it engenders not strength, but despair. A few there may have been who have been able to dispense with all tender feelings, and to live high lives by dint of the law of duty alone. All honor to such hardy spirits; no word shall be said in disparagement of them. However imperfect their principle may be, their face is set in the right direction; they are on the way, we believe, to all good. Yet their lives, upright though they may be, will be stern and unrejoicing, wanting in much that hearts set free should have. But for most men, and among these for many even of the nobler sort, such a life would be impossible. Under such an iron rule, a large, and that the finer part of man's being, would have no place; the souls gentler, but more animating forces, would be starved for lack of nutriment. Still, as this law contains so much of highest truth, let us keep fast hold of it, and see whence it comes and whither it leads.

On reflection we find that there are many facts of human nature and of the world, many separate lines of thought, all leading upward and converging on one spiritual center. These are like so many mountain paths, striking upward in diverse directions, but leading all at last to one great summit. Of these the moral law is the loftiest, the directest, the most inward, the most awe-inspiring. But to begin with the outward world, there is we shall not say so much a mark of design on everything, as an experience forced in upon the mind of the thoughtful naturalist, that, penetrate into nature wherever he may, thought has been there before him; that, to quote the words of one of the most distinguished, "there is really a plan, a thoughtful plan, a plan which may be read in the relations which you and I, and all living beings, scattered over the surface of our earth, hold to one another." The work of the naturalist, he goes on to say, "consists only in an attempt to read more and more accurately a work in which he has had no part—a work which displays the thought of a mind more comprehensive than his own; his task is to read the thoughts of that mind as expressed in the living realities that surround us; and the more we give up our own conceit in this work, the less selfish we become, the more shall we discern, the

deeper we shall read, and the nearer we shall come to nature;" and, we may add, to Him whose thought nature is. Then when we look within, there is "the causal instinct of the intellect," as it has been called—the mental demand for a cause of every event, or rather the ineradicable craving for a power behind all phenomena, of which they are but the manifestations—a craving which no form of Comptian philosophy will ever exorcise. Again, there is the passionate longing of the imagination, aspiring after an ideal perfection for ourselves and others, apprehending a beauty more than eye has seen or ear heard. Again, there is "the unsufficingness of self for self"—the dependency of the affections, feeling the need of an object like themselves; yet higher, stronger, more enduring, on which they can lean, in which they may find refuge. Another avenue upward is the feeling of the derivative nature, not of our affections merely, but of our whole being. We are here a little while—each a small rill of life—with many qualities. We feel, think, fear, love; no facts are more certain to me than these. Yet it is just as certain that I am not here by my own will. I did not place myself here; cannot keep myself here. My life is in the grasp of powers which I cannot, but in the smallest degree, control. There must be a source whence this life, and all the other similar lives around me, come. And that source cannot be anything lower, or possessed of lower qualities, than mine, but rather something containing all the qualities, which I and all other beings like to me have, in infinite abundance. There must be some exhaustless reservoir of being, from which my small rill, and these numberless like rills, of being come—a fountain that contains in itself the all of soul that has been diffused through the whole human race, and infinitely more. This is no elaborate argument, but almost an instinctive perception. Call it anthropomorphic, if you please; it is none the less a natural and true way of thinking, and as old as the Stoics. Cicero puts it into the mouth of his Stoic Balbus, and has supplied him with no better argument. Lastly, and chief of all, there is the law of duty, coming home to the morally awakened man more intimately, affecting him more profoundly, than anything else he knows. What is it—whence comes it—this law, which lies close to all his thoughts, an ever-present, though often latent, consciousness haunting him like his very being? Mr. Mill speaks slightingly, as it seems, of "the sort of mystical character which

is apt to be attributed to the idea of moral obligation," but he has not as yet been able really to explain the mystery. If instead of trying to solve it, unsatisfactorily we think, into lower elements, as the analyst is apt to do, or to shrink from it as the sensual nature always will do, or to act out merely the letter of it, as the legalist will try to do, we can but get ourselves to look at it steadily, and with open heart, the mystery of its nature and origin will not grow less to us, but more. What is it; is it a mere abstraction? That which reason apprehends, and the personal will bows to, as an authority superior to themselves, cannot be a mere abstraction, but something which is consubstantial with themselves. The moral law must be either a self-existing entity, like to our highest nature, or must inhere in One who possesses all that we have of reason and will, only in an infinitely greater degree. That which our inner self, our personality, feels to have rightful authority over it, must be either a personality, or something more excellent than personality, if that is possible. To some such conviction as this we are led up, by asking what is this moral law which we apprehend, and whence does it come? Here, if anywhere, we find the golden link which connects the human nature with the divine.

Putting then all these converging lines of thought together, we see that they meet in the conviction that there is behind ourselves and all the things we see and know, a Mind, a Reason, a Will, like to our own, only incomprehensibly greater, of which will and reason the moral law is the truest and most adequate exponent we have. Not that these lines, any or all of them, are to be taken as proofs demonstrating the existence of God, which is, we hold, incapable of scientific demonstration. The notion of God we believe with Coleridge to be essential to the human mind, not derived from reasonings, though as a matter of fact actually called forth into distinct consciousness mainly by the conscience. When, however, we come to reflect on that conviction afterwards, we find hints and confirmations of it, mainly in the existence of our moral nature and of the law of duty, and secondarily in those other lines of thought which, as we have seen, converge towards the same center. But these are dim tracts of thought, hard to tread with firm step. Yet though the lines here traced are, as we know, imperfect and broken, they may be taken for what they are, imperfect and broken, they may be taken for

what they are meant to be—hints for thought on an exhaustless subject.

In this discussion we have taken for granted that the morality of man is in its essence identical with the morality of God—that when we use the word *righteous* of man and of God, we do not use it in two different senses, but in the same sense. This position, implicitly held before by all, both philosophers and ordinary men, has been more explicitly brought out and established by the polemic which Mr. Mansel's denial of it has called forth. The result of a real belief not merely in an abstract moral law, but in a Personal Being, in whom dwells whatever of highest is in ourselves, whose moral nature is imaged in our own, will be to let in on the soul a new motive power, a new center of existence. This is the first condition of a living morality as well as of vital religion, that the soul shall find a true center out from and above itself, round which it shall revolve. The essence of immorality, of sin, is the making self the center round which we would have all other beings and interests revolve. To be delivered from this, which is the condition of the natural man, is the turning-point of moral progress, and of spiritual renewal. The new and rightful center which shall draw us out of our own self-center, and by its attraction make us revolve round itself, must be that which contains the moral law, and whatever is best in ourselves and in all other created selves. He only in whose image we are made can be such a center to our creaturely wills. But further, neither the God whom mere science leads to, nor the God whom the bare unrelenting moral law sets forth, is capable of being a real resting-place for the heart of man. There are warm emotions within it, which before the representation of a God of mere law, whether natural or moral, die down like herbs beneath an arctic winter. To call forth these, it requires the unveiling of a Living and Personal Will, in sympathy not only with whatever moral principle is in us, but also with whatever is most pure and tender in our affections. When we come to conceive thus of God, then there becomes possible a going forth towards him of the tenderer and devouter emotions, as well as of the more purely moral sentiments. Such a Being becomes to a man the center and the end for the reason, the affections, and the conscience alike—a foundation on which his whole being can permanently repose.

But a few only, and these the most favored of men, have, apart from revelation, ever attained so to conceive of God. A pure-minded sage here and there, Plato when he drops his dialectics, and gives vent to his devouter mind, as in the well-known passage of the *Theætetus*, Marcus Aurelius here and there in his meditations, may have in some measure, though far off, so caught a glimpse of Him. To most men who have sought him at all, outside of Christianity, it has been at best but a dim feeling after him if haply they might find him. It required the appearance of Christ on earth to bring close to the heart of large numbers of men the power of moral inspiration which is laid up in the very thought of God. Till then he seemed too high, too remote for this. But when Christ in human form came near to them, his presence touched the moral springs in men, hitherto dormant, and made new forces of spiritual life to stir within them. Christ henceforth, both by his own personal teaching and example, and also by the new light of God's character which he let in on men's hearts, himself the channel through which that light was let in, became a new dynamic power of virtue, an inspirer of goodness. The virtue-making power which he used was different from that which had been employed by the philosophers. They addressed the reason, he touched the heart by his words, by his deeds, above all by his contact with himself. The two methods are well contrasted in the following passage of "Ecce Homo":—

"Who is the philosophic good man? He is one who has considered all the objects and consequences of human action; he has, in the first place, perceived that there is in him a principle of sympathy, the due development of which demands that he should habitually consider the advantage of others; he has been led by reflection to perceive that the advantage of one individual may often involve the injury of several; he has therefore concluded that it is necessary to lay down systematic rules for his actions, lest he should be led into such miscalculations, and he has in this reasonable and gradual manner arrived at a system of morality. This is the philosophic good man. Do we find the result satisfactory? Do we not find in him a languid, melancholic, dull and hard temperament of virtue? He does right, perhaps, but without warmth or promptitude. And no wonder! The principle of sympathy was feeble in him at the beginning for want of contact with those who might have called it into play, and it has been made feebler still by hard brain-work and solitude. On the other hand, who is the good man that we admire and love? How

do men become for the most part pure, generous, and humane? By personal, not by logical influences. They have been reared by parents who had these qualities, they have lived in society which had a high tone, they have been accustomed to see just acts done, to hear gentle words spoken, and the justness and the gentleness have passed into their hearts and slowly molded their habits, and made their moral discernment clear; they remember commands and prohibitions which it is a pleasure to obey for the sake of those who gave them; they think of those who gave them; they think of those who may be dead, and say, How would this action appear to him? Would he approve that word, or disapprove it? . . . They are never alone, because the absent Examples, the Authorities they still revere, rule not their actions only, but their inmost hearts; because their conscience is indeed awake and alive, representing all the nobleness with which they stand in sympathy, and reporting their most hidden indecorum before a public opinion of the absent and the dead."

It was this last mode of appeal, one not wholly unknown before his day, that Christ adopted. But though the channel was familiar, the use he made of it was not; for the influence, he poured through it was not only the purest human, but the divine. The philosophers had addressed the reason, and failed. Christ laid hold of a passion which was latent in every man, and prevailed. What was this passion? It was the love, not of man, "not of all men, nor yet of every man, but of *the man* in the man." But this in all men is naturally a weak principle; how did he make it a powerful one, make it "a law-making power, a root of morality in human nature?" He gave a command to love all men without exception, even our enemies. Now a command cannot create love; but with the commandment he gave himself to love, and to awake the love that lies dormant in every man. This, which is the central teaching of "Ecce Homo," must be given in the author's own words, so full of beauty and power:

"Did the command to love go forth to those who had never seen a human being they could revere? Could his followers turn upon him and say, How can we love a creature so degraded? . . Of this race Christ himself was a member, and to this day is it not the best answer to all blasphemers of the species, the best consolation when our sense of its degradation is keenest, that a human brain was behind his forehead, and a human heart beating in his breast, and that within the whole creation of God nothing more elevated or more attractive has yet been found than He?

. . It was because the edict of universal love went forth to men whose hearts were in no cynical mood, but possessed with a spirit of devotion to a man, that words which, at any other time, however grandly they might sound, would have been but words, penetrated so deeply, and along with the law of love the power of love was given. Therefore, also, the first Christians were enabled to dispense with philosophical phrases, and instead of saying that they loved the ideal of man, could simply say and feel that they loved Christ in every man. . . . Christ believed it possible to bind men to their kind" (and to all goodness), "but on one condition, that they were first bound fast to himself."

To his followers who walked with him on earth, his presence, and to many in every age since, his image, has been the strongest of all levers to lift them out of selfishness, and to create goodness in them. They have found in his life and character an objective conscience better than all other ideals of perfection; in their sympathy with him they have had the most unerring test by which to discern what was right and what was wrong to do; and in their love and veneration for him, a motive power beyond all other powers, enabling them to do what was right from the love of it—a power of loving God and of loving man, because they loved both in him. To such the law of love absorbed into itself the law of duty, and became, in a new and preëminent way, the fulfilling of the law. Morality to them was no longer subjection and obedience to a dead abstract law, which they might revere, but could never love, but an inspiration caught by contagion with Him, who contained the moral law and all the springs of morality in himself. This is that central truth, long tacitly recognized, but enforced with such power in "Ecce Homo" as almost to appear new.

If we were to go no farther, we have enough to prove that Christ introduced into the moral heart of man that which all philosophers have been unable to find—a new dynamic force, which not only told them what was good, but inspired them with the love and the power of being good. In short, he was the living center of a new moral and spiritual creation. But if we go thus far we cannot stop here; we must go farther than the author of "Ecce Homo" does. For Christ claimed for himself, and all who have followed him most closely have acknowledged, that there are other powers and truths in him, which in that able survey are either left in the background or altogether passed by.

Those more transcendent doctrines—Christ's atonement, his resurrection, the dwelling of his Spirit—are as much part of the testimony about Christ, and of the agencies by which he has changed the world, as anything that we know of his character. You cannot cut off the one without shaking the foundations of the other; and these doctrines are, if true at all, not merely in conformity with the purest moral and spiritual principles, but must be their very essence, must lie at their very root. Those who have most laid to heart, and lived by these doctrines, have found in the atonement the obliterating of the whole burden of past sin. This is not the place to enlarge on it. But no fact in man's moral history is more certain than this, that the simple statement of Scripture, "Christ has appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," has been found efficacious to reach down to the lowest depths of men's souls beyond any other truth ever uttered on this earth. In the Resurrection they have found the assurance that what conscience prophecies will in the end come true, that, though experience often seems against it, "right is stronger than wrong, truth is better than falsehood, purity shall prevail over sensual indulgence, meekness shall inherit the earth; for right, truth, and purity are summed up in their champion Christ, and He has conquered death, the one unconquerable champion of the enemy." In the promise of the indwelling Spirit, and its fulfillment, they have found a surety that the impulse which Christ first gave will not grow old, but will outlast time. One great practical result of these truths is the animating confidence they give that "God is for us." There is nothing so crushing to moral effort as the suspicion that however we may strive to live rightly, the great forces of the universe may be after all against us. But here the Atonement, the Resurrection come in. They tell us that this suspicion is groundless—that God is not against us, but on our side; that the faintest desire to be better he sympathizes with, and will help; that even on the heart where no such desire is yet stirring, he still looks tenderly, he wills its salvation. Can any greater strength for moral improvement be imagined than this?

The result of all that has been said is this, that only in vital Christianity, or rather, to speak plainly, in God revealed in Christ, lies the adequate and all-sufficient dynamic for man. For in Him thus revealed all the principles of man's composite nature

find their object. The natural desire for happiness, the yearning of the affections, the moral needs of conscience, are all satisfied. And all these principles so centered are turned into motive powers, or rather into one composite motive power, in which the lower, more self-regarding elements, are gradually subordinated and absorbed by the higher.

But you say, perhaps, that these things, if true, are things of faith, and morality stands on grounds of reason. Is it so? Is it, then, certain that morality is independent of faith? To prefer an unseen duty because it is right, to a seen pleasure, because it is pleasant—what is this but an act of faith? It requires faith to do the simplest moral act, if it is to be done morally. And the highest religious truths, if once they are apprehended vitally and spiritually from within, and not merely taken passively on authority from without, will be found to require but an expansion of that same principle of faith, by which, in its more elementary form, we realize simple moral truths.

There can be no manner of doubt that the promise "I will put my laws into their hearts, and in their minds will I write them," is the one great work which philosophy could not do, which the Gospel has to some extent done. It has brought in that which moralists in vain sought after, and without which their schemes were vain—a living "virtue-making power." This was held forth as a hope in the Old Testament, "All my fresh springs are in thee;" "In thy light shall we see light;" "Then shall I run in the way of thy commandments, when thou shalt enlarge my heart." In the New it was abundantly fulfilled. To St. Paul and the first Christians the law became no longer a stern commandment, standing outside of them, threatening them from above, but a warm law of love within them—not only a higher discernment of the good, but a new and marvelous power to do it, cheerfully, and with joy. And down all the ages, whatever obscurations Christianity has undergone, this, the true apostolic succession, coming straight from the Divine Source to each individual recipient anew, has never failed. In such as Augustine, à Kempis, Luther, Pascal, Leighton, Fénélon, Henry Martyn, the pure and sacred fire has been re-lit from age to age. They, by what they were, and what they did, became, each to their generation, the renewers of a deeper, more substantive morality. For the Christian light in them was not a tradition or an

orthodoxy, but a living flame, enlightening and warming themselves, and passing from them to others. And so to this day their works are storehouses of moral and spiritual quickening, more than all the books of all the moralists. When you read Leighton, for instance, you feel yourself breathing a spiritual air, compared with which the atmosphere of the moral systems is dull and depressing. For in Leighton, and such men, morality is, as Mr. Arnold finely expresses it, "lighted up with the emotion and inspiration needful for carrying the sage along the narrow way perfectly, for carrying the ordinary man along it at all." The saintly Archbishop was but speaking of what few have a right to speak of, but what he had seen and known when he said, "One glance of God, a touch of his love, will free and enlarge the heart, so that it can deny all, and part with all, and make an entire renouncing of all, to follow him." Again, "It is in his power to do it for thee. He can stretch and expand thy straitened heart, can hoist and spread the sails within thee, and then carry thee on swiftly; filling them, not with the vain air of men's applause, but with the sweet breathings and soft gales of his own Spirit, which carry it straight to the desired haven."

This is the language of those who, like Leighton, have known most immediately, to use again his own words, "the sensible presence of God, and shining of his clear-discovered face on them." Perhaps ordinary men had better speak little of these things—they are so far beyond their experience. But because language like this has been often repeated as a mere hearsay, by those who had no experience of it, it has come to be considered by many a mere decorous tradition among religious people, which other men nauseate. Still, however overlaid it has been with words, and however remote from it most men must confess themselves to be, the thing here spoken of remains none the less a reality—toward which end not only the religious, but even the uprightly moral heart, must look and aspire.

In the light of these thoughts regarding the spiritual springs of morality, how vain appears that cry so often heard in this day, "Give us Christian morality without the dogmas!" In as far as any dogmas may be the mere creations of Churches, or may be truths crusted over with human accretions, by all means let them be either swept away or purified. There is much need that all doctrines taught should be adjusted fittingly to the moral

nature of men, so as, by manifestation of the truth, to commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. It is also true that as men advance in spiritual insight, their view of doctrine becomes more simple, more natural, more transparent with moral light. But still it is no less true that love to a transcendent object, to a living Person, is the one root of Christian virtue, and that to expect Christian well-doing without a soul based on Christian faith, is to expect fruit from a tree which has no root. As we have heard one say whose long life of Christian wisdom and love gives weight to his words: "Renan and others admire the morality of the Sermon on the Mount, but reject altogether the doctrines or transcendent truths of Christianity. They would divide the one from the other as with a knife, and preserve this, and throw that away. Now, only think of it in this way. Take that one precept, 'Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.' How am I really to fulfill this? If the law of my country gives me a command, bids me do this or not do that overt act, I can give it an outward mechanical obedience, and with this human law is satisfied. But this divine precept commands not an outward act, but an inward spiritual condition of being. How am I to attain to this? By my force of will? My will can rule my outward acts, but cannot change my inward dispositions. What shall avail to turn the whole tide of feeling, and change the natural hatred of enemies into love for them? Nothing short of the forgiving love of God in Christ to me and to all men felt in the heart as a reality. This once felt has power to change the natural hatred into a forgiving love. Nothing else can." To us this seems clear as demonstration. And in like manner it might be shown that there is not one Christian precept which has not its root, its motive spring, directly in some transcendent truth of God's nature, and of the soul's relation to him. Deny these, and the precepts fall. Vain, therefore, is the dream of a Christian morality without a true Christian theology at its foundation.

But this tendency to seek the fruits of Christianity while rejecting its root, is as nothing compared with the extravagance of that modern system, which teaches that "the service of humanity" may be raised to the level of a practical and all-powerful moral motive, while all belief in a personal immortality and in the existence of God is denied, and a vague something, called the

"spirit of humanity," is made the only object of worship. This strange persuasion has at this time its devotees, some of them men of great parts, and we believe, of benevolent lives. That there should be some such—men possessed by fanaticism for a creed which parodies Christianity while it rejects it—is not more to be wondered at than any other form of fanaticism. The causes that have produced this strange phenomenon might not be difficult to find. But it is a thing to be wondered at that a cool-headed philosopher like Mr. Mill, who has never evinced tendencies to fanaticism for this or any form of religion, should have thrown over it the shield of his patronage. Yet so it is. While professing that he entertains the strongest objections to M. Comte's system of politics and morals, he still thinks that that system has "superabundantly shown the possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even without the aid of a belief in Providence both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion; making it take hold of human life, and color all thought, feeling, and action, in a manner of which the greatest ascendency ever exercised by any religion may be but a type and foretaste." The strength of this statement, perhaps, it may be right to attribute to Mr. Mill's generosity in advocating a mode of thought which he thought to be unpopular. For certainly it is one of his characteristics, that whether from the desire to help the weaker party, or from the love of paradox, he never shrinks from cutting prejudice against the grain. Can it be to the same reason we are to attribute that other strange statement of his, that the ideal of Christian morality is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active, abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good. If this is not to be put down to the love of paradox, it is an instance of ignorance in a writer of high repute, to which it would be hard to find any parallel. To refute it there is no need to turn to the New Testament, though, if we did so, we should have to quote nearly one-half of it; neither need we point to the lives of the most eminent Christians, and the extent to which philanthropy purely Christian has changed the world. For a sufficient refutation we need only refer to a modern authoress, who plainly enough shows that she is as free as Mr. Mill is from any deference to orthodoxy. In her able essay on "Christian Ethics," Miss Cobbe sets forth with great force how Christ changed the negative law of the Jews into a positive, and thereby

transformed the whole spirit of morality, giving to men the being good, and doing good for their aim. And then she contrasts with this what she thinks the ethics of the modern Churches—the mere refraining from evil and leading harmless lives. But to return to Mr. Mill's assertion, that "the service of humanity" may probably be found to be a motive force as powerful, or even more powerful, than any hitherto known. Now, is it not a fact of history that it was Christ who, by his character, his teaching, his whole revelation, for the first time so enlarged men's narrow hearts as to make some of them at least conceive an universal love for their kind? How he did this we have partly seen already, and cannot dwell more on now. Is it not also a fact of history, that since his sojourn on earth a new virtue, philanthropy, has come into action, and that of the great benefactors of mankind by far the largest number, and those the noblest and most self-denying, have been men who have confessed that they drew their inspiration to well-doing directly from love to him? Have these not declared that the power which enabled them to overcome natural revulsion, and to seek out their fallen fellow-creatures, even under the most unlovely and revolting circumstances, was the simple faith that God and Christ have pity on themselves, and on all men, even the most degraded? This worth, which human nature, even when most sunk in vice, has in the eyes of Christ, has for his true followers invested it with a new sacredness. In saying this we speak of no mere feeling or fancy, but of one of the soberest, best-attested facts. If for eighteen centuries this has been proved to be the strongest motive power in the breasts of great philanthropists, will men's devotion to the good of their kind become wider or more intense if you remove those beliefs which have hitherto fed it? Men's permanent devotion to any object is exactly in proportion to their belief in the worth of that object. Will men's opinion of the worth of the race be greater when you have removed from their minds all thought of an eternal destiny, and convinced them that their yearnings toward God are a delusion? Would human life seem more lovely or more sublime, if you could take Christ out of the heart of the race, and obliterate all sense of the relation in which we stand to God? Would the music of humanity sound more grand and deep if you could silence these, its tenderest, profoundest tones? Nothing that we know of the past or of the

nature of things makes it in the least probable that by withdrawing what history has proved to be the strongest motive, indeed the creative power of philanthropy, you will increase its volume. And if we are to wait till trial can be made of the new panacea, the suspense will be long, and the result, we believe, disastrous to the best interests of mankind. It will, we suspect, require more than the mere assertion of any philosopher to make sober-minded men willing to hazard the experiment.

Not to Christian morality, without the faith which underlies it, still less to the Comtian "service of humanity," can we look with hope for the moving force which shall make man fulfill his moral end. There is still another agency, which is so ably recommended that it must not be passed without a word. Mr. Arnold, in the farewell lecture of that remarkable series by which he has added new luster to an Oxford chair, adorned within living memory by Milman and Keble, has lately renewed his advocacy of Culture as a meliorating power in society. This lecture, like all that Mr. Arnold writes, is instinct with ideas, not indeed formalized into system, and with no parade of philosophy, but more living, more provocative of thought, than much of what passes for philosophy amongst us. From the light banter and playful humor with which he conducts his assaults, there is a danger that minds of the heavy-pounding sort may not recognize his real earnestness. Anew, in this lecture, he reiterates his assertion that the great enemy to all that is high, pure, and spiritual, is British Philistinism. By Philistinism, he elsewhere explains, is meant, on the side of beauty and taste, vulgarity; on the side of morals, hardness and coarseness; on the side of mind and spirit, unintelligence. Mr. Arnold, who, from a more intimate knowlege of Continental life and manners, is better able than many to estimate British society, thinks that it is rank with this Philistinism. And of the British people he seems to give the great middle class, and the upper part of the lower class, credit for the larger share of it. That the thing he speaks of is no chimera, but a really existing evil, that stands in the way of all moral elevation, no one with an eye to observe what is going on around him, and some things it may be in his own heart, can for a moment doubt. Only it may be doubted whether, when we trace the thing to its root, any class of society can be justly credited with a monopoly of it. Mr. Arnold of course speaks chiefly of

English society, with which he is best acquainted. But we in Scotland cannot claim any exemption from the plague of Philistinism. Our Scottish Philistine, however, has not so much of the third element—non-intelligence. Indeed, he has a large fund of intelligence of a sort, but that so raw and harsh a sort, as only to bring into more offensive prominence the other two elements. So little can knowledge alone really educate a man, that sometimes even the very highest scientific attainments may be found combined with true Philistian character. Mere knowlege without those influences that make a man generous, gentle, humane, is to the man within the man a very doubtful gain. But besides raw *brusquerie* of intellect, triumphant industrialism and rapidly-gained wealth tend this same way. For Philistinism is a plant that springs up rapidly under the sun of material prosperity. But the truth is, it belongs to no one soil, or set of circumstances. Wherever there is a man pre-occupied with thoughts about himself, and, as a consequence, without thought for others, there is the germ of Philistinism, whether in a coarser form, or a more refined. Where there is a heart at leisure from itself, however rustic and unlettered, there Philistinism cannot be.

For the antidote to this evil, the solvent to break up the horny crust that hardens round the hearts of men, Mr. Arnold looks to Culture; and by culture he means much more than has usually been meant by that word. Not only æsthetic and intellectual elements he makes it include, but moral also, and even religious. It has generally been desired as rendering "an intelligent being more intelligent;" but besides this, Mr. Arnold regards it in another aspect, as the means "to make reason and the will of God prevail." To the former aspect, which regards rather the improvement of each man's self, this view of Mr. Arnold's would add a social and a moral side, which includes, as a main element of culture, the love of our neighbor, and the desire in a man to leave the world better than he found it. What is new in Mr. Arnold's view is the emphasis with which he insists that culture is not only the endeavor to see things as they are—to know the order of the world as it exists—but to know it as the will of God, and to make this will prevail.

With great power and fine irony, Mr. Arnold shows how in Great Britain, at this hour, men everywhere, absorbed in the pursuit of the means of life, worshiping the machinery, lose sight

of the ends—those ends which alone give to the machinery any value. Immersed in love of coal, steam, wealth, population, bodily health and strength, they fail to find true well-being. They find instead the character of Philistines in all its hideousness, as the result of this worship of machinery, this neglecting of the spiritual ends which machinery ought to serve. In rebuke of all this, he reiterates with Epictetus, and how many more, that the formation of the spirit and character is our one real concern. This is familiar teaching—often taught, ever forgotten, "What will it profit a man" . . . The spiritual ends, however, to which he exhorts, the ideal which he holds up contains in it fully as much of the Greek as of the Hebrew element. A complete and harmonious inward perfection, a character combining sweetness and light, the two noblest things we know—sweetness, or the love of beauty, harmony, goodness—light, or the large and high intelligence open to all truth—these are the ends that make men's real welfare; these he urges them to seek, and to make all their other seekings subserve.

In much of this teaching Mr. Arnold does real service to moral progress. In preaching once more the doctrine of moral ends and means, he is following in the path of all the sages, only with a language which the present hour will understand. But it is because we so entirely side with him as against his opponents, the many enemies of culture, because we see the existence of the evil he warns of, the Philistinism already at our throats, and love the excellence he loves, that we are desirous that no mistake should be made about the right grounds and true method of eradicating the one and of attaining the other. Mr. Arnold makes religion an ingredient in culture, a means, perhaps the highest means, toward culture, yet a means. He thinks that culture in its ideal of a "harmonious expansion of all the human powers," goes beyond religion, as it is generally conceived among us. Again, he says that culture "adding to itself the religious idea of a devout energy, is destined to transform and govern" religion. Culture the end, religion the means. But there are things which, because they are ultimate ends in themselves, refuse to be employed as means, and if attempted to be so employed, lose their essential character. Religion is one, and the foremost of these things. Obedience, conformity of the finite and imperfect will of man to the infinite and perfect will of God,

this, which is the essence of religion, is an end in itself, the highest end which we can think of; and it cannot be sought as a means to an ulterior end without being at once destroyed. This is an end, or rather the end in itself, to which culture and all other ends are only means. And here in culture, as we saw in pleasure, the great ethic law will be found to hold, that the abandoning of it as an end, in obedience to a higher, more supreme end, will be made the very condition of securing it. Stretch the idea of culture and of the perfection it aims at wide as you will—and Mr. Arnold has widened and deepened it to the utmost—you cannot, while you make it your last end, rise clear of the original self-reference that lies at its root; this you cannot get rid of, unless you go out of culture, and beyond it, abandoning it as the end, and sinking it into what it really is—a means, though perhaps the highest means, towards full and perfect duty. No one ever really became beautiful by aiming at beauty. Beauty comes, we scarce know how, as an emanation from deeper sources than itself. If culture, or rather the ends of culture—sweetness and light—are to be healthy natural growths, they must come unconsciously, as results of conformity to the will of God, sought not for any end but itself. On the other hand, culture, making its own idea of perfection the end, and religion the means, would degenerate into an unhealthy artificial plant, open to the charges urged against it by its enemies.

But it will be said, Have not religious agencies of all kinds been busily at work for the last three centuries, and behold the result! In the warmest advocates of religion, bitterness and division; in the great mass of the thriving classes, rawness, narrowness, vulgarity; in the lowest portion, barbarism and profanity. Has not the religious idea been tried to the uttermost, and found wanting? Intensify to the uttermost "the dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion," will this cure the inherent Philistinism of our people, achieve the ends which culture longs for? No one can pretend that the religious organizations, as they now are, have done this, or are on the way to do it. So much is their spiritual strength spent in enforcing sectarian and divisive ideas. Sectarianism, whatever else it may have done, has certainly not promoted the harmonious expansion of human nature which Mr. Arnold aims at. But there are signs enough that its day is waning. On all sides we see the new

wine—a purer Christian spirit, new and strong as ever, ready to burst the old bottles, if only new ones were at hand to preserve it. Amid all our narrowness, and limitations, and contradictions, is not the horizon visibly widening around us? And as it widens, and as social philosophies one after another try to keep pace with it, and fail, the adaptation of Christ to fill the hearts of all men individually, and the necessity of him to become the cementing bond of renewed humanity, will become more than ever apparent. In subservience to Him is the right place for culture. Large service lies ready for it to do, if it only understand its true calling, to be the minister of a faith higher than itself. As an instrumentality of this kind, culture may become a most beneficent power, probably the power most needed in this age. But it must be as means, not as end; as servant, not as master.

We have attempted to show, as far as our space allowed, how a new and more vital force is imported into morality, if we can regard the abstract moral law of ethical science as absorbed into the All-righteous, All-loving Personal Will which Christianity reveals. In doing so we have touched, and that very imperfectly, we are well aware, but one side of a many-sided, indeed of an exhaustless, problem. When man's natural moral sentiments are confronted with the Christian revelation, many other questions arise, some of them more fundamental, though none perhaps more practical, than the one here discussed. Of these fundamental inquiries one of the foremost is, how far man naturally possesses within himself certain moral sentiments which serve as criteria by which the truth of a revelation may be judged. On this grave question we cannot even enter at the close of this long discussion. Only we would remark, that the moral nature in man must be that to which any objective religion, which claims to be universal, must mainly make its appeal. Else man has no internal standard at all by which to try any religion which claims to be received; and on purely external grounds it is conceivable that a religion, teaching immorality, might have much to say for itself. Christianity, at first, though it came with other evidence besides the moral, yet rested its claim mainly on the moral ground, and must do so more and more, as man's moral perceptions, through its agency, along with other agencies at work, become, age by age, deeper and purer.

The appeal to a power of judging in man is made in many

different forms by our Lord himself: "Why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?" St. Paul, too, says that he strove in all he taught to commend himself to every man's conscience. And the more either individuals or the race advance in spiritual intelligence, the more readily will they respond to this appeal in preference to all others. Morality and Christianity have, for eighteen centuries, acted and reacted on each other, the outward teaching quickening the inward perceptions, and these, when quickened, purifying men's apprehensions of the outward truth. And these two have become so interwoven that we believe it to be now impossible to separate them in the moral consciousness of mankind, and to say, this was drawn from the one source, and that from the other. Christianity, from the first, appealing partly to men's natural desire to escape from the dreaded consequences of sin, partly to the moral longing for righteousness, never wholly dead in the race, has, through this mingling of prudential and moral motives, elevated the best of mankind, and made their moral perceptions what they now are. And these moral perceptions, thus refined, react on the objective religion, and require ever more stringently that the truths presented by it shall be not only moral, that is, comfortable to all that is purest and best in man, but that they shall complement this, strengthen, elevate it. They require not only that nothing which is unmoral shall be taught as true of God and his dealing with man, but that all which is taught concerning Him shall be in the highest conceivable degree righteous, shall be such as to lay hold of and to cherish whatever susceptibility of righteousness there is in man, and carry it on to perfection. This is so obvious that it seems a truism. It is so readily assented to that no one would think of denying it when stated in this general way. Yet it is painful to think how much and how persistently it has often been lost sight of in popular religious teaching, and with how disastrous consequences. We are quite aware of the difficulties which this principle has to meet when turned on to certain points in the elder and more rudimentary forms of revelation. To solve these fairly would require a combination of moral and historical insight, with various kinds of knowledge, such as few possess. But when this principle is applied to the latest and completed revelation, Christianity can meet its requirements in their most exacting form. If precept or truth can elevate, what height of morality can be con-

ceived which shall not find its complement in such precepts as this, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect?" or in such announcements as these, "God is love;" "God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all?" Indeed it is only when the inner moral eye has been clarified that the meaning of these statements comes out at all, and evermore as the moral nature rises these great truths rise above it infinitely. And if it be said that after all, these are but general announcements, void of content, and we still need to know what perfection, light, love, are, then there remains our Lord's own life, with his teaching, actions, character, to fill these general words with concrete meaning and substance.

It were well that those who have to teach religion should consider these matters more closely—make a study more searching than is commonly made of what there is moral in man—what this longs for, with what alone it will be satisfied. The most thoughtful teachers know this, know that for want of thus meeting the moral needs of men—thus grappling with the higher moral side of questions—there is danger lest the purest morality of modern time part company with the received religion. Men who are to teach cannot see too clearly, or seize too firmly the distinction between that which is really moral and that which is merely prudential in man; and though they may not altogether pass over notions drawn from the latter region, on the former mainly they must throw themselves, to it must be their chief appeal. They must cease to be content if they can raise men merely to the prudential level of a desire for safety, they must feel that their work is hardly begun till those they teach have come to desire righteousness for the love of itself. They must cease to meet moral yearnings by unmoral doctrines or expedients—for bread giving men a stone. They must keep steadily before them that nothing can permanently satisfy the moral being in man, but something not less, but more moral, more spiritual than itself. They must feel themselves, and make others feel, that in the Divine economy, though there is much which is mysterious, there is nothing which is not even now supremely moral, and which will not at last be clearly seen to be so. In ceasing to use so exclusively the weapons of merely earthly, and wielding more confidently those of pure spiritual, temper, they need not fear that the old armory of Christianity will fail them. In the

old words, the old truths, the old facts, more vitally and spiritually apprehended, because brought closer to the moral heart of man, they will find all they need. This close contact between Christian truths and the highest moral sentiment of the time, while it vitalizes and makes real the former, will react no less powerfully on the latter. There is no moral truth which is not deepened when seen in the light of eternity and of God. That which, regarded from the side of man, is felt merely as a yielding to his own sensual nature, when seen from the side of God as disobedience to a loving and righteous will, to which he owes everything, is deepened into a sense of sin. Character which, when regarded from a merely moral point of view, almost inevitably becomes a building up from our own internal resources, takes altogether another aspect when it is seen that what a man really is in the last resort is determined by the relation in which he stands to God. Then it comes to be felt that the rightness men search for cannot be self-evolved from within, that they must cease from attempting this, must go beyond self, must fall back on a simple receptivity, receiving the rightness and the right-making power which they have not in themselves, from out of the great reservoir of righteousness which is in God. Only on thus falling back on God, and feeling himself to be as of every other thing, so of righteousness, a recipient, is a man truly righted. Thus the last moral craving and the first upward look of religion agree in one—"A man can receive nothing except it be given him from above."

XVIII.—THE METAPHORS OF ST. PAUL, DRAWN FROM THE GREEK GAMES.*

BY REV. J. S. HOWSON.

The papers which, at successive intervals have been inviting attention to St. Paul's favorite metaphors, have by no means exhausted the characteristic imagery of that apostle; and in order to give a better completeness to this short series of essays, it may be useful to prefix to the last paper a few general remarks on the whole subject.

A single example, selected out of those which have previously been given, may introduce these general remarks. St. Paul, in writing his first epistle to the Corinthians, says to them, as we have seen, "Ye are God's building." These simple words are like the striking of a key-note. Then follows immediately the full swell of a familiar passage,† with all its melodious rythm and its intricate verbal and moral harmonies. There is no need to occupy ourselves now, as was in some degree desirable on the former occasion, with the religious meanings of the passage, but only with the allegory. If we place ourselves at Ephesus, where the letter was written, or at Corinth, where the letter was received, and notice the evident and outward characteristics of such places, we see at once the significance of the language. Conspicuous in these cities were vast public buildings—such as the Temple of Diana at Ephesus,‡ and similar edifices at Corinth—strong, firm and magnificent, with columns and slabs of marble, porphyry and granite—"precious stones"—and richly completed with metallic decorations—"gold and silver." But close beside them were the hovels of the poor, with a sharpness of contrast to which we are not accustomed, but which we can in some degree set before our minds by imagining some of our great public edifices to be densely surrounded by an accumulation of wretched villages, with huts hastily run up with "wood," the interstices filled with "hay," and the roof thatched with "stubble." And now, suppose a fire to take place in such a scene, and you have immediately the simple outward image on which the Apostle's manifold parable

* From the *Sunday Magazine*, July, 1867. [H. B. H.]

† 1 Cor. iii, 9–15.

‡ See Acts xix, 27.

rests. All these wretched hovels—so cheaply, so carelessly built would be burnt up; and all that could be hoped for to the poor man himself in any one of them, would be a bare personal escape through the flames. The great building, on the other hand, might be scorched and blackened; but it would stand steady and erect, and exhibit still all the proofs of patient working in the quarry, of good and solid masonry, and of rich and elaborate ornament. In listening to expositions of this passage, you often find that this plain and simple way of looking at it has never occurred to the expositor; and you are presented with the unreal and grotesque image of a rubbish-heap, consisting of sticks and straw, and containing also some contents of a jeweler's shop—diamonds, rubies, and garnets. This is not the style in which St. Paul would be likely to write to the Corinthians. And misconceptions of such a kind arise from this—that men, in interpreting Scripture, so often look only at the words and not at the things, so often forget that every writer in the Bible drew his illustrations from the circumstances with which he was surrounded, and especially those circumstances which were most in harmony with the temperament of mind which the Holy Ghost, in that particular case, consecrated and employed.

The general notion, then, of these papers is this—that in order to enter into the full force of St. Paul's writings, it is useful, not only to have that clear apprehension of the meaning of his words, which we obtain through our exact study of Greek literature, but also that apprehension of the familiar sights and sounds, customs and institutions surrounding him, which is furnished by our knowledge of history and antiquities, science and art; and further, to notice what portions of that outward environment he most employs by preference or habit in the inculcation of religious truth. In studying the Bible, the Dictionary of Things is almost as important as the Dictionary of Words; and St. Paul's writings are no exception to this rule, but one of its best exemplifications.

As to his own temperament and predilection, we may again revert to a remark which was made before, that his metaphors are usually drawn, not from the operations and phenomena of the natural world, but from the activities and the outward manifestations of human life. In this respect, St. Paul's illustrative language has already been contrasted with that of St. James. "The vapor, the fierce wind, the fountain, beasts and birds and

serpents, the flower of the grass, the wave of the sea, the early and latter rain, the sun risen with burning heat"*—these are like the figures of the ancient prophets. There is more imagery of this kind, in the one short epistle of St. James, than in all the speeches and letters of St. Paul put together. The address to the idolaters of Lystra†—country people as they were, in a rude and remote district—if it is an exception at all, is exactly that kind of exception which makes the general rule more palpably evident.

St. Paul's favorite figures are undoubtedly taken from the midst of the busiest human society. Four of these have been selected for careful examination, and we are now proceeding to the consideration of the fourth. But others of the same general type might easily have been added to the list; and again for the sake of completeness it may be desirable to make this remark in passing. Thus, how large a portion of St. Paul's attention is given to money matters! How often are his images drawn from the market! To take only three instances. "Owe no man anything, but to love one another."‡ It would be impossible, perhaps, by the use of any other illustration, to express with equal force all that this sentence implies. Again, in the phrase, "Redeem the time,"§ what is really said is this—"Buy out of the market what you may never buy so cheap again; use the opportunity while you have it, and use it thoroughly." So, likewise, his reference to the law courts, and the administration of justice, even when he is arguing points of theology, need only be mentioned in general terms. An interesting question arises, whether in such passages he refers mainly to Jewish law or to Roman law, especially when the allusion is to marriage‖ and the making of wills;¶ but in either case his consistency is preserved, as regards the characteristic nature of his imagery. The third instance is that of slavery, as was almost inevitable for such a writer at this period of history. In the ancient world, war and slavery ran one into another; and throughout the Roman empire the whole of society was made up of the contrasts of "bond" and "free,"** with the freedmen (and such, probably, were St. Paul's own ancestors) intermediate between the two. Hence, when speaking of the most momentous alternatives in the condition of

* James iv, 14; iii. 4, 7, 11, 12; i. 6, 10, 11; v. 7.
† Acts xiv, 15–17.
‡ Romans, xiii, 8.
§ Eph. v, 16. Col. iv, 5.
‖ Rom. vii, 3, 4.
¶ Gal. iii, 15; iv, 1.
** 1 Cor. xii, 13. Gal. iii, 28. Col. iii, 11.

the soul, his language is drawn from the experience of slaves. The great and decisive change is expressed thus: "Being emancipated from that cruel master, sin, ye are now the happy slaves of a good master, God." * But it is time to proceed without delay to our proper subject. The imagery to which our special consideration is to be given now is the most animated of all, being derived from the lively and exciting *games of the Greeks.*

There is an obvious reason why images of this kind should have been very familiar to St. Paul's thoughts, and why, when made the vehicles of instruction, they should have been very helpful to his converts. Wherever he was residing, at Corinth, at Athens, and in all places where a Greek population was predominant (and this was, in fact, over the whole of the Levant), the athletic games of the Greeks came before his notice, as a subject which caused the most exciting and universal interest. The *gymnasium* or place of training, and the *stadium* or ground for running, were among the most conspicuous and most frequented spots in the architecture and establishment of the cities. In many of them their remains can still be traced. Wrestling, boxing, and especially foot-races, with all the preliminary training, with the assembled and applauding multitudes while the contest was going on, with the formality of the heralds and the strict observance of the rules, with the umpires and prizes and eager congratulations at the close, with the poems which perpetuated great victories like heir-looms, through successive generations,—these things were almost a religion among the Greeks, and they caused an enthusiasm which we ourselves can hardly understand, though it does happen that in our day athletic sports are a fancy and a fashion, and really in some cases, it would seem almost a religion.

I said, especially the foot-race. This was preëminently the struggle which caused the most eager interest in that age and in those countries. And this is preëminently the image which seems to come obviously to the apostle when he employs comparisons of this kind. We find instances in the book of Acts. Thus, when he is preaching one of his great missionary sermons at Antioch in Pisidia, and has occasion to mention John the Baptist, he speaks of him as "*fulfilling his course*," † which literally means "running the race he had to run;" and this lively expression is evidently a fitting image of that career, which did not last

* Rom. vi, 18, 22. See vii, 23; viii, 21.

† Acts xiii, 25.

very long, but was very energetic while it lasted. So in addressing the elders at Miletus, and speaking of himself, and alluding with deep feeling to the "bonds and afflictions" which awaited him, he says: "None of these things move me, neither count I my life dear unto myself, that I may *finish my course* with joy."* He knows that his course requires a vigorous effort—he feels that there are many things to dissuade him from it and to cause him to turn aside—but he braces himself up, like a runner, for the struggle, throws himself into it with all his force and spirit, and thinks of the joy and exultation which await him at the close.

Similar, and very frequently, is his language in the Epistles. It is well worth our while to observe how generally and variously this figure is distributed through them. Some phrases of this kind must appear strange to those who do not consider the context of circumstances by which the apostle was surrounded. Thus, to take as our guide the same English word which we have observed in the Acts: "Pray for us," he says to the Thessalonians, "that the word of the Lord may have free course and be glorified."† Here the gospel itself is the runner, for which he desires a race that shall be vigorous, rapid, free from obstacles, and triumphant at the end. Again, to turn to most pathetic language having reference to himself, he writes to Timothy, "I have fought the good fight: I have finished *my course:* I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day."‡ We must be careful here to give the right meaning to the word "fight." This term has nothing to do with war. It denotes an *athletic* contest. And the particular kind of athletic contest, which he specifies in the customary way, is the foot-race. But now he is writing near the close of life. The race is nearly run, the struggle is all but over; he is weary, as it were, and panting with the effort, but he is successful; the crown is in sight, and the judge, the "righteous" judge, who cannot make any mistake, is there, ready to place that bright wreath upon his head.

And as with the word "course," so with the verb that corresponds with it.‖ "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that

* Acts xx, 24. † 2 Thess. iii, 1. ‡ 2 Tim. iv, 7, 8.

‖ In 2 Thess. iii, 1, the margin has "run." No use is here made of Heb. xii, 1, simply because in these papers it is not desirable absolutely to assume the Pauline authorship of that Epistle.

runneth," says St. Paul in the argument,* which turns all our confidence towards Him who "hath compassion" and "sheweth mercy." His anxiety regarding the success of his own apostolic work, is expressed by the same image in two very different epistles, written at widely-separated points of time. He tells the Galatians that at an early period he negotiated very carefully at Jerusalem "lest by any means he *should run* or *had run* in vain;"† and writing long afterwards from Rome to the Philippians, he expresses his desire that they may be consistent, in order that he himself "may rejoice in the day of Christ, that he had not *run* in vain."‡ And the metaphor which he applies to the progress of the gospel committed to him, he applies also to the practical consistency and progress of those who had learnt the truth from him. "Ye did *run* well," he says to some, who had grievously failed and fallen; "who hath hindered you, that ye should not obey the truth?"§ "Ye were running the Christian race successfully and well: who hath put these obstacles in your way, which have thrown you down, and brought you to shame?" The whole language, as read in the original Greek, is far more easily seen to be applicable to the foot-race, than can possibly be seen in the English version.

Thus we see that both direct and indirect advantages may be gained by pursuing a narrow line of thought suggested by mere words. We here perceive the harmony of St. Paul's language in his speeches and his letters, and lay hold on one of the small collateral proofs of the genuine and honest character both of the Acts and the Epistles. We are very far, however, as yet, from having mentioned all instances of the use of such metaphors in these latter documents; and perhaps their use, in fact, strikes us all the more, when the actual words to which our attention has hitherto been given, are not employed. Thus, when St. Paul says to Timothy, "Exercise thyself unto godliness,"‖ the word he employs is most distinctly taken from the training and practising for *gymnastic* contests. And then he adds: "Bodily exercise profiteth little, but godliness is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come,"¶ a passage often misinterpreted. It is, in fact, frequently distorted in two ways. The "bodily exercise" is taken to mean religious

* Rom. ix, 15, 16. † Gal. ii, 2. ‡ Phil. iii, 16. § Gal. v, 2.
‖ 1 Tim. iv, 7. ¶ Ver. 8.

asceticism, and the contrast is understood to lie between this and some supposed "godliness" not connected with bodily self-denial; whereas the comparison is simply between the training of the body for the games, and the training of the whole man—body, soul and spirit—in the life of religion. And this helps us to avoid the other mistake, which is often committed in the interpretation of the passage. It would be a strange thing if St. Paul were to urge his disciple to the practice of a strict religious training of his character, by any promise relating chiefly to this life. He does nothing of the kind. He points out that if the athletes will do so much for a reward which is merely of this world, we ought to do much under the influence of a promise which relates not merely to this world, but also to the next. God has indeed a blessing for this world, as the blessing of Esau, but his highest blessing is for the next world, even as the blessing of Jacob. It is as if St. Paul said to Timothy (and we could well imagine that such recollections of the past were in his mind as he wrote), "My son Timothy, thou rememberest how, when we were at Corinth, * with our brother Silas, and Crispus, the ruler of the synagogue, we watched the athletes training for the games; young men of noble forms, eager and active, patient and persevering. It was a foolish toil, for a worthless reward. But we may learn a serviceable lesson from them. The children of this world are in their generation more diligent than the children of light. Train thyself—thy religious character—with the like eagerness and activity, patience and perseverance. Thy reward is not only earthly, but heavenly." And similar trains of thought might be followed in reference to other phrases, where not obviously at first sight but still really images of the games are imbedded in the context of the Epistles. Thus, when he says that he himself has spoken the gospel of God "with much contention," † or that others have been "striving fervently" ‡ in intercessory prayer, or when he tells Timothy to "fight the good fight of faith," § the metaphor is really *agonistic*, though the variations in the English version conceal the fact. But we must turn now to more copious passages, where the agonistic allegory is presented in its most animated form.

In the Epistle to the Philippians St. Paul writes thus: "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect—

* Acts xviii, 5, 8. † 1 Thess. ii, 2. ‡ Col. iv, 12. § 1 Tim. vi, 12.

but I follow after. This one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." * Was there ever a more vigorous picture of a runner in earnest? Here is the eager pressing towards a definite end in view—the feeling that nothing else is to be thought of for the present—the determination that nothing shall interfere with the matter in hand; and at the same time, with the strong effort of the will, there is the utmost alacrity and activity of movement. There is no looking back, no thought of giving up the struggle. The whole energy of mind and body is bent upon success, and till success is achieved, nothing is done. It would be easy to dwell on these points at greater length; but really the best commentary on the passage is supplied by the familiar facts of a well contested foot-race.

And there is yet a still more copious and animated instance of the same kind of illustration. As in the discussions of the other metaphors, some one passage was selected as furnishing the best sample, and as containing in fact the main basis for the discussion; so here we turn naturally to some verses in the ninth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians: "Know ye not that they which run in a race, run all, but one obtaineth the prize? So run, that ye may obtain. And every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things. Now they do it that they may obtain a fading crown; but we an unfading. I therefore so run, not as uncertainty; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air: but I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast-away." † It may perhaps be a help towards our entering fully into the spiritual meaning of this passage, if we try to associate one practical topic with each one of the four verses.

And the topic which we may associate with the first of the verses is this: the *earnestness of purpose* that is essential to the Christian's career. "Know ye not that they which run in a race, run all, but one receiveth the prize? So run, that ye may obtain." St. Paul appeals to the *experience* of the Corinthians. There was nothing with which they were better acquainted than these famous foot-races. Their own games near their own city,

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* Phil. iii, 12–14. † 1 Cor. ix, 24–27.

were among the most celebrated in the world. They "knew" well that each race was eagerly contested, and that "one" obtained the prize. But at this point we must mark a difference. In that race there was competition; and because there was competition, each runner was in earnest. In the Christian race there is no competition. The prize is within the reach of all. But then each runner must be as much in earnest as though there were competition and only one prize. And this is what the apostle expresses. He does not say (as I understand his words), "run so—*in such a way—as to* obtain;" but "run *so—as those runners run—in order that* ye may obtain." In their case there is competition, and therefore they are in earnest. In your case there is no competition; but their earnestness of purpose is an example to you.

And, certainly, no pattern of earnestness can be a more forcible example than the earnestness that arises from eager competition. "Run in the Christian race as the athlete in the foot-race runs." All his nerves and sinews are strung up for the effort he is making. Nothing else is thought of; and as the distance between his feet and the winning-post diminishes, he does not flag, but throws more and more exertion into the movement of his limbs. Whatever strength and elasticity he can summon up, whatever struggling remainder of his short and failing breath he can muster, all may be wanted at the very last moment. And what a contrast this is to our dull and languid Christianity! We go and take our place in the course, as though the prize could be won without any running at all, or as if there were no prize worth running for. We dream and loiter and fold our arms. We turn aside to look at every object of passing interest; or if we did begin with some vigor, all the zest and warmth of the struggle grows feebler and fainter, when it ought to become more animated: and, like the Galatians, we care little what hindrances occur, to stop our course, and to risk a dishonorable fall. Earnestness of purpose is what we want, and there is no picture of earnestness more forcible than that which is drawn from the ardor of competition.

But now we pass to the next verse—"Every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things"—and the lesson is pointed by a contrast—"They do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible." The successful athlete in the Greek foot-race received for his prize a crown of green leaves, placed by the judge upon his head. In itself it was of no value; but it

was the mark of victory. The winning of this crown was sung in poetry; it was the subject of pride and congratulation to the city from which the successful runner came, and it was the ground of boasting for long generations afterwards in his family. For the winning of this, exertions were made involving the utmost patience and self-denial; and no waste of strength and activity was thought too great, if only it could be secured. And yet it was only a corruptible, a fading crown. Its beauty passed away sooner than the beauty of those leaves which are stripped off from our trees by the winds of November. And indeed *all* human glory is a fading crown. It *must* wither and die in the end. Yet what trouble men take to obtain it! And what an example in this respect is the eager lover of glory to the Christian! His crown can never fade. To lose that crown—as it certainly may be lost—by neglect, by indolence, by turning out of the right course, by falling headlong over temptations that lie before our very feet—this is surely the strangest and most unaccountable folly; while to win it is worth far more, ten thousand times, than all the toil of the most faithful servant of Christ, all the torture of the most suffering martyr.

This verse, however, points not to suffering, but to self-restraint, which self-restraint is itself a blessing. And the topic which we we may associate with these words in the apostle's comparison, might be expressed thus—*self-restraint inspired by hope.* It is often worth a man's while to give up something which he values, for the sake of some higher good in prospect. This is what was done in the Greek athletic sports, when the competitors were under training; and so, indeed, it is now, sometimes to an absurd extent, in English athletic sports. Classical authors furnish us with materials, by help of which we might, if it were necessary, describe the strict discipline to which these young Greeks were subjected under the trainer—the diet—the exercise—the hard life—the fixed hours—the peremptory abstinence from everything likely to hinder the end in view. It is the *example* to the *Christian* presented by this discipline, which is the point before us. Nor is this the only place where the same apostle makes a similar reference. In writing another of his epistles he says—"If a man also strive for masteries, yet is he not crowned, except he strive lawfully;"* *i. e.*, he cannot obtain the prize, unless he complies

* 2 Tim. ii, 5.

with the regulations; and these regulations included, among other things, very strict and systematic methods of discipline and training. And the gospel strife with earthly sin for a heavenly prize has likewise its strict regulations. There is a preparatory discipline and training, to which the Christian must be subjected, before he can be fit to enter on his reward. The discipline, however, is, as was said before, itself a blessing. The training is a training for happiness. The apostle expresses it thus—"temperance in all things"—the habit of self-restraint running through the whole life—a check placed, not only on the passions, but on the words—moderation strictly practised in food and in sleep—those eager desires for amusement and novelty kept in control—so that the man is always master of himself. Thus under God's grace that character is formed, which commands respect and exerts influence in this life, and is prepared to enter on the future life, where no sin and folly disturb the balance of the purified soul. It is the hope of that life which furnishes the motive for self-restraint, just as the hope of victory in the foot-race gives the athlete patience to submit to all the discipline and training required by the rules.

"I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air," is the next of the apostle's sentences. *Definiteness of aim*, then, in the Christian's race and contest, is our next topic. And it will be observed that St. Paul presents this subject under two images, one drawn from running, the other from boxing. The foot-race was, as I have said, the most popular athletic contest among the Greeks; and it supplied to the Apostle his favorite comparison, in connection with subjects of this class. But the *pugilistic* contest was also constant and familiar at the public games, and he associates this contest with the other in illustration of the point which is now before us. Not only does the Christian act with earnestness of purpose, not only is he encouraged to practice self-restraint, but he is definite in his aims. And in two ways he is definite. He has a distinct view of the objects of his desire, and a distinct view of the enemies against which he must contend.

"I so run, not as uncertainly." A man who does not know his own mind is seldom successful. That is a very unhappy temperament which is easily turned this way and that, and which always yields to the latest influence, is always persuaded by the last new argument. Such a man is continually in the hands of

others. He is never his own master. He never does anything well. And there is another very unhappy habit of mind: when a man does not go direct to his point—when he tries experiments on the right and on the left—when he loses time by hesitation, or follows circuitous methods, whereas the straightforward course is always the best. They are both opposed to the true dignity of Christian principle. The disciple of Christ should be known as a simple-hearted man. His eye is single. He has one great object before him. His desire is to be like Christ, to prepare for spending eternity with that blessed Master, and meanwhile to honor him by doing good to all around him. And nothing could express this in a more lively manner than the comparison with the runner in a race. Direct—with the goal straight before him—with his whole frame vigorously moving that way—moving, too, by the shortest path—such is his course. Let such be our course. "Forgetting the things that are behind, and reaching forward to the things that are before, let us press toward the mark for the prize of our high calling."

But still, while we have a course to run, we have also enemies to fight; and to express this, another metaphor is appropriate—"So fight I, not as one that beateth the air." St. Paul passes here from the runner to the boxer, and, drawing a comparison from this source, he points out that the Christian has very definite antagonists. With the pugilist it is no mere striking for striking's sake, no mere pastime, no dealing of blows in the air for the exercise of the muscles. When the Corinthians or Athenians or Ephesians came in crowds to see their favorite athlete engaged in this contest, it was no showy and unmeaning attitudes that they came to witness, but the vigilant and most active employment of hand and eye for the purpose of victory over an opponent equally active and vigilant. And the best application which we can make for ourselves of this apostolic comparison is this—that we must be on the alert against our besetting sins—that we must keep our attention fixed upon them, and deal our blows sturdily against them. Now, in order to do this, we must first know what our besetting sins really are. This is a most serious subject. It is not sin in general that we have to contend against, not the sins of our neighbors, not the sins whch we have no temptation to commit, but "the sin which doth so easily beset us." *

* Heb. xii, 1.

What is that sin? Has the reader discovered his besetting sin? If not—this is not the place for dogmatizing on spiritual things—but it may well be doubted whether it is possible for us to be saved at all, unless we have found out our besetting sin.

Now let us consider the last of these four emphatic verses: "I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached unto others, I myself should be a cast-away." The image of the pugilist is still continued here; and we have to observe first, *what* the apostle does, and secondly, *why* he does it. He resists his carnal nature, systematically attacks it, and perseveres till he has subdued it; and this he does under the influence of a salutary fear, lest, whilst he has been made a blessing to others, he himself should fail to obtain the reward. The topic then suggested by this part of the passage, might be expressed thus: *persevering effort inspired by fear.*

The simple fact of St. Paul using this image at all, is a very grave fact. The pugilistic encounter was no mere light and languid amusement. Very often it was a matter of life and death. And certainly there is something very revolting in the thought of such a combat (whether in ancient Greece or modern England), being made an entertainment for a crowd of spectators. But these Corinthians, Ephesians, and Athenians were heathens, and whatever we may feel on this subject does not affect the strong significance of the apostle's comparison. It is the intense reality of the struggle which constitutes the point of resemblance. Those heavy blows, dealt by one combatant with tremendous force upon the other, are taken to signify the resolute and incessant warfare which the Christian maintains with whatever is sinful in his human nature. These fleshly inclinations are determined to give *him* no rest, and he is determined to give *them* no rest: and he perseveres till the blows of this opponent become weak and faint, and he is master of the field. This is a very serious picture of the Christian life in one of its aspects: and it shows it to be very different from what it is sometimes supposed to be—a mere habit of passive acquiescence in certain opinions—a mere decorous compliance with certain rules of society—a mere receiving of impressions from without, unaccompanied by any spring of resolute energy from within.

But it is quite as important, and even more important, to observe the *motive* of the apostle in this energetic and vigilant re-

sistence. His persevering effort is inspired by *fear*. "I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection, lest that by any means, when I have preached unto others, I myself should be a cast-away." "*Lest*"—never was a little word more weighty in any sentence; and the writer makes it more emphatic, by the addition of "*by any means*." Could there be a more solemn admonition of danger? Here is this great apostle, to whom the establishment of Christianity in the world is due more than to any one else, telling us that he carried on a watchful and vigorous warfare against his fleshly nature, *for fear lest*, in the midst of all these ministrations, he himself should lose his reward. Well, then, may we fear for ourselves; and, most of all, those amongst us who are actively endeavoring to do spiritual good to others. What thought can go with greater power into the very depths of the conscience than this: "God may be using me for the spiritual good of others, and yet my own heart may not be right; my own soul may not be safe, through the mysterious power of sin in my fleshly nature; I may be falling away further from God, even while I am drawing others nearer to Him?" It is of course obvious that we are here brought into contact with the doctrines of predestination and election, and that a difficulty arises when such a passage as this is compared with passages supporting these doctrines. It is easy to range texts on both sides of such a controversy as that, and not easy to reconcile them, except by making one set of texts give way to another. And this we have no right to do. With other parts of the Scripture before us, we might meditate with advantage on the sweet comfort which is derived from the conviction that those who have placed their souls in the care of Christ are safe, and that no one can pluck them out of that Saviour's hands. But that is not our subject now. We must take the Bible as we find it. St. Paul does most distinctly tell us in this place that *with him* the fear of being "a cast-away" was a commanding motive. Hope and fear are the two poles of the Christian's life; and certainly fear has a very conspicuous place in Holy Scriptures. "Be not high-minded, but *fear*." "Pass the time of your sojourning here in *fear*." "Let him that thinketh he standeth *take heed* heed lest he fall." *

The general subject of St. Paul's habit of taking metaphorical language from the athletic games is by no means yet exhausted.

* Rom xi, 20. 1 Pet. i, 17. 1 Cor. x, 12.

Even in the context which we have been examining at considerable length, there is at least one other agonistic allusion, which might easily escape notice. When St. Paul speaks in this passage of "having preached to others," the true rendering is, "having been *a herald* to others." And the reference is to that officer in the concourse at the games, whose business it was, with his voice, or with a trumpet, to summon the competitors to the exciting struggle. Much more, too, might be said on various points of detail, which have been only lightly touched, such as the training, * the rules, † the judge, ‡ the prize, § the attending spectators, ‖ and the jubilant joy ¶ with which the victor was received at the close of the race. But it is now time to lay the subject aside; and this short series of papers on St. Paul's illustrative language may be briefly concluded by two reflections, one of which has reference to the apostle himself, the other to the Bible at large.

It is impossible not to feel, in pursuing such studies as these, that we have not merely St. Paul's instruction and exhortation, but his personal example, before us. We always feel that we should like to know something of the character of a man who produced such wonderful effects in the world as the apostle Paul. And, certainly, we have no lack of materials for forming a judgment on this subject. Among other things, we have his customary language. A man's customary language, (at least if he is a man of mark) generally shows something of his character, and perhaps especially the language which he uses in his letters. For in letter-writing we are free from the disturbing influence of conversation, while yet the personal element is strongly present. Four groups of St. Paul's favorite similes have been before our attention, and perhaps each of them might furnish a suggestion in regard to his character. Thus, in his architectural imagery we might be reminded of his steady adherence to first principles, and of his constructive ability (under God's spirit), in regard both to doctrine and the church; while his illustrations drawn from agriculture seem to present him before us in his sympathizing care for the spiritual growth of his converts and his reliance on the exercise of God's beneficent power. But perhaps it is more easy to make this use of the metaphors which he draws from Roman

* 1 Cor ix, 25. 1 Tim. iv, 7, 8. † 2 Tim. ii, 5. ‡ 2 Tim. iv, 8.
§ 1 Cor. ix, 24. Phil. iii, 14. ‖ See 1 Cor. iv, 9. ¶ Acts. xx, 24.

soldiers and Greek games. We can hardly be mistaken in believing that by combining them together we obtain an approximate picture of the man. In both cases his references to such subjects are copious, natural, and customary. From this we should conclude that there was something of the soldier and the athlete in his moral and religious constitution. And so in truth it was. He had much of what we should call tenacity of character—a great power of elastic recovery, when he was beaten back by opposition—a strong will, not deterred by difficulties—and at the same time a remarkable alacrity and versatility and readiness of resource. We know this to have been the case, from the facts of his life; but we see it also in the imagery, which he is in the habit of borrowing from the Roman soldiers and the Greek games.

As to Scripture at large, the remark which suggests itself in conclusion is this, that the careful student can in every part of it enter upon large and precious trains of thought, and can find a germinating power even in what seem to be its secondary portions. In these short essays we have been following very narrow paths through a very limited portion of God's Word; and yet we have found a good deal to interest and instruct us. It is a great proof of the endless variety and richness of the Bible, if we can gain so much by merely pursuing the course of a peculiar word or a characteristic metaphor. God's Word is like God's world—very varied, very rich, very beautiful. You never know when you have exhausted all its secrets. The Bible, like nature, has something for every class of mind. As in the phenomena around us there are resources and invitations both for science and for poetry, so does God's revelation furnish materials both for exact theological definition and for the free play of devout thought and feeling. Look at the Bible in a new light, and you straightway see some new charm. This is true, even in regard to very minute particulars. The view from a commanding Alpine summit, which has been climbed by great labor, and where half a kingdom is spread before you, is very glorious and not to be forgotten: but the quiet foot-path along the slopes of the lower eminences may also be full of beauty at every turn. And such has been our modest course in these essays. It is something to have obtained a deeper conviction than before of the inexhaustible charms and advantages of even the by-ways of Scripture.

XIX.—THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE.*

BY THE DEAN OF CANTERBURY.

It seems to me that, in these days, our thoughts on the Christian conscience want reviewing and clearing. Its origin, its description, its operation, and present extent of influence, on public and private opinion and action, may perhaps profitably be made matter for an essay.

"The good that I would, I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." (Rom. vii, 19). Who are these two—the I that desires—the I that acts? Not two persons: for it is one and the same Paul that both desires and acts. Nor can we say that both are the simple and consistent doings of one and the same persons. There is a complication, there is a coercion. A desire to act in one way rises within: this desire is thwarted, and action is hindered. A reluctance to act in another way is felt: the reluctance is overborne, and action takes place. And this is not as when the body refuses the bidding of the will; when energy is suspended by lassitude, or the desire of quiet broken by nervous excitement. Those conflicts, those defeats, are temporary; but this is enduring. Those are between the flesh and the will: this is within the will itself. For in this description, there are two wills. We will one way, we act another way. But no man can be properly said to act without willing: the motion of conscious action is voluntary; abstinence from that motion is voluntary also. So that within the man is a will saying, "I will," and protesting against the will which is carried out in action: sitting, so to speak, bound, and witnessing its own defeat. And when we come to inquire about this deposed, this frustrated will, there can be no question that it is the nobler, the higher of the two, though it be thus defeated. For it bears testimony for good and against evil; whereas its victorious adversary thwarts the good, and carries out the evil.

So then we find ourselves in the presence of these two phenomena in man: a higher will, a nobler consciousness, testifying

* From *Good Words*, January, 1868.

to good, protesting against evil, but overborne; and a lower will, a less noble consciousness, putting aside the good, choosing the evil, and commonly prevailing. And we may observe that both these are resident in the inner man, not belonging the one to the inner, the other to the outer. However the lower will may become entangled with, and enslaved by, the bodily emotions, it is yet a decision given not in nor by the body, but in and by the mind.

But now let us go a step further, and let us suppose that in some given case the higher will obtains the mastery, and that the word of command which the mind gives to the body to act or not to act, proceeds not from the lower will but from the higher; or, if necessarily from the lower, then from the lower subordinated to and absorbed into the higher. Let us suppose, in other words, a state of things which would be expressed by "The good that I would do, that do I: and the evil which I would not do, that do I not." Manifestly, this is no impossible supposition, but one which is often, though not ordinarily, realized in fact.

What have we now obtained? Why this: that my practical will, the ruler of the acts which I do, and the non-acts which I refuse to do, lies open to two distinct influences—one drawing it upward, in the direction of good and to the avoidance of evil, the other drawing it downward, in the direction which may lead to the adoption of evil, and to the avoidance of good. And there can be no question that this my practical will emanates directly from, and is the expression of, my personality—that it is the exponent of myself. But let us advance a step further in this preliminary examination. This practical will, of which we have spoken, is the result of thought, is the issue of determination. Are thought and determination peculiar to man? Certainly not. Every kind of organized animal life, in its measure and after its kind, possesses them. The practical will may be as limited as in the oyster, or as free as in the eagle; but it is equally in obedience to it, that conscious animal action takes place. In man, of all animals, its capacities are greatest; but its nature is not distinct. In man, with all its intellectual powers and wide-reaching susceptibilities, it is but the animal soul; in the lowest organized being, with all its narrowness and dullness, it is the animal soul still. The Greeks, in their wonderfully accurate language, expressed by the same (ψυχή, *psychê*), the soul of man

which he has to save, and the life of the reptile which man crushes under his foot. And it would have been immensely for our profit if we had done the same. For then we should have understood what very few now do understand, the true nature, the true place, of this our intellectual and emotional being. We then should have read in our Bibles not only, "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it;" but also (for the same word is used), "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own life? Or what shall a man give in exchange for his life?" For it is this life of man that carries his practical will, with all those motions of intellect and feeling which set it at work: it is the life, which is mysteriously bound up with the body, and which is reft from it at death—it is this life, which if a man spend upon God and upon good, he shall save to life eternal. Infinite misunderstanding, infinite mischief, has arisen from confounding this animal soul of man with his immortal part. We hear frequently, in fact it is the usual and still commonly-received notion, that man is compounded of two parts, the mortal body, and the immortal soul. Whole sermons, whole treatises, proceed on this view of man. Books of argument have been written to prove the immortality of the soul; and have been for the most part writen in vain. The reasons alleged have been acute enough in themselves, but capable of the easiest refutation. The soul, it was maintained, was immortal because it was indivisible, or because of some of the functions which it performs independently of the body in which it dwells. It was easy to see that this, if it proved anything, proved too much. For how is my animal soul more indivisible than the animal soul of my dog? And what faculty have I that, after his kind, he has not? No consideration of this sort in fact proved more than the pretty conceit of our metaphysical poet—

> "Thoughts whose very sweetness yieldeth proof
> That they were born for immortality."

There is absolutely no reason for believing, if man is compounded only of body and soul, that he continues to exist after this present life. The powers and faculties of the soul decay with the decay of the soul. The same blow which ends the corporeal organism, ends also the existence of animal self-consciousness, which, as far

as we know from any inductive argument, is bound up with that organism.

Even the witness of nature herself was against this twofold division of man. We do not, we cannot, account ourselves a mere higher form of the brute, as on this theory we must do. For according to it we differ from the brute only in degree of intelligence and higher bodily endowment, and not in any matter of kind at all. Whereas it is the impregnable conviction of our race, unaffected by any adverse theories of philosophers, that between the lowest intelligent man, and the highest intelligent animal, there is a gulf fixed, impassable by any mere intensification or depreciation of existing faculties.

And wherein does the difference consist, that places man on the one side of this gulf, and the brute on the other? man on the heavenward side, the brute on the earthward? Wherein, but in this, that whereas man and the brutes have body and soul in common, man has a third and higher part, which none of the brutes possess?

And this third or higher part is, man's spirit; that portion of him in and by which he is conscious of God. No created being on this earth is conscious of God, but man.

> "Of all the creatures, both on sea and land,
> Only to man Thou hast made known Thy ways,
> And put the pen alone into his hand,
> And made him secretary of Thy praise."

And he is thus conscious of God, not by virtue of a higher degree of that which he possesses in common with the lower tribes of animal life, but by virtue of something which he alone is endowed with. No mere animal has a conscience. An animal may be trained, by hope of reward and fear of punishment, to simulate the possession of a conscience—to behave nearly as if conscious of right and wrong. An animal may be acted on by its affections, all situated in the animal soul, so as to lead it to consult, to be united to, even to anticipate, the wishes and feelings of another animal, or of a human master; but no animal ever knew wrong as wrong, or right as right; ever shrunk from inflicting pain on principle, or practiced self-denial except emotionally. Conscience, the source of the will that would do the good, that would not do

the evil, is entirely a function of that nobler part, the spirit, which man possesses exclusively.

How do we know this? What has enabled us to detect, to describe, to reason upon, this higher portion of the threefold nature of man? I answer, we know it by revelation. Holy Scripture has revealed to us not God only, but our own nature. This its threefold division was not recognized, was not perceptible, by the Greek philosophers. Wonderfully accurate and keen as were their investigations, they could not attain to this discovery, for it was altogether above them. Neither, again, was it entirely made known in Old Testament days; nor could it be, in the gradual unfolding of God to man, and of man to himself. It is matter of Christian revelation. We are first let into the secrets of our own nature, when the entire redemption and renewal of that nature are disclosed.

And in this disclosure, the Christian Scriptures, as they stand entirely alone, so are they throughout consistent with themselves in asserting this triple nature of man. In fact, this consistency is kept in all the anticipatory notices in the Old Testament also. From the first description of man's creation, to the latest notice of his state by redemption, the Scripture account of him is one and the same, and is found nowhere else. The body, created by the Almighty out of the dust of the earth; the divine nature breathed into this body already organized, by God himself; the animal soul, common to man and the brute creation, expressed by the same term in speaking of the brutes and of man, carrying his personality, being that which he was made to be, "and man became a living soul."

I cannot refrain from further commenting on this very important description, because the comment lies so directly in our course of making plain this matter.

Man became this living soul. This was his characteristic—this was the hue which his being took. He became this living soul, connected in its upper portion with the divine spirit breathed into him, connected in its lower portion with the organized body, with the inlets of the senses, with the earthly and the bestial. Let us mark this well. He was not at first mainly spiritual, but mainly animal; an example, not of the spirit that gives life, but of the soul, that lives by life given. This, we are told by St. Paul in his grand reasoning on the words, was necessary—

necessary, that the man should not be put first into the sphere of the spiritual but into the sphere of the soulish, animal nature. If we may venture to supply the link missing here, we should say it was necessary, because all God's works have an upward progress, not a downward. Our race had to emerge, not to be submerged: from being headed by an Adam who was a living soul, to be headed by an Adam who is a life-giving spirit—not *vice versâ*.

Well then, what followed? Man being thus constituted, drawn upward, drawn downward—himself, so to speak, standing on the platform of the animal life—the downward influence prevailed: the solicitations of sense overcame the pleadings of the Father of his spirit. And what has been the result? Had the spirit prevailed, life would have been his characteristic—the Divine Spirit would have endowed with immortality the animal soul, and its vessel, the body; but, the flesh having prevailed, death became the characteristic. The earthly body was not lifted above its natural infirmity of decay; the animal soul, with its emotions and its intelligences, passed into a living death, bereft of the leading light of the spirit, and having left only light enough to make its darkness visible. The spirit, the informing, guiding, elevating, principle, shrunk up and dwindled almost to nothing. And in this shruken and dwarfed state the spirit, the nobler part of man, has continued—not extinguished, but subsisting, as the comparison has been aptly made, in the same way as certain rudimental organs subsist in bodies which use them not. Man has been, everywhere and in every age, animal, or, as Scripture would say, psychical—the creature of his animal soul, not of his divine spirit; led by reason, led by imagination, led by emotion, but not led by consciousness of God. And yet, stunted as man's spirit was and is, it has never been extinct, nor has its voice been utterly silenced. Even when its higher functions have been in abeyance, it has testified by the conscience. Right, because it is right, has been approved, even by men who did not practice it; wrong, as being wrong, was disapproved, even while it was being done.

But I said that conscience, in the ordinary natural man, does little more than make the darkness visible; and so it is. Even in the savage, the spark remains smouldering, but nothing more. As man rises in civilization, and in the training of the intellect, the spark brightens and spreads, but it is a spark still. In

Christian lands first, it breaks into a flame, and begins to enlighten and cheer, because there first it is that the law of the Spirit of life sets men free from the law of sin and death; there it is that man's spirit is revivified and endowed with its proper growth, no longer stunted and dwarfed; is put into union with Him who is the principle of all life and all growth, and in virtue of that union becomes partaker of his prerogative, and, with him, is waiting for all things to be put under its feet.

It is a grand and glorious thing, this higher and nobler part of man, dwelling in perpetual sunshine; this, of which we may say, almost with the poet, that—

> "Its great bright eye most silently
> Up to the Throne is cast;"

looking evermore above the letter of law to its spirit; casting its bare arms, free from the fetters of precedent and human tradition, ever up into the pure blue sky; feeling for love, feeling for truth, feeling for justice—a grand and glorious, but a wayward and a fitful thing—slumbering for centuries in nations, dormant for long years of a man's life; but when it wakes, when it speaks, leading, at any cost, however perilous, straight into conflict, straight into solitude, straight into bereavement.

A strange thing too; for it may speak ever so low, and armies cannot silence it. Its utterances may savor of folly, or of imprudence, or of inaptitude for practical life; but they drop like seeds into the great heart of mankind; they fashion policies, they rule empires—that which was erewhile shouted as the nickname of an enthusiast, that which was just now branded upon the flesh of a martyr, shall before long glitter in gems on a scepter, and float out to the breezes as the righteous emblazonment of a realm. And a fearful and a dangerous thing it is too; for in the midst of successful iniquity, or disregarded equity, let it but lift up its voice, and brave men turn cowards; let but one note of that voice be heard from the lisping tongue of a child, and bold workers of wrong, and busy toilers for gain, and the world's idols, and the world's idlers, shrink and shrivel up, as if the icy north had blown upon them—because they know that a power, swifter than the telegraph, and keener than the lightning, prints all its words in that book of remembrance, which the angel shall hold open when all mankind shall meet before God.

But we must not treat of man's conscience, even in Christian countries, as being infallible, or universally enlightened. It is clear in its testimony, it is trustworthy in its verdict, only in proportion as men have become Christians. In every Christian land there are a certain number of persons, greater or less according to the purity or corruption of its Christianity, who form, as it were, the focus of the bright light of the Christian conscience. Sometimes they are banded together, and acting on the public—but this can only be where the utterance of opinion is free. And even in such lands, the men of pure and clear Christian conscience often know not one another, and work not together. They are separated by barriers of rank, or of sect, or of other circumstance; and it is not till God's providence has made utterance inevitable, that it is discovered how irresistible a power was gathering in secret. Thoughts that it would take a bold man to utter on a platform to-day, may to-morrow be carried like a tide-wave over the land, and may the next day have become a confessed basis of national action. Of course, in lands where utterance is not free, the Christian conscience is repressed and borne down. But even there, it is, in the long run, repressed and borne home in vain. Like the up-bursting of the boiling granite from the central heat, it will find its way through the chinks and leaks of the thickest and tightest impost of artificial rule; or, if it cannot, it will end by upheaving and shattering in a moment the compacted crust of ancient and prescriptive wrong.

But our immediate concern is happily not with repressive despotisms. We dwell in a land which is of all lands the freest as to this matter. The Christian conscience here may utter its voice, and act unrestricted on society. It is as thus free, and as thus acting, that we have to consider it. The winning of this its charter of freedom has been, of all others, the work which we as a people have had to do in the world. In many of the elements of a nation's greatness, others may have surpassed us; in arts, and in arms, it would be mere vanity to vaunt ourselves as at first in the world; but in this one thing we stand unapproached and unrivaled—that of all the nations, we alone have thoroughly come to understand the rights of the Christian conscience, and are in the main acting according to that our understanding. And from the moment when our eyes began to be opened to these rights, we among the nations have taken the

lead in bringing about moral changes, and reforms in the direction of the gentler feelings of humanity, in the practice of men. We have had our seasons of torpor, nay, our seasons of apparent retrogression—but even these latter were preparing the way for advances yet to come, bringing about their own reaction in the Christian mind of the people. And in some of these periods, retrogression and progression have remarkably acted on, and prepared the way for, each other. The assertion of the right, made as it was by imperfect men, who imagined, as those who are impassioned always will do, that man's wrath works God's right, contained in itself elements of wrong; so that while the right was waxing strong and becoming the axiom of the nation, the wrong, even while it was being wrought, was raising for itself adversaries and so preparing men for another assertion of the right on the other side. We might find striking examples of that which we are asserting, in the great struggle of the seventeenth century. There can be no doubt that the Cavaliers, amidst much that was foul, and unjust, and unfaithful to God's law, had on their side also a noble spirit of chivalrous loyalty and love of constituted rule. There can be no doubt, again, that their adversaries, while none can admire their close and narrow views, and their superstitious adherence to the ill-understood letter of Scripture, were yet endowed with a grand sturdiness and unbending independence of spirit; were men who, first and best of their time, knew and valued the inner testimony of a God-fearing conscience. What has been the result? We have inherited the chivalrous loyalty of the Cavalier, we have inherited the unflinching independence of the Roundhead. The Briton is a strange, but surely a happy, compound of the principle of obedience and the principle of resistance.

I might draw further illustration of these remarks from what has happened since the date last referred to. But space admonishes me to hasten onward; and besides, I am not writing in order to praise the achievements of our national conscience. I am no optimist in this matter, as will ere long be discovered. It is only that I may have ground to start from, that I state these facts—that I go on to acknowledge our sense of that which the free utterance of the Christian conscience has done for us. There is no use in denying that it has accomplished great benefits in our own times, and that it is going on even now to accomplish

more and greater. It spoke, and the fetters dropped from the bondsman; it spoke, and the lifted weapons of alienated friends fell down powerless, and the vaunted code of worldly honor was torn to shreds amidst the scorn of mankind. It spoke again, and man's ill-judged restrictions no longer denied free course to God's provision of food for the great human family. On another dark place of our national life has its bright light long been turned. Age after age, the hosts of its army of truth have been, as it were, circling the "strong cemented walls" of the fortress of our national intolerance; year by year battlement and bastion are crumbling down, until at last the ponderous ruin shall fall, and the righteous nation which keepeth the truth shall enter in.

All this I thankfully acknowledge: but I submit that these are only partial triumphs, only flashes in the midnight, compared with what ought to be, what might be, the result of the spiritual life which is growing and bearing fruit among this great people. Whole realms of thought and action are as yet in utter darkness, as far as any illumination by the Christian conscience is concerned. And this, with the light shining in the midst of them. Look at private life, look at public morality—and what a strange disparity appears. There is, thank God, no lack in our land of the pure clear life of the spirit of man, led in the light of God's countenance, guided by the gentle whisper of his Spirit. Thousands of British families are thus guided, thus traveling, walking on in the Spirit through temptation to victory—Christian parents, Christian lads and girls, Christian children, fearing God, and obeying God. But where, when we look abroad over public morality, shall we find an exercise of the conscience of this Christian nation, at all in proportion to its undoubted individual and family life? Shall we seek for it in commerce? Where shall we find it, to cite an example from the things of our day, in any public action taken with regard to the stupendous failures occurring, through what every Christian man must call by the plain name of dishonesty? Echo may well answer, "Where?" when public walls can receive, and public assemblies applaud, studied apologies for men who have been well called "high-minded and honorable pickpockets," men who have brought ruin on the unhappy thousands who have been simple enough to trust them. Shall we find the working of the Christian conscience in those

who tell us that such evil doers "must not be blown upon," for fear the salvage from their wreck should be lessened?

I wish we were able to say that unprincipled commercial conduct was discouraged and dying out among us. But I much fear that this is far from being the case. I fear that the number of instances is even multiplying, in which the family is upheld in opulence, and is respected and looked up to for high Christian example of charity and good works, while the head of it is increasing the gains, whereon this benevolence is fed, by means which he could not justify, and dared not confess.

If we regard public conduct in another great matter of honor and trust, I fear our idea of the power of the Christian conscience among us will hardly be strengthened. It would be difficult of belief if reported in a written history, that the English legislature is continually passing enactments against the practice of bribing electors for their votes, and that a great portion of those who pass these laws deliberately and systematically violate them every time that the occasion occurs. And on the other hand it would be hardly credited that there are in almost every constituency a certain number of persons, patent to all, and distinctly defined, whose votes are known to be purchasable by money. No one presumes to justify this state of things, yet no one concerned appears really earnest in wishing to put an end to it. That there would be great difficulty in doing so, is not to be alleged in excuse. Conscience when once awakened, does not stick at difficulties. It is only where a compromise with evil is resolved on, that their existence is put forward to palliate inaction.

But let us raise our eyes higher—from secular to religious life. Let us ask whether in the practice of the churches of this land the Christian conscience speaks clearly and is obeyed.

What is the state of things among us in England? I am asking the question not with any view of passing a criticism on existing arrangements. I take them as an accomplished fact—as the basis of what I have to remark. We have in England one form of Church established, and in connection with the State. We have many other forms existing as voluntarily associated bodies; existing by recognized right of the Christian conscience. This recognition has, historically, not been arrived at without considerable difficulty, and a struggle which has lasted for ages. Though a legitimate and necessary corollary from the principles

of our Reformation, it was not seen to be such by the dominant party, till the course of Providence proved too strong for the self-will of men. We began by persecuting in order to enforce conformity; we advanced to a meager and ungracious toleration; and, notwithstanding that our nonconforming brethren have now, thank God, acquired equality of civil rights, at this point of ungracious toleration we for the most part remain still. The State has been more recognizant of, more loyal to the Christian conscience, than the Church, which ought to have been its most jealous and watchful guardian. Nothing is more strongly impressed on my mind, when I look over the religious state of England, than that we, who are members of her Established Church, have need to face the whole important question of our relations to Nonconformists, with a view to a re-adjustment, in the light of the Christian conscience, of our words and our acts respecting them. There is a very wide basis of doctrine, there is a still wider basis of Christian morality, on which we are absolutely at one. As far as those bases extend, our aim is identical. We may not be able to work together; our instruments may be different; our tastes may be incompatible. Allow the utmost force to these considerations; and the utmost force also to the consideration, that our very differences are themselves points of conscience, and that we are bound to stand up for them, and not merge nor compromise them. Still, allowing all this, it seems to me that there is no justification for the present alienation of affection, the present virtual suspension of intercourse, the present depreciating tone and manner, which prevail on the part of English Churchmen toward Dissenters, and toward Churches which differ from ourselves in organization. That such a tone does prevail, needs, I suppose, no proof; but how far it is carried can hardly be imagined but by help of illustration. In the last number but one of a weekly Church newspaper, occurred the following sentence, forming part of a review of a work by Dr. Preuss, a Lutheran divine holding a distinguished academical office in Berlin: "His position, as a member of a body of religionists without the pale of the Catholic Church, naturally places him without the range of the Church's sympathies." It would be difficult to say whether the insolence, or the ignorance, of this sentence be the greater, or whether both be not surpassed by its utter opposition to the whole spirit of our Blessed Lord and his

Apostles. The confession implied in the words "without the sympathies of the Church" is, I need hardly say, a sign that he who makes it has yet to learn his first lesson in the nature and attributes of that Church of Christ of which he speaks so flippantly. If her sympathies be not with all whom Christ died to save, she has deserted the office to which He appointed her—that of being his body, and the habitation of his Spirit.

There lies at the root of all this arrogance a most mischievous, but I grieve to say a widely prevalent fallacy. We of the Church of England have absolutely no right to assume our own form of church government to be the only lawful one, and to look askance upon other forms, whether in England or elsewhere. We have not this right, because we distinctly proclaim, as to all things required of necessity to be believed, an appeal to Holy Scripture; and in Scripture as much, or as little, is found for one form as for another. If depreciation of Nonconformists is excused on the ground of our possessing superior means of education and endowment, then the plea itself involves a violation of the dictates of the Christian conscience; for, if the facts be as stated, it is mainly owing to our having excluded our brethren from the national advantages which we ourselves possess; and it is high time that such exclusion should come to an end.

We have, I conceive, a curious example of the perversion of conscience in the English Church, in the fact that a large and increasing party of her members are at this time agitating for union into communion with the Roman and Eastern Churches, from both of which we are separated by important doctrinal differences—that this desire for union is justified by them on the most solemn grounds, as furnished by the words of our Lord's own intercessory prayer, and yet that no mention whatever is made of any desire for union, on the basis of mutual allowance of differences, with our Christian brethren in the British islands.

I have believed it not out of place to treat of these matters in these pages, because they affect us all, Churchmen and others, alike. It is impossible, with the present rapid transmission of knowledge by the press, but that such movements as are now going on in the Church of England should excite emotions adverse or favorable in every intelligent mind—as it is also impossible but that the effects of any deadening or awakening of the Christian conscience in the Church of England

should be felt, for evil or for good, among other religious bodies also.

Being persuaded of this, I go on to notice one more fact which serves, in my opinion, to show anything but a healthy state of the ecclesiastical conscience among ourselves. It is, that in connection with the High Church movement of the last thirty years there has sprung up, and has now become widely prevalent, a sort of dealing with words which I know not how to characterize except, again, by the plain epithet "dishonest." The shortest description of this method is, that it consists in interpreting rules and formularies so as to suit a pre-arranged theory, not in accordance with fair dealing and common sense. In many instances of this which might be given, the data whereby to arrive at the true meaning of the words in question were abundant, and sufficient for all men's common sense—it was well known what the framers of the words wished to secure, and what they wished to prevent—to any ordinary ear, their words plainly expressed both: but because those words admit of some far-off and undreampt-of sense, we are called upon to believe that this, and not the meaning which grammar and history alike attach to them, is to be received by us. Simply for the sake of illustrating my meaning, I quote a crucial instance. The framers of the Articles of the Church of England had said that "the Romish doctrine concerning purgatory was a fond, vainly invented thing." No man in his senses need be told that their intention was to condemn the doctrine altogether, and that the epithet "Romish" was prefixed in order to identify the doctrine condemned with that commonly known in this country. Not so, said our special pleaders; we will take the words differently—it is the *Romish* doctrine, and no other, which is here stigmatized—therefore if we can find any other doctrine about purgatory which is *not* Romish, that is not here condemned—and by not being condemned, is left open for English Churchmen to hold. As if a man should say that, because the second commandment runs, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven image," if a man did not make a graven image to *himself*, but got another man to make it for him, it would be no breach of the commandment. This, which I have quoted, was one of the earliest specimens of the non-conscientious mode of arguing; it occurred in the famous Tract No. 90 of the "Tracts for the Times." But it is only a fair specimen of

the interpretations ever since, and now, put forth in abundance by the same party. As far as regards the interpretations themselves, they might safely be left to the contempt of mankind. The only importance attaching to them is, that they form part of the recognized tactics unblushingly avowed by a powerful body of learned and able men in our land—and I ask whether this can be the case, without a wide-spreading and baleful effect on the Christian conscience of the realm? When I see the tortuous and disingenuous advances of the party which adopts these practices, and at the same time contemplate the paralysis of the commercial conscience already noticed, together with those other indications that we know the good and follow the worse, I cannot help feeling that some among us who think that they are doing God's work, and the Church's work, have, and will have, more to answer for than they suspect.

There is another matter; one on which the Christian conscience of all the churches in our realm needs awakening. I mean the duty of bringing our Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures into closer proximity to the text in which those Scriptures were written. This has become a matter of very serious import. It is now well known to most persons of any information and intelligence, that there are very many passages in which our version either represents a text which is not the genuine one, or misrepresents that genuine text in rendering it. We are reading and preaching on, as the word of God, sayings which are demonstrably no part of that word—we are giving to its texts meanings which any scholar can see they will not bear. We of the Church of England are using two different versions of the Book of Psalms, in one of which are some verses that yield no assignable sense in themselves, and some, the sense of which flatly contradicts the sense of the corresponding verses in the other version.* And yet both these versions, the one asserting, the other denying, the same fact, are read and preached from indifferently.

I know it is the custom to depreciate and minimize the importance of these variations and errors. And this is one of the very things of which I complain. I never saw this method of

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* As an example of the former kind: can any acuteness extract sense from Ps. lviii: 8 in the Prayer-book version? As an example of the latter—compare Ps. cv: 28 in the two versions.

argument followed without very great unfairness. Not to mention that in the esteem of those who set the highest possible value on Scripture, no assignable deviation from its actual meaning ought to be a trifle—it is distinctly not the fact, that the variations and errors are of slight account. In very many parts of St. Paul's epistles, the inattention, on the part of our translators, to the force of words and the accuracy of constructions, has rendered the apostle's argument unintelligible to English readers. And the first duty of a faithful expositor is to assure his hearers, on his own authority, that St. Paul does not say what they read in their Bibles, nor mean what those English words would appear to convey.

Nor can I regard as any more conscientious the miserable argument against touching the Authorized Version, which is often raised on the ground of expediency. There is danger, we are told, in unsettling the minds of those who simply rely on their English Bibles as the word of God. I am amazed at hearing this plea from lips which frequently utter it. For what abuse, for what dereliction of unwelcome duty, may it not be made an apology? And even if we descend to its own cowardly level, and begin to weigh expediencies, which of the two, think you, is the greater danger—manfully to meet the present unsatisfactory state of things by an authorized revision, or to allow a text which we vaunt as the word of God to be continually either held back because it will not bear examination, or brought into doubt and contempt by being disavowed from our pulpits?

And the matter is one not presenting any insuperable difficulty. Let a Royal Commission (for I see no other way of gaining for the new version the same authority as the old possesses), let a Royal Commission call together the most capable men out of all reformed denominations, and set them on this work, and (I speak from having been engaged in it with others of different views and habits of mind) they will be astonished how soon practical terms of agreement will be arranged, and a basis of operations settled. There are few things that I hope and pray for so much, as that He who has men's hearts in his hand, would cause the conscience of his Churches to awaken to this their bounden duty. But alas, while I hope and pray, there are few things which I less expect. There seems to have settled down on our Churches such a spirit of secularity and timidity, especially with

regard to the treatment of Scripture, that I cannot see the faintest prospect of such a work being undertaken in our time.

And now, in drawing toward a close, I must say something of the Christian conscience in individuals. Let us remember that, the higher and more delicate the organ, the more liable to be strained or deranged. And the more so, beyond doubt, if it happen to have been thoroughly put out of order and action before. Now both these are the case with the Christian conscience. It is a limb which has but newly come out of paralysis, but it is a limb which has our whole weight to sustain, and of which the finest and most delicate work is required. No wonder if it be soon enfeebled, soon strained and distorted. It needs training for its work; it needs careful tending, and strict watching. We are accountable for the healthiness of our consciences, and have no right to play tricks with, or to neglect them. We are far too apt to forget that conscience is not a vague, ever-shifting thing, but is judged by the fixed rule of God's revealed will. One man's conscience, he supposes, leads him to persecution; another man's conscience leads him to charity. In this extreme case, perhaps, few of us would maintain that both were right—but in cases quite as plain, if fairly regarded, we do continually maintain this. We suffer ourselves quite to forget that saying of Scripture, "There is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death." And even while we are quoting and urging this fact, we frequently behave as if we thought men's consciences, and especially our own, infallible. It must be plain to all that the general practical issue of this last consideration ranges very wide. But so far as it affects us individually, its lesson is soon stated. And that lesson is, self-distrust, and its two great fruits, modesty and charity. We are very apt to be over-confident in matters of conscience. We have been brought up to think this or that; or, we have for ourselves, independently of our bringing up, arrived at this or that conclusion. Therefore, we say—and the young mind is especially apt to say it—therefore my view is right, and I will make it matter of conscience, and nothing on earth shall stir me from it. It is a sore temptation, and a grievous hindrance of usefulness, this starting in life with decided opinions. Show me a young man whose views and maxims are all cut and dried, and I will show you one whose years of strength will be spent, at the best, in get-

ting rid bit by bit of his sham wisdom; who will not be ready for Providence's work, till his more modest compeers have half done their allotment of it. Conscience has its duties as well as its rights; and its first duty is toward itself. It is set to rule us, not despotically, but constitutionally; not by strong arbitrary commands, but by mature and well-grounded decisions, given according to the laws of our nature, and the leadings of Revelations and Providence. It is just as much trifling with conscience to obey its fitful whispers when it grumbles about trifles, as it is to disregard its voice when it warns us in more serious matters. Its healthiest discipline is to be found in the exercise of plain manly common sense. And as this is true of all times, so is it especially of our time. In many cases, our views of men and things are too artificial. I was struck the other day with the parting word of one of the excellent American bishops who have been with us this autumn. My friend is what is called a missionary bishop—one whose work is to travel for months over the wilds of Arkansas, and set up prayer and preaching where neither was ever heard before. He had been some days my guest, and as we walked to the train which was to take him away, he said, "I'll tell you what would do you a vast deal of good, and that's two thousand miles with me in my buggy. You here are too civilized by half; you want some good honest barbarism put into you, and you would get along a vast deal better." Good, honest barbarism—that is, I suppose, a way of looking at things themselves direct, and not through the mist of eight centuries of institutions. Well, I believe we do want some of this kind of barbarism; only we can't get it *as* barbarism; we can't put back the historical clock, nor can we make the stream of Providence run upward to its source. We must get at the result by simple honesty and single purpose; by a casting off of timidity and time-serving and being bold for truth; by ourselves going back, in every social and religious question, past the mere runnel-pipes of sect and precedent, up to the fountain-heads in God's everlasting hills.

I must apologize for having dwelt so much on the more serious, and I fear less generally interesting, portions of my subject. That subject might have been taken in various social aspects, and illustrated by incidents of our daily life. I might have brought before my readers the constant and admitted petty breaches of

the rule of conscience, in which we live, and by which most of us suffer. Which of us, if he thought honestly over the day, could go to bed at night quite clear of having dealt hardly with some neighbor's reputation, of having exaggerated some fault of a friend, or extenuated some fault of his own? We might also have noticed faults which we call by the somewhat milder epithet "unconscionable," and among them, the inroads on time and on good nature daily and relentlessly perpetrated by average men and women—the case of the "won't detain you a moment" man, who is sure to occupy half your morning; the platform speaker, whose "one word more and I have done," is the sure prelude to a dreary half hour of incoherent platitudes; the preacher who, though he knows that half an hour would be better for his people, for himself, and for his subject, yet somehow always gives them three-quarters. We might have satirized those numerous little compromises with the thing that is not, which are spread thick over our habits of visiting and greeting one another; those lies to which I can only concede the epithet "white," inasmuch as they certainly are unblushing. We might have dwelt, one by one, on those pious frauds and one-sided representations prevalent among our religious coteries, whereby the same honest zeal, if it happens to be with us, is made out to be angelic, if against us, diabolic.

All these and many other of our weaknesses and inconsistencies, would have to be touched on in any full treatment of my present subject. I thought it best to put that subject before my readers in what I believed to be its true position, to give them its definitions and laws, and to illustrate them by a few of the graver examples furnished by passing things.

Whether what I have written be approved or disapproved, if it shall have excited thought and inquiry on so serious a matter, my object will have been gained.

XX.—RECENT RESEARCHES IN JERUSALEM.*

The topography of Jerusalem has of late formed a subject of learned, and sometimes rather keen controversy. A change in the state of feeling among Mohammedan officials has opened the way for more extensive and thorough exploration than was before practicable. Formerly an entrance to the Haram could be effected only by stealth, or under such restrictions as almost effectually prevented full examination. Now fanaticism has yielded to court favor or *bakshish*, and many parts of the Haram may be visited, measured, sketched, and photographed with freedom. It is to be hoped that we may soon be able to settle those vexed questions regarding the holy places which have so long perplexed and excited antiquarians. Not that we expect men who have almost staked their reputation upon strange theories, or men who have exalted ecclesiastical tradition to the position of infallibility to be satisfied. That were hopeless. But those thoughtful, moderate, unprejudiced investigators, who will impartially examine and weigh historic testimony, and who will be guided by local research; whose minds, in a word, are open to conviction—they will, we believe, ere long, be of one mind in the leading points of Jerusalem topography.

The researches of M. de Saulcy in and around the Holy City, though interesting, are by no means so important as those prosecuted by him elsewhere. He is too enthusiastic and impulsive for calm and systematic exploration. He hastily adopts theories, and then by a process of reasoning and manipulation, in many respects peculiar to himself, he manages to convert all that he reads and all that he sees into so many proofs of the truth of his theories. He has, however, rendered good service by his exploration of the Tombs of the Kings (so called) and other ancient sepulchers, and by his descriptions and historic notices of some of the most ancient remains in and around the Holy City, especially among the southern and western walls of the Haram.

The two places in Jerusalem to which travelers and antiquarians now chiefly direct attention, are the Jewish Temple and the

* From the *British Quarterly Review*, October, 1867. [P. S]

Holy Sepulcher. Around these all other sites are regarded as grouping themselves, and to these they are made subsidiary. The position of Mount Zion, the site of the tower of Hippicus, the line of the ancient walls, the course of the Tyropœon valley, the age of the Haram platform, the extent of the ancient city, the courses of old streets and aqueducts, and the situation of monuments, pools, and gates—all are discussed mainly in their relation to the two grand points of interest. The real size of the Temple, and the extent of its court, can, we believe, be ascertained by excavation with absolute certainty; but the tomb of our Lord, never. Excavations properly conducted may unquestionably determine whether the latter could or could not have been located within the present Church of the Sepulcher, but beyond this we cannot go. There is no evidence extant sufficient to establish its exact locality, much less its identity. That it was outside the city, we know; but more than this we do not know. If it can be shown that the site of the Church of the Sepulcher, was outside the city in the days of our Lord, then the Tomb may possibly have been there. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that the site was within the circuit of the wall, then the Tomb could not have been there.

The case is different in regard to the Temple. No man will now question that it stood somewhere within the present Haram. No man will question that the whole of its courts, as they existed in the time of Herod, were also within the present enclosure. The points at issue are, Where did the *naos* stand? How much of the present area was embraced in the courts? Did they, as some maintain, embrace the southern half of the Haram, and did the naos stand close to the site of the Mosque Kubbet es-Sukhrah? Or did they, as others affirm, embrace only a section of about six hundred feet square at the south-western angle, thus excluding Kubbet es-Sukhrah and the massive masonry of the south-east angle? These questions involve the singular theory of Mr. Ferguson, who holds that Kubbet es-Sukhrah is the original Church of the Sepulcher; that the Golden Gateway was the Propylæum to the Basilica of Constantine, and that the great terrace, or platform, at the south-east angle, was constructed by Justinian, who built upon it the Church of St. Mary.*

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* *Essay on the Ancient Topography of Jerusalem.*

The most valuable contribution hitherto made to the topography of the Haram, is the magnificent work of the Count de Vogüé.* His researches commenced in June, 1862, were conducted throughout with great skill and minuteness, and under most favorable circumstances:

"According to an arrangement concluded with the principal sheikh, the mosque was at our disposal every morning from six o'clock till mid-day. We could sketch, measure, and photograph at our ease, employing ladders and all necessary instruments; we never encountered the least difficulty; the work was thus arranged—Mr. Waddington, aided by M. Sauvaire, chancelier of the Consulate, copied the Arabic inscriptions; I sketched with M. Duthoit. We made long and numerous examinations, and we did not quit the ground until the sacred mountain had almost completely yielded to us its secrets."

With the traditionary history of Mount Moriah and its Holy Rock, as detailed by M. de Vogüé, we have here nothing to do. With his theories as to the site of the Temple, and extent of its courts, we do not agree. Our immediate object is to give the leading results of his researches.

He has described with minuteness and accuracy the physical features of Moriah. It is a narrow limestone ridge; with the ravine of the Kidron on the one side, and the Tyropœon valley on the other. The ridge projects to the south, culminating in a rounded crown of naked rock, now covered by the central edifice, which is thence called Kubbet es-Sukhrah, "The Dome of the Rock." Around this rock is an artificial platform, nearly rectangular, 1529 feet long by 926 wide. At the north-west angle the rock has been cut away; while the eastern side is raised by a solid embankment, and the southern by piers and arches. The whole area is surrounded by a colossal wall. Near the center of the area is another artificial platform, 550 feet long by 450 wide, raised some twelve or fifteen feet; and above it, not far from its center, rises the Holy Rock—the natural summit of Moriah—an irregular crown of limestone, 60 feet in diameter and five in height. M. de Vogüé's plan and sections of the Haram, given on plate I, show very clearly the general features of Moriah, with its platform, cisterns, and present buildings.

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* *Le Temple de Jérusalem, Monographie du Haram-ech-Chérif suivie d'un Essai sur la Topographie de la Ville-Sainte.* Par le Comte Melchior de Vogüé. Paris, 1864.

The encircling wall of the Haram presents some remarkable features. Its masonry is of various ages. The oldest, and apparently the original, portions of it are easily recognized. The stones are colossal, measuring in length from twenty-four feet downwards. One is even as much as forty feet long. They are in general carefully hewn, and "beveled"* at the edge. M. de Vogüe found this earliest style of masonry in the lower parts of the western wall, extending from the "Jews' Place of Wailing" to the south-west angle; also in the foundations of a great part of the southern wall, and in the eastern for a distance of three hundred and one feet from the south-east angle, and at the north-east angle. A later style of masonry, resembling Roman, he observed above the former at the south-west angle, in the substruction of the Mosque el-Aksa; and likewise in the walls of the Golden Gateway. The remaining parts of the wall are comparatively modern, and have been erected at various dates, but of ancient materials. The greater part of the eastern wall is of this latter character; and it would be important to ascertain by a series of excavations whether it rests upon foundations of the oldest type. It is admitted on all hands that the "Place of Wailing" belonged to the enclosure of Herod's temple. The masonry at the south-western, south-eastern and north-eastern angle is certainly of the same type; and were a series of excavations made round the base of the wall, the extent of Herod's temple could be ascertained at once.

M. de Vogüé describes four ancient gates still existing in the oldest portions of the wall. The first is on the western side, a few paces below "The Place of Wailing." It is single, and on the outside remains perfect, though within, it has been remodeled to correspond with the second type of masonry. In the southern wall are two gateways, one double and the other triple, retaining much of the ancient colossal masonry. These three gates are

* It may be well to insert here the following explanation of the term "beveled" given by Capt. Wilson: "The term has led to much confusion, the style being almost in reality identical with that of the granite work in the forts now building in England, each stone having a 'draft' from one quarter to three eighths of an inch deep, and two to five inches broad, chiseled round its margin, with the face left rough, finely picked, or even chiseled, according to the taste of the time or labor that could be spared upon it; of the rough work some portions of the wall near the south-east angle show the best specimens; of the finer, the Wailing Place is a well-known and favorable example."

considerably below the level of the platform, and long subterraneous passages of the oldest style of architecture lead up from them to the area above. The fourth is the "Golden Gateway," which has been hitherto considered a work of a much later period. The external ornaments, arches, and interior passages are Roman; but M. de Vogüé discovered the ancient colossal monolithic jambs, corresponding in size and plan to those of the southern gateway still *in situ*. These gates, as now for the first time fully described, are of great interest and importance, throwing new light, as we believe, upon the extent of Herod's Temple.*

The vaults beneath the south-eastern angle of the Haram, M. de Vogüé found to be comparatively modern—none of them earlier than the second epoch of mural architecture. But the exterior wall is of a much more remote age; and the windows seen from the outside near the angle, are of the same type as the southern gates. These and other traces of antiquity led him to the conclusion that the vaults occupy the site of others which were coeval with the most ancient part of the exterior wall. He also believes that vaults of *the earliest period* still exist in the south-west angle under the Mosque el-Aksa. That section remains yet to be explored, and to it we would respectfully call the attention of the Palestine Exploration Society. Excavations within the vaults at the south-east angle would also determine whether *the foundations* of more ancient piers exist there also.

The cisterns within the Haram are numerous. A great part of the area appears to be occupied by immense subterraneous reservoirs. There is one of enormous extent, hewn in the rock, in front of the Mosque el-Aksa. We believe it was first described by Dr. Barclay in his "City of the Great King."† It is the principal receptacle for the water brought by the aqueduct from the Pools of Solomon. Beneath the "Holy Rock" are two small caves, one below the other. In the middle of the roof of the upper cave is a small circular hole pierced through the rock, from the mosque above; and below it, in the floor, is a corresponding aperture, opening into the lower cave. This is now covered with

* It would be of very great importance to make an excavation at the Golden Gateway, so as to lay bare its ancient foundations, and thus to ascertain its plan and probable object.

† Pages 525–7.

a marble slab and is called by Mohammedans "The Well of Spirits." A channel tunneled in the rock leads from the little fountain called *El-Kâs*, beside the great reservoir, to the lower cave, beneath the mosque, thence to two other caves under the platform, some distance farther north, and then, turning at right angles, it is carried down into the Kidron valley. These channels, with the caves through which they flow, were, according to M. de Vogüé, constructed in the time of Solomon, to carry off the blood of the sacrifices by flushing with plentiful supplies of water. The great "Altar of Sacrifice," M. de Vogüé would locate over the northern caves, some two hundred feet from the Holy Rock, and the Temple itself a little farther west. He considers the present Haram area to be identical in extent and form with that of the temple courts in the time of our Lord; and the massive masonry of the wall at the southern end he attributes to Herod who enlarged the temple court in that direction. These views he has developed with clearness and ingenuity, drawing his measurements and various data from Jewish authorities, and grafting them skillfully upon the physical features, the architectural remains, and the excavated channels and cisterns of the Haram as he has now explored them.

The "Golden Gateway," in its present form, M. de Vogüé holds to be an isolated monument of the fifth or sixth century. Of the same date are the ornaments of the two southern gates. The Mosque el-Aksa, in its present form, he says, is entirely Arab; but he adds, "It is not the less true that its form of a Basilica, its cruciform plan, and the existence of certain remains, prove that it was preceded by a Christian church, whose ruins served as the kernel of the Arab edifice, and whose principal outlines are preserved through the successive transformations of the mosque. That church was the Basilica of Justinian." * After a very thorough examination of the architecture, as well as of the history of Kubbet es-Sukhrah, he states positively that, though Byzantine in style, it wants the distinguishing characteristic of a church, and was undoubtedly erected for a mosque.† These views bring him, of course, into direct antagonism with Mr. Fergusson.

During M. de Vogüé's residence in Jerusalem, excavations

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* "*Le Temple de Jérusalem*," p. 69. † Ibid, p. 82.

were made in various parts of the city for the foundations of new buildings, and by those he was able to establish some points of importance. He proves beyond question the existence of a valley which extended, as Dr. Robinson affirmed long ago, from the Jaffa Gate to the Tyropœon, at the west side of the Haram. Its depth near the citadel was thirty-three feet below the present surface. Farther eastward the bottom of the valley is twenty-six feet below the level of the street of David, and nearly eighty feet lower than the brow of Zion, which thus appears to have been originally an isolated summit, as is indicated in the story of its capture by King David. At one spot a fragment of the ancient northern rampart of Zion was laid bare by excavation. It was built close against the cliff, and though only rising to the top of the rock behind, it was yet thirty-nine feet high toward the ravine in front. Excavations along the southern brow of Zion also brought to light portions of the wall, with stairs hewn in the rock, leading down to the valley of Hinnom, and probably marking the position of the Gate of the Essenes. These we had ourselves an opportunity of inspecting a few years ago. Several other discoveries of ancient monuments have been made. Among them is a fragment of a tower, a little eastward from the Church of the Sepulcher, resembling, in the style of its masonry, the Haram at Hebron. De Vogüé gives a sketch of it at page 118. Not far from it an ancient triple-arched gateway has also been exhumed; but its style of architecture shows that it cannot be of an earlier date than the sixth century. M. de Vogüé supposes that these fragments mark the line of the second wall of the city; but much more excavation is required ere that theory can be established satisfactorily. Were it not for the desire to exclude the Church of the Sepulcher from the bounds of the ancient city, it is questionable whether such a theory would ever have been thought of.

The *Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem*,* recently completed under the direction of Captain Wilson and a staff of Royal Engineers, leaves nothing to be desired, in so far as cartography is concerned, and the lines of elevation are sufficiently numerous to show clearly the physical contour of the site. The maps and plans are drawn

* *Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem.* Made with the Sanction of the Right Hon. Earl de Gray and Piper, Secretary of State for War, by Captain C. W. Wilson, R. E., under the direction of Colonel Sir Henry James, R. E., F. R S. London, 1865.

with equal accuracy and artistic skill, and they embrace not merely the city but its immediate environs, and all the leading buildings in detail. Captain Wilson's *Notes on the Survey*, which have just been issued in a somewhat unwieldy volume, have disappointed our expectations. The opportunities and facilities for research enjoyed by the staff of surveyors were very great, and we think more important results, at least in some departments, might have been expected.

The remarks on the geological structure of the country are meager and unsatisfactory, and add little to our previons knowledge. The topography of the Holy City, however, has been examined with very great care and minuteness. This department may be regarded as pretty nearly exhausted. The line of levels carried across from Joppa to the Dead Sea, has settled definitely the exact depression of the latter, which is now shown to be one thousand two hundred and ninety-two feet below the Mediterranean.

The survey of Jerusalem has brought out many points of interest. In the valley of the Tyropœon, between Zion and Moriah, there is an accumulation of rubbish eighty-four feet in depth; and the eastern side of Zion is shown to have been almost a precipice of naked rock. Captain Wilson found traces of three ancient aqueducts carried along at different levels from the high ground between Bethlehem and Hebron to Jerusalem. One of these, "the high level aqueduct," follows the line of the ridge west of Solomon's Pools and past Bethlehem; crosses a valley at Rachel's Fount, nearly a hundred feet deep, by a syphon formed of pierced blocks of stone; and appears to have entered the city at or near David's Tower, and at such an elevation as to be available for the supply of all quarters.

The remarks of Sir Henry James, on the site of the ancient Temple and Tower of Antonia, founded on the descriptions of Josephus, and topographical notes of Captain Wilson, go far to confirm the views of Dr. Robinson. He says: "It would seem, therefore, to be impossible to resist the conclusion, that the northern front of the Haram is identical in position with that of the northern front of the enclosure of the temple, as it was built by Herod; for the description would apply to no other position for it."*

* "*Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem*," p. 14.

Sir Henry also believes that the eastern and southern walls of the Haram occupy the exact positions of those encircling the Temple of Herod. We think, however, that it would still require a more minute examination of the masonry, accompanied with excavations along the whole line of the eastern and southern walls, to establish this point conclusively. The notes of Captain Wilson scarcely warrant to the full extent the inferences of Sir Henry, though the latter will probably be found in the end to be correct.

From the southwest angle of the Haram, as far north as Bab-es-Silsilé, the most ancient type of masonry was traced by Captain Wilson in the present wall. Underneath Bab-es-Silsilé is a pool, called el-Burâk, a portion of which is spanned by an ancient arch, forty-three feet wide, its springing stones forming, as in Robinsons's Arch, part of the old Haram wall. From this point to the north-west angle the wall has not been examined. Modern houses abut so closely upon it that only one or two places are open to inspection; and, besides, rubbish has accumulated along it to a depth of more than seventy feet. Unfortunately no excavations were made along the northern wall of the Haram. At the north-west corner stand the modern barracks, on a crest of rock which rises twenty-three feet above the adjoining Haram area. A large section of this rock has been cut away to form the area; and from this point the bare rock is seen sloping gradually down to the northwest corner of the platform on which the Kubbet es-Sukhrah stands, where it again rises toward the sacred rock beneath the mosque. From the northeast angle down as far as the Golden Gate, the Haram area is filled up in places, as much as twenty-six feet above the natural surface of Moriah.

Captain Wilson examined many of the cisterns in the Haram, also the remarkable vaults in the south-eastern angle, and the two ancient subterranean gateway; but he has added nothing of importance to the information already given in the splendid work of De Vogüé. In fact, the antiquarian researches of Captain Wilson have neither been so extensive nor so definite as we should have desired.

We were likewise disappointed to find that very little had been attempted in the way of excavation; and yet that little shows how necessary excavations are to solve disputed points of ancient topography. Thus, one excavation proved that the so-called

Gate Gennath, of which so much has been written, was a comparatively modern structure;* another proved that the supposed fragment of the "second wall" east of the Church of the Sepulcher, was a fragment of a not very old church;† another brought to light, at the depth of thirty-seven feet, one of the piers of Robinson's Bridge.‡ It is to be hoped that means will now be adopted for carrying on the work of excavation at every available spot of interest in and around the Holy City, until its ancient topography has been completely elucidated. Never was there a time more opportune. The visit of the Sultan to Christian lands will contribute much, we believe, to remove old prejudices, and to soften and subdue fanatical feelings. The way will thus be gradually opened for the enterprising antiquary and artist to the venerated shrines and sepulchers of Palestine, and we venture to predict that ere long a flood of light will be thrown on some of the most interesting points of sacred topography and archæology.

It is well known that the religious prejudices of the Mohammedans have hitherto prevented excavation, and to a large extent even minute examinations, within the bounds of their sanctuaries. Unfortunately these sanctuaries contain the places of greatest biblical interest in and near Jerusalem—such as the site of the Temple, and the Tombs of David and Abraham. A vizierial letter authorizing explorations was asked from the Turkish government by Lord Stanley, and forwarded to Lieut. Warren at Jerusalem; but when opened it was found to contain a clause expressly excluding *all sanctuaries*. This was a sad disappointment; but Mr. Warren resolved, while thus shut out from the interior, to explore the foundations of the colossal exterior walls of the Haram. The remarkable success which has already crowned his labors, is thus described by Mr. Grove in a recent letter to *The Times*:—

"The result is, that outside the walls of the sacred enclosure, he has made a discovery which is almost, if not quite, as important as any that have ever been made in or about Jerusalem, and which cannot fail to be the fruitful parent of many more. He has found that the south wall of the Haram, which rears its

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* Page 56. † Page 53. ‡ Page 75.

venerable face to a height of eighty feet above the soil, descends also to no less a depth than fifty-three feet below it—the solid rock of Mount Moriah, on which it is founded, being covered with that immense thickness of *debris*. Thus this wall must have originally have stood at a height of one hundred and thirty feet above its foundations, fully justifying the expressions of Josephus, who says concerning it, that 'if any one looked down from the top of the battlements into the valley he would be giddy, while his sight could not reach to such an immense depth.' (*Ant.* xv. 2, 5).

"The foundations and the unworn masonry of the buried portion may be expected to disclose many a secret affecting these venerable walls—secrets which Lieut. Warren is now diligently occupied in revealing. But this is not all. He found two other things. He found, first, that the eastern wall is prolonged beyond the southern face, and continues in the general direction of Siloam. How far it continues, or what are its exact directions and extent, I expect to hear shortly from Lieut. Warren. He found, secondly, that below the *debris*, a second south wall exists twenty feet distant from the known one, and of slighter workmanship. How far this wall goes, what its purpose may have been, its relation to the 'triple gateway' and the staircase which M. de Saulcy believed that he had discovered to descend from the triple gateway, how this discovery may affect the piers of the arches below the south-east corner of the enclosure, are questions which await further information to be able to answer."

The great importance of these discoveries is not over-estimated by Mr. Grove. The real extent of the Temple area, as described by Josephus, must now be definitely settled. The uncovering of the old foundations will set at rest forever questions which, during the past quarter of a century, have called into vigorous action the temper as well as the talent of architect and antiquary.

Note.—Under date of Novemer 11th, 1867, Mr. Grove has communicated to the London *Times*, still later accounts of the progress of these important discoveries. Among other things he says, "Mr. Warren has established, by actual demonstration, that the south wall of the sacred enclosure, which contained the Temple, is buried for more than half its depth beneath an accumulation of rubbish—probably the ruins of the successive buildings which once covered it, and that, if bared to its foundation, the wall would present an unbroken face of solid masonry, of nearly 1000 feet long, and for a large portion of the distance more than 150 feet in height; in other words, nearly the length of the

Crystal Palace, and the height of the transept. The wall, as it stands, with less than half that height emerging from the ground, has always been regarded as a marvel. What must it have been when entirely exposed to view? No wonder that prophets and psalmists should have rejoiced in the 'walls' and 'bulwarks' of the Temple, and that Tacitus should have described it as *modo arcis constructum.*

"The valley west of the Temple (Tyropœon) turns out to be very different in form from anything hitherto supposed, viz: tolerably flat, for the greater part of its width, with ample space for a 'lower city,' and suddenly descending close below the temple wall to a narrow gully of great depth. The well-known arch, discovered by Dr. Robinson, the center of so many speculations, may thus prove to have been only a single opening to span this gully, instead of the commencement of a long bridge or viaduct.

"I sum up by recording the important fact that his (Mr. Warren's) discoveries have completely changed the conditions of research in Jerusalem. They are nearly equivalent to the discovery of a new city. Hitherto we had explored the surface, or at most, the vaults and cisterns immediately below it. We must now go far deeper, and penetrate those mysteries which the kind earth has entombed and preserved for centuries for the advantage of our generation.

"The exploration in Jerusalem is at present in the condition of a puzzle or joining-map of which only half a dozen pieces are found, out of sixty or seventy. Find the others, and the whole can be put together, and will then be intelligible enough. Extend to the other parts of the city the researches here begun, and the sites of the Temple, Calvary, the Holy Sepulcher, the Pool of Bethesda, will be problems no longer."

Mr. Grove closes with an urgent appeal for contributions to the Palestine Exploration Fund. In the two years in which the explorations of Palestine have been prosecuted, £3,242 have been expended. D.

LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE.

Of the three abridgments in one royal octavo volume of *Smith's Bible Dictionary*, that edited by Rev. S. W. Barnum, and issued in parts* (fourteen of which have already appeared), is unquestionably the best. The addition of maps and of important matter drawn from the latest and best works of Biblical scholars, together with the careful revision of the several articles in the original work, are some of the chief features of this edition. These additions and changes, which are quite numerous in the aggregate, exhibit the editor's well-known carefulness and accuracy, and are evidently the result of much labor. The pictorial illustrations, paper and type, are all that could be desired.

—*The Duty and the Discipline of Extemporary Preaching* are earnestly set forth in a volume bearing this title,† by an English clergyman, Rev. F. B. Zincke, who frankly relates his own efforts, failures, and final success. His narrative and suggestions cannot fail to be of service in many ways to those who would imitate his laudable example. The book is well worth reading.

—In brief and suggestive notes on the Gospels‡ the Rev. I. P. Warren has endeavored to present to the mass of common readers the best results of modern critical studies on these books, so far as they can be thrown into a popular form and be expressed in a few words. This plan the author has carried out with good judgment and taste. While no one will expect to find here extended discussions of difficult questions, there are many who will welcome a Commentary like this, in which the best explanations of passages, the meaning of which does not immediately appear, are concisely given. The beautiful typographical execution of the volume and the numerous illustrative cuts, add still further to its attractiveness.

—Under the title *Short Studies for Sunday School Teachers*,§ Dr. Robinson, of Brooklyn, has published a series of familiar addresses, on subjects likely to interest those engaged in the religious instruction of the young. They are simple, frank and fresh. Mr. Scribner has done a good work in republishing

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* *A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Bible, mainly abridged from* Dr. William Smith's *Dictionary of the Bible, but comprising important additions and improvements.* Edited by Rev. Samuel W. Barnum. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1867–8. Parts 1–14. 30 cents each.

† *The Duty and the Discipline of Extemporary Preaching.* By F. Barham Zincke, Chaplain in ordinary to the Queen. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1867. 12mo. pp. 262.

‡ *The New Testament; with Notes, Pictorial Illustrations and References. Vol. I. The Four Gospels; with a Chronological Harmony.* By Israel P. Warren. 12mo. pp. 368. Boston: American Tract Society.

§ *Short Studies for Sunday School Teachers.* By Chas. S. Robinson, D. D. New York: Wynkoop & Sherwood, 1868. 16mo. pp. 247.

from the *Hours at Home*, the homely and touching story, *Fred, and Maria and Me.** There are times and circumstances in which the presentation of such a picture of disinterestedness and simplicity will accomplish more than any formal exhibition of Christian truth however able or excellent.

—The following are the most important works on Theology recently published in Great Britain, the United States and Germany:

Auberlin, Divine Revelation, translated from the German, 10s. 6d.—Canon Muratorianus, edited with Notes by *Tregelles*, 4to., 10s. 6d.—*Delitzsch*, Commentary on Isaiah. Vol. II. 10s. 6d.—*Brown*, The Dervishes, or Oriental Spiritualism. Phila. $3.75.—*Phelps*, The Solitude of Christ. Boston. 50c.—*Smith*, Dictionary of the Bible, edited by Prof H. B. Hackett and E. Abbot. Vol. I. $6.50.—*Grote*, Review of Mill on Hamilton's Philosophy. 3s. 6d.—*Smith*, Book of Moses, or the Pentateuch. Vol. I. 15s.—*Anecdota Brentiana*, Ungedrukte Briefe und Bedenken von Johannes Brenz. pp. 607. $4.40.—*Bachmann*, das Buch der Richter. Mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte seiner Auslegung und kirchlichen Verwendung erklärt. I. Band, 1. Hälfte. 248. pp. $1.65—*Burger*, das Evangelium nach Johannes deutsch erklärt. Gr. 8. 533. pp. $2.60—*Dieterici*, Prof. Dr. F., die Logik und Psychologie der Araber im 10 Jahrhundert n. Chr. 207 pp. $2.80.—*Fürst*, Prof. Dr. Jul., Geschichte der biblischen Literatur und des jüdischhellenistischen Schriftthums. Historisch und kritisch behandelt. I. Band. 511 pp. (Will embrace 2 volumes.) $2.50.—*Hagenbach*, über Ziel und Richtpunkte der heutigen Theologie. Drei Vorträge. 78 pp. 40c.—*Hengstenberg*, Prof. E. W., die Weissagungen des Propheten Ezechiel für solche, die in der Schrift forschen, erläutert. I. Theil. 300 pp. $1.50.—*Hofstede de Groot*, Prof. Dr. P., Basilides am Ausgange des apostolischen Zeitalters, als erster Zeuge für Alter und Autorität neutestamentlicher Schriften, insbesondere des Johannesevangeliums, in Verbindung mit andern Zeugen bis zur Mitte des zweiten Jahrhunderts. Deutsche vermehrte Ausgabe. 152 pp. 85c.—*Holsten*, Dr. C., zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus. Altes und Neues. 457 pp. $2.20.—*Piper*, Prof. Dr. Ferd, Einleitung in die monumentale Theologie. 931 pp. $4.80.—*Schmid*, der Kampf der lutherischen Kirche um Luthers Lehre vom Abendmahl im Reformationszeitalter. Im Zusammenhang mit der gesammten Lehrentwicklung dieser Zeit dargestellt. 368 pp. $2.10.—*Wünsche*, Dr. A., der Prophet Hosea, übersetzt und erklärt mit Benutzung der Targumim, der jüdischen Ausleger Raschi, Aben Ezra und David Kimchi. 1 Hälfte. 296 pp. $1.90.—*Nöldeke*, Thdr., Grammatik der neusyrischen Sprache am Urmia-See und in Kurdistan. 456 pp. $5.20.—*Unger*, G. F., Chronologie des Manetho. Gr. 8. Berlin. 368 pp. $3.70.

—During the year 1866, there were published in Germany no fewer than at least 692 separate works in the department of theology alone. Besides these, there are 13 journals devoted to scientific discussions of theological questions, 7 to practical theology, 13 to Church news in general, 4 to foreign missions, 6 to home missions, not including others of a more miscellaneous character.

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* *Fred, and Maria and Me.* By the author of "The Flower of the Family." New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. pp. 71.

XXI—SCOTTISH CHRISTIANITY AND MR. BUCKLE.*

There is hardly any problem more perplexing to the Christian mind than the relation which modern literature, in its freshest and most significant forms, bears to evangelical religion. Drawing so largely from the old fountains of Pagan culture, and accustomed to find the standard, not merely of taste, but of character and feeling, in the productions of Grecian and Roman learning, it could not fail to manifest a certain Paganized tone. And though much of existing literature shows the clear influence of Christian conception, and the fruitful working of a genuine Christian spirit, it is still to be feared that, in a special dogmatic sense, there is hardly any phase of our literature more religious than that of the last age. There is certainly a clear advance from the sceptical epicurianism of the eighteenth century, with its mechanical modes of conception, its tame and narrow spirit, its cold and elaborate classicism; and Christianity regarded not as a mere system of notions, with a set of phraseology, but as a life, touching thought at a thousand points, has powerfully blended itself with every phase of our literature, imparting to it a higher moral ideal, a more humanized cast of thought, as well as greater vigor, passion and originality. And yet, if we examine the most popular and pleasing productions of modern times, that have, so to speak, fixed the sentiment of society on a large class of questions —whether we refer to popular novelists, like Dickens and Thackeray, who cannot conceive of religion as associated with a cultivated mind or a warm heart; or trenchant reformers, like Theodore Parker, who are sound, in the main, upon all social questions; or the champions of historical liberalism, like Buckle or Lewes; or the worshipers of force, like Carlyle, with his melancholy "Adieu to Church;" or sentimental moralists, like Martineau; or Broad Church essayists, like Maurice and Kingsley— we find them all in more or less direct and energetic conflict with

* From the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, January, 1868.

the truths of a positive Christianity, and strenuously and contemptuously opposed to every form of evangelical religiousness. The fact is deplorable in the extreme, especially in the present imbroglio of our faiths and superstitions, whether we consider, on the one hand, the danger to Christian habitudes of thought and feeling from such fresh and fascinating works of genius, or, on the other hand, the beautiful uses of literature itself, and the morally exalting power which exists in all its genuine manifestation, even apart from their relations to Christianity.

But there is a class of scientific thinkers who have come in with the era of Positivism, still more unfriendly to, and devoid of all reverence for positive Christian truth. They show how fatally modern civilization has sharpened the edge and envenomed the point of every weapon formerly wielded against the gospel; indeed, there is nothing in church history to be compared with the "Julian-like intolerance and Lucian-like blasphemy of these writers." They are worse even than men of the stamp of Walter Savage Landor—the type of the pure *literary* Pagan—who makes apologies for idolatry, and paints in the darkest colors the practices and ideas of Christians. We refer to the small but growing school of philosophical historians and critics, who are trying to transplant Comtist ideas to English soil, and to subject every branch of human learning and activity to the criticism of the most remorseless positivism. They account religion a superstition; Christianity a necessary portion of the general mundane evolution, divine only in the sense in which all is divine; the idea of Deity is to be banished from the field of astronomical science, as the study of the *mecanique celeste* has made the idea of divine energy rationally unnecessary; the belief in a Providence is an irreligious dogma which science has destroyed; the name of God is a superfluous expletive in accounting for the events and changes of history—in fact, the conception of Deity is itself entirely empiric, a mere generalization from Asiatic or European experience—and is to be banished from history as it has been from physical science. These prophets of Positivist culture thus very quietly take for granted—what the Christian philosopher most persistently denies—that the conception of history as a thing of laws and sequences must necessarily imply atheism, and that those cold algebraic things called general laws, cannot be the external symptoms of a divine and ever-working purpose, as if the very

earliest notions of order given us in all literature were not associated with the divine agency—"Thou hast given them a law that cannot be broken."

One of the most distinguished disciples of this scientific school of thought was Henry Thomas Buckle, the author of three remarkable volumes on the History of English Civilization, which have passed silently but securely within ten years into the great chronicle of English fame. This work displays in every page the evidences of an almost incredible industry, a love of labor not to be satiated by any prolixity or minuteness of detail, and a multifarious if not uniformly accurate knowledge, rich with the spoils of all sciences and all times. The writer is quite fearless in his conclusions, no matter how shocking to the instincts and susceptibilities of a Christian age. He follows his logic "down Niagara." We venture to affirm that no writer of modern times has equalled him in the power of evolving from assumed premises, hastily grasped—that are either absolutely or partially false, because they overlook other truths material to the subject—a tissue of such extreme, reckless, and desperate conclusions. He was specially at war with the theological spirit, and yet no theologian was ever more dogmatic in his opinions, more scornful in his censures, or more arrogant in his spirit; and no Calvinist of Scotland ever had a more Chinese cast of mind or a more stupid contempt than this liberal Englishman, for everything that lay beyond the wall of his materialistic philosophy. Mr. Buckle delighted in the havoc he made of the most sacred convictions, and principles, and institutions, that are dear to the holiest men; he raged against the clergy, Protestant as well as Romanist, with an anger that reminded one of the fury of a wild beast amidst the encircling flames; and the plain Christianity of Scotland, so different from the grand hierarchical system, in the absence of all melo-dramatic pageantry and ancient ceremonial, became the object of the fellest hatred that ever found expression in the literature of any land. Scotland is more superstitious than France, and quite as superstitious as Spain; the people hold the irreligious dogma of supernatural interference; instead of cultivating the arts of life, improving their minds, or adding to their wealth, the old generations of Scotchmen passed the greater part of their time in what were called religious exercises; they were liberal in politics, but illiberal in theology; the clergy dwarfed the intel-

lect of Scotland, prolonged the reign of ignorance, and stopped the march of society; they were the enemies of human happiness; they made the people in religious matters fearful and austere, and colored the whole national character with that dark hue, which now, though gradually softening, it still retains; they were harsh and unfeeling masters, who regarded pleasures as sinful and sufferings as religious; their object was to destroy, not only human pleasures, but human affections; and in their writings there is a hardness of heart, an austerity of temper, a want of sympathy with human happiness, and a hatred of human nature; while their influence over Scotland was one of the most detestable tyrannies ever seen in the earth. These casual expressions indicate the regnant spirit of the work, which is that of heartless, indiscriminate, and, we had almost said, malevolent depreciation.

Now, it was the clear object of Mr. Buckle, in pursuance of his great plan, to write the moral genesis of the Scottish nation, and to estimate the sum of its contributions to that vast and splendid composite, English civilization. But in our opinion, he was singularly wanting in all the necessary qualifications for such an important work. In the first place, he had no sympathy with the religious ideas of the nation, and it is hard for a historian to delineate or understand the characters of men, whose chief moral elements belonged to a sphere beyond the reach of his sympathies, to that higher region of human feeling where piety and patriotism are kindled. He pours contempt upon their religion, ridiculing them at one time, for their superstition in praying for rain, "the impious contrivance of calling in the aid of Deity to supply those deficiencies in science which are the result of our own sloth;" and, at another time, informing them that "a rainbow is that singular phenomenon, with which in the eyes of the vulgar, some theological superstitions are still connected," while the enlightened people of this age are informed that "our religion is not to be borrowed from antiquity, but it is to be discovered by each man's mind; it is not traditional, but personal." He makes no distinction between the clergy before the Scottish Reformation and the clergy after it, as if they had been still the same unchanged body, exactly identical as to character, tendency, aims, and all but opinion, while he has failed to explain how a body so incurably selfish and corrupt as the Presbyterian clergy, with not a single redeeming quality but their "democratic and

insubordinate tone," could have gathered the whole thought and feeling of the most barbarous and intractable of modern nations into the most compact unity, and wielded it, as he himself admits, against kings and armies, to the utter overthrow of Stuart despotism and the full establishment of our popular liberties. The science of statistics can never measure these men, or show how the stern Calvinism of the Reformation was the creator of modern society as well as modern liberty, and is still the largest social and political element in that great civilization which is the wonder and admiration of the world.

But, in the second place, we believe that our author is quite unable to estimate the Scottish nation, on account of his peculiar theory of history. Looking down with, we admit, a well-merited contempt upon those old historians who reveled in antithetical characters and rhetorical common-places, he constructs a new theory of historical science, based on statistics * and matured from the facts supplied by registration tables and the records of meteorological observation. He has no eye for the moral forces of history, no place for individual human force, an element which it is the special credit of Carlyle to have rescued from undue depreciation, and he has no regard for considerations of race; but climate, scenery, physical characteristics, and large general causes, account for everything. Men are nothing, be they Luthers or Napoleons; the Reformation was the result of the invention of printing, gunpowder, and Greek literature, with Luther, Calvin, and Knox, and three or four kings and emperors thrown in as episodes; gunpowder destroyed European feudalism; the mariner's compass gave America to the civilized world. Archdeacon Hare has remarked upon the tendency of the materialistic phi-

* It is proved (says Mr. Buckle) by careful statistics, that the same number of people commit suicide every year; that so many are murdered; so many are born to die; and so many are married. Thus we are supplied with positive data for judging of the conduct of men, and constructing the true science of history. But surely the most accurate statistics will not enable us to predict the conduct of any individual man, nor to calculate those eccentric anomalies and inconsistent passions which are so familiar to the student of history. Statistics have been prepared to show how many murders are committed annually in the leading countries of Europe and America, but no statistics could have enabled us to predict the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Statistics prove nothing whatever as to the causes of human action. They are simply a numerical expression of the state of the observer's expectations. They can neither determine nor predict the actions of any individual man.

losophy to discover the great agents in the history of mankind in mechanical inventions, and not in the Luthers, and Calvins, and Bacons, as if the importance of these inventions lay in themselves alone, and not in the powerful minds that fashioned and shaped them to their ends. The positive philosophers forget that many of our greatest mechanical inventions existed in China for ages without producing any grand revelation in knowledge. "The utility of an invention depends upon our making use of it." According to Mr. Buckle's theory, the Reformation, which, be it remembered, in spite of rack and faggot was firmly established in less than forty years in Germany, France, Switzerland, Holland, and the British Isles, was not a spiritual movement, but political and intellectual. The Scottish Reformation sprang, forsooth, out of a deadly struggle between the nobles and the Romish hierarchy; "the issue of the struggle was the establishment of the Reformation and the triumph of the aristocracy."* This is surely a summary method of explaining the most thorough of all the Reformations. The most self-willed people in Europe are mere cyphers, and appear nowhere on the scene. John Knox comes from Geneva only to find the work already done. "He effected more than any single man;" but "his influence in promoting the Reformation has been grossly exaggerated by historians, who are too apt to ascribe vast results to individual exertions."† Mr. Buckle forgets that before this period, Knox had been the means of leading many of these very nobles to the truth, that he confirmed their courage by a constant correspondence from Geneva, and that he established the Reformation in the hearts of professors, students, and people, at St. Andrews and its neighborhood, several years before the downfall of the Romish hierarchy. The Scottish Reformation was, in the eyes of our historian, no grand moral struggle, but a petty and deceitful warfare of nobles and priests, issuing in changes that were aided by large general causes, but no more determined by individual exertion or individual character than the formation of a coral reef is affected by the labors of a single polyp.

It will not, then, be considered strange that according to our author, the genesis of the Scottish religious character is to be found in the constant wars with England, and in the peculiar

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* Vol. ii, p. 230. † P. 224.

climate of Scotland, with its mists and storms, predisposing the people to fear and superstition, and fostering their dependence on the clergy.* While, moreover, the Scotch, being agricultural, were more docile and amenable to clerical influences than the manufacturing classes are usually found to be. Hence, the Scotch people are still, next to the Spaniards, the most superstitious in the world. But now that wars with England had ceased, and that one-third of the whole population of the country has been gathered into towns, how is it that the theological spirit—for that is what our author means by superstition—is still so rampant? It is suicidal for Mr. Buckle to say that the spirit of trade began in the eighteenth century to encroach on the old theological spirit, and that two classes—the intellectual and the industrial—arose independently of the theological, to restrict the ecclesiastical power. He ignores well-known historical facts. The theological spirit at the Reformation was always strongest among the manufacturing populations of France, England, Germany, and the Low Countries; and it is still stronger in the Scottish manufacturing towns than in the country districts. The towns are still the teeming fountains of religious and moral power.

But Mr. Buckle is quite unacquainted with the condition of religious society in Scotland, if he imagines that the clergy ever were the spiritual tyrants of the country. For there never was a nation more ecclesiastical in its whole tone, and yet so practically independent of its clergy. A Scotch clergyman has remarked that the Scotch are a priest-riding rather than a priest-ridden commu-

* The absurd generalizations of our author on this question of climate are very remarkable. He accounts for the fickleness and instability of the Spaniards, Swedes and Norwegians, by the interruption of agricultural pursuits from climatal causes; but no such fickleness or instability exists. Superstition is said to be most powerful where earthquakes and volcanoes exist; hence the deep superstitiousness of Spain and Italy; but Scotland is without both, and yet, according to Mr. Buckle, is nearly as superstitious as Spain. The Spanish and Italian peninsulas possess the greatest painters and nearly all the greatest sculptors, because, forsooth, countries that are disturbed with earthquakes develop the imagination. Now, we read of only two great earthquakes in Spain and Portugal, but Cervantes, Calderon, Camoens, Murillo, Ribera and Velasquez, lived before the great earthquake of 1755, which destroyed Lisbon. England, with no earthquakes, has produced the greatest poets; South America, which is continually subject to their action, possesses none. Mr. Buckle says that such nations are not scientific, overlooking the remarkable development of scientific genius in Galileo, Torricelli, Galvani, Volta, Leonarda da Vinci, and others. Such is a specimen of the hasty generalizations of our author.

nity. And even the author of that wretched fasciculu of prelatic calumnies—"Scotch Presbyterian eloquence,"—admits that "the people are truly the guides, and their pastors must follow them whom they pretend to conduct." * They gave their pastors no such power. Their church existed independent of the minister, who owed his office to their free choice; the will of the majority was its law; and each of the brethren possessed equal rights with the elders as to election. The Reformation in Scotland, in fact, exalted the laity, and the relation was no longer that of priest and people, but of church and minister. But suppose the people had been a nation of slaves—as our author would represent them—yielding, through abject and ignominious fear, to the behests of an intolerant priesthood, how is it consistent with historical example or with moral possibility, that such a people could be trained by such a clergy, to stand up during many long and bloody years, to fight the splendid battles of constitutional government and popular liberty with no by-ends in view, and display a firmness, a severity, a decision for that which had the validity of sacred truth and conviction, such that no king, nor noble, nor courtier could ever force them again to submit to tyranny? There is a culture, short-sighted and pedantic, that talks such platitudes and admits such marvels; but it is a stranger to all the deeper lessons of history and philosophy.

We tender our acknowledgments to Mr. Buckle for the really eloquent manner in which he describes the splendid services of the Scotch, at a most critical period in British history, to the great cause of national liberty. † He refers to the period of the civil wars. But he spoils the effect of his concession by attributing the "democratic tone," of the clergy to their anger against the nobles for stripping them of all but one-sixth of the church revenues at the reformation. ‡ He remarks, too, "that general causes

* The choice organs of a polite cosmopolitanism at the English press are in the habit of speaking of Scotland as "The Protestant Spain," "the most priest-ridden country in Europe." But do they really understand the meaning of this language? Superstition is a blind apprehension for a power vaguely conceived and not to be contended with. Now, the Presbyterian ministers do not exercise any spiritual terrorism; they are not feared as dispensers of eternal perdition, nor courted as the awarders of eternal bliss; but as men of ability, education, and moral worth, they wield that influence which a self-reliant and intelligent nation believes them to merit.

† P. 258–9. ‡ P. 233.

made the clergy love liberty," as if they had obeyed the promptings of a mere blind instinct. The explanation is miserably false as well as ungenerous. For where has Calvinism ever been the enemy of popular liberty? "How is it," says Bancroft, the American historian, "that the fanatic for Calvinism has always been the fanatic for liberty?" Our historian must know that George Buchanan—a man by the way, of a very theological spirit—published his well-known treatise *De jure regni apud Scotos*—a book which may be said to have laid the first stone in the edifice of modern liberalism—before this period, and Dryden informs us that it had the most powerful influence on the politics of Milton. We should like to know how it happens that self-government on the grandest scale is only possible in modern times to the most theological peoples? How is it that the English and the American Revolutions* succeeded, and that the French, the least theological ever heard of, ignominiously failed? There never was a revolution more profoundly infidel than that of France, and never one that more miserably and completely failed. This is a *crux* for the Buckle philosophy. One might suppose from the high place that our author usually assigns to the intellectual classes in the history of civilization, that they had always been the most intrepid pioneers of popular liberty, and that their complete emancipation, in some instances, from all theological dogmas, had peculiarly fitted them for a fearless grapple with absolutist tyranny. But can it be at all credited that almost their whole political history is that of illustrious meanness, servility and cowardice? What have the literary classes done for liberty? For two centuries they have employed their genius in pouring the measureless stores of their vituperation upon the Puritans and Covenanters, who won for them the right to their free and fearless modern discussions. And how does it happen that the six most celebrated infidels of modern times, Hobbes, Hume, Montaigne, Bayle, Bolingbroke, and Gibbon, were the friends of absolutist government: Bayle, writing

* From whom did the first declaration of independence issue in America? From Irish Presbyterians. Bancroft says: "The first public voice in America for dissolving all connection with Great Britain came, not from the Puritans of New England, the Dutch of New York, or the planters of Virginia, but from the Scotch Irish Presbyterians. They brought to the new world the creed, the spirit of resistance and the courage of the "Covenanters."

with all his vehemence against "the execrable doctrines of Buchanan" and "the pretended sovereignty of the people," without sparing the revolution of 1688; while, on the other hand, men of genius, with much of the theological spirit, like Milton, Locke, Newton, Addison, and Clarke were the friends of liberty? What is the explanation of these facts? Is it not, first, because your Hobbeses and Humes, with a spirit too feeble and contracted, can never be persuaded to seek redress in forcible resistance, because they have misgivings in every enterprise, and expect little from human wisdom and virtue? And, secondly, is it not because they have no real sympathy with the people? Bancroft says that Puritanism was religion struggling for the people. But the intellectual classes of the free-thinking order, are only too like the ancient philosophers who scorned the multitude and labored to adorn the top of society. This aristocratism of ancient civilization, as Neander calls it, has nothing in common with that Christianity, which "sounds the bass-string of humanity," and repudiates the spirit of castes and classes. The Calvinism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stirred the whole nation, north and south, as the wind shakes the trees of the forest, but only to build up a homogeneous people of shapely development, rooted in the soil, springing like the oak, and swelling every age with an annulus of development.

Mr. Buckle devotes two long and able chapters to an examination of the Scottish intellect in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is marked by his usual dogmatism and hatred of Calvinism. He affirms that the clergy dwarfed the intellect of Scotland and stopped the march of society, as if the first grand work of John Knox at the Reformation had not been the establishment of the parochial schools, and an ampler provision for the full development of University instruction. Calvinism has everywhere been synonymous with education as well as liberty. Bancroft says that John Calvin was the founder of the free school system. The Calvinists of New England established the common schools which now prevail through all the States of America. And what is the true test of any system of education? Its influence on the masses. For the mere result of producing a few scholarly and thoughtful men in comparison with the whole is insignificant compared with that of leavening a whole people with thought and intelligence. "The spirit of dissemination may

draw away the sap from the higher studies, but it is the character of our civilization rather to cast her roots among the people, than to throw her branches boldly in the air." Mr. Buckle will hardly maintain that the clergy dwarfed the intellect of Englishmen, and yet it so happens, that in comparison with them, the most clerically disciplined nation is still the best educated.* How is it that, in England, they have hardly yet begun to educate the masses? Nearly two centuries ago, Bishop Burnet expressed his amazement at the controversial quickness and metaphysical acumen of the Scottish peasantry. On the other hand, there is scarcely a people in any part of the world more generally dull and ignorant in religious matters, except in districts where the dissenters, who are generally Calvinists, prevail, than the lower and even a large part of the middle classes in England. Our author is particularly careful to depreciate the literary renown of Scotland during the seventeenth century; but the causes of the decline of letters during that period are conveniently ignored. There was, on the one hand, the departure of James I. to England, with nearly all the nobility, and that which gave an impulse to literary honor was thus for a period withdrawn; while, on the other hand, there were the terrible and bloody persecutions of Charles II, in which the schools were shut up, the colleges deserted, and the country ravaged. And yet during this dark era, Scotland produced one of the greatest men of genius—Napier, the inventor of logarithms; sent forth a swarm of learned men who taught science and letters in every school of Europe;† produced Alexander Henderson, one of the wisest politicians and theologians of his age, who foresaw the Laudean revivals of after days, George Gillespie, who was a match for debate in the Westminster Assembly for Selden, the prince of antiquaries, for Lightfoot, versed in Talmudic and oriental lore, and for Gataker, the father of English scholarship—as well as Samuel Rutherford, the author of *Lex Rex*, the earliest printed exposition of limited monarchy and constitutional government, on whose devotional letters Mr. Buckle pours the most withering contempt—and Andrew Melville, one of the finest scholars of his age. Let it be

* The per centage of persons who sign their names on the occasion of their marriage, is greater in Scotland than in England, being in Scotland 88.5 per cent. for men, and 77.2 for women; and in England 70 5 for men, and 58 for women.

† Innes, p. 280.

remembered, too, that some of the most distinguished philosophers and men of letters in Scotland have been clergymen—Reid, Campbell, Beattie, Blair, Robertson and Chalmers.* But our author makes an allowance for the fact that, while the English church is the main support of all kinds of learning with her stalls, and mitres, and rich benefices, the church in Scotland was stripped at the Reformation of all those splendid and substantial attractions which incite the ardor of the Southern clergy, and that a considerable portion of the much lauded English theology is due to persons who, though in orders, are not working ministers of the gospel. It is impossible that a Scotch minister should sit down to edit a Greek dramatist.

There is the old charge that the Scotch, like the Puritans, condemned and abhorred all elegant studies. Of course, they had no knowledge of the fine arts; but Ruskin tells us that at the Reformation, the conscience and the tastes of Europe went different ways, and we, like other Reformed countries, declared for conscience and turned our pictures to the wall. The Scotch might have cultivated dramatic poetry, music, architecture, the fine arts, but after all æsthetics are but a poor crop to cultivate instead of more essential things. They diffuse weakness, and a turn for ease and present enjoyment, while they never make any people more moral or prosperous or free. Æsthetics are the only outlets to mental activity allowed by despots, and the Scotch had grander work in hand in the seventeenth century. But we utterly deny the charge that the Scotch were opposed to elegant studies, and we demand the proof. Mr. Buckle has a low opinion of Scotch intellect because it was so superstitious, and then he dwells with special delight upon the witch delusions and prosecutions of Scotland. We have no disposition to censure him for holding up this enormity to scorn—this grand blot on the good sense and manliness of the Presbyterians—if he will only have the fairness to mention that these trials were not unknown in other countries, and that the intellectual classes by no means held themselves aloof from such delusions and cruelties. Will it be believed that Sir Isaac Newton, the father of physical philo-

* Mr. Buckle repeats the trite saying of his school, that the clergy are always opposed to science. Yet, out of thirty-six meetings of the British Association for the advancement of science, no less than nine presidents have been clergymen, including such names as Whewell, Buckland, Sedgwick, and Robinson.

sophy, and Sir Thomas Browne, the author of a treatise on "Vulgar Errors," and Sir Matthew Hale, one of the most humane judges in England, and Sinclair, a scientific Scotchman of much eminence, believed in the delusion and concurred in the execution of witches? The literary classes were by no means in advance of the spiritual classes. Lord Bacon, the author of the Novum Organum was a believer in astrology; and so was the infidel Lord Shaftsbury, the most sagacious statesman in England. They were thus, in reality, behind the theological classes. And who are the superstitious now? Not the religious classes, but the Pantheists, Universalists, and infidels, who accept all the blasphemies and absurdities of spirit-rapping. Robert Owen, the well-known infidel communist, was a believer in this shameful imposture.

Our author imagines that he is called upon to account for the fact that, though a fine skeptical literature was produced in the eighteenth century, it did not touch the masses, whose superstitions in consequence remained undiminished.* His theory is, that the intellectual classes could produce no disintegrating effect on the body of Scotch theology, because they followed the deductive instead of the inductive method of scientific inquiry. But he evidently mistakes generalization for deduction, and confounds deduction with the deductive method. † We deny that the Scottish writers did not use the inductive method, and we utterly repudiate the assertion that induction is always fatal to the theological spirit, for it is by the induction of instances from the word of God that theology is constructed. Lord Bacon, the author of the inductive method was a theologian, and said of theology that "it was the Sabbath and part of all man's labors and peregrinations;" and the Scotch, who, as our author admits,

* By superstitions he means evidently their theological opinions, and especially their belief in a Providence, so inconsistent with his ideas of law. He is wrong in thinking that the essence of a belief in Providence, is a belief in the irregularity of human events and equally so in imagining that the Scotch Presbyterians held that Providence extended only to such great events as the Spanish Armada, the Gunpowder Plot and the landing of William of Orange, without including every single item of which life is made up. Mr. Buckle must surely be aware that Jesus Christ taught the doctrine in this sense. Matt. x: 29, 30.

† The deductive method includes three things,—an induction, by which a general principle is reached, a deduction from this general principle to a particular fact and a verification proving the argument to be correct.

have now accepted the inductive method are still as deeply tinged as ever with the theological spirit. In point of fact, Mr. Buckle speaks a great deal of nonsense concerning the Baconian method. He uniformly depreciates the past, and especially everything before Lord Bacon, as if all the great men before his age were barbarians, and all their institutions and movements were mere waste of energy. But surely Galileo had demonstrated the true solar and planetary motions, and Kepler had fixed their laws; the telescope, the mariner's compass, the printing press, had been invented, before the *Novum Organum* saw the light; and *it* was produced, be it remembered, in an age of extraordinary intellectual and experimental activity. There is no difficulty to our mind in accounting for the separate pathways that the intellectual and the theological classes took in the eighteenth century. The free-thinkers, like Hume, had no sympathy with the traditions of national struggle, and others who were sound in a political sense were infidels in religion.

Much of his chapter on the Scottish intellect is devoted by our author to an exposure of what he calls the horribly fanatical and austere teachings of the Scottish divines, and accordingly he rakes together, from every quarter, a miscellaneous collection of extraordinary sayings and anecdotes, and scraps from sermons, with the view of demonstrating how the clergy destroyed all human happiness, cast a gloom over the national temperament, and subjected the people to the most debasing control. But it is a disgraceful piece of literary dishonesty for him to ignore the fact that nearly all this literature of gloom and austerity belonged to a period of persecution, when the preachers, deeply stirred by the sufferings they had endured, the jeopardy in which their life stood every hour, and the hair-breadth escapes they had already made, poured forth their burning harangues, not in the strains of scholastic pedantry or artificial rhetoric, but with an all-vital realism which spurns the frippery of art, upon their crowds of listeners, standing forth as patriots to defend the injured rights of their country, or as confessors, to plead for the higher prerogatives of their heavenly King. Mr. Buckle sits down in cold blood to anatomize such harangues, delivered while the shots of the bloody soldiers were ringing over the moors, and dying scenes were being enacted in the Grassmarket. He drags to light the literary faults of the preachers, which were the mere

asides of grave, and high, and noble speech, picks out sentences that seem grotesque in their isolation, and ignores the weight and wisdom, as well as the bright and sunny qualities, which, in spite of all the darkness and apostacy of the times, constituted the genuine characteristics of the men at whom he flings his haughty scorn. Rutherford, Binning, Durham, Dickson, and Halyburton are quite unintelligible to a Positivist. Besides, we protest *in toto* against the fairness of accepting without question the extracts of sermons from such works as "Scotch Presbyterian eloquence," the author of which denied the Scottish persecutions altogether, for we might just as fairly accept the representations of Julian and Celsus upon the nature of Christianity.* We have further to observe that many of the expressions he quotes as rhapsodical or fanatical are in the very words of the apostles, and that his sarcastic and ironical commentaries are not by any means honestly based upon, or fairly springing out of, the ample texts contained in his foot-notes. For example, he says that "The clergy believed that they alone were privy to the counsels of the Almighty, and that by virtue of this knowledge they could determine what any man's future state would be," on the ground of Samuel Rutherford's remark, quoted from Scripture, "I am free from the blood of all men; I have communicated to you the whole counsel of God." If Dickson says that the power of the key was given to the church to open and shut the kingdom of heaven—in reference, as every one knows, to the power of church discipline,—it means that the clergy have power to control the future state of men; "if ministers call themselves ambassadors of Christ," they are guilty of intolerable presumption; "if they teach the Scripture doctrine concerning the devil and hell," "they delight in horrible and revolting ideas;" if Rutherford speaks of the world as a "plaistered, rotten world," "an ashy, dirty earth,"—as it might well appear to persecuted men,—the lesson is that "it is wrong to take pleasure in beautiful scenery;" if Binning says there is no creature so miserable, as man

* This is his habit. He quotes Theodore Parker for the fact, that there are no distinguished theologians in modern times in Great Britain, and George Combe, the most arrogant and tiresome dogmatist that ever lived, for the statement that there is no country so priest ridden as Scotland. He speaks, too, of "Peden's Prophecies" as if they were genuine. He seems not to know that they were the compilations of a wandering peddler, whose credulity was equal to his ignorance.

Mr. Buckle does not remember that this was a famous saying of Plato; if Durham condemns "palate-pleasers," he is saying that "a Christian must beware of enjoying his dinner;" if Abernethy says, "men are loth to lend their ear to the Word when they abound in prosperity," he is saying that it is wrong for a man to wish to advance himself in life, or in any way to better his condition; if a preacher repeats the well-known words of an apostle concerning the love of money, he is sharply admonished by Mr. Buckle, that "no passion has done so much good to the world, as love of money;" if Gray speaks of "weaning our affections from all things that are here," he seeks to destroy human affection,—he says a Christian has nothing to do with love or sympathy; it is a terrible thing, in Mr. Buckle's estimation, to say that pleasures are hurtful to the soul; if the Scotch thought writing poetry a grievous offense, it was when poetry was full of ribaldry, blasphemy, and obscenity; if it was weak for the people to imagine wars in the shape of clouds, calamities in the stars, and a comet as a sign of coming tribulation, they were no wiser than many of the intellectual classes, Lord Bacon himself included, who believed in astrology. Far be it from us to justify the extreme and erroneous interpretations of the Scottish pulpit, and especially the ghastly pictures of future woe, which were too common in all the literatures of that age, and for which the poetical and intellectual classes, especially Milton and Dante, are in a main degree responsible; but it is a perfectly gratuitous assumption on the part of our author that this class of subjects formed the staple of all pulpit addresses, and that the clergy, with an insane and one-sided vehemence, never desisted from the preaching of woe. Their published sermons tell another story. Apart from the polemic shape which everything assumed in that age of transition, there was in their discourses a depth, and richness, and warmth of religious sentiment, very different from the weak mixtures of modern religious serialism, springing out of the doctrines of free grace, and deriving its power, as a means of impulse and movement from them alone. If the world was dark and sad to them, it is no wonder their sermons should show it.

Mr. Buckle reserves his most pungent sarcasms for the terrible tyranny of the kirk-sessions, which were, it appears, the appointed tribunals for carrying into effect the decrees of the pulpit. Of course, he makes no allowance for the thoroughly corrupt and

disorganized condition of Scottish society at the Reformation, and for the general barbarism of the people, for the lawlessness which had grown up under the shadow of the old hierarchy, for the fatal training of an institution which was doomed to destruction from its utter immorality and godlessness, as a governing power. It is extremely questionable whether anything but an extreme strictness could have built up an orderly and moral community out of such rude materials, for the masses were singularly coarse and undisciplined in moral feeling, as well as wanting in all the healthful instincts of self-control. The pregnant observation of the *Westminster Review*—a periodical very unfriendly to evangelical Christianity, if not to Christianity itself—in reference to the consistorial discipline of Calvin at Geneva, has a most suggestive bearing upon the subject before us: "The policy of Calvin was a vigorous effort to supply what the revolutionary movement wanted—a positive education for the individual soul. Government at Geneva was not police, but education—self-government mutually enforced by equals upon equals." It is well known that there was, in all countries, a fearful dissolution of manners after the Reformation, as we see in the Anabaptism of Germany, and the Libertinism of France; and the Reformers themselves were alarmed at the fearful prevalence of moral confusion and social license. Every great crisis in history, every period of change, is fruitful of such almost universal and often gigantic vice. It was most natural, therefore, that the organizing genius of reformers like Calvin and Knox, should devise some plan by which the moral life of the Reformation might be not only saved, but hardened and prepared for the fearful ordeals of persecution in store for it. And if men like Mr. Buckle are so severe in their strictures on kirk-sessions tyranny, which certainly no man can now defend, they might, at least, keep in mind not only the confused ideas that then universally prevailed respecting the two jurisdictions, civil and sacred, but the remark of a modern writer—that "no mere aesthetic spirit of freedom could have then maintained its ground against the dark plans and the malice of the reactionary interest." But his strictures are unnecessarily severe. In the first place, we are not quite sure whether Mr. Buckle's prejudice against kirk-sessions does not arise from the fact that they were intended to curb the immoral excesses of the people, for he has told us that our "appe-

tites, being as much a portion of ourselves as any other quality we possess, ought to be indulged, otherwise the whole individual is not developed."* Now, though he says immediately after, "that the proper limit of self-indulgence is that a man shall neither hurt himself nor hurt others," it is clear that he claims for the individual a wider margin of moral license than he will find in the ground covered by the ten commandments. It is true that he has but a mean opinion of the moral system of Christianity, which had nothing in it, he says, that it did not borrow from Paganism—as if Paganism ever taught the equality of man before God, the forgiveness of injuries, the dignity of humility, the sanctity of marriage, the equality of the sexes, purity of life, and the rights of the slave—but it is, after all, as Mr. Buckle must know, the only system that has had enduring results of a moral and highly elevating nature upon the expanding civilization of the world. In the next place, he is totally ignorant of the constitution of these kirk-sessions. He says that the clergyman of the parish selected a certain number of laymen, on whom he could depend, and who, under the name of elders, were his councilors, or rather the ministers of his authority."† The elders owed their appointment, not to the clergyman, but to the free choice of the congregation; and so far from being the mere ministers of his authority, they could easily outvote him in deliberation. In the next place, we cannot accept as historical facts the odious slanders of royalist and prelatic enemies, in reference to the work of these religious tribunals. The Puritans of New England were for several generations exposed to scorn and ridicule for the famous "Blue Laws" of Connecticut, which prohibited a husband from kissing his wife and a mother her child on the Sabbath day; but it is now discovered that no such ridiculous laws ever existed. The Rev. Mr. Lyon, in his history of St Andrews, mentions that some of the Scotch clergy, in drawing up regulations for the government of a colony, inserted an exactly similar clause, and we believe it to be a perfectly gratuitous slander. The kirk-sessions, we believe, must have many a time exercised a too inquisitive control over the conduct of members: but let it be remembered that if they condemned dancing and gaiety, it was mostly in a time of persecution and calamity: if they condemned "penny-bridals," it was in the interest of the poor, as well as of decency

* P. 403. † P. 344.

and sobriety; if they forbade plays, there was hardly a comedy of the seventeenth century that did not make adultery its staple, and the subject of laughter; and they were discountenanced, as people now discourage the reading of Dumas, or Balzac, or Sue; if they forbade travel in Popish countries, they were only following in the track of a prelate, Bishop Hall, who in his *Quo Vadis*, informs us that young gentlemen, in taking the tour of Italy, the Sodom of that age, became fops and profligates, as well as Papists; if they maintained the Sabbath laws with strictness, they were only carrying out what a Scotch Parliament of laymen had enacted. We presume it was through the moral discipline of these tribunals that the people, as Kirkton tells us, became so sober, and so free from the vice of dishonesty—for "the taverners' ordinary lamentation was that their trade was broke, the people were become so sober," * and that after the Restoration, when a flood of licentiousness overspread England, and priest and people were become equally profane, the high moral spirit of Scotland checked and counteracted the progress of the alarming evil.

It is quite evident that Mr. Buckle's quarrel with Scotch Calvinism is a quarrel with the theological spirit everywhere.† And yet he does not see that this spirit not only wholly underlies all the grandest movements of the past, but is still the animating spirit of the greatest social, intellectual, and political combinations of the present age. There is a literary sciolism which regards religion merely as a social accomplishment, almost as one of the fine arts, or as a mere ornament of civilization, but denies to it all powers to restrain, direct or inspire the conduct of men. This is the mere empiricism of a shallow and flippant philosophy, with which we cannot afford to hold a moment's discussion. But people like Mr. Buckle cannot be allowed to ignore historical facts. Calvinism built institutions for men as well as men for institutions. It founded, as we have seen, our civil and religious liberties. It built up a nation in America, next to Scotland, the

* Kirkton's MS. History.

† We hold Calvinism to be the strongest embodiment of the theological spirit, though the latter, we know, may be Arminian as well as Calvinistic; but, in point of fact, Arminianism is only powerful, so far as it grasps the leading principles of Calvinism—not in precise dogmatic form, but in practical scope and spiritual tendency. There is a vast difference, for example, between the Evangelical Arminianism of Wesley and Fletcher, and the Pelagian Arminianism of Tomline and Whitby. The one is much nearer to Calvinism than the other.

most Calvinistic in the world, and, with hardly an exception, the most progressive and prosperous, now draining every monarchy of Europe to replenish its vast territories with a polyglot of tongues, and expanding swiftly, even through disaster and blood, into an almost unparalleled greatness.* Calvinism was the spring of Dutch greatness. France cast out its Calvinism, and has ever since been oscillating between the extremes of despotism and anarchy. Its popular movements have been after Calvinistic example, and would have been more successful, if they had caught the spirit, while aiming at the results of Calvinism. Perhaps, however, these facts have no weight with a historian who believes that a nation's progress depends, not upon moral, but intellectual causes. But even upon his own theory, how will he account for the fact, that nations so intensely theological, have been the most intellectual, and therefore the most progressive?†

Our author attaches great importance to literature as an element of progress, but it must be a literature hostile to the theological spirit, and in more or less alliance with the aims of positivism. But all that is really original, or wholesome, or cleanly, in

* What a remarkable difference there was between the Massachusetts Colony, founded by the Puritan clergy and people, and Carolina, settled under the auspices of the English nobility, and its fundamental laws, framed by Shaftsbury, the most sagacious statesman, and Locke, the most famous philosopher of England!

† His theory is, that morals are stationary, and intellect is progressive; and therefore intellect is the parent of modern progress and civilization. The principles of morals are no doubt stationary, but their applications are not so. They are stationary like mathematics, but who can estimate the boundless developments of mathematics in astronomical and physical science? Why have India and China remained stationary for three thousand years? They have had a wonderfully high intellectual culture during those ages. Is it not from their miserably low moral positions as idolatrous nations? Why has Europe, with a higher morality, been progressive? And why have the Roman Catholic nations been so far outstripped by the Protestant, in prosperity, intellect and enterprise, but from the difference in their moral training? Mr. Buckle maintains the soundness of his theory from the fact, that war has become less frequent in modern times, from the spread of knowledge, and not from moral considerations which must have existed for hundreds of years. But war has not become less common in modern ages, and, strange to say! it is the most enlightened nations, such as England, America and Prussia, that are the most warlike. He affirms, besides, that religious persecution has ceased in modern times on account of their superior enlightenment, and not from moral causes, inasmuch as the best of men have been persecutors. But he must know that the best defences of toleration have come, if not from theologians, at least from men with the theological spirit; and, as has been well-pointed out, the worst persecutions that were ever aimed at the existence of Christianity belonged to the most enlightened period of Roman civilization.

our modern literature is tinged more or less with the theological spirit. Take, for example, the moral teachings of Thomas Carlyle—who is, unquestionably, one of the representative men of modern literature—and whose writings, on all kinds of questions, are very fascinating, and as some people think, very profound and original. Let us quietly ask, whence this moral teaching? It may be very original to say that to be is better than to seem, that there is an inner light of conscience teaching right and wrong, that there is work appointed to every man, which he will neglect at his peril, that it is good to reverence work, that many evils exist in the world, that many shams are popular, and that if we could find out the ablest man among us, some grand aristocrat, say, with rythmic drill, and give him due authority, these would be remedied. But surely these are not new doctrines. They are just the moral principles—bating that aristocratic drill-sergeant—of the old forsaken Calvinism which Mr. Carlyle imbibed at the Secession Church of Ecclefechan. The ethical part of our more refined literature—even that which is hostile to evangelical Christianity—is a mere plagiarism from it. Whence has modern literature acquired its subjectiveness, as well as its earnest and generous purpose? Subjective writing, or that form of literature that gives prominence to the personal life, has been borrowed from the Puritans, from the classical age of experimental as well as dogmatic theology. Till a comparatively recent period, literary men devoted themselves to the world of sense, picturing the various objects that constitute the scenery of existence, and tracing the paths which wind among them in the shifting light of an uncertain destiny. But the higher forms of literary work, of which we have many modern instances, owe their charm to their subjectiveness, the authors laying their scenes, not so much in the external sphere of human experience, as within the soul itself; picturing the soul and its sorrows, its ecstacies, and its longings for rest. This is Puritan. Thomas DeQuincey is the best example of this kind of writing. Circumstances, not outward, but in their inward reproduction, the lightning that scathes the brain and shatters the heart, the hurricane and strife within the soul, the vision opened to heights that tower in the firmament, or to abysmal depths that are cleft below us, the intimate and inseparable alliance between the intensities of human affection and the vast issues of eternity—these are the passion of his literature, and

they come, in their spirit and intensity, from the classics of Puritan devotion, and remind one of the thoroughness of Puritan self-scrutiny, with this special difference, however, that the latter is not weakened by that intense, obtrusive, diseased self-consciousness which has become too much the fashion in the world of letters.

Shall we speak of Calvinism in its social triumphs and moral reforms? It has always concentrated in itself an unbounded energy of wholesome change. Judged even by the standard of that gross materialism, which looks at everything in the point of view of its immediate utility and results, it holds a vital place among the forces of society. While men like Carlyle, and the weekly organs of polite literature, array themselves against all the humanity of our era, hopeless of the future, picturing the diseased realism of modern life, with the interest of an artist or a Chesterfieldian *roué*, and not with the earnest purpose of a reformer—either loud in the glorification of force, or in a spirit of miserable *dilettantism*, discoursing concerning Philistinism, vulgarity, and the dissidence of Dissent, as the three great evils of an age of culture—the theological spirit is quietly and incessantly at work in every department of reform, leading the way in every movement that can humanize society or relieve the pressure of human suffering. It is the boast of Bancroft, that the New England Puritans were far ahead of the English in criminal reforms; they had a most humane criminal code, they never hanged for theft. The charitable system established by John Knox over the length and breadth of Scotland, making each congregation the guardian of its own poor, was one of the wisest economies, for it repressed all attempts at professional mendicancy, and had much to do in nourishing that high self-respect which makes the Scotch beggar so rare a curiosity. It is needless to speak of the missionary heroism of Calvinism. The triumphs of self-sacrifice are not certainly to be found among rationalist divines or positivist philosophers. Even Lecky, in summing up the triumphs of rationalism, makes the honest admission that it is as much an enemy to devotedness and self-sacrifice as it is to ignorance and error.

In concluding this review of Mr. Buckle's examination of Scotch Christianity and the Scotch intellect, we cannot but express our surprise that he should have discovered only a single admira-

ble quality in the people, namely, their devotion to civil liberty and national independence. Yet, this implies a very great deal —an intense individualism, unshaken self-reliance, abounding energy, and passionateness of conviction. These are still the traits of Scotchmen. Their spirit is, no doubt, less fierce: it runs in other channels, but it flows on as deep and strong as in the old battle-cries for liberty and independence. There are some natures so thin and feeble that there is no anchorage in them for strong convictions; but it is the testimony of a High Church enemy that, in no other country in the world but Scotland is there a greater amount of active conviction on the subject of religion. We resent the accusation of national superstitiousness as a libel. Mr. Buckle knows that there was no deference to ancient superstitions at the Scottish Reformation; the thoroughness of the work was checked by no concrete and historical sympathies as happened unfortunately in England; ten centuries of prescription were nothing to the reformers against one text of Scripture; they could not keep themselves conveniently in the dark like their southern brethren, or "let logical contradictions dwell together in harmony." They resolved that, at least in Scotland, there should be no *tolerabiles ineptiæ*, no Romish principles left to become the seeds of Laudean revivals; and so it was never to be, that several hundreds of her clergy and nobility should go over to Rome, or that, amidst the utter godlessness of the time, she should be torn asunder by idiotic controversies about the kind of spiritual millinery a priest should wear in celebrating the holy eucharist, or in mumbling out the gospel in a medieval monotone. It was never to be that her preachers, after the choral pantomime, should try to edify the people by a few sorry sentences concerning priestly power, the sanctification of baptismal water, the merits of St. Chad, patristic scraps, and apocryphal quotations. The Scotch have always been superior to superstitions of this degrading order: but if Mr. Buckle means to call believing in a Providence superstitions, then undoubtedly they are preëminently so. But it is the superstition of strength, not weakness; it is the superstition that feels the pressure of great eternal laws, that cherishes the supernatural element in all the life of man. No more than the religions of other nations, can the Scotch tolerate the restrictions of materialism, for it is a foe to their whole nature, to their intellect no less than to their sensibilities, to their

religious instincts, as well as their sensuous faculties, and, compelled as they are by the acceptance of Christianity as a revealed message of mercy and love to man, to acknowledge the near connection of all their interests with the evolving issues of the universe, they cannot escape the deep and heartfelt conviction that eternity is ever pressing on the minutest incidents of their history. These were the men, and this was the manner of their superstition. Mr. Buckle has not, so far as we can remember, charged them with hypocrisy. He knows too well—what cavalier historians and royalist poets always forget in slandering the Puritans—that irresolution is and must be the characteristic of all who hold a double character, and that the Covenanters as well as the Puritans were, as a body, far too decided in their principles and policy to merit this stale and odious accusation.* He is quite certain, however, that they were very sour, and austere, and fanatical, just as their descendants still are, as well as the enemies of human happiness and averse to innocent amusements.†

Certainly obloquy and persecution are apt to sour the very sweetest natures, but exactly the same charge was brought against the Calvinists of France, simply because they refused to mingle in the gaieties and festivities of their neighbors, and rebuked the indolence and poverty of the Roman Catholics by their industry and success in trade. Our author is particularly incensed at the ecclesiastical tone of Scotch society, and the extreme illiberality of sentiment that prevails upon all religious and ecclesiastical questions. Now though we are perfectly at one with Mr. Buckle in believing that liberality of spirit, exhibited in a practical form, is one of the best and truest attributes of civilized life, we are perfectly convinced that, judged by a practical standard, the Scotch are more liberal than the English. For example, the English Church unchurches the Scotch; the Scotch recognize the church-standing of the English. The English universities have always been kept as ecclesiastical preserves, or governed as mere appendages of the English Church, and on the most narrow and

* Even infidels, who regard hypocrisy as the worst of all offenses, are not always models of consistency upon this head. Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States, had the hardihood actually to propose a resolution in Congress appointing a day of national prayer, fasting and humiliation.

† This is a pure libel. They were enemies to sinful amusements, but they practiced all manly sports from childhood. Professors in universities as well as students joined in them, and ministers were present at them.

bigoted principles; so that though dissenters may gain a few of its prizes, no dissenter can be allowed to fill one of its chairs. On the other hand, there is no such connection in Scotland between the universities and the Church, and there is no such exclusion of dissenters from the professorial chairs. Some people think, however, that Scotch theology is far too rigid and unaccommodating, and that it would be a real advantage to the religion of the country, to have it weakened and desolated by that philosophical pestilence which rages so furiously in the bosom of English Christianity. We have no sympathy with a religious liberalism of this order, and yet no real friend of that massive structure of British theology which was "reared two centuries ago by the piety and genius of the Westminster divines," will object to see an ethically disciplined, metaphysical spirit, operating according to the canons of a well-applied logic, under the increasing light of Biblical science, working towards the fuller development and elucidation of a richly intellectual and profoundly scriptural theology. But sure we are that the Scotch mind will never yield to that miserable cowardice of unbelieving, so boldly insinuated by Mr. Buckle, that the more man advances in intellectual, moral and social culture, the more will God turn away his face from him. This is the miserable doctrine of that scepticism which has been well named the suicide of the soul, and whose warmest dreams and moral aspirations, if such can be at all imagined, will never secure its disciples from the most terrible attacks of hopelessness and despair.

XXII.—THE TALMUD.*

BY B. HARRIS COWPER.

Several methods are open to any one who sits down to write about the Talmud, and whichever he adopts he is secure against much adverse criticism, because very few can form an independent opinion upon his work. He may write the Talmud up, and if he has a warm imagination, a fluent pen, and some partiality, he can make it appear that the book abounds in all the graces of literary composition, in all the beauties of history and anecdote, allegory and parable, in the highest moral teaching, and the most skillful exegesis, etc., etc. He may write the Talmud down, and for this nothing more will be needful than a determined preference for its vulgarities and indecencies, its profanities and immoralities, its monstrous fables and lies, its perversion of Biblical teaching, its evasion of plain obligation, its unscientific form, spirit, and entire conception, its puerilities and its anilities, etc., etc. He may write the Talmud both up and down, by an honest selection of its repulsive and attractive elements, by a truthful exhibition of its features,—"nothing extenuate, nor aught set down in malice." For ourselves we are inclined to think the latter will be the course determined on by any one who has looked carefully into that most inconsistent, heterogeneous, and incongruous work, and feels that he must describe facts, whoever is pleased, whoever is offended, and whatever the picture may turn out. If light and darkness, truth and error, the beauteous and the ugly, the graceful and the grim, good and evil, alternately prevail in the Talmud, the candid reporter will say so. If as he reads he is led to fancy himself in the presence of the philosopher and the charlatan, the sage and harlequin, the historian and the fabulist, the divine and the impious, he will say so. If he finds much that is valuable to studious and thoughtful men, and much that is simply either worthless or vile, he will say so. If he ascertains that it is a Babel in ruins, with precious relics imbedded in

* From the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, January, 1868.

heaps of rubbish and dirt, he will publish the fact. If he finds what illustrates the Old and New Testament, and at the same time what looks like a burlesque, he will declare it. Whatever else is uncertain, we think, however, this is certain,—that the Talmud is a very extraordinary work, and that, taken as a whole, it is without a parallel. This conclusion, will, we hope, at least be justified by the facts and illustrations which we have been at some pains to collect for the information of those who are anxious to know more about the Talmud.

It is an ancient saying that a great book is a great evil; but although the Talmud is a great book, it ought to be a good one, if only a tithe of the praise which has been lavished on it be deserved. The Jews, as is well known, hold it in very high honor, and there are current among them many extraordinary opinions about it. The date of its compilation is pretty well ascertained, but there is some difference of opinion as to its origin. A popular idea is, that the Talmud is to all intents and purposes an oral law originally given to Moses, taught by him to the elders, and handed down through successive generations until it was finally committed to writing, with various commentaries and observations added by the Fathers or Rabbis of the Jews. This view of the case, which is that of Maimonides, is thus stated by a modern English Jew: "All the commandments that were given to Moses on Mount Sinai were given to him with their proper explanations: for it is said, 'And I will give unto thee the tables of stone, and the law, and the commandments.'" (Exod. xxiv, 12). By the word *Torah*, i. e., the law, is meant the written law, and by the word *Hammitzvah*, i. e., the commandment, is meant the proper interpretation thereof, and we are commanded to keep the law according to the interpretation thereof, which interpretation is the oral law. The whole of what is called the written law, i. e., the Pentateuch, which is the text, was written by Moses himself before his death; the number of copies which he wrote was thirteen; he gave one to each tribe, and one copy he put into the ark to remain there continually, according to the commandment in Deut. xxxi, 26: "Take this book of the law, and put it in the side of the ark of the covenant of the Lord your God, that it may be there for a witness against thee." But the interpretation of the law he did not commit to writing, but gave it in charge to the elders and Joshua, and the rest of Israel, as it is said, "All

the words that I shall command you, that shall ye take heed to do;" and for that reason it is called the oral law. The said oral law was what Moses continually taught in his Sanhedrim to the elders and the rest of the people, the manner of which was as follows:

"As soon as Moses was returned to his tent from receiving the Word of God, he called Aaron thither unto him, and first delivered unto him the text which was to be the written law, and after that the interpretation thereof, which was the oral law, in the same order as he received both from God in the mount. Then Aaron arising and seating himself at the right hand of Moses, Eleazer and Ithamar, his sons, went in the next, and being taught both these laws, at the feet of the prophet, in the same manner as Aaron had been, they also arose and seated themselves, the one on the left hand of Moses, and the other on the right hand of Aaron. And then the seventy elders, who constituted the Sanhedrim or great senate of the nation, went in, and being taught both these laws in the same manner, seated themselves also in the tent. And then entered all such of the people as were desirous of knowing the Word of God, and were taught it in the same manner. After this, Moses withdrawing, Aaron repeated the whole of both laws, as he had it from him, and also withdrew. And then Eleazar and Ithamar repeated the same, and likewise withdrew. And then the seventy elders made the same repetition to all the people present, so that each of them having heard both these laws repeated to them four times, they all had it thereby firmly fixed in their memories. The text was put in writing, as above mentioned, but the interpretation thereof was to be delivered down *only by word of mouth* to the succeeding generations, and towards the latter end of the fortieth year from their going forth out of the land of Egypt in the beginning of the eleventh month, Moses, calling all the people of Israel together, acquainted them of the approaching time of his death, and therefore desired that if any of them had forgotten aught of what he had delivered to them, they should without delay repair to him, and he would repeat to them anew what had slipped their memories, and farther explained to them every difficulty and doubt which might arise in their minds concerning what he had told them of the law of God; and hereon, they applying to him, all the remaining time of his life, that is from the beginning of the said

eleventh month till the sixth day of the twelfth month, that interval was employed in instructing them anew in the text, which is called the *written law*, and in the interpretation of it, which is called the *oral law*, and having on the said sixth day delivered to them the copies of the written law, as aforementioned, he on the seventh day went up into Mount Nebo, and there died. After his death, Joshua, his successor, taught the said oral law in his Sanhedrim, and delivered it to the elders who succeeded him, as will be hereafter shown at large." *

This rather lengthy extract is but the beginning of the very precise and detailed account of the transmission of the Jewish oral law from its first recipients through a long succession of persons divinely appointed to be links in what is called the *chain of receivers*." There is some dispute as to the order in which this *catena patrum* is to be constructed, but that is a matter of no vital importance. When Ezekiel is reached we are told that the great synagogue of one hundred and twenty persons was constituted the depositary of the precious treasure, which remained intact through all changes until Rabbi Judah Hakkadosh, or the Saint, compiled the Mishna, about two hundred years after Christ.

In the interval between Ezekiel and Judah, several eminent Rabbis are recorded, one of them being Simon the Just, who was high priest when Alexander the Great marched upon Jerusalem. The Talmud of Jerusalem—we will explain this further on—says "That all the time of Simon the Just, the scape-goat had scarce come to the middle of the precipice of the mountain from which he was cast down, but he was broken in pieces; but when Simon the Just was dead, he fled away alive into the desert, and was eaten of the Saracens. While Simon the Just lived, the lot of the Lord in the day of expiation went forth always to the right hand; but when he was dead, it went forth sometimes to the right hand and sometimes to the left. All the days of Simon the Just the little scarlet tongue looked always white, but when Simon the Just was dead, it looked sometimes white and sometimes red. All the days of Simon the Just the west light always burned brightly; but Simon the Just being dead, it sometimes burned and sometimes went out. All the days of Simon the Just, the fire upon the altar burnt clear and bright, and after two pieces

* David Levi, *Rites and Ceremonies of the Jews*, pp. 223–6.

of wood laid on in the morning, they laid on nothing else the whole day after; but when he was dead, the force of the fire languished in such a manner that they were forced to supply it all the day. All the days of Simon the Just, a blessing was sent upon the two loaves and the shew bread, so that a portion came to every priest, to the quantity of an olive at least, and there were some who did eat, and there were others to whom something remained after they had eaten their fill; but when Simon the Just was dead, that blessing was withdrawn, and so little came to each priest that those who were modest withdrew their hands, and those who were greedy still stretched them out." (*Levi*, pp. 246–8).

This Simon the Just, however, must not be dated so far back as the tradition above named would place him, but only about one hundred and eighty years B. C. With him the supposed Great Synagogue ends, and the series of learned Rabbis begins. In what we may call an exhaustive article on the Talmud in Herzog's *Real Encyklopädie* (vol. xv, p. 643), the writer, Pressel, gives a list of the principal Rabbis quoted in the Talmud, assigning to them the dates arrived at by Dr. Jost. The list commences with Simon the Just, who is followed by Antigonus of Socho; Zadok and Boœthus, Jose ben Joezer and Jose ben Johanan (B. C. 70, the first of the Pharisaic teachers proper), Joshua ben Perachiah, Nithai of Arbela, Simon ben Shetah, and Judah ben Tabai, Shemaiah and Abtalion (47 B. C.); Hillel and Menahem, and then Shammai (at about the birth of Christ). These are followed by others, who bring us down to A. D. 160, at which time we have a double series, one in Palestine, and one in Babylonia, ending with Pumbeditha, about A. D. 500. Thus the entire range extends over about six hundred and eighty years.

The Talmud is divided into Mishna and Gemara; the Mishna being the older of the two, and dating from near the close of the second century after Christ, when it was compiled by Rabbi Judah the Holy.* The Gemara is two-fold: that of Jerusalem was written late in the fourth century after Christ, and that of Babylon not completed till about A. D. 500. The Mishna, which forms the lesser portion, is a sort of a text which is accompanied

* The notion that R. Judah did not write the Mishna, so far as he compiled it, is no more reasonable than that the "oral law" was handed down by word of mouth from Moses to Judah with perfect accuracy.

by the Gemara as a kind of commentary. The whole is divided into six larger portions and many smaller sections, and there are appended to it certain separate tracts which may be regarded as supplementary. Many extracts have been made from this great compilation, and the entire Mishna has been translated into Latin; but the complete work has never been translated,—nor is it likely to be.

The structure of the Talmud is thus compendiously described by Dr. Edersheim:—"Every separate traditional legal ordinance was termed a 'halacha.' The 'halachas' or traditional ordinances, in their scientific arrangement, constituted the Mishna, of which the Talmud or Gemara was the commentary, the explanation, illustration, and application." * It must be remembered, however, that the Mishna rather *ought* to be made up of halachas than is made up of them, for they are mixed up with plenty of other matter. Nor must we fail to remind the reader that when Dr. Edersheim here calls the Gemara alone the Talmud, he adopts a not uncommon and a not commendable Jewish custom.

The character of the Talmud has been so differently estimated by different persons, that many are in doubt as to what they ought to think of it. Under the circumstances, it may be needful to say something upon this point, and we will introduce our observations by an extract in which a learned Jew, Mr. Bedarride, controverts the hostile opinions which some have formed. We do not give more of his remarks than is required to show the drift of them, but they may all be found in his *History of the Jews in France*, etc.† He thus begins: "Any one would be embarrassed if he had to prove that the Talmud teaches anything but the practice of all virtues: although we find in the work an infinity of things which an enlightened man and the man of good sense cannot avow. But it must be remarked that the Talmud is a collection of the opinion of a multitude of Rabbins, and in what country shall we find a multitude of men of whom some do not reason wrong? Christian theologians would not come off so well, if they were compared in this respect with the Rabbins. It might be asked in effect if the Fathers of the Church have always professed a great regard for morality, when they have spoken of heretics, if all is worthy of approval in the writings of the Escobars, the Sanchezes, and the Molinas; and cer-

* *Hist. of the Jewish Nation*, p. 409. † Paris, 1859, pp. 444 *et seq.*

tainly if serious errors have fallen from some Rabbi, we should be disposed to pardon him. Happily if blamable opinions can be cited from the Talmud, they are redeemed by a mass of truths which justify it entirely in regard to morals; and it is to this mass that enlightened men ought to confine themselves, because it is not the abberrations of certain persons which can be considered as the morality of a people. He who makes this reflection will be forced to admit that it is not virtues of which the Talmud proscribes the practice, and that the morality which is called *evangelical* is found complete in the sentiments avowed by the Rabbins a long while before the appearance of the Gospel. Thus, for example, people are in the habit of repeating that the Christian religion has invented a new virtue—the love of our neighbor. This is an old error. The law of Moses and the Talmud teach that we ought to love our neighbor as ourselves: no distinction is made between the Jew and him that is not one." After quoting texts from the Old Testament in support of this last statement, to which no objection will be made, the author proceeds to cite corresponding declarations from the Talmud. One of the examples he quotes is that famous one ascribed to Hillel, not seldom as preceding the great saying of Christ: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the prophets." (Matt. vii, 12), or as given more concisely by St. Luke: "And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise." The version given of Hillel's dictum by M. Bedarride is this: "A pagan asked of Rabbi Hillel in what the Jewish religion consisted. Hillel answered, 'Do not unto thy neighbor (ton semblable) what thou wouldest not one should do to thee. Behold,' said he, 'the whole of religion; the rest is but the consequence.'" Lightfoot, who follows his original more closely, renders the passage thus: "A certain Gentile went to Shammai and said, Make me a proselyte, that I may learn the whole law while I stand on one foot. Shammai thrust him away with a staff which was in his hand. He went to Hillel, and he made him a proselyte and said, Thou shalt not do to thy neighbor what is hateful to thyself." So far as the rabbinical *precept* is concerned, it is much more like a loose copy from the book of Tobit than a pattern for the words of Jesus: "Do that to no man which thou hatest," (Tob. iv, 15); anyhow the apocryphal writer has a two-fold advan-

tage over the Talmudical one, for he is more ancient and more comprehensive. Hillel restricted his rule to one's "neighbor;" but the writer of Tobit, like Christ, extended it to every man. The Mosaic law enjoined that the Jew should love his "neighbor," but it remained for the Gospel to give the wide and all-embracing explanation of that word. We do not wish to deny the existence of large and liberal principles in the Talmud, for they are there; but the misfortune is that along with them there are other and quite incongruous utterances. If we are asked in regard to the Talmud as an oral law of divine authority, or as a divinely authorized exposition of the Pentateuch and commentary upon it, we shall know what to say; we shall simply refuse to comply. But if we are merely to view it as an uncritical conglomeration of maxims, sentiments, facts, fictions, waking dreams and wise utterances, we shall readily assent: for this is what it is. It is the sweepings of the intellectual threshing-floor of Judaism accumulated during some centuries, and consigned to the Talmudic garner without any effectual winnowing. It is the salvage of the great wreck of Judaism, first gathered into a great heap and then roughly sorted into lots. The heterogeneous mingling of the precious and the worthless, the beautiful and the grotesque, the alluring and the repulsive, is indescribable. It forcibly reminds us of the vision of the ocean's bed as Shakspeare makes the Duke of Clarence describe it:

> "Methought I saw a thousand fearful wracks,
> A thousand men that fishes gnawed upon,
> Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl,
> Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels,
> All scattered in the bottom of the sea;
> Some lay in dead men's skulls; and in those holes
> Where eyes did once inhabit there were crept
> As 'twere in scorn of eyes, reflecting gems
> That woo'd the slimy bottom of the deep,
> And mocked the dead bones that lay scattered by."

Mishna and Gemara contain a certain amount of valuable material for the Christian student, but it costs a good deal to get it, owing to the gigantic pile of rubbish through which it is scattered. The Talmud must not for certain be compared either with the Old Testament or the New, nor be set up as a substitute for either; nor be proclaimed as the expositor and commentator of either. It gives explanations of Old Testament passages, but it

excels in the delightful art of explaining away; it gives proper glosses upon sundry texts, but it is very fond of making what is called "a guy" of them; it supplies us with parallels more or less real and formal to a number of things in the New Testament, but distant resemblances often turn out to be a mirage.

The Talmud is very valuable as supplying illustrations of matters which the New Testament withers with sarcasm, or crushes with invective. If you want, we would say to any inquisitive genius,—if you want to see the force of truth and the literal accuracy of the hard sayings of Christ and Paul about the Jews, priests and people, scribes, lawyers, Pharisees, and so forth, read the Talmud. Should you be unable to read the copious and forbidding original Hebrew, take the Latin, the *Mishna*, as translated by Surenhusius, or if that is too much, consult the notes of Lightfoot upon the Gospels and other books of the New Testament.* You will soon discover that there was a meaning in the words of Christ, and a reason for them: because we have no doubt that the Jews of his day were like those who compiled the Talmud. A few examples are worth a long array of fine words, so we will give a specimen. Christ says, "Blessed are the pure in heart;" the Talmud says, "Come and see how far the purity of Israel extends; for not only is the clean prohibited to eat with the unclean, but the Pharisaeus seminifluus cum seminifluo plebeio." The absence of delicacy in the portion we copy in Latin is comparatively a trifle, for the indecencies of the Talmud are wonderful. It has been said in vindication of them that the book is legal in its character, and that laws and lawyers must speak plainly on all subjects. Be it so, but it is hard to believe that the trifling with delicate topics which shocks us, is worthy of the dignity either of the lawyer or the moralist, to say nothing of the divine. If the following choice anecdote had been told of any of the founders or fathers of the Church, it would have been turned to advantage by our enemies: "Soliti sunt R. Gidal et R. Jochanan ad locum immersionis sedere ubi lavarentur feminæ; cumque a quibusdam monerentur de periculo lasciviæ; Respondit R. Jochanan, ego sum ex semine Josephi in quem dominari non potuit malus affectus." What earthly use can be made of a story like this? Even if Rabbi Jochanan told the truth, which is very doubtful, he and his friend Gidal set their disciples a most dan-

* *Horæ Hebraicæ et Talmudicæ.*

gerous example, and yet one which they might be easily tempted to try to follow. Oddly enough the same section has been saying, "Intuens vel in minimum digitum feminæ, est ac si intuereter in locum pudendum." "Blessed are the pure in heart," says Christ, but your Rabbis, Gidal and Jochanan, think a man may be pure in heart while he takes no care of his eyes. The best that we can say is, that the wondrous laxity of some portions of the Talmud is compensated by the stern rigidity of others.

Christ says, "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." The Talmud says, that he who smites a man on the cheek shall give him two hundred denarii, but if he smites him with the other hand, let him give him four hundred. The punishments recommended for other offenses are also often severe in the extreme, and not at all in the spirit of Christ.

Christ condemned the wretched trifling and punctiliousness of the Jews, and not without reason. The Talmudists excelled in the art of hair-splitting, and their observations upon certain peculiarities of the Scripture text and ritual are quite edifying. Here is one example: "The book of Deuteronomy came and prostrated itself before God, and said, O Lord of the universe, thou hast written in me thy law, but a testament which is weak in one point is weak in all. Behold Solomon attempts to extirpate *jod* from me (viz., in Deut. xvii, 17: "Neither shall he multiply wives"). The holy and blessed God answered, Solomon and a thousand like him shall perish, but a letter shall not perish from thee. R. Honna in the name of R. Achai said, The letter *jod* which God took away from the name of our mother Sarai, he gave the half of to Sarah, and half to Abraham. A tradition of Rabbi Hoshaia: The letter *jod* came and prostrated itself before God, and said, O eternal Lord, thou hast removed me from the name of that holy woman. The blessed God answered, Hitherto thou hast been in the name of the woman, and that at the end; henceforth thou shalt be in the name of a man, and that at the beginning. Hence that which is written,—And Moses called the name of Hoshea, Joshua." Lightfoot, who cites this from the *Jerusalem Gemarists*, says the Babylonians thus record the removal of *jod* from the name of Sarai to that of Joshua: "The letter *jod*, saith God, which I removed from the name of Sarai, stood and cried to me many years, until Joshua

arose, to whose name I added it." All this may be very amusing to ordinary readers, and it may contain abysses of wisdom for the sage who can fathom it, but in any case we are happy to think the style was not followed in the New Testament.*

It has been said that the style of the Talmud can be compared with that of no other book. So far as the style is concerned this is hardly true, but it is allowed that no other book of so heterogeneous a character has come down to us from antiquity. The redactors did not always estimate the value of the opinions and cases they cited; they strung together the opposite opinions of their "lawyers," and put down very apocryphal cases to illustrate points of problematical importance. Mr. Bedarride does them no injustice, if he awards them no honor, when he implicitly likens the Talmudists to Escobar, Sanchez, Molina, the tribe of pettifogging and unprincipled casuists pilloried by Pascal in the *Provincial Letters.* The Jesuits lay down a sound principle, and then set to work to nullify or evade it. The moral theologian, a Dens or a Liguori, propounds a law; he asks whether this is absolute or conditional, under what circumstances it is binding, and in what way it can be set aside practically; violated in the spirit and observed in the letter. He tells us that A. says something, that B. and C. are of the contrary opinion, that D. differs from the rest, and sums up by suggesting that this or that is probable. The mind is left in a fog, and the rule is mystified and made void. Something of the same sort happens with the Talmudists, who cite the most contradictory judgments, and then go on to something else, so that their reader is as wise as when he began, but a little more uncertain as to his duty. We are very glad to have their work to study in connection with the New

* Those who cannot read the Talmud itself, may be comforted by the information that Christian scholars in the seventeenth century devoted immense labor to its exploration, and although what they did is not in harmony with the modes of recent scientific study, they have put into Latin or German thousands of passages from the Talmud, and thousands of observations upon its form and spirit. Ewald says: "It is well known what immense labor was expended by Christian scholars during the seventeenth century, upon the effort to understand the Talmud and everything connected with it. Jewish scholars also have lately done something more than merely to commit it to memory; but if they would really understand and use it in a scientific manner, they must first of all lay aside the prejudices which cleave but too sadly to most of those even, who most plume themselves on their ability. Not yet have they comprehended the spirit of the Talmud, or even the manner of its origin and composition."

Testament, the simple precision of which on moral and practical questions, becomes all the more admirable when contrasted with the uncertainties and confusion of the Jewish mode. The uncertainties of this oral law might be proved by many examples. Thus, under certain circumstances, a sum called *collybus* has to be paid: "is bound to pay one *collybus*. But Rabbi Meir said two *collybi*. How much is a collybus? According to R. Meir, it is a silver obolus; according to the wise men it is the half of one." R. Akiba lays down a rule for the payment of tithes of animals a little before the Passover, Pentecost, and the Feast of Tabernacles, which makes the time of payment variable; but "R. ben-Azai says the payments are to be made on February 29th, May 1st, and July 29th; and Rabbis Eliezer and Simeon say the 1st of March, the 1st of May, and the 29th of August." We naturally ask, which is to be followed?

Perhaps it would not be fair to lay much stress on the ceremonial and ritual elements of the Talmud, but as Christians we cannot help regarding some of the items as mere petty trifling. For instance, in the section Shekalim, from which we have just quoted, we are informed that "all the spittle which is found in Jerusalem is clean, except that of the High street. So R. Meir; but R. Jose says what is found on other days of the year in the middle of the road is unclean, but what is found at the sides is clean, and at a feast (or time of festival), what is found in the middle of the road is clean, and what is found at the sides is unclean, because few turn to the side." Again, "All the vessels which are found in Jerusalem in the way which goes down to the place of washing are unclean, but in the way which goes up from it they are clean; for their coming up is not like their going down. So R. Meir; but R. Jose says all of them are clean, except the basket, the spool, and the bone-crusher, which pertain to burials." Again: "According to R. Eliezer, what is defiled by a father of uncleanness (i. e., something in itself unclean), whether without or within, ought to be burnt without; but what is defiled by a son of uncleanness (i.e., something simply polluted), whether without or within, ought to be burnt within. But Rabbi Akiba says, where things are defiled they are to be burnt." It is no part of our business to reconcile these discordancies of judgment, which swarm in the Talmud; we only say they are there, and that they remind us much more forcibly of the Sanchez and

Molina school than of the Pauline and Evangelical. As for the wretched microscopic distinctions, they remind us of the many rebukes of such things contained in the New Testament.*

But if we do not feel strongly attracted by the thousand and one examples of minute distinctions, the force of which is destroyed by contrariety of opinions, we shall not be edified by many of the curious remarks on Old Testament facts and persons. When Adam was created, he at first reached from one end of the world to the other, but after he fell into sin, God reduced his magnitude. During the one hundred and thirty years in which Adam was separated from Eve, he was the father of unclean spirits. In an elaborate article upon the Talmud in Kitto's *Biblical Cyclopædia* (New Edition), Dr. S. Davidson gives the following, which we quote because it relates to two persons mentioned in the Old Testament. "Abba Saul said: When I was an interrer of the dead, I had once to pursue after a gazelle; I entered into the hollow of a hip-bone of a dead man, and ran after it three miles, and yet I reached neither the gazelle nor the end of the hip-bone; when I returned back, they told me this bone belonged to Og, the King of Bashan. Abba Saul said: Once upon a time when I had been interring the dead, a cave opened under me, and I found myself standing up to my nostrils in the socket of a dead man's eye; when I returned, they told me it was the eye of Absalom. Perhaps thou wouldst say, Abba Saul was a short man: Abba Saul was the tallest in his generation."

The Mahommedans have appropriated some of the enormous stories of the Talmud, and have tried to improve upon their models. But where did the Jews find a precedent? If they had none, we must admire the power of their imagination, for it is not everybody who would suppose a man's leg bone upwards of three miles in length, and so capacious that a person ran along the inside of it all the distance mentioned, and came back, and only then learned that it was a bone he had been in. The ancient mythologists produced gigantic forms, which may be compared for magnitude with some of the lesser Jewish creations; but they were usually consistent, and when not grotesque were almost sublime; whereas these Jewish fables are magnified exaggera-

* Enough of the puerile and petty distinctions of the *Mishna* to satisfy the appetite of an ordinary English reader, may be found in Wotton's translation of the two Mishnic tracts, *Shabbath* and *Erubin*. (8 vo., London, 1718).

tions of old wives' fables, fit for the nursery, and without any colossal grandeur and poetic glory. We have copied one of Dr. Davidson's specimens, and we will quote another, because some may fancy that the vast and the rational must, after all, be in harmony, and that so venerated a book must have proceeded from men who did not stumble upon scientific truths by accident, but were sober, plodding students. "Rabbah says: They that go down to the sea have told me that when a wave is going to overwhelm a ship, sparks of white light are seen on its head. But if we strike it with a staff on which are graved the words, 'I am that I am, Jah, Lord of Hosts, amen, amen, Selah,' it subsides. They that go down to the sea have told me that the distance between one wave and another is three hundred miles. It happened once that we were making a voyage, and we raised a wave until we saw the resting place of the least of all the stars. It was large enough to sow forty bushels of mustard seed, and if we had raised it more we should have been burned by the vapor of the star. One wave raised its voice and called to its companion, 'O, companion, hast thou left anything in the world that thou hast not overflowed? Come and let us destroy it.' It replied, 'Come and see the power of thy Lord. I could not overpass the sand even a hair's breadth, for it is written, Fear ye not me? saith the Lord; will ye not tremble at my presence, which have placed the sand for the limit of the sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass.'" The moral here may be commended, but what of the fable? That reminds us of some charming passages which we have encountered among our readings in the literature of Hinduism and Buddhism; nor is it at all beyond credibility that the precious or curious fragments of oriental philosophy which are embedded in the Talmud, rest side by side with metamorsphosed renderings of oriental mythography. Why not? We know very well that the rabbinical schools borrowed more than philosophical notions from countries and peoples further east than Judea—we know that Jewish theology was enriched in substance and in vocabulary from the same sources. It may be, then, that without adopting the huge creations of Buddhism, etc., the Talmudists took them as a sort of pattern to work by, a style of literary architecture to be applied to Jewish uses. Any one who doubts the reasonableness of our supposition, has only to consult very accessible books on Buddhism and Brahminism to satisfy himself upon the subject.

Even Hurwitz (in his *Hebrew Tales*) has been tempted to refer to a Hindoo origin the story of the Bar Juchne, the wonderful bird which the great romancers, the Rabbins, have created and embalmed in the Talmud, until it is eaten by Israel at the advent of the Messiah. Perhaps the most plausible apology we have seen for the huge exaggerations of the Rabbins, is that their lies are so immense they could never have expected or desired to have them believed. This is an excuse which we own we should have accepted, but for the fact that the narratives in question are mixed up with opinions as monstrous as themselves, suggesting more of the charlatan than the philosopher and divine. It would be mere insincerity on our part, under all the circumstances, to palliate the vagaries of the Talmudists; and it would be impolitic, because that huge collection of wisdom and folly, truth and fiction, which makes up the Talmud, has been at once a model and a stimulus, an excuse if not a law, to more recent Rabbis, who have vied with their forefathers in all the forms of grave and solemn trifling.

From a moral and theological point of view, we observe three classes of precepts in the Talmud: those which simply repeat the Old Testament teaching; those which resemble somehow the New Testament teaching; and those which resemble neither. To the last item of this category we should refer such cold-blooded abominations as the following against heretics, from the Gemara of the Aboda Sarah: "Minim, mosoroth, apostatizers and epicureans shall be put into a pit; and if there be in the pit a way to come up for him that is cast therein to save himself, thou shalt fill the pit with earth, and shall say, 'I do it only that my cattle shall not fall into it!' And if there be a stone which has covered the pit, thou shalt leave the stone, and say, 'I leave it only because I want to pasture my cattle here.' Or, if there be a ladder in the pit, thou shalt take it out, and say, 'I want to take down my son from the roof.'" According to the *Gemara Sanhedrim*, "Ruth Johanan said: 'A Gentile who is engaged in studying the law is worthy of death.'" There is plenty more of this sort of thing in the Talmud; and those who want to know how all the Ten Commandments can be violated, and how the noblest precepts of Christianity can be contradicted, need not go beyond the Talmud. The filthiness of some of the doings and sayings of the Rabbis quoted in this strange compilation, we have already

alluded to. But we cannot wonder at it if the following is not an exceptional case: "It is said that Rabbi Eleazar, son of Dordaia, did not pass a single harlot without sinning with her. Once he heard that there was a harlot in the town, near the sea, and that she took a bag of dinars for her wages; so he took a bag of money, and crossed seven rivers till he came to her," etc. (Abodah Sarah). Here is another, who was eminent in a different department: "They say that Rabbi Johanan, son of Norbai, did eat three hundred calves, and drank three hundred measures of wine, and ate forty soos of doves, for a lunch only." (Gemara Pesachim). Admirable men of this character were, of course, the sort of people to whom Christ and the Apostles were indebted for much of their holy wisdom, and to whom we should go if we are anxious to understand properly the New Testament and its teachings.

Perhaps we shall be more successful if we go in search of Talmudical learning and science. There is not much zoology, we admit, in the New Testament, but what little there is is tolerably correct. If we take the early Fathers, we may say much the same, with the exception of the phœnix, which is no more peculiar to them than to the Greeks, Romans and Jews, all of whom had it. The race of Rabbins delighted in creating animals otherwise unknown in heaven above or earth below. Such was the wild cock, which will be mentioned again, whose feet rest upon the ground, and whose head touches heaven. Such was the ziz, a bird of such magnitude, that when it spread out its wings the disc of the sun was obscured; such was the bar-juchne, one of whose eggs once fell down and submerged sixty villages, and broke down three hundred cedars; such, too, was the bird which strode through the sea, where the water was so deep that a voice from heaven declared how an axe, which had fallen there seven years before, had not reached the bottom, and yet the water scarcely came up to the knees of the bird. In the time of Moses there was the tachash, a creature which had one horn on its forehead, and was presented to Moses, who made the tabernacle of it. Rabbi Akiba tells of a frog, which was so prolific that it filled all Egypt; and another says: "I saw a frog which was as big as the village of Hagaronia; and how large was Hagaronia? A town of sixty houses. And there came a dragon which swallowed the frog; and there came a crow which swallowed the dragon,

and flew away, and sat on a tree. Behold how great the strength of that tree! Rabbi Papa, son of Samuel, said, If I had not seen I would not have believed." This is in the section Baba Bathra; but we suppose the son of Samuel scarcely expects us to swallow it. Another Rabbi saw a kid of one day old which was as large as Mount Tabor; "and how far does Mount Tabor extend? he asks. "Four parasangs" is the audacious reply.

This short excursion in the domain of natural history will be sufficient to show how far the Talmudists excelled in it. But if it be not sufficient, let the reader suspend his judgment until he has received from us a fuller account of some of the particulars, with additional examples. We have strung these together here for a definite purpose, and that is to show what sort of notions got into the heads of those venerable Rabbis, whose work, as a whole, though unread by ordinary Jews, is regarded by them as something divine. Their successors have not failed to represent the Talmudists as worthy of all credit and honor, and the Talmud as equally necessary with the Old Testament. It may be necessary to modern Judaism, but Christians may possibly dispense with it. That the Talmud is as necessary as the Bible is stated in various ways. The Bible is like water, the Mishna like wine, and the six *sedurim* (Gemara) like sweet wine—none of which can the world be without. The law is like salt, the Mishna like pepper, and the Gemara like sweet wine, none of which can the world be without. The man who goes from the Halachah to the Bible profits no further. If a man opposes the Rabbins, it is as if he contradicted God; and if he murmurs at them, it is as if he murmured against God. He who transgresses the words of the scribes is worthy of death. He who teaches a Halachah before his Rabbin is worthy of death. He who calls his Rabbi by name is an Epicurean, and has no portion in the world to come!

It is well to honor our teachers, but if they teach with the Talmud, what shall we do? Now the Talmud says there are three over whom the evil principle has not prevailed, Abraham Isaac and Jacob; and again, every man who says the sons of Eli sinned is in error; and again, every man who says Reuben sinned is in error (in reference to the transaction recorded Gen. xxxv, 22); and again, every one who says the sons of Samuel sinned is in error (in reference to I Samuel, viii, 3); and the same is said of those who say David sinned in regard to Bathsheba, or Solomon

in practicing idolatry. Again, that the "Queen of Sheba" was not a woman, but a kingdom; that God takes counsel with the angels; that a man's star makes him wise and rich; that usury is allowable, though forbidden by the law; that at Purim a man must drink till he does not know the difference between "cursed be Haman" and "blessed be Mordecai;" that a man may pass all his children through the fire to Moloch; that a man who praises God too much will be excluded from the world; and that a man must not take counsel of the devil on a Sabbath day, but may on a week day.

The admirable veracity which renders the Talmudists so trustworthy in what concerns either the New Testament or the Old, is very well exemplified in what they say of the *Shamir*, which they fancied or fabled to have been a worm, by the aid of which Moses fitted and polished the gems of the Ephod and the two tables of the law, and Solomon the stones of the temple. Although no bigger than a barley-corn, the shamir was so strong that, by its touch, it could make mountains start from their places, and easily split and shape the hardest stones. In the Pirke Aboth, God is said to have created ten things on the eve of the first Sabbath, and this worm was one of them. Not much is recorded of the manner in which Moses made the acquaintance of this wonderful being; but there are sundry stories of the way in which Solomon found it out. One of these is in the tract Gittin, and a pretty tale it is, showing how very familiar Solomon must have been with devils and devilesses. Eisenmenger quotes this elegant specimen of Rabbinism. The sum of it is this: Solomon asked the Rabbins how he should make the temple without the use of iron. They referred him to the worm shamir, which Moses employed. How could he find it? They said he must bring a devil and deviless, and tie them together, for perhaps they know, and will tell. So he brought the devil and deviless, and tied them together, and they said they did not know, but perhaps Asmodeus, king of the devils, knew. But where was he? They told him he was in a certain mountain, and had dug a hole, and filled it with water, and covered it with a stone, and sealed it with his ring, and went every day up into the firmament and learned in the school of the firmament, and came down to earth and learned in the school of earth; and that he came and examined his seal, and opened the pit and drank, and

covered and resealed it, and went away. So he (Solomon) sent Benaiah, son of Jehoiada, and gave him a chain that was inscribed with the Name (the Shem Hamm phorash), and a ring, upon which was also inscribed the Name, and a little wool and wine. So Benaiah went and dug a pit under that of the devil, and let the water run off, and stopped the hole with the wool. Then he dug a pit above that of Asmodeus, and poured into it the wine, and covered it, and climbed up and sat in a tree. Now when the devil came and inspected his seal, and opened it and found the wine, he said: It is written, Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, and every one that is deceived thereby is not wise. And it is written, Whoredom and wine and new wine take away the heart. And he drank not. But when he became very thirsty, he could not restrain, and drank and was drunk, and lay down and went to sleep. Hereupon Benaiah came down and put the chain on him, and fastened it. When he woke, and would have broken off his fetters, Benaiah said: The name of thy Lord is upon thee; the name of thy Lord is upon thee. After this, the two set out. Asmodeus comes to a date tree, which he throws down; then to a house, which he overturns; then to a widow's cottage, and would have thrown it down, but she came out and entreated him; and as he went to cross over to the other side, he broke a bone, and said: So it is written, a soft tongue breaketh a bone (Prov. xxv, 15). When they had come to the palace, he was not brought before Solomon for three days. On the first day the devil said, Why does not the king let me come before him? They said he had been drinking too much. Then took he a brick, and set it upon another; and they went to Solomon, and told him him what the devil had done; and he said, this is what he means, go and give him more drink. On the second day he said again, Why does not the king let him come before him? They said, He has eaten too much. Then took he the brick off the other, and placed it on the ground. So they went to Solomon and told him this; and he said, What he means is, give him little to eat. On the third day Asmodeus came before the king, and took a measure and meted out four cubits, and then threw it away, and said to him, When thou diest thou wilt have but four cubits in the world. Now thou hast subdued all the world, and art still unsatisfied till thou hast conquered me also, and put me below thee. Solomon replied, I want nothing of thee; I want to build the temple, and

for this I need the shamir. Then he answered, He is not mine, but belongs to the chief of the sea, and he gives it only to the *tarnegola* (cock, or wild cock), which is faithful to him, because of the egg which he had pledged to him. And what does he with it? He takes it up the mountains, where nobody can dwell, and keeps it on the mountain rock, and splits the mountain, and takes it away. Then he takes seed and throws there, and there is prepared a place to dwell in, and hence is he called a mountain artificer. When they had found the nest of the *tarnegola*, containing young ones, they covered the nest with glass. When the parent bird came, and could not get to its young, he went and fetched the shamir, and put it on the glass; but Benaiah shouted of a sudden so loud that the bird dropped the shamir, which Benaiah took up, and the bird went and hanged itself.

The tarnegola is usually the domestic cock, but the Rabbins have shown their scientific tendencies by turning it into an impossible monster. We have had it in league with the devil; and we find the Targumists thus making God speak in Psalm i, 2: "Known before me are all the birds of the mountains which fly in the air of heaven; and the cock, whose feet stand upon earth, and whose head reaches into heaven, sings before me." Buxtorf quotes the second Targum of Esther as saying: "Not on the fifth day, because upon it were created leviathan and tarnegola, which were prepared for the synagogue of Israel for dinner at that great day" (the day of Messiah). Buxtorf notices that in Baba Bathra the great bird, which has its feet on earth and its head in heaven, is not called the tarnegola. We are often reminded of the use made of these fables by the Mohammedans, as when Mohammed on his night journey sees the angel of cocks, as a cock, and so large that his feet stood on the first heaven, and his head reached the second heaven, a distance of a five hundred days' journey. This is the cock which crows when God sings a hymn of a morning. In suggesting that God sings hymns again, the Mussulman reminds us of the Talmudists, who make Him pray.*

Of Solomon's other dealings with Asmodeus, we can only say that the story of them is a mixture of profanity and absurdity For example, when Solomon frees the devil of his chain, and gives him his ring, the devil throws him four hundred miles away, and he becomes a wandering beggar, etc.

* In reference to a portion of Jost's *Geschichte des Judenthums*, Ewald says: "Genuine Rabbinism has the greatest resemblance, on the one side, to Popery, and

We have shown that the Talmud teaches folly as well as sin; but if any one doubts the latter, let him read this: "Rabbi Ilea says when the evil nature of a man prevails over him, let him go to a place where he is not known, and put on black garments, and do as his heart desires, and not profane the name of God openly." Moreover, a man is allowed to commit all the sins forbidden in the law, if he can preserve his life by such means.

To folly and profanity lies must be added, or, at any rate, fictions. Some of these we have given. There are many more: one that the body of Adam was made of dust from Babylon, his head from the land of Israel, and his limbs from the rest of the world; he had two faces; his stature reached from earth to heaven before he sinned, after which God shortened him; he could see from one end of the world to the other; he would have eaten hay with his ass, etc. Og, king of Bashan, and the unicorn, outlived the deluge. No wonder, if Og and the unicorn were of the huge dimensions assigned to them. It is related of Og that he wanted to throw a stone at the Israelites, and finding that their camp extended some ten or twelve miles, he went and pulled up a mountain of the same extent, and put it on his head, but God let some ants come on it, and they bored a hole in it, and it fell over his head on to his neck, and when he went to lift it off, his teeth grew out suddenly on both sides, and he could not get it off. Moses, who was ten cubits high, took an axe ten cubits long, and sprang up ten cubits into the air, and smote Og on the ankle, and felled him to the ground dead. A story almost word for word the same is in the Targum of Palestine. (End of Numb. xxi).

Rabbi Johanan, one of the worst liars in the Talmud, says God told Noah to take precious stones and pearls into the ark, to give him light like noonday. Another says, "We once went into the wilderness, and saw geese whose feathers fell off for fatness, and streams of fat were running from them; and we said to them, Have we any part in you in the world to come? Some lifted up their wings, and others their foot. While I was engaged with them, Rabbi Eliezer came to me and said, Israel must give an account because of them (i. e., for causing Messiah to tarry so

on the other to Islamism. And though Jost thinks that the best part of Islamism is drawn from Rabbinism, he is almost entirely mistaken in the sense in which he understands it, while he is but too correct in respect to the internal resemblance itself."

long, that the geese are afflicted by their fat)." It was the same gentleman who saw the frog as large as a village, and the serpent and crow and tree, already mentioned. The tree was, perhaps, the cedar which fell down, and was so large that sixteen wagons drove abreast along it. It was the same veracious Rabbin who saw the fish which threw down sixty villages when the sea cast it ashore, which sixty other villages ate of, which sixty other villages salted part of, from which the fat of one eye filled three hundred barrels, and at the end of twelve months they saw the people collecting its bones, to build again with them the towns which had been thrown down. The same old sailor saw another fish, upon the back of which the sand had accumulated, and rushes had grown. "We thought it was the dry land, he says, and landed and cooked provisions, and sat down on it; but when it felt the fire it dived down," and if his ship had not been at hand the narrator would have been drowned, and the world would have been deprived of the benefit of his peculiar talent. However, he survived, and at another time sailed for two days and two nights between the fins of a fish, which swam in one direction as the ship went in another. Resolved not to be outdone, Rabbi Johanan tells how he was once in a ship and saw a fish which lifted its head above the water, and its two eyes were like two moons, and it spouted water out of its nostrils like the two streams of Sura. This reminded Saphra of a fish which he saw, which stretched out its head above the water, and had horns, upon which was written, I am the smallest creature in the sea, and am three hundred leagues in length, and go in the throat of leviathan. Rabbi Ashi, who had identified the last fish but one as a *Gildena*, whatever that is, says this is a sea goat, which searches about and has horns.

The idea of a fish three hundred leagues in length sailing down the gullet of leviathan, is not extravagant, and the venerable father who, by this conception, a little exceeded his holy brethren, is the sort of man to teach Christians the meaning of the New Testament! We should have been much better pleased with Rabbi Ashi if, instead of standing godfather to the lie, he had told us its true character. But the leviathan? Modesty forbids us to repeat what is said of it, save that God has put to death the female leviathan, and salted it, to feed the just in the world to come. We say the same of Behemoth, the female of which is

also preserved for the great feast at the end of time. Then there is the wonderful lion, which Cæsar wanted to see. At the summons of a Rabbi, the lion set out, but when four hundred leagues away, roared so loud that, among other calamities, the walls of Rome fell down. When three hundred leagues distant he roared again, and people's teeth fell out, and Cæsar himself tumbled from his throne to the ground, and besought the Rabbi to let the lion go back.

These Talmudists had a rare acquaintance with the marvels of nature. They tell of a place where they saw heaven and earth touch one another; of a precious stone which restored dead fowls to life, etc. They say there were in Rome three hundred and sixty-five streets, and in every street three hundred and sixty-five palaces, and in every palace three hundred and sixty-five stairs, etc. In Sepphoris there were one hundred and eighty thousand streets, etc. Camels and asses are distinguished for their piety. Directions are also given for discovering and taking devils, and for rendering witches harmless.

The immoralities of the Talmud we pass over, and say nothing of the magical exploits of some of the Rabbins. It is worth noting, however, that among the latter we find some that may be compared with certain stories in the Arabic Gospel of the Infancy. Absurdity is added to absurdity, until we become in doubt whether these reverend Rabbis are not positively mad. For eating, Big-bellied Ben is a child to them; for drinking, they could swallow any quantity, and their carcases were enormous for fatness. The right sort of men for teaching pure ethics and a spiritual religion! Excellent illustrators of the New Testament! Their indecencies and immoralities are so unutterable that Eisenmenger himself, who gives examples of them in the original, dare not translate them, though he is not a man to stop at trifles!

The Rabbis were sometimes very capricious. There is, for example, that story of the heathen who once went to Shammai, and said to him, "How many laws have you?" He answered, "Two, a written law and an oral one." The man said, "I believe thee in that which is written, but in the oral I do not believe thee; make me a proselyte by teaching me the written law." Hereupon Shammai was in a passion, and sent him away with a rebuff. So the man went to Hillel, the rival of Shammai, to be made a

proselyte, and Hillel, as his lesson for the first day, taught him Aleph, Beth, Gimel, Daleth. The next day the man went again, and got nothing better, and complained of it, but got such a reply that he apparently declined to go any further.

It may be observed here, that although Hillel and Shammai taught many things contradictory to one another, and their followers were divided for some years, a voice from heaven (Bath Kol) declared the teaching of both to be alike the word of God. On other occasions, the contradictory teachings of the Talmud are admitted by itself, and God is made responsible for the contradictions. Under the circumstances, the study of the Talmud needs to be encouraged by rather strong expressions. We are therefore told this: "Our Rabbis teach that the students of the Bible do what is a virtue and no virtue; the students of the *Mishna* do what is a virtue, and gain a reward; and the students of the *Gemara* perform a greatly virtuous deed." The piety of the Mishnic and Gemaric doctors must not be taken always for granted, though we may readily predicate it of some. It is observable that a recent writer, who has depicted the Talmud and Talmudists in very glowing colors, says: "When the masters of the law entered and left the academy, they used to offer up a short but fervent prayer." How many of them did this? John Henry Otho, author of the *Rabbinical Lexicon*, *History of Mishnic Doctors*, etc., says of Nechoniah ben Hakana: "Nechoniah was also accustomed, contrary to the common practice, on entering the school, to utter a short prayer. When asked why he did it, he answered, 'At entering I pray God that no scandal may happen through me, and at leaving I give thanks to God for my portion which it has pleased him to bestow on me.'" This Nechoniah was no doubt a bit of a Pharisee, but that is not the question; if it was the custom for the masters to pray on entering and leaving the schools, why was Nechoniah asked to account for his doing so? When this man was old, they asked him how he came to live so long, and he said, "I have not received gifts, nor indulged my passions too much, nor sought my own glory in the shame of my companion, and therefore the curse of my companion has not come upon me. As far as I could, I have avoided avarice," etc.

The Talmud supplies us with many remarkable specimens of Biblical exegesis. The text of the Old Testament represented by it is not always the same as that now accepted, though the varia-

tions are probably scarcely worth the trouble of collation. But the explanations, as we must call them, of passages of the Old Testament are often very curious, if seldom profitable. With an ingenuity to which we can find no parallel, texts are strangely turned inside out, or interpreted in the most extraordinary way. They are applied to the illustration or confirmation of imaginary facts and idle fancies; moral and immoral deductions are drawn from them; and analogies of the most wonderful kind are found in them. In their pursuit of heretics alone, the Talmudists have discovered a great many allusions to them, and condemnations of them, which are altogether visionary. In seeking rules and definitions relating to ritual and ceremonial matters, they are perhaps even more unreasonable. In general, we may say that the Talmud is of little or no value as a storehouse of glosses and comments upon the Old Testament, because of the incurable habits of its compilers, who perverted and distorted their text without scruple and without reason.

"What is Mount Sinai? A mountain from which hatred flows down to the nations of the world." Thus says the Talmud, and the saying is almost verified by many things reported alike of the Talmudists and their followers. It may be, and it is, true that the Jews were provoked and persecuted by Pagans, and by Christians eventually, though we must remember that Jewish exclusiveness is far older than the Christian era. It may be, and it is true, that modern Judaism is adorned by some of the noblest specimens of impartial generosity and liberality, though we must bear in mind that herein they run counter to a whole stream of writers, from the Talmudists downwards. But whatever may be said to show that the Talmudic dictum quoted above is inconsistent with others in the same work, and that it is now not much attended to, the characters drawn in the Talmud are often perfect specimens of arrogant conceit, selfishness, narrow-minded exclusiveness and bigotry, and we believe this circumstance has tended to deepen the hostility shown to it, and to the Jews who professed to revere it.

The angelology, demonology, and pneumatology of the Talmud is another curiosity. Fancies which were current in Babylon and elsewhere, have been grafted upon the teachings of the Old Testament, and of the whole a compound has been formed at least as strange as any product of the school-men in the middle ages.

We have the following specimen of truthful history in a quotation from the Talmud, given by Dilherr (*Farrago Rituum*, etc.): "If any one goes forth to be stoned, a herald precedes him, crying, 'Such a one, N., the son of N., goeth forth to suffer the punishment of death because he hath committed the crime N.; and the witnesses of his crime are N. N. Whoso, therefore, knoweth his innocence, let him come and make it known.' The same was observed on the evening of the Passover, when the case of Jesu was in hand. But after proclamation had been made before him a whole forty days, he was led forth, who bewitched and seduced and provoked Israel. 'If any one, therefore, knoweth his innocence, let him come and declare it.' But they found no excuse." Now we shall quite understand the influence such a statement is likely to have upon a Jewish mind, if we remember that the Talmud is supposed to embody the doctrines and learning of the Jews, as well as the principles of divine and human law. Christian readers who read this for the first time will not fail to view with suspicion the work containing it, although strongly recommended to them as furnishing excellent illustrations of the New Testament. Excellent illustrations indeed, but accidentally and not designedly.

That imitations from the New Testament are at least possible may be gathered from the Talmudic account of Rabbi Chanina, son of Dusa, who, according to the *Zemach David*, lived in the time of Rabbi Johanan Zechai and Rabbi Simeon, son of Hillel. He taught the law along with R. Johanan Zechai, and saw the destruction of the temple and city by the Romans. Rabbi Chanina is therefore made the contemporary of Christ and his Apostles, and this is what the Jews record of him: "The fame of his piety and wisdom so spread that, according to the book Juchasin, a voice from heaven said of him, 'The whole world is cherished for the sake of Chanina my son;' and again, 'Receive admonition from Chanina my son.'" A good many things are reported of this man in the Talmud, whereupon Lightfoot says: "Almost innumerable are the stories told of the miracles wrought by him, which abundantly savor of magical performances."

It is related of him in the Mishna, that when he prayed for the sick, he knew which would die and which would recover. On being asked how he knew, he said, when he prayed freely he gathered that his prayers were accepted of God; and if not, that

the sick would die. Once upon a time two of the disciples of the wise told him that the health of the son of R. Gamaliel was not good, so he told them to wait awhile till he had gone up into his chamber. When he had prayed, he came down, and said, The son of R. Gamaliel is freed from his fever; and R. Gamaliel observed that at the same hour the fever left him.

But why go further? The impeachment of the Talmud has surely proceeded far enough, and the necessary conclusion to be arrived at is, that its good and truthful elements do not atone for its thousands of abominations. Those who hope to learn from it how tradition may be supported, how Ritualism may be defended, how the Fathers may be honored, how the New Testament may be illustrated, will turn from it with unutterable dismay, disappointment and disgust. For linguistic purposes it will be useful, like any other works in Shemitic dialects, irrespective of their character. Men of science may learn from it what its compilers thought on scientific and philosophical subjects. The topographer will gather some useful hints; the archaeologist will glean some valuable information; the historian of Judaism will learn the frightful degradation of the system; the Christian will gather sundry illustrations of New Testament phraseology and allusions, and especially of the denunciation of Jewish teachers and abuses; the moralist will find some good proverbs and maxims, along with shameful sentiments; all will see that it is a work which cannot be translated honestly, decently, or safely, into any modern language, and that the utmost use that can be made of it for the public is to select its best maxims and stories, and to say, these are the few grains of corn from the bushel of chaff, the few pearls from the heap of dirt. The wisdom and piety which it embodies are not fair samples of the work, and they only help to deepen the feeling which the historical philosopher refers to, "Omne ignotum pro mirifico!" Let Mishna and Gemara sleep, we say, in their well-deserved obscurity; but let the world be admonished that they are what they are. Any attempt to evoke them from their lurking-places will be like charming the serpent, which is none the less a serpent for coming into the light. Of course we fear nothing from their study, which may even be a necessity for some, that men may be told the secrets which they cover. That there is good in the Talmud, we have said again and again, and wish not to issimulate; but as a work, it is not a

work for the world, nor would it repay many for the sacrifices involved in its study. Dr. Lightfoot tried to distil from it all he could to bear on the New Testament; and although incomplete, his volumes give the results of an honest endeavor. Dr. Gill tried to press it into the service of the Old Testament, and it is manifest that the fruit was not worth the toil. Others have done their best, but the general conclusion, from a survey of them, is, that whatever use may be made of the Talmud against Judaism in its traditional form, and however it may corroborate the New Testament denunciations of Rabbinical vagaries, it will not help to deprive the Gospel of its claim to surpassing excellence as the newest, brightest, and final phase of divine revelation.

There are good things in the Talmud, but they cannot claim to be older than the similar good things in the New Testament. This claim is often made, but without the shadow of justice, for no part of the Talmud was compiled until long after the Christian Scriptures, and some portions of it not till, perhaps, five hundred years after. That the Talmud itself refers to Rabbins who lived before or at the time of Christ, and fathers certain sayings upon them, is not demonstration, and this is admitted by some of the Jews themselves. We remember on one occasion speaking with a Jew, to whom we remarked that a New Testament doctrine which he opposed was actually taught in the Talmud. His answer was, "The Talmud was not completed till some five hundred years after your New Testament, the effect of which the Jews had seen and felt; and what is more natural than to suppose that when they wrote the Talmud they imitated whatever they safely could from the New Testament?" We are not able to answer this; on the contrary, we believe it as likely that the Talmudists owe something to Christian teaching, as that Mohammed owed something to both Talmudists and Christians. In any case, the date of the Talmud, and the vast range over which it professes to extend, forbid its ever being honestly employed to undermine the authority and priority of the New Testament.

With reference to the question whether the Jesu of the Talmud is the Jesus of the New Testament, the learned Jacques Gusset answers it in the affirmative, on the following grounds:— 1, He is called Jesu; 2, is a Nazarene; 3, is son of Mary; 4, went into Egypt before He taught; 5, His doctrine seemed idolatrous; 6, He wrought miracles; 7, His miracles have been attributed to

the name of God; 8, He was condemned by the Sanhedrim as a seducer of the people; 9, He was crucified or hanged up; 10, this happened on the eve of the Passover and the Sabbath; 11, He was related to the royal stock; 12, He had followers; 13, one of his chief disciples was Matthew, and another Thaddeus.

Buxtorf has collected some curious passages bearing on the subject in his Rabbinical *Lexicon* (art. Stada, fol. 1458 *sq*). From the Babylonian Talmud, tract Sanhedrim, he gives an extract, describing the trial of a false teacher, which thus concludes:—"And thus did they to the son of Stada, in Lud, and hung him on the eve of the Passover. The son of Stada was the son of Pandira. Rab Chasda says the husband of Stada was Pandira (Paphus, son of Judah). But still, I say, Stada was his mother, that is Mary, a plaiter of women's hair, as they say in Pumbeditha; she turned aside from her husband." To the word Stada they attached the idea of going astray, or conjugal infidelity. This story is cut out of the Basel edition of the Talmud; but it appears as well in the Jerusalem Talmud, where we read—"Thus did they to the son of Stada, at Lud, against whom two disciples of the wise laid ambush, and brought him before the judges, and stoned him." That one version says the son of Stada was hanged, and another that he was stoned, will not surprise any one a little conversant with the Talmud. But, again: The Babylonian Talmud says that Rab Bibi was once with the angel of Death, and the angel said to his messenger, Go and bring to me Mary, the plaiter of women's hair. And he went and brought him Mary, the plaiter of little ones. Still again: "Rabbi Eliezer said to the wise, did not the son of Stada bring up magic arts out of Egypt in a cutting of his flesh? They said to him, he was a fool, and proof is not sought from fools." With reference to Pandira as the name put instead of Joseph, it reminds us of the apocryphal fiction which makes Joseph himself the son of Panthera.

There are multitudes of observations in the Talmud relating to ceremonial and ritual and, of necessity, technical matters. Among them are many which imply a certain knowledge of such things as with us are left to the medical profession. To ordinary readers these details would be simply disgusting, and all we say of them is, that whatever interest may attach to them in connection with the the history of medical science, they need not occupy

the student of the New Testament. Under the same general head of matters ceremonial, come sundry astronomical items, among which, however, are a few that should be known to the student of the Gospels. What is reported of sundry observances and customs, as at the celebration of the Passover, also deserves attention; but, in fact, the more useful details have been collected by such men as Lightfoot, and often published in books explanatory of Biblical archaeology.

What St. Paul meant by being in bondage to beggarly elements, may be inferred from the following, which we find among the regulations for the Sabbath in the *Mishna*. "R. Meir says a cripple may go out (on Sabbath, with his wooden leg), and Rabbi Jose prohibits it.* And if it (i.e., the wooden leg) has a cavity to receive anything soft, it will receive pollution. Beds (or cushions) will receive pollution by treading. And they (i.e., the crippled) may go out upon them on the Sabbath, and may go in to the Court of the Temple. The seat and crutches (of a cripple) are polluted. They may not appear abroad with them on the Sabbath, nor go with them into the court. Stilts (or skates) are clean, but men may not appear abroad with them." And so on *ad nauseam*.

Proverbial sayings found in the Gospels find their counterpart often in the Talmud; and there are many others, but we must be satisfied with mentioning the fact.

The following summary of observations upon the utility of the Talmud is gathered from the tract by Dilherr already quoted. The Talmud contains trustworthy relics of Jewish antiquity, fitted to condemn the unfaithfulness of later Jews, to illustrate the histories of the Old and New Testaments, and to aid in understanding the rites, laws and customs of the older Hebrews. It embodies many sound theological principles, though often in the midst of absurd and useless matter. It is valuable for much that is juridical, medical, ethical, political, astronomical, etc. It con-

* The word for "prohibit" really denotes "to bind," and is common in this sense. As denoting the imposing of restrictions, the same word is found in other dialects. This fact is very important in connection with our Lord's words, "Whatsoever ye shall bind," etc.,—words which have nothing to do with pardon or absolution, as claimed by some, but give the Apostles legislative power in the church. "Whatsoever ye shall prohibit, and allow." Whether this power passed to their successors, is a question of a different kind.

tains useful proverbs, sentences and apothegms. But it is frequently absurd, frivolous and impious. True, all is not absurd that seems so at first sight, for the Jews, like other Orientals, were fond of explaining mysteries by means of figures and enigmas, parables and fables; yet it is surely absurd to say that "God prays every day;" that he wept too late, because he had destroyed Jerusalem; that Adam was so tall that his head reached heaven; that he was created double; and that woman was formed from his hinder part. And it is frivolous to discuss whether it be lawful to snuff a candle on the Sabbath; whether wood, which has fallen into a furnace on the Sabbath, is to be left to burn; and other questions, which decency forbids us to repeat. As for the profane, we find it in the assertions that God is the cause of all sins; that he offers annually a goat for the sins he commits; that he teaches devils in heaven; that he plays with Leviathan like a girl with a doll; that Jesus was the son of a public harlot; that he worshipped images; that he practiced enchantments; that when once recalled from hell by a Rabbi, who used magic, and asked him how he was punished, he replied that he was boiling in a brazen vessel of seething dung, etc. With respect to this last abomination, it has been pleaded in excuse that it refers to some other Jesus, who lived above a hundred years before Christ—a device which we can only regard as indicative of a less savage spirit among our Hebrew friends.

After such a summary, unsophisticated people will be ready to exclaim, Thus far, certainly, the Talmud seems admirably fitted to illustrate the new Testament, and especially such passages as those in which the Scribes and Pharisees are held up to eternal infamy, for mixing up error with truth, and evil with good. The twenty-third chapter of Matthew appears to be no dead letter, no passionate exaggeration, but a picture photographed from the life. Yet some may still feel inclined to comply with the Talmudic recommendation: "Let a man always divide his years into three portions, a third for the Bible, a third for the *Mishna*, and a third for the Talmud." * If, after all the labors of Maimonides, there are those who will dip into *Mishna* and *Gemara*,

* Here, as very often, "Talmud" is equivalent to "*Gemara*," although properly inclusive of both *Mishna* and *Gemara*.

they must find in it a huge amount of intellectual folly, filth and rubbish, whatever else they may discover.

There is reason to believe that one of the best, and certainly one of the most interesting uses to which the Talmud can be put, is to ascertain its bearing upon the constitution of the Apostolic Church, its officers, rights and ceremonies, and upon the phraseology of the New Testament, where it differs from that of the Law and the Prophets. Under these heads, we believe some light might be thrown upon the subject of baptism and the Lord's Supper, on the orders of the ministry, on the mode of conducting divine worship, etc. Nor let any be scared from such inquiries, because the synagogue services of the later Jews differed as much from those of the Temple in its glory, as a Primitive Methodist chapel differs from a cathedral. It is necessarily true that the early converts to Christ transferred many things from Jewish forms and arrangements, and adapted them to Christian purposes. And no one, surely, will pretend that the constitution and rites of the Church were originally either elaborate or gorgeous. The Talmud may partly help to realize what the Church was at its outset, and partly the course which it pursued on its way to a more artificial and sumptuous state of being.

We hear a good deal in our days about science and faith, and we may notice that in the Talmud the two are often combined, and seldom fall out. But what science! and what faith! In his notes on Matt. xxiv, 24, Lightfoot quotes these for another purpose:—"Let a man observe his good dreams till he is twenty-two years of age, after the example of Joseph. If you go to bed merry, you will enjoy good dreams. There were twenty-four interpreters of dreams at Jerusalem; and I, when once upon a time I had dreamed a dream, went to all of them, and what this interpreted, that did not interpret, yet all things happened which all had interpreted.—Let no one go out on Sabbath wearing a charm, if it is not one prescribed by an approved physician.—Let them not say a hymn over a wound on the Sabbath. That also which is repeated over the man-dragora is prohibited (on the Sabbath). If any body says, 'Come, and repeat a verse over my son, or lay the book on him, or phylacteries, that he may go to sleep,' it is forbidden (on the Sabbath). Twenty-four of the school at Lydda all perished by the evil eye. R. Joshua beat a

magician by magic, and sank him in the sea. Forms of incantation occur, to be said over sores, against mad dogs, against the devil, and even in the name of Jesus. The Rabbis could procure rain almost whenever they liked, by the simple expedient of fasting and prayer."

Now it is very apparent that, although for sacred purposes it was counted very important to be acquainted with natural phenomena, especially times and seasons, and with the diagnosis of diseases, etc., Jewish science did not aim at much beyond these necessary things. Praise what is good, we may and must, but when we find the most wretched astrology and fortune-telling, and the most miserable superstitions as to the cause and cure of diseases, we feel that our praise must be with discrimination. The astronomical calculations involved some observation of nature, and some skill in arithmetic, and so of the rest; but he would be a bold man who asserted the Jewish science represented by the Talmud to be better than that represented by the general literature of the same period. Any one who doubts the correctness of this judgment will be convinced, we think, by a little reflection on the writers in various departments of science who flourished in the Gentile world, while the Jewish doctors were creating the materials for the Talmud. It is not denied that the astronomers and physicians of Greece, Rome and Asia were superstitious and credulous, but it is maintained that Talmudical superstition and credulity find no parallel in literature produced west of Palestine. Certainly we do not find it in Vitruvius, Celsus, or Censorinus, in Galen, Hippocrates, or Ptolemy. The crop of idle fables and superstitions was plentiful enough, of course, in all the West, but its growth was checked by various influences, one of which was Christianity. In the far east it was not so. From Persia to China and Japan, the Zoroastrians, the Buddhists and the Hindoos not only rivalled the Jews in scientific and literary excellence, but in superstitious credulity. The example proves that the study of astronomy and mathematical sciences, and the elaboration of a miscroscopic ceremonialism, do not necessarily induce a healthy working of the reason and the imagination in all departments. If not the compilation of the Talmud itself, yet the influence of the school it represented, at once encouraged and restrained speculation and scientific inquiries in Islam and in

Christendom. More than that, it generated a whole forest of fables, to which Christian and Mussulman alternately stood sponsor. The Misnist and Gemarist doctors are the true fathers of many absurd stories told in the Apocryphal books, which infested and defiled the Church from the days of the Gnostics onwards; and to the same doctors Mohammed and his disciples were indebted for absurdities which bestud the Koran, and which abound in their traditional books. Along with these things, we say again, valuable lessons were often conveyed, and so far as those lessons—whether in sacred, moral or physical science—are concerned, we are thankful for them. But taking the Mishna and Gemara as a whole, traditional Judaism would not find its best friend in the man that recommended the general study thereof. The barbarous and grotesque forms of thought and speech, the false, foul and profane sentiments, the puerile and irrational reasonings, the Jesuitical, crafty and hair-splitting distinctions, the idle tales, the monstrous fables, the many abominations, make the search for golden sentences a wearisome and ill-requited toil.

XXIII.—"OF CHRIST ALONE WITHOUT SIN."*

BY REV. J. B. MOZLEY.

Professor Tyndall, in his remarks upon the Bampton Lectures of 1865 in the *Fortnightly Review*, confined himself generally to a ground of science—a ground upon which he justly felt himself strong, and in connection with which he has won so high a name: though I should be disposed to draw a broad distinction between the most intimate, subtle, and even imaginative insight into the facts of science and—what the Professor appears to claim—an exclusive right to the inferences, whether physical or metaphysical, from them.† Upon one occasion, however, the Professor enters upon special theological ground, and objects to miraculous evidence as applying to the doctrine of our Lord's sinlessness:—

"Mr. Mozley demands a miracle as a certificate of character. He will accept no other evidence of the perfect goodness of Christ. 'No outward life or conduct,' he says, 'however irreproachable, could prove his perfect sinlessness, because goodness depends upon the inward motive, and the perfection of the inward motive is not proved by the outward act.' But surely the miracle is an outward act, and to pass from it to the inner motive imposes a greater strain upon logic than that involved in our ordinary

* A reply to Professor Tyndall; from the *Contemporary Review*, April, 1868.

† "They have no monopoly by virtue of their special knowledge of the elements of the question."—*Guardian*, Feb. 15. "Undoubtedly," says Mr. Fowler, "we owe the wonderful discoveries which have distinguished our age to the exercise of the greatest faculties of our nature by men who have been singularly endowed; and certainly no greater gift was ever bestowed upon mankind than the grant of such powers to these men. But granting all this to the fullest extent, we cannot thence conclude that we are to accept from them more than they profess to teach, and to take their authority as final on matters about which their means of knowledge are not greater than our own." "It is natural enough," says a writer in the *Spectator*, "that the evidence of miracles is held insufficient by those who find nothing of spiritual reason in them; sufficient by those who find in them the highest appeal to spiritual reason."

methods of estimating men. There is at least moral congruity between the outward goodness and the inner life, but there is no such congruity between the miracle and the life within. The test of moral goodness laid down by Mr. Mozley is not the test of John, who says, 'He that doeth righteousness is righteous;' nor is it the test of Jesus, 'By their fruits ye shall know them: do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?' But it is the test of another: 'If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.' . . . .

"Accepting Mr. Mozley's test, it is evident that, in the demonstration of moral goodness, the *quantity* of the miraculous comes into play. Had Christ, for example, limited himself to the conversion of water into wine, He would have fallen short of the performance of Jannes and Jambres, for it is a smaller thing to convert one liquid into another than to convert a dead rod into a living serpent. But Jannes and Jambres, we are informed, were not good. Hence, if Mr. Mozley's test be a good one, a point must exist on the one side of which miraculous power demonstrates goodness, while on the other side it does not. How is this 'point of contrary flexure' to be determined? It must lie somewhere between the magicians and Moses; for within this space the power passed from the diabolical to the Divine. But how to make the passage—how, out of a purely *quantitative* difference in the visible manifestation of power, we are to infer a total inversion of quality—it is extremely difficult to see . . . Let us not play fast and loose with the miraculous; either it is a demonstration of goodness in all cases or in none."

The question of evidence here discussed is one which, from the peculiar nature of the subject-matter of it, I approach with some reluctance. As, however, only a bare reference to the subject was made in the lecture, and as the whole question of miraculous evidence, as applying to it, is so erroneously stated by Professor Tyndall, I will take this opportunity of going somewhat further into the statement of the lecture, though at the cost of treading upon ground where Christian reverence is properly sensitive.

Professor Tyndall, then, here assumes that if miracles act at all as evidence of Christ's sinlessness, they can only do so by reason of the greater quantity of the miraculous in our Lord's case. And upon that assumption he may well ask, what is the quantity which decides sinlessness? Some men who had a certain amount of this power were bad men. "How is this point of contrary flexure to be determined? How out of a purely quantitative dif-

ference are we to infer a total inversion of quality?" But to make this assumption is to overlook the fundamental idea of a miracle as evidence. A miracle, regarded in its evidential function, is only a guarantee to an assertion. It depends, therefore, on what the assertion is, what that is which the miracle proves. Nobody before Christ asserted himself to be without sin. No miraculous powers, therefore, which were exerted before Christ, could be any evidence of the sinlessness of those who exerted them. No miracle of itself proves anything; no quantity of the miraculous proves anything; there must be an assertion made before there can be anything for the miracle to verify or guarantee. Between a miracle and a conclusion from it there is an important intervening term —viz., an asserted doctrine or fact.

Professor Tyndall says: "There is at least moral congruity between the outward goodness and the inner life." There is. We can place before ourselves in imagination a certain outward character between which and the supposition of inward sinlessness, assuming the latter to be revealed to us, there would be no disagreement. But between one of these being compatible with the other, supposing the latter to be known and revealed to us, and one of these being sufficient evidence or proof of the other, there is a vast, an immeasurable interval. Take, for example, our Lord's denunciatory language against the Scribes and Pharisees. To those who admit, upon the evidence which is laid before them, our Lord's sinlessness, there is not the slightest discord between such language and such sinlessness; but common reason tells us that had we to judge of such language without the assumption of our Lord's sinless character, we could not tell but that some element of imperfection, some shade of prejudice, some passionate excess, might enter into such censures—such taint of mortal frailty as has entered into the speeches and judgments of the best and most pure-minded human reformers. The majesty, the integrity, the holiness of our Lord's character is indeed conspicuous and obvious upon the facts of the case; but when we attribute absolute sinlessness to Him, it is plain that by the laws of reason we must be going upon some further evidence than that which is contained in His outward life and deportment.

The statement in the lecture that "we accept our Lord's perfect goodness upon the same evidence upon which we admit the rest of His supernatural character," assumes, indeed, that sinlessness

is a supernatural characteristic; nor, when we examine what we mean by supernatural, can we avoid giving this designation to it. We do not, indeed, assert it to be a *Divine* characteristic, or that it necessitates a Divine nature in the possessor; for Christians hold a past or paradisal, and a future or heavenly perfection of the simple man; and two very opposite schools have inserted even in this intermediate state of things, and in the actual existing condition of human nature, a sinless mere humanity: Socinians, that of a simply human Christ; a Roman school, that of the Virgin Mary. But though not necessarily a Divine, it is a supernatural characteristic. Both these schools connect the sinlessness which they respectively attribute to two human personages with a supernatural cause, not even entertaining the idea of such a characteristic being a simply natural fact, or imagining the possibility of mere human nature, or the human nature of experience, producing it. The Racovian Catechism asks the question,—"Was, then, the Lord Jesus a mere or common man?" and answers, "By no means;" by reason of "his supernatural conception, his resurrection, his being sanctified by the Father, and separated from all other men, being distinguished by perfect holiness," &c. All divines treat our Lord's sinlessness as part of His supernatural character.

What, indeed, do we mean by supernatural or miraculous? We mean that which contradicts universal experience. But is the field of experience confined to material nature? Does it not include just as truly, and just as strictly, the moral nature of man, the region of his mind, his will, his conscience, his moral feeling, his moral action? Undoubtedly it does. But what does universal experience assert with respect to this moral nature, but that it never as a matter of fact does produce a perfect moral condition of the man: that it never produces any other state of the moral being, but that in which, together with whatever good he may be conscious of, he is also conscious of evil,—evil which he has done, and evil which exists in his motives and springs of action? We only know man as such a being. Different accounts and rationals are given of this fact by different religions and different philosophies, ancient and modern. The doctrine of original sin is the Scriptural account of this fact; Manichæanism is another account of it; Hegelianism is another. But apart from any rationales of this fact, whether false ones or the true one, we are now concerned

simply and solely with the fact itself. Using the term *law*, in this moral sphere, in the same sense in which we use it in the physical—viz., as uniform and constant fact—sin is the *law* of human nature, regarded as a field of experience. The presence of it in the individual is as much the law of human nature as gravitation is the law of matter. That is to say, it is always found there as a fact. The extent to which it is perceived by the individual in himself depends upon the cultivation of his conscience, but of its existence in him there is no doubt; the absence of the perception, if it is absent, only indicates the firmer root of the disorder, although it may safely be asserted that no single human being, however savage and rude his condition, is without some consciousness of it.

Again, no theoretical difference in the mode of describing sin, whether as positive, or as a negation and privation of good; no difference even in the moral estimate of sin, whether a latitudinarian view of such sin as is universal, which represents it as a less serious matter, or whether a profounder or more condemnatory view of it is adopted;—neither of these differences affects at all the universal fact of sin. The most latitudinarian doctrine of sin admits that every man has cause for moral regret; it admits a struggle in every human heart in which the will has often given way to temptation, and taken the worse side instead of the better; it confesses to an impediment to goodness in every man, which has been yielded to wrongly or sinfully. Even the pantheistic fatalist's view of sin does not in the least interfere with the universality of sin. He regards good and evil, indeed, as at bottom homogeneous facts, the growth of one root, one great impartial discharge from the machine and workshop of the universe; but though he explains away sin at the base, he admits the universal phenomenon; in spite of his own explanation, he cannot rid himself of the *sense* of sin, of the inward confession of it, of the burden of self-reproach, and the pains of conscience. The poet of Pantheism makes it a matter of charge against the constitution of the universe that he is subject to such a galling yoke:—

> "And who made terror, madness; crime, remorse; . .
> And self-contempt bitterer to drink than blood."

But in the very complaint at the injustice of it he admits its inexorable pressure. In relief he turns accuser, and institutes the

contrast between man and nature. Nature is beautiful and tender, majestic, sweet, elevating, calm, consoling; man is unjust, grasping, cruel, mean, proud, a hypocrite and an oppressor. The Pantheist admits all the sensations, all the struggle, all the defeat of a sinful nature. He regards the moral law as a tyranny indeed, and he would wildly break through that tyranny; but he cannot help feeling himself condemned if he does so. His theory of conscience is inexplicable; he sees no promise in it, no augury, no anticipation of a future; he sees no meaning in it; it gives him no prospect and no hope; but he admits it as a blind force within him, and he expresses that force and its movements with a strength which is all but religious.

This is so sure a law of our conscience, indeed, that we count upon and expect a sense of sin and moral imperfection in the very best man, with the same absolute certainty with which we count upon the return of the equinoxes, the course of the sun through the zodiac, or the alternations of the tides; we expect from him the consciousness that he has done wrong actions, and that he has the element of evil clinging to his motives and feelings. Free from this condemnatory consciousness, we cannot conceive ourselves to be for a moment without being self-condemned for it; to imagine ourselves without it would be to imagine ourselves different beings from what we are; to escape from it is to escape from the consciousness of ourselves. Consider the principle of impulse in human nature,—how serviceable, how necessary it is to produce any sterling virtue in man! What man is worth anything without it? It is the root of all action; but, if so, action is disordered at the root. The very virtues of man have some obliquity or excess in them, so that we could not extract the evil without eviscerating the good. Whence it is that in works of fiction we reject "too perfect" characters, knowing that such portraiture is a delusion, and that strong virtue cannot grow up in man without some erroneous manifestation of his nature being produced in the very process. We want the fault, then, for the sake of the virtue; we need the shadow to express the brightness; we interpret perfection as a blank. And hence, again, the rule of Scripture: "Be not righteous over much;" which is directed, of course, not at real exactness of conduct, but at the motive which sometimes stimulates an outward exactness; when men make it apparent that they really have the idea that they can and

will, by pursuing conduct into minutiæ, attain a perfection of character to which nothing will be wanting. Consider again the indomitable internal wildness of the human mind, its irrepressible volatility, which is a constant fount of *moral* disorder; when it is hurried off by a thought, fastened on by a retrospect, disturbed at a mere glance of some casual obnoxious image that flits across its horizon; and the involuntary evil excitation is present before the better can prevent it. This wild nature is a *law* of the mind, because there is no perfect cure for it, no discipline which quite corrects it.

It is thus the very law of the human conscience that the better a man is, the more alive he becomes to the fact of evil in his actions and motives, and a sense of sin is part of the morality of human nature. The very normal effect of goodness in the human heart is the revelation of evil. Can any apparent amount of goodness, any phenomenal sublimity of character that we can picture to ourselves, cancel this law? Let us make the supposition of a man exhibiting the richest and most splendid assemblage of virtues, the utmost purity of life, largeness of heart, active zeal, love for others; let us suppose the loftiest bearing, the most calm and imposing wisdom, the most benevolent services to mankind; let us suppose also this man asserting that he was without the sense of sin. How should we regard such a character—I mean on simply human principles? Could we imagine it for an instant as real, we could not contemplate it without consternation. Such a man would be an enigma, and a portent to us; wholly unintelligible, but not the less condemned by the conscience of humanity; a rebel against the first law which is stamped on human hearts, and an outcast self-excommunicated from the society and fellowship of the righteous. Let the void within be covered by ever so luxuriant a growth of outward virtue, we could not believe in the reality of such man's goodness; his character could only appal; and the one thing wanting would destroy the most majestic external moral fabric. It would be converted into an unsubstantial shadow; and the nobler the assemblage of virtues, the more portentous would be the illusion and deception of the structure.

It may be asked, indeed, is there not a type of goodness, different from and higher than any exhibited in human history, which is capable of being manifested to human eyes, and which would of itself prove sinlessness? But the reply to such a question is,

that however high the type of goodness in the person himself, it must still manifest itself to those without by means of such expressions and modes of action as would be to the human eye common to a perfect and to the highest imperfect goodness. How, *e.g.*, could strong indignation be the evidence of its own perfection, when the same expression would suit it and also a high imperfection? The obstruction to the proof of sinlessness by outward life is thus the essential invisibility of inward motives; and to this we must add the inexorable law of human goodness, in consequence of which the higher the outward life of any one, the more we count upon the sense of sin in that person.

If exception is taken at regarding anything so impalpable, so inaccessible, so mysterious as right and wrong are in their own nature, as holding a parallel position to physical fact, the reply is that we are not here considering right and wrong in their own nature, but only as fixed feelings or impressions of the human mind. However mystical, transcendental, and beyond analysis right and wrong may be in themselves, that they exist as feelings and impressions of the human mind, and that the impression of having done wrong is universal in the human mind, is a plain and palpable fact. The pains of conscience are sensible inward phenomena, they are special known feelings, quite different from any other.

To return then to the point from which we started; if the presence of sin is an universal fact or law of our moral nature, regarded as a field of experience, it inevitably follows that the absence of it is a contradiction to law; that is to say, that it is of the nature of a miraculous or supernatural fact. To be without moral regrets, without sense of shortcoming; for the whole root of inordinateness and dissatisfaction to be extracted from the soul, to be an ideal to yourself, to possess that which the more it has been pursued the more has fled all human grasp—the Crown of a Supreme Righteous Self-approval—suppose this, and you certainly suppose a marvel. It is an unknown state of mind, totally unlike experience; an anomalous insulation in the self-convicting conscience of humanity. That pervading subtle ingredient of life—how are we to imagine the total clearance of it out of the human exterior; the removal of that part of man's self, the ever-accompanying shadow, the unfavorable reflection upon himself? Christ was satisfied with Himself. That is, He witnessed to Him-

self that His conscience was what no human conscience had ever been; that is, he witnessed to a contradiction to a universal law of experience, or to a supernatural fact. When we realize under what conditions we ourselves and the whole human race are working out the problem of our moral being, and that these conditions as uniformly in fact involve in our case the consciousness of sin as the law of any species in nature involves any characteristic of that species; when we embrace, in short, what is the experimental character of the moral struggle of life in any human being; and then turn to that fulfilment of an ideal, that absolute purity, that immunity of an inward life from all mixture and alloy,—we must see that all that extraordinariness, that strangeness of type, that difficulty of reception attaches to the sinless state that attaches to a miracle; that it has that at first sight unreality, incredibleness, effect of astonishing, which the violation of a law of physical nature has; and that it is in short a miracle, only a miracle of the inner world instead of the outer.

Christ's sinlessness did not indeed imply a freedom from the burden of resisting evil, of maintaining a contest. But the law of sin in human nature is not the contest with evil, but the failure more or less under the contest. It is this which constitutes the subject of that self-reproach under which all human nature labors: the immunity from this was immunity from a law of human nature, a universal characteristic of it.

Let the test of the historical imagination,—I mean the principle of deciding at once against the truth of facts, if when we realize what they are, we start at the unlikeness to, the opposition to the experimental type,—let this test, which has been applied to physical miracles, be applied to the sinlessness of Christ, and does it meet that test? Is there anything more certain, more sensible, more palpable than this universal fact of evil, this imperfect struggle with evil? Is any geographical fact, any historical fact, more absolutely taken for granted? Is there anything imaginable wanting to the constancy of experience, to the rigorousness of fact here, that out of this vast mill of probation which the world is, all goodness comes forth mixed with the "ineradicable taint?"—that no human life is clear?—that if any one said his was, we should not for an instant believe him? With this overpowering stamp, then, of the actual, the real, upon his mind, with this strength of assurance from the world of fact, let any

one turn to the thought of the One Sinless Conscience, that marvellous interior of One Man. Does not that paradisal insulation in humanity, the section of the heavenly state crossing with the earthly, sinlessness co-existing with pain and resistance, challenge the same wonder, the same astonishment, the same instinctive questions—Is it real? Is it possible?—that a physical interruption of the order of nature does? Does it not excite the same antagonistic instinct of custom, the same jar with the experimental touchstone of truth? Has the one fact less of the at first sight incredibility than the other? If the resurrection of Christ was an idea, was the sinlessness a fact? The same antipathy of *un*reason or mechanical impression to strange, unlike, unknown, types, rejects both; the same cultivation of true reason retains both.

What I said, then, in the lecture to which Professor Tyndall refers, was, that sinlessness being an internal and supernatural characteristic of our Lord, of which His outward life, sublime as that was, could not in the nature of the case be adequate proof, miracles were a guarantee to the truth of that assertion of our Lord respecting Himself, in the same way in which they were a guarantee to the rest of His supernatural character. Not that miracles could prove such an assertion without other conditions co-operating; but that they had an evidential force with those other conditions concurring. And certainly, whatever theoretical difficulties may be raised with respect to the mode in which miracles operate as evidence of that of which they alleged to be evidence, practically speaking, to say that the whole of the miraculous circumstances of Christ's life, supposed to be true, would operate in no way as evidence of the truth of his assertion of His own sinlessness, would be to contradict the common reason of mankind.

There are two corollaries which attach so naturally and unavoidably to this statement of the supernaturalness of Christ's sinlessness, that they should not be omitted.

1. The religious and philosophical position taken by the late Mr. Baden Powell was, that the denial of supernatural facts does not interfere with the doctrines or spiritual truths of Revelation. But here is a doctrine or spiritual truth, an essential part of the doctrine of the Atonement, which such a denial does touch imme-

diately. The moral perfection of a future state is no exception to this present order of nature because it is not inserted in it; but if the fact of a sinless Person is inserted in this order of nature, it is an exception to it, or supernatural, and is therefore shut out by Mr. Baden Powell's barrier.

2. It appears to be the notion of many—indeed, I may call it a tendency of thought in the present day—to accept the Gospel moral portrait of Christ, omitting His supernatural character. Such a ground must be distinguished from the liberty which Christian writers claim to portray our Lord's humanity, as for the time contemplated apart from His divinity. The extent to which this may be done, the Incarnation being a complex doctrine, made up of two great truths, is what may be called an administrative question in theology, not capable of any rigid definition. The notion, however, to which I am referring is, that the Gospel moral portrait of Christ can be fully and completely preserved, although permanently separated from His supernatural character.*

What I observe, then, is that, upon this basis of omission of the supernatural, the sinless character of our Lord must be omitted, as well as the physical supernatural attaching to Him. A person might at first sight suppose that this basis of omission would only apply to the body of outward miracles which glorified His birth and death, and accompanied His ministry; but, upon reflection, he must see that upon this basis he must also omit another asserted characteristic of Christ. For what are the contents of the supernatural? Do the physical miracles, do these and the mediatorial and atoning office of Christ together constitute the whole of the supernatural? No: the sinlessness is supernatural. Upon the basis, then, of the omission of the supernatural, the sinlessness must be omitted.

But does the omission of the sinlessness make no difference in the moral portrait of our Lord. That would be a strange thing to say. Consider, the moral character of Christ was not a mere exhibition or procession of actions; it was not a mere succession of abstract virtues; it was not a mere external fabric of virtue. There was behind all this manifestation of action a Person. What

* The author of "Ecce Homo" avows his belief in the supernatural character and acts of Christ; and this avowal forms the basis of Mr. Gladstone's and the *Guardian* reviewer's estimate of that remarkable, though in some important respects dubious, book.

was the moral condition of that Person? It must make a difference; it must make a fundamental difference in the moral portrait which we have in our minds of the Person, whether He was with or without the consciousness of sin.

This is no metaphysical distinction, it must be seen; no difference which can be set aside as belonging to the sphere of unintelligible dogma; it is the difference of a plain and palpable matter of fact. As I have said, whatever be the impenetrableness of the distinction of right and wrong in itself, the feelings, the impressions, the consciousness of human nature with regard to it are the most sensible facts possible; they are actual mental sensations; everybody knows what they are; all the motions and workings of these feelings are known; they are assumed in all conversation, in all history and biography. The alternative here, then, is between there having been the absence in that Person of a sensible known consciousness, such as we all understand to our cost, or the presence of it in Him—no speculative difference. The alternative lies between a sinless goodness; or—if the sinlessness is omitted—a mixed and alloyed goodness, the goodness of human experience. What is the universal portrait of man good with the goodness of experience? This is his portrait: a man who has moral regrets, who blames himself, who does not rise up to his own ideal, who did something yesterday, this hour, which fell short of a standard within him, who is not satisfied with himself. Was Christ—the argument compels me to ask the question—such a man? Unless sinlessness is attributed to Him, the only alternative, the only possible alternative, is that He was. Of all goodness which is not exceptional, of all the goodness of experience, this unfavorable consciousness is the uniform, the infallible, the inexorable law; its attendance is as certain as the most certain physical conjunction in nature; it is as certain as the succession of the seasons, as the law of life and death, as the reproduction of animal and vegetable types; and we should as soon expect the earth to roll back upon its axis as look for a contradiction to this law in any human being. Upon the principle, therefore, of omission of the supernatural characteristics of Christ, it follows inevitably not only that He ceases to be God, not only that He ceases to be mediator between man and God, not only that He becomes only man, but that He becomes sinful man. Sin must enter with the withdrawal of sinlessness, and sinlessness must be

withdrawn with the withdrawal of the supernatural. But this is a fundamental subversion of the moral portrait.

For—and it is necessary to state this distinctly, it is by no means a superfluous thing to state, though it is a truism—there is no medium between "no sin" in a man and sin. We are apt to look upon the outside of goodness, and to forget the inside, the human interior out of which it proceeds, and the conditions which accompanied it in the actual inward person himself. So suppose a generous or a condescending unbeliever drawing, as Rousseau and several have done, a portrait of Christ, and describing His course here; how it was characterized by consummate benevolence, patience, moral dignity, &c. Would he attribute to Christ a sinless character because he thus described Him? No. Yet neither, on the other hand, would he contemplate Him as having moral evil. He would stop short at the outside of his picture. What he has in his mind is a personification, an assemblage of various virtues, a spectacle, a superficies. But was not the center of that whole outward erection of virtue a real Person? And was there not a real interior of that Person? There was; and we know with certainty what that conscious interior, *if* it was not sinless, was: that it was the sphere of moral regret, sense of shortcoming, sense of failure, &c. Here, then, is a subversion of the moral portrait. A person might say, indeed, I do not know what this mystical sinlessness is; I cannot form to myself a clear conception of it; therefore the absence of it is to me no absence of a positive intellectually apprehended part of the portrait. But to such a person I would say, Stop. Even supposing—for I need not enter into that question here—that you do not know intellectually what sinlessness is, you know the alternative very well which exists in man, if he is not sinless. You know that alternative intellectually; you know it by experience; you know it by the most sensible and palpable experience. This alternative is the difference of a broad fact; because there can be no neutral state: if not sinless, the man must have the consciousness of sin and its concomitants.

It is the tendency of the historical school among us to exhibit our Lord as a life without a Personality. They describe a great moral spectacle, a great exhibition of the virtues, a great procession of the highest attributes of humanity. But we want a center of all this fabric and edifice of high action—an Agent, a Person,

the Being who has inward life, soul, consciousness, conscience. This is not included in the description; and yet to exclude it is to transgress against the historical principle. That inward man, the conscience of that Man, was as much a fact as His outward life. Was it a sinless conscience, or—I am obliged argumentatively to state the alternative—had it a history of self-reproach and dissatisfaction? Its condition must have been either the one or the other; either the former, which is supernatural, or the latter, which is a confession of sin. The alternative between a supernatural Christ and a sin-conscious Christ, cannot really be avoided; yet the historical school stops short of this point, does not approach it, and draws the moral portrait of Christ without the question being settled. It avoids the inward Personality, and confines itself to manifestations; yet the center of this whole outward moral erection was not a void or cavity, like the Christ of the Docetæ.

The moral estimate even of the *manifestations* must be deeply affected by the rank of the person from whom they proceed. Were the benevolent, the compassionate manifestations, the condescensions of a Great One, a Superior, to frail, weak and miserable man; or did they represent the active benevolence of a philanthropist to his fellows? Upon the latter supposition there would be an immediate difference in the moral impression which those actions produce. They would still be good, but their goodness would be different. There would be a fall in the type; a solemnity, a beauty, a depth of moral interest would have vanished; they would have ceased to be what they are. Any common, poor man would be sensible of the alteration, as he read the Gospels. The acts of mercy and sympathy as they come upon him make a peculiar, moral impression, and embody a higher moral type in his eyes, in consequence of something in their background, in their basis; that they come from an Agent who is lifted up in the nature of His goodness above mankind, from an exalted Personage; the love which descends from a mysterious height is the greater and profounder love; because it is connected with the supernatural, it is higher morally. The moral type gains from the loftiness of the Agent, and the actions rise with their fountain-head. They are the acts of the Unkown One—unknown, though known as well; the unknown moral state from which they come gives an untold weight and meaning to

them. The philanthropy *in* our Lord's actions, supposed to proceed from a philanthropist only, would fall flat upon the mind.

The omission of the supernatural, therefore, would be the subversion of the moral portrait too, as being the omission of the inward sinlessness. But, again, upon this basis not only is the great internal characteristic of Christ abstracted, but there is the total demolition of an actual, visible, outward portrait; for if the sinlessness is omitted, the next step is inevitable—viz., that the *assumption* of it must be omitted too. But although the characteristic itself is internal and supernatural—that He *professed* to be sinless, that He made this pretension, that He used this language, is part of the visible and external character, as portrayed in the Gospels. The assumption pervades His acts and speech; it is as much a portion of the Gospel biography as His benevolence, His compassion, His purity, His courage, His resignation; as much as His judging the Scribes and Pharisees, instructing the poor, suffering for righteousness' sake, witnessing to the truth, and delivering Himself to death in behalf of His mission. What a man thinks or says of himself, his view of himself, his estimate of himself, is a most important characteristic of the man, in secular biography. The writers of the life of Christ have transmitted, as an essential portion of Him, this great act of self-assertion, this tone about Himself, which was quite unique, and to which there was no approach in human history. Nor can this characteristic be removed without a complete destruction of the whole portrait, and the substitution of another Christ for the Christ of the Gospels; whose profound statement respecting Himself re-appears in the Epistles, as believed and bowed to by the Apostles, and made the foundation of a new message to mankind.

Let us place side by side this Character and another. In St. Paul we have a participation in the lot of humanity, an experience of a struggle, a sense of disappointment and shortcoming, a sense of weakness joined to a triumphant sense of strength; we have the beauty and the interest of the simply human character. He is akin to that "whole creation which groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now," to that nature which says, "to will is present with me, but how to perform that which is good, I know not." This is the goodness proper to man. The sense of weakness, the humility of confession, the self-condemning type, is a

fundamental requisite for man's goodness; without it, no apparent grandeur or sublimity can satisfy us. No strength of will, no greatness, no calmness of the philosopher, no zeal of the philanthropist, without this, can gain our moral affections. It is impossible to love a man because he is majestic, because he is wise, because he is calm, because he is active, because, even, he is philanthropical. We demand from him first a participation in the lot of humanity, a fellowship with it in confession of sin and weakness—not the mere sympathy of a human benevolence upon a high condescending ground with humanity;—that will not do; that is not enough; we must have confession. St. Paul makes this confession, and acknowledges fellowship with weakness and frailty. Now take the other Character. There stands One erect and unconfounded before the throne of God. He casts off from Himself that whole fabric of language toward God which the sense of sin had formed; He throws off for Himself the whole penitential type. His humility is the humility of condescension, of magnanimity, of patience, of long-suffering innocence, of dignity undisturbed by mockery and insult; it is the humility of good desert; it is not the humility of imperfection and frailty, which is the characteristic humility of man. The normal effect of sanctity is reversed, and it reveals in Him no sin—righteousness only; and that while His own moral criterion searched the inmost corners of the heart. A man may fulfil to the letter an outward ceremonial code; but Christ's code was, "Ye have heard it said, Thou shalt not kill; but I say unto you," &c.; "Ye have heard it said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thine enemy; but I say unto you," &c. The more inward the touchstone, the greater enigma the assumption of perfectly standing it; the more astounding the profession that the law was not death but life to Him, because He fulfilled it wholly. Yet this Man *preached* confession of sins; he preached it as the very criterion of an accepted state, and denounced self-justification as the condemnation of man. The publican was justified, because he smote upon his breast and owned himself a sinner; the Pharisee was condemned because he thanked God he was not like that sinner. The very form of prayer which He put forth as the prayer of all mankind involved confession of sin. But the same Man who laid down the law of self-abasement for sin for every other human being, disowned it for Himself; He condemned the Pharisee, and

He did what the Pharisee did, justify Himself; He praised the publican, and declined to do what the publican did, condemn Himself; His prayer made all mankind sue for pardon, but He himself did not pray to be forgiven. He said to others, "Repent;" but He himself *explained* why He submitted to the baptism of repentance. That He disowned the confession of sin for Himself is the fact that it is, because the confession of it was the first object of His love in others. There may have been philosophical philanthropists who did now bow their necks to the penitential yoke; but then they were men who did not accept the penitential type—who did not admit the truth of that moral standard which imposes it—whose idea of morals superseded it both for themselves and others—who thought it imbecile and weak, and below the dignity of human nature. But Christ's sympathy was with the penitential type solely; He abhorred the righteous in their own sight, He loved those to whom much was forgiven.

Now it is evident that these two characters cannot both be right, except upon the assumption of some entire difference in the basement or pedestal upon which each stands. They are opposed in fundamental type. If both characters are attributed, then, to the same ordinary humanity, if one is right the other is wrong. It might appear at first sight that a criticism of a character upon one basis was perilously near to a criticism of it upon another; but in truth no two acts of criticism are wider apart; we are never further off from a character upon its own appropriate basis than when we regard it upon another and improper one. We have never a more different character than when we have the same pretensions with different rights. The latter of these two characters is plainly enormous and monstrous, except upon the supposition of a humanity morally higher than all experience, or supernatural.

But this *is* the claim and the assumption of the Christ of the Gospels; it is the basis of the whole moral portraiture in the Gospels. This character has never, indeed, from the first, stood but upon one foundation; the portrait has never, from the time it was first drawn, belonged to any other than a supernatural personage; it is given *as* the character of such a Being; that is its explanation; that is historically its connection. Removed from this basis, it does not correspond to our moral sense, but this is its basis. The portrait that was drawn as a *contrast* to human saintly

characters, cannot be proper *as* a human saintly character, but then it was drawn as a contrast. Scripture is a succession of saintly biographies all upon one type, the penitential. By a sudden transition there springs up one solitary instance of a completely opposite type which vanishes, and never re-appears. But the solitary and insulated unpenitential type makes also a solitary assumption of worth, and the assumption is part of the portrait.

There is, then, a total demolition and destruction of this visible Gospel portrait upon the principle now commented on, because with the omission of the supernatural sinlessness must go, and with the fact of sinlessness the pretension to it must go—*i. e.*, the whole of that high and majestic assumption which constitutes the peculiarity of the character of Christ in the Gospels. For what is the character in the Gospels without this claim? Particular features might be left, but the whole would be gone. We should have a different character. The supernatural in Him goes deeper than into His outward miraculous life—viz., into the structure of His moral character.

One remark in conclusion. The liberty of permanently omitting any elements in the Gospel life of Christ, must assume the spuriousness of those parts of the Gospels which contain those elements. The liberty to omit the outward miracles must assume the spuriousness of the miraculous record. The liberty to omit the supernatural offices of Christ must assume the spuriousness of those parts which contain the mention of those offices. The liberty to omit *all* the supernatural must assume the spuriousness of all those parts in which a claim to and assumption of the supernatural appears. But according to the foregoing observations, the high moral assumption of our Lord about himself would be included under this head. The Gospel *moral* portrait of Christ, considered in the light of a whole, would thus have to be pronounced spurious. The whole, therefore, of this subject belongs to, and must be handed over to the jurisdiction of, the department of Christian evidences.

XXIV.—RECENT SPECULATIONS ON PRIMEVAL MAN.*

BY THE DUKE OF ARGYLL.

At the last meeting, in Dundee, of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, a paper was read by Sir J. Lubbock upon "The Early Condition of Mankind." It purports to be a reply to a lecture on the "Origin of Civilization" by Dr. Whately, the late Archbishop of Dublin, which was published in 1854. The Archbishop's position is shortly this—that mere savages—that is to say, "men in the lowest degree, or even anything approaching to the lowest degree, of barbarism in which they can possibly subsist at all—never did and never can, unaided, raise themselves into a higher condition." That even when brought into contact with superior races, it is extremely difficult to teach them the simplest arts; that they "seem never to invent or discover anything," because even "necessity is not the mother of invention, except to those who have some degree of thoughtfulness and intelligence;" that whatever the natural powers of the human mind may be, they require to be started, as it were, by some instruction from without. He holds it to be "a complete moral certainty that men, left unassisted in what is called a state of nature—that is, with the faculties Man is born with not at all unfolded or exercised by education—never did, and never can, raise themselves from that condition." Therefore, "according to the present course of things, the first introducer of civilization among savages is, and must be, man in a more improved state." But as "in the beginning of the human race there was no *man* to effect it," this must have been the work of another Being. "There must have been, in short, something of a revelation made to the first, or to some subsequent generation of our species." The conclusion is, that as Man must have had a Divine Creator, it seems equally certain that, to some extent, also, he must have had a Divine Instructor.

* From *Good Words*, March, 1868.

This is the argument which Sir J. Lubbock has undertaken to refute. His conclusion is, that the "primitive condition of mankind was one of utter barbarism;" that from this condition certain races have independently raised themselves; and, of course, that instead of existing savages being the degenerate descendants of ancestors who were more advanced, all existing civilized races are the children of men who were once in the same low condition. A further conclusion, though not formally asserted, is plainly indicated, viz.: this, that the "utter barbarism" of the first man was itself an advance on the condition of some progenitor. I infer that this idea is intended to be conveyed when the "first men" are explained to mean the "first beings worthy to be so called."

The two main lines of argument pursued by Sir J. Lubbock connect themselves with these two propositions which he undertakes to prove: 1st, "That there are indications of progress even among savages;" and, 2d, "That among the most civilized nations there are traces of original barbarism."

Sir J. Lubbock's paper has confirmed an impression I have long had, that Whately's argument, though strong at some points, is at others open to assault, and that, as a whole, the subject now requires to be differently handled and regarded from a different point of view. On the other hand, the same paper has convinced me that the argument in favor of what may be called the savage-theory, is very much the weaker of the two, and rests upon a method of treatment much more inadequate and incomplete.

I propose in this, and in some following papers, to set forth the reasoning upon which these convictions rest.

There are, however, some preliminary considerations which it may be well to deal with before proceeding farther.

It will be observed that both arguments are avowedly conducted irrespective of any belief in the Mosaic narrative of creation. They both profess to be purely scientific; that is, founded on natural knowledge, and using for the discovery of truth such facts and inferences as are ascertained by reason. Whately expressly says that in his argument he has not appealed to the Book of Genesis as an authority because he "thought it important to show, independently of that authority, and from a monument actually before our eyes—the existence (namely) of civilized man—that there is no escaping such conclusions as agree with

the Bible narrative." The opposite argument is, of course, maintained always from the same basis of scientific independence, and those who urge it do not generally profess or care to reconcile the conclusion arrived at with the Mosaic narrative. Sir J. Lubbock at the close of his paper says emphatically, "These views follow, I think, from strictly scientific considerations." No doubt, if the inquiry is to be pursued at all upon this basis, it must be conducted honestly, and the conclusions legitimately reached must be accepted with just so much of conviction as is justified by the nature of the data, and the nature of the reasoning employed.

The question may well arise in many minds in reference to this subject, whether it is a legitimate subject of speculation at all—whether it does not transcend our faculties to ascertain the truth.

Respecting this question, there is one answer which is obvious, although it may not go far to satisfy those whose scruples are most sincere. When men in the position of the late Archbishop of Dublin enter upon this discussion, and declare that, independent of all authority, certain conclusions can be shown to be unavoidable by natural reason, we cannot prohibit others from entering upon the same ground, or from producing such arguments as they may be able to find in support of an opposite conclusion. But there are some better arguments than this. This, indeed, is enough to show that the discussion must, as a matter of necessity, be encountered, even though it should be deplored. But other considerations may perhaps convince us that it should not be shunned. It may be that the desire of knowledge is capable of excess, and that the spirit which, in the ordinary concerns of life, is condemned as idle or vicious curiosity, has its counterpart in the higher pursuits of intellect. David seems to imply as much when he pleads in favor of his own character and conduct before God, "I do not exercise myself in things too high for me." On the the other hand, we must remember that in nothing has the human race been more liable to the delusions of superstition than in the conception of the matters which were to be held, or were not to be held, as forbidden to the investigations of reason. Those physical laws of nature which are now so familiar to us as the peculiar field of observation and discovery—a field on which the march of intellect has been so rapid and so triumphant—were once held by the early Greek philosophers as belonging to

the most secret things of God. They thought, perhaps, not unnaturally, that a region which lay, or seemed to lie, so much nearer to themselves, even their own mind and spirit—its phenomena and its methods of procedure—must be the ground most open to their search, and must afford results most comprehensible to the understanding. And so they plunged into all the problems of metaphysics. But there are no mysteries so deep as these—none in which the human mind reaches so soon the limits of its power—none in which the temptation is stronger to strain after knowledge which is shrouded in impenetrable darkness. The greatest intellects which the world has ever seen have labored at such problems, and have left them as they found them. The same tendency of metaphysical speculation, blending through the school of Alexandria with the mysticism of the East, infected the theology of the early Church, and heretics were not seldom divided from the orthodox upon questions which were not only beyond the reach of reason, but equally beyond the scope of Revelation. In the Confessions of St. Augustine there is a curious indication of this transposition of the subjects which are the most legitimate, and the most accessible subjects of our research. In early life he had been, as is well known, led away by the curious and idle speculations which pass in ecclesiastical history under the name of the Manichæan heresy. He pours out his lamentations over the subtleties which had once engrossed and perplexed his mind—subtleties of which Christianity had revealed the folly. And among the temptations which he still desires to overcome is the appetite of knowledge—a "vain and curious desire hiding under the name of science" (lib. x, c. 37). This is the desire which pretends, he says, to reach the inmost secrets of nature—secrets which when discovered could have no value, and of which men desire and expect nothing except to know. Now, here we have an exact definition of the true scientific spirit—a spirit which has, indeed, in its results, richly "endowed the human family with new mercies," but which never has had this dower in view as its only, or even as its chief, inducement. It is not, perhaps, exactly relevant to observe that the glorious facts of Astronomy are among the secrets of nature which Augustine rejoices to say he no longer desires to know; because, in his mind, Astronomy took the form of Astrology, to which in his youth he had been much addicted. But Augustine is right when he detects

this same love of mere knowledge in the instinctive arrest of his attention by the commonest works of nature. He desires to be delivered even from this. He has given up many pleasures of the eye and curiosities of the mind in which he once delighted—not only the transits of the heavenly bodies and the response of oracles, but even the public spectacles of the Roman world. Still, this wretched love of mere knowledge — this lust of the eyes—is ever pursuing him as he walks and lives. Although no longer tempted to go to the Amphitheater to see the race of hound and hare, the same sight, if seen accidentally in the fields, will divert his attention from some profound meditation. Even from the windows of his home his eye is caught by some little lizard catching flies upon the wall, or by some spider spreading for the capture her wondrous web. The smallness of these creatures, he confesses, does not diminish his instinctive curiosity. True it is that he might pass from these creatures to magnify the Creator of them all. But he is conscious that this was not present to his thoughts when they were arrested and fixed upon the things he saw.

Most true! and equally true was it, that this desire of knowledge was burning intensely in him when it wrung from him no confession: or rather, when it was interwoven into the very tissue of which his immortal Confessions are composed. In them no more splendid passages occur than those in which he turns the eye of his curiosity inward upon the secrets of his own nature, and asks a thousand unanswerable questions on the structure and the power of memory. What and where are those innumerable chambers—those vast halls—which hold in perpetual imagery not only all he had ever seen, but all he had ever conceived and known? How can the immensities of time and space, of earth, and sky, and ocean, be thus contained? How can they be recalled into what seemed a lost existence? What depths and mysteries of being! How little can we understand ourselves! Does it not seem then as if the mind were too narrow to comprehend itself? And so, through pages of most subtle and eloquent analysis, he revels in that faculty of Wonder, which is the very root and principle of all curious inquiry. I do not say that these questions are wholly vain. But they are useful only as all knowledge may be useful, in teaching us—if it be nothing else—how small that knowledge is. St. Augustine was right in thinking

that this wonderful power of Memory lies close to the final secrets on which our very being and personality depend. An eminent philosopher of our own time has found in Memory the only insuperable difficulty in the way of reducing the definition of ourselves into that of mere "Possibilities of Feeling." But in pursuing these speculations into the most inscrutable of all subjects, St. Augustine is but following the instincts of the same restless and curious intellect which had once struggled with questions, What Matter is, and How Evil came to be? There is no inquiry in which the human mind comes so immediately to the limit of its powers, as in the analysis of itself. Inscrutable questions may indeed be asked as to what Man once was. But questions much more inscrutable may be asked, and are habitually asked, as to what Man now is. No conclusions in respect to the original condition of our race can be more shocking to reason and common sense, than many conclusions which metaphysicians have pretended to establish respecting its condition now.

Another reason against declining this inquiry, is to be found in the fact that the plea of impotence against the human understanding, is a plea which may be urged in the service of the most irrational error, as easily, perhaps more easily, than in the service of the most certain truths. Men engrossed by some particular theory are under immense temptation to denounce the power of faculties whose function it is to apprehend ideas at variance with their own. At the present moment this is the habitual practice of a whole school of thinkers who have eyes for nothing but a particular class of facts, and who therefore very naturally resort to the assertion that all eyes with a wider range of vision are eyes of "phantasy." And if this has been sometimes the result of the anatomy of Mind, what are we to say of the anatomy of the Body? We cannot even think of our bodily frames without encountering at once all the facts which connect the phenomena of Mind with the structure and condition of Material Organs. And then our Organism as a whole, how close it stands to that of the beasts that perish! Are we to close these paths of investigation also, because some minds have been led by them to a gross materialism? It is not on one subject of inquiry, but in all, that we come speedily to questions which cannot be answered. In none should we be jealous of research. In all we must be jealous of presumption. In all should reason be warned to keep

within the limit of her powers. From none should reason be warned away. Men who denounce any particular field of thought are always to be suspected. The presumption is, that valuable things which these men do not like, are to be found there. There are many forms of priestcraft. The same arts, and the same delusions, have been practiced in many causes. Sometimes, though perhaps not so often as is popularly supposed, men have been warned from particular branches of physical inquiry, in the supposed interests of religion. But constantly and habitually, men are now warned from many branches of inquiry, both physical and psychological, in the interests—real enough—of the Positive Philosophy! "Whatever," says Mr. Lewes, "is inaccessible to reason, should be strictly interdicted to research." Here we have the true ring of the old sacerdotal interdicts. Who is to define beforehand what is, and what is not, "inaccessible to reason?" Are we to take such a definition on trust from the priests of this new philosophy? They tell us that all proofs of Mind in the order of the universe, all evidences of purpose, all conceptions of plan or of design, in the history of creation, are the mere product of special "infirmities" of the human intellect. In opposition to these attempts—come from what quarter they may—to limit arbitrarily the boundaries of knowledge, let us maintain the principle that we never can certainly know what is "inaccessible to reason" until the way of access has been tried. In the highest interests of truth, we must resist any and every interdict against research. The philosophy which assumes to issue such an interdict, must have reason to fear inquiry.

On these principles it may be affirmed generally that all subjects are legitimate subjects of reasoning in proportion as they are accessible to research; and the degree in which any given subject is accessible to research cannot be known until research is tried. Within certain limits it is not open to dispute that the early condition of mankind is accessible to research. Contemporary history reaches back a certain way. Existing monuments afford their evidence for a considerable distance farther. Tradition has its own province still more remote; and latterly Geology and Archæology have met upon common ground—ground in which man and the mammoth have been found together.

It has not, however, been sufficiently observed that the inquiry into the Primitive Condition of Mankind resolves itself into three

separate questions—that is to say, three questions which, though connected with each other, can be, and indeed must be separately dealt with:—

1st. The Origin of Man considered simply as a species—that is to say, the method of his creation or introduction into the world.

2d. The Antiquity of Man, or the time in the geological history and preparation of the globe, at which this creation or introduction took place.

3d. His Mental Condition when first created.

No doubt the theory as to the origin of man at which Sir J. Lubbock glances when he speaks of the "first being worthy to be called a man" (which is obviously the theory that this first man was born from some preëxisting creature not worthy to be so called), is most naturally connected with the farther theory that his mental condition was one of "utter barbarism." But this is not at all a necessary consequence. The first man, however created, may have had special knowledge conveyed to him as well as a special material organization. Special powers of acquiring knowledge he certainly must have had, since we know that these are inseparably connected with the organization which made him "worthy to be called a man." The two questions, therefore, of the Origin of Man, and of his Primitive Condition, are clearly separable. In like manner, as regards Antiquity, the question of Time has no necessary connection either with his Origin or his Primitive Condition.

There is another point connected with this division of the whole subject into three separate questions, which has not perhaps been sufficiently considered, and that is the different degrees of connection which these questions have respectively with the Mosaic narrative. I have already said that the inquiry as conducted both by Archbishop Whately and Sir J. Lubbock, is avowedly conducted on a purely scientific basis. It is in the same light that it will be considered here. But it may be useful to observe in passing that, in regard to some of these questions, the Mosaic account of Creation (apart altogether from any questions which have been raised as to the allegorical elements it may contain) leaves room, even according to its most literal interpretation, for a much wider latitude of speculation than seems to be generally supposed. As regards the Origin of Man, indeed, the impression conveyed is that the Creation of Man was a special act—which,

indeed, whatever may have been its method, it must have been; but, as regards the Primitive Condition of mankind, it must be remembered that, according to the narrative in Genesis, there never was any generation of men which lived and walked in the primal light. It was the first man who fell. The second man was a murderer. The causes, therefore, of degradation are represented as having begun, so far as the race is concerned, at once; and it is a special peculiarity of the account that those causes are said to have gone on in an accelerating ratio until the flood. Even after that event there was no immunity from the operation of the same causes, and existing races, therefore, may have passed through stages of any degree of barbarism without involving any necessary inconsistency whatever with the Mosaic account. It is farther to be observed that writers on the Primitive Condition of Man are generally guilty of the oversight of forgetting to define the sense in which they use the words "civilized" and "uncivilized." This is a strange oversight on the part of such a logician as Dr. Whately. Sir J. Lubbock naturally enough feels himself relieved from an inconvenient obligation. But implicitly, if not explicitly, the savage-theory and the reasoning in support of it, assume that civilization consists in a knowledge of the arts. Knowledge, for example, or ignorance, of the use of metals, is, as we shall see, characteristics on which great stress is laid. Now, as regards this point, as Whately truly says, the narrative of Genesis distinctly states that this kind of knowledge did not belong to mankind at first, but was the fruit of subsequent discovery, through the ordinary agency of those mental gifts with which man at his creation was endowed. It is assumed in the savage-theory that the presence or absence of this knowledge stands in close and natural connection with the presence or absence of other and higher kinds of knowledge, of which acquaintance with the metals is but a symbol and a type. Within certain limits this is true, and we may assume, therefore, that in Genesis also the intimation given on this subject implies, that so far as civilization means a command over the powers of nature, man was left to make his own way through the powers of reason, and the instincts of research. Whately has indeed inferred that the great economic principle of the division of labor was at the first divinely taught to Man, in the description given of Cain as a tiller of the ground, and of Abel as a keeper of flocks. But, if

we are to understand this literally, not of tribes tracing their descent from Cain and Abel, but of the individual men who were the third and fourth human beings upon earth, then we must suppose that the possession of domestic animals and acquaintance with artificial cultivation were either divinely communicated to man, or instinctively discovered by him at once. It may have been so, and it may be the intention of the narrative to assert it; but at all events, it is perfectly conceivable, that beyond a knowledge of the simplest arts which were necessary for the sustenance of life, man's primitive condition may have been a condition of mere childhood.

As regards the third element in the whole question—the element of Time—it is well known that all calculations in regard to it rest upon data respecting which there has always been much doubt and difficulty, and that similar data taken from the three existing versions of the Old Testament—the Hebrew, the Samaritan, and the Septuagint, give results which vary from each other, not by years, or even by tens of years, but by many centuries. Where differences exist of such magnitude, no confidence can be felt in either of the results. It seems more than questionable how far the history of man given in the Old Testament either is, or was intended to be a complete history, or more than the history of typical men and of typical generations. At all events, it would be worse than idle to deny that this question of Time comes naturally and necessarily within the field of scientific investigation, in so far as science can find a firm foundation for any conclusions in regard to it.

Having already quoted St. Augustine upon the general subject of the desire of knowledge, I cannot close even this cursory reference to the relation in which the Mosaic narrative stands to scientific research, without dwelling for a moment on the very striking passage in which that great man deals with the only account which the world possesses of the history of Creation. St. Augustine was not the man to be dead to all those curious speculations and inquiries which that account excites, and which it does not profess to satisfy. His confession, he says, would not be the humble confession he desires them to be, were he not to confess, that he does not, as regards many of those questions, understand the sense in which Moses wrote. All the more does he admire his words, "so sublime in their humility, so rich in their reserve"

(*alta humiliter, pauca copiose*); then follows (lib. xii, c. 31) a passage which—considering the age in which it was written, considering also the vague notions entertained by St. Augustine himself, and by all the world in his time, on the rank and importance of the natural sciences—is surely one of the most remarkable passages ever written by theologian or philosopher: "For myself," he says, "I declare boldly, and from the bottom of my heart, that if I were called to write something which was to be invested with supreme authority, I should desire most so to write that my words should include *the widest range of meaning, and should not be confined to one sense alone, exclusive of all others, even of some which should be inconsistent with my own.* Far from me, O God, be the temerity to suppose that so great a prophet did not receive from thy grace even such a favor! Yes; he had in view and in his spirit, when he traced these words, all that we can ever discover of the truth—even every truth which has escaped us hitherto, or which escapes us still, but which nevertheless may yet be discovered in them." Certain it is, whatever new views may now be taken of the origin and authorship of the first chapter of Genesis, that it stands alone among the traditions of mankind in the wonderful simplicity and grandeur of its words. Specially remarkable—miraculous it really seems to be—is that character of reserve which leaves open to reason all that reason may be able to attain. The meaning of those words seems always to be a meaning a-head of science—not because it anticipates the results of science, but because it runs, as it were, round the outer margin of all possible discovery.

Having now cleared the ground of some preliminary difficulties which might have otherwise impeded us in a proper access to the subject, I shall proceed in this paper to deal with the first of the three questions into which that subject is divided—viz: the Origin of Man considered as a Species, in so far as this question appears to be accessible to reason.

The human race has no more knowledge or recollection of its own origin than a child has of its own birth. But a child drinks in with its mother's milk some knowledge of the relation in which it stands to its own parents, and as it grows up it knows of other children being born around it. It sees one generation going and another generation coming, so that long before the years of childhood close, the ideas of birth and death are alike

familiar. Whatever sense of mystery may, in the first dawnings of reflection, have attached to either of these ideas, is soon lost in the familiar experience of the world. The same experience extends to the lower animals—they, too, are born and die. But no such experience ever comes to cast any light on the origin of our own race, or of any other. Some varieties of form are effected in the case of a few animals by domestication and by constant care in the selection of peculiarities transmissible to the young. But these variations are all within certain limits; and wherever human care relaxes or is abandoned, the old forms return, and the selected characters disappear. The founding of new forms by the union of different species, even when standing in close natural relation to each other, is absolutely forbidden by the sentence of sterility which nature pronounces and enforces upon all hybrid offspring. And so it results that man has never seen the origin of any species. Creation by birth is the only kind of creation he has ever seen; and from this kind of creation he has never seen a new species come. And yet he does know, (for this the science of Palæontology has most certainly revealed), that the introduction of a new species has been a work carried on constantly and continuously during vast but unknown periods of time. The whole face of animated nature has been changed, not once, but frequently; not suddenly for the most part, perhaps not suddenly in any case, but slowly and gradually, and yet completely. When once this fact is clearly apprehended—whenever we become familiar with the idea that creation has had a history, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that creation has also had a method. And then the further question rises,—What has this method been? It is perfectly natural that men who have any hopes of solving this question should take that supposition which seems the readiest; and the readiest supposition is, that the agency by which new individuals are born is also the agency by which new species are created. The difficulty of conceiving any other, compels men, if they are to guess at all, to guess upon this foundation. Such is the origin and genesis of all the theories of development, of which Mr. Darwin's hypothesis is only the latest form. It is not in itself inconsistent with the Theistic argument, or with belief in the ultimate agency and directing power of a creative mind. This is clear, since we never think of any difficulty in reconciling that belief with our knowledge of the ordinary laws

of animal and vegetable reproduction. Those laws may be correctly, and can only be adequately, described in the language of religion and theology. "He who is the alone author and creator of all things," says the present Bishop of Salisbury, "does not by separate acts of creation give being and life to those creatures which are to be brought forth, but employs his living creatures thus to give effect to his will and pleasure, and as his agents to be the means of communicating life."* The same language might be applied, without the alteration of a word, to the origin of species, if it were indeed true that new kinds as well as new individuals were created by being born. The truth is, that the argument which has so often been employed to elevate our conception of the wisdom hid in secondary causes, is an argument which only gains increasing strength and force in proportion to the number and involution of those causes, and to the extent and scope of their effects. If it does not diminish, but only augments the wonder of organic life, that it has been so contrived as to be capable of propagating itself, neither would it diminish that wonder, but rather enhance it to an infinite degree, that organisms should be gifted with the still more wonderful power of developing forms of life other and higher than their own. So far, therefore, as belief is a personal creator is concerned, the difficulties in the way of accepting this hypothesis are not theological. The difficulties are scientific. The first fundamental difficulty is simply this,—that all the theories of development ascribe to known causes unknown effects—unknown as regards the times in which we now live, and unknown so far as has hitherto been ascertained in all the past times of which there is any record. It is true that this record—the geological record—is imperfect. But as Sir Roderick Murchison has long ago proved, there are parts of that record which are singularly complete, and in those parts we have the proofs of creation without any indication of development. The Silurian rocks, as regards oceanic life, are perfect and abundant in the forms they have preserved, yet there are no fish. The Devonian age followed, tranquilly, and without a break; and in the Devonian Sea, suddenly, fish appear—appear in shoals, and in forms of the highest and most perfect type. There is no trace of links or transitional forms between

* *Charge*, 1867.

the great class of mollusca and the great class of fishes. There is no reason whatever to suppose that such forms, if they had existed, can have been destroyed in deposits which have preserved in wonderful perfection the minutest organisms. So much for the past.

As regards the present, organisms are known to reproduce life, but always life which is like their own. And if this likeness admits of degrees of difference, the margin of variety is not known to be ever broad enough for the foundation of a new species. This, too, is remarkable, that such margin of variety as does ever exist among the offspring of the same parents becomes smaller and smaller in proportion as we rise in the scale of organic life. That any organism, therefore, can ever produce another which varies from itself in any truly specific character, is an assumption not justified by any known fact. No organism is ever seen to exert such a power now. There are many indications which tend to show that all organisms have been equally incapable of modification since the earliest monuments of man. There is no proof that any organism ever did fulfill such functions at any time. It is resorted to because of the difficulty of conceiving any method of creation except creation by birth. But this is no adequate standing-ground for a scientific theory. It would be well for those who speculate upon this subject to remember, that whenever a new species, or a new class of animal has begun to be, something must have happened which is not in the "ordinary course of nature," as known to us. Something, therefore, must have happened which we have a difficulty, probably an insuperable difficulty, in conceiving. If, therefore, the theory of development can be shown to involve difficulties of conception which are quite as great as those which it professes to remove, then it ceases to have any standing-ground at all. An hypothesis which escapes from particular difficulties by encountering others which are smaller, may be tolerated at least provisionally. But an hypothesis which, to avoid an alternative supposed to be inconceivable, adopts another alternative encompassed by many difficulties quite as great, is not entitled even to provisional acceptance. Now, the difficulties attending the theory of development, or of creation by birth, attain their maximum in the case of man. Some of them are referred to in a cursory manner by Dr. Whately. Let us examine them a little nearer.

"Man's place in nature" has long been, and still is, the grand battle-ground of anatomists and physiologists; but the points on which they are disagreed among themselves have not really any importance corresponding to the vehemence with which they have been disputed. The great French anatomist, Cuvier, was of opinion that the distinctions between man's organism and the organism of the highest among the beasts are of such magnitude and importance, that the human race cannot be classified as belonging to the same "order" with any other creature, but must be held to constitute an "order" by itself. In our own time, Professor Owen holds the same opinion. Professor Huxley, on the other hand, has undertaken to prove that the anatomical differences between the human frame and the frame of the gorilla or chimpanzee, are not such, either in kind or in degree, as to justify this wide distinction. But he specially limits this conclusion to the differences of physiology, and confesses that, if in defining man we are to take into account the phenomena of mind, there is between man and those beasts which stand nearest to him in anatomy, a difference so wide that it cannot be measured—an "enormous gulf"—"a divergence immeasurable" and "practically infinite." But this last conclusion is really incompatible with the first. There is an inseparable connection between the phenomena of mind and the phenomena of organization. They must be taken together, and be interpreted together. The structure of every creature is correlated with the functions which its several parts are fitted to discharge, and the mental character, dispositions and instincts of the creature are again strictly correlated with these functions. We must accept from anatomists all the facts which anatomy can teach; but the value to be placed on these facts is a very different question. All classification is ideal, and depends on the relative value to be placed on facts which are in themselves indisputable. On this question of the comparative value of anatomical facts we have other facts to go by which do not belong to the science of physiology. Nature is her own interpreter, and her evidence is clear. Whatever may be the anatomical difference between man and the gorilla, that difference is the equivalent in physical organization of the whole mental difference between a gorilla and a man. This is the measure of value which nature has set upon the kind and degree of divergence which separates these two material

forms. Any other measure of value which may be set on that divergence must be founded on an arbitrary and partial selection among the facts of which all sound classification must take account. Imperfect as all existing systems of classification are, they are not so bad in the case of any group of the lower animals as to separate organs from the functions they discharge, and from the mental habits which peculiarities of structure both embody and subserve. Although the resemblances which have been seized upon for the purpose of grouping together a certain number of animals into classes, or families, or orders, have been for the most part resemblances arbitrarily selected, and have borne no consistent reference to any one standard of comparison throughout the creatures to be arranged, yet those resemblances have not been so arbitrary or so fallacious as to join together in one common "order" animals separated from each other in powers and habits by an impassable gulf. Of the eight "orders" (exclusive of man) into which Cuvier divided all the animals whose young are suckled (*Mammalia*), one is distinghished from the others by the prehensile character of both feet and hands (*Quadrumana*); another order is distinguished by the nature of its food (*Carnivora*); the third is distinguished by peculiarities in the production of the young (*Marsupialia*); the fourth and fifth are distinguished by the nature of their teeth (*Rodentia* and *Edentata*); the sixth are distinguished by the texture of their skin (*Pachydermata*;) the seventh by the peculiarities of the digestive system (*Ruminantia*); and the last by fish-like form and fish-like habitat of the whales and dugongs (*Cetacea*). Now, although it is obvious that no one principle of classification is consistenly adhered to in this system,—although there is no common standard to which they are all referred,—yet, as a matter of fact, the peculiarities chosen are not only the most salient and the most characteristic peculiarities of the animals as a whole, but they are connected with others which run through the whole organism, and with some corresponding similarities of instinct and disposition. But no such defence can be offered for the system which groups man in the same order with the chimpanzee or the ourang-outang, merely because the limbs of those animals are terminated by organs which are anatomically "true feet and true hands;" or because they have the same number of teeth; or because the same primary divisions exist in the structure of the brain. The differ-

ence between the hand of a monkey and the hand of a man may seem small when they are both placed on the dissecting-table; but in that difference, whatever it may be, lies the whole difference between an organ limited to the climbing of trees or the plucking of fruit, and an organ which is so correlated with man's inventive genius that by its aid the earth is weighed, and the distance of the sun is measured. In like manner let us assume it to be true that the difference between the brain of man and the brain of the gorilla may be reduced to a difference of volume, to that visible difference alone, and even as regards volume to a difference in quantity comparatively small. "Cranial capacity" is measured by the cubic inches of space which a skull contains. Professor Huxley tells us,* on the authority of Professor Schaafhausen, that some Hindu skulls have as small a capacity as forty-six cubic inches, while the largest gorilla yet measured contained upwards of thirty-five cubic inches. This represents a difference of volume of less than eleven cubic inches. But the difference between this Hindu skull and the largest European skull (one hundred and fourteen cubic inches) amounts, according to the same authority, to no less than sixty-eight cubic inches. Nevertheless, the significance set by the facts of nature upon that difference of eleven cubic inches between the gorilla and the man, is the difference between an irrational brute confined to some one climate and to some limited area of the globe, which no outward conditions can modify or improve, and a being equally adapted to the whole habitable world, with powers, however undeveloped, of comparison, of reflection, of judgment, of reason, with a sense of right and wrong,—and with all these capable of accumulated acquisition, and therefore of indefinite advance. It is not true to affirm that these characteristics stand wholly apart,—separated by an "enormous gulf"—from his physical organization. There is an adjustment between these peculiarities of mind and the special peculiarities of his frame, as nice, and as obvious to sense and reason, as there is between the ferocious disposition of a tiger and his powerful claws, or between the retractile character of these and his soft and stealthy tread. When anatomists object to erect a separate "order" for man on the plea that it is an attempt to reconcile two different orders of ideas, namely, ideas of ana-

* Lyell's *Antiquity of Man.* p. 84.

tomical structure, and ideas of mental power, they are simply refusing to place that value on anatomical differences which nature puts on them. They find no similar difficulty as regards other animals in co-ordinating anatomical structure with mental powers and instincts. The canine teeth of the carnivora stand in close and consistent relation with their dispositions. The prehensible character of the feet or tail in monkeys is a true and adequate expression of their arboreal habits; and the small and simple brains of the marsupials (kangaroos, &c.) are strictly correlated with their low intelligence. We may not—and we do not—understand how these phenomena of matter and of mind are thus dependent on each other; but as a fact we see that this dependence is universal, and the distinctions which we found on anatomical structure have their value corroborated and confirmed by close and inseparable correspondences of instinct and intelligence. Man is no exception whatever to this universal law; and any system of classification which places a value on his anatomical peculiarities, separating by an impassable gulf between his body and his mind, is a system altogether inconsistent with philosophy. The value set upon any given anatomical peculiarity, or group of peculiarities, in a sound system of classification, ought evidently to correspond as nearly as possible with the value assigned to those peculiarities in the system of nature. The significance of any anatomical feature hinges on the number and variety of other peculiarities to which it stands related. Professor Owen's argument is therefore clearly sound in principle,—that the "consequences" of any such peculiarity must be considered in estimating its systematic value. Take the case of the differences, anatomically small, which distinguish the arms of man from the arms of a monkey. "The consequences," says Professor Owen, "of the liberation of one pair of limbs from all service in station and progression, due to the extreme modification of the other pair for the exclusive discharge of those functions, are greater, and involve a superior number and quality of powers than those resulting from the change of an 'ungulate' (hoofed, one of Cuvier's sub-class divisions) into an 'unguiculate,' or claw-bearing condition of limb, and they demand therefore an equivalent value in a zoological system."

Accordingly, Professor Owen has attempted to found a system of classification on the degrees of cerebral development as being

the anatomical feature which on the whole stands in the most governing relation to other peculiarities of structure. This proposal has been vehemently contested; but the contest seems to have turned on a point not really vital to the question. Objectors do but aim at proving that all the leading divisions in the brain of man exist also in the brain of monkeys; and thus, that the difference is reduced to one of volume or quantity alone. But this difference of quantity, relative to the size of the organism, even if no other can be detected with the knife, is correlated with a whole host of other anatomical peculiarities which span the whole breadth of the chasm which yawns between the brutes and man. These peculiarities must be taken as a whole, in their assemblage, and in their actual connection. The size of brain is but the index of many other differences, all closely related to one purpose, and contributing to one result. It is no answer to this argument to say that an equal amount, or even a greater amount, of difference in mere bulk is found to exist between the lowest and the highest human brain, because the fact with which we have to deal is this, that a certain minimum quantity of that mysterious substance is constantly and uniformly associated with all the other anatomical peculiarities of man. Below that minimum the whole accompanying structure undergoes far more than a corresponding change,—even the whole change between the lowest savage and the highest ape. Above that minimum, all subsequent variations in quantity are accompanied by no changes whatever in physical structure. In placing, therefore, a high value—a value in classification of order, or even of class—upon the eleven cubic inches of brain-space which lie between the Hindu and the gorilla, when we place no such value on the sixty-eight cubic inches which lie between the Hindu and Sir Isaac Newton, we are but accepting the evidence of nature—following where she leads, and classifying according to her award.

The bearing of this conclusion on the origin of man is simply this, that in proportion as the difference between man and the lower animals is properly appreciated in the light of nature, in the same proportion will the difficulty increase of conceiving how the chasm could be passed by any process of transmutation or development.

This difficulty is still further increased if we advert for a moment to the direction in which the human frame diverges from

the structure of the brutes. It diverges in the direction of greater physical helplessness and weakness. But this is not the direction in which the blind agencies of "natural selection" could ever work. The unclothed and unprotected condition of the human body, its comparative slowness of foot, the absence of teeth adapted for prehension or for defence, the same want of power for similar purposes in the hands and fingers, the bluntness of the sense of smell, so as to render it useless for the detection of prey which is concealed,—all these are features which stand in strict and harmonious relation to the mental powers of man. But apart from these, they would place him at an immense disadvantage in the struggle for existence. This, therefore, is not the direction in which the blind forces of natural selection could ever work. The creature "not worthy to be called a man," to whom Sir J. Lubbock has referred as the progenitor of man, was *ex hypothesi*, deficient in those mental capacities which now distinguish the lowest of the human race. To exist at all, this creature must have been more animal in its structure; it must have had bodily powers and organs more like those of the beasts. The continual improvement and perfection of these would be the direction of variation most favorable to the continuance of the species. These could not be modified in the direction of greater weakness without inevitable destruction, until first by the gift of reason and of mental capacities of contrivance, there had been established an adequate preparation for the change. The loss of speed or of climbing power which is involved in the fore-arms becoming useless for locomotion, could not be incurred with safety until the brain was ready to direct a hand. The foot could not be allowed to part with its prone or prehensible character until the powers of reason and reflection had been provided to justify, as it now explains, the erect position and the upward gaze. And so through all the innumerable modifications of form which are the peculiarities of man, and which stand in indissoluble union with his capacities of thought. The lowest degree of intelligence which is now possessed by the lowest savage is not more than enough to compensate him for the weakness of his frame, or to enable him to maintain successfully the struggle for existence. With many savages it is a hard struggle, despite senses of sight and hearing trained by necessity so as almost to approach the instincts of the lower animals; despite also all those powers of rea-

soning which, however low, are yet peculiar to himself, and separate him, as is confessed, by an impassable gulf from the highest of the beasts. Many of the aborigines of Australia could do no more at times than support a precarious existence by scraping up roots, and eating snakes and other reptiles. The rotten blubber of a dead whale cast upon the beach, was, and is often, not only a luxury and a feast, but deliverance from actual starvation. Sir J. Lubbock's theory is, that in these savages we see something rather above than under the primitive condition of mankind. But it may be safely said that a very small diminution of mental capacity below that of an Australian savage, would render man's characteristic structure incompatible with the maintenance of his existence in most, if not in all of the countries where he is actually found. If that frame was once more bestial, it may have been better adapted for a bestial existence. But it is impossible to conceive how it could ever have emerged from that existence by virtue of natural selection. Man must have had human proportions of mind before he could afford to lose bestial proportions of body. If the change in mental power came simultaneously with the change in physical organization, then it was all that we can ever know or understand of a new creation. There is no ground whatever for supposing that ordinary generation has been the agency employed, because no effects similar in kind are ever produced by that agency, so far as is known to us. The theory of transmutation in all its forms, even as applied to the lower animals, is exposed to many difficulties greater than it professes to remove. But as applied to man, those difficulties are accumulated to an incalculable degree. Most of them, too, are altogether of a special kind, because the divergence which ordinary generation is supposed to have produced in the case of man is a divergence, to use Professor Huxley's words, "immeasurable—practically infinite."

It needs only to be added to this sketch, that such as man now is, man, so far as we yet know, has always been. Two skeletons at least have been found respecting which there is strong ground for believing that they belong to the very earliest human race which lived in northern Europe. I defer any reference to the probable epoch of time when these skeletons were clothed with flesh and blood. This belongs to the next division of our subject, which is the antiquity as distinguished from the origin of man.

Suffice it here to say that although one of these skeletons indicates a coarse, perhaps even what we should call—as we might fairly call some living specimens of our race—a brutal man, yet even this skeleton is in all its proportions strictly human. Its cranial capacity indicates a volume of brain, and some peculiarities of shape not materially different from many skulls of savage races now living. The other skeleton, respecting which the evidence of its extreme antiquity is the strongest, is not only perfectly human in all its proportions, but its skull has a cranial capacity not inferior to that of many modern Europeans. This most ancient of all known human skulls is so ample in its dimensions that it might have contained the brains of a philosopher. So conclusive is this evidence against any change whatever in the specific characters of man since the oldest human being yet known was born, that Professor Huxley pronounces it to be clearly indicated "that the first traces of the primordial stock whence man has proceeded need no longer be sought by those who entertain any form of the doctrine of progressive development in the newest tertiaries" (that is, in the oldest deposit yet known to contain human remains at all). "But," he adds, "they may be looked for in an epoch more distant from the age of those tertiaries than that is from us." * So far, therefore, the evidence is on the side of the originality of man as a species, nay, even as a class by himself, separated by a gulf practically immeasurable from all that the creatures are, or that are known ever to have been his contemporaries in the world. In possession of this ground, we can wait for such further evidence in favor of transmutation as may be brought to light. Meanwhile at least we are entitled to remain incredulous, remembering, as Professor Phillips has said, that "everywhere we are required by the hypothesis to look somewhere else; which may fairly be interpreted to signify that the hypothesis everywhere fails in the first and most important step. How is it conceivable that the second stage should be everywhere preserved, but the first nowhere?" †

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* Lyell, *Antiquity of Man*, p. 89.

† *Life—the Origin and Succession*, by Prof. John Phillips.

BRIEF NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

We regret that our space compels us to speak so briefly of two important works recently published. The first is LANGE's *Commentary on Genesis*,* translated by Prof. Tayler Lewis and Dr. A. Gosman. This is now the largest and on the whole the best of the modern commentaries on Genesis. The author does not hesitate to grapple with the difficult questions connected with the authorship, divine authority and interpretation of the book, and generally with more or less success. His views, however, are sometimes fanciful and extravagant, and sometimes almost if not quite unintelligible, both in the original and in the translation. In questions of pure philology he rests mainly upon the decisions of Keil and Delitzsch, and can scarcely be cited as independent authority. The introduction on the other hand is unusually complete, both in the discussion of preliminary questions and in the literary apparatus referred to. Both the style of Lange and in many cases the intensely subjective character of the ideas he endeavors to bring out, render a good translation of his commentary on Genesis a matter of more than ordinary difficulty, and we cannot therefore but congratulate the translators on their success. Prof. Lewis has made large additions to the original, but we cannot in all cases accept either his speculative views or the etymological and critical grounds adduced in their support.

With the high value, therefore, to be unquestionably assigned to this commentary, a discriminating use of it in distinction from a servile acceptance of its dicta, becomes more than ordinarily necessary.

— The eighth volume of LANGE's *Commentary on the New Testament*, embracing the epistles to the Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, Philemon and the Hebrews,† possesses in general the characteristics of the volumes already issued. They do not take the form nor do they possess the excellencies of the higher critical commentaries, like those of Meyer and Ellicott, which professed scholars prefer, but are rather adapted to the wants of the large class of educated ministers who desire the best results of exegetical labor with a fair exhibition of the grounds on which they rest, and would be repelled by critical and philological discussions. Of the several commentaries which compose the present volume, all possess substantial value, and deserve a place in every minister's library.

**Genesis, or the First Book of Moses, together with a general theological and homiletical introduction to the Old Testament*, by JOHN PETER LANGE, Professor in Ordinary of Philosophy in the University of Bonn. Translated with additions, by Prof. TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., Schenectady, N. Y., and A. GOSMAN, D. D., Lawrenceville, N. J. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868. Royal 8vo. pp. 665.

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